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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the formulation of unemployment 
policy by the Government from 1929 to 1931t the MacDonald 
administration. The study is based upon unpublished official 
records of the Government, in particular the minutes and memoranda 
of the Cabinet and Cabinet Committees, Government Departments and 
advisory bodies associated with unemployment policy. This materiel 
is supplemented by published material relating to the problem of 
unemployment and policy development; and historical, biographical 
and autobiographical accounts relating to the activities of 
Government.
Unemployment v>as high throughout the twenties and rose dramatically 
in the early thirties. The Government was pledged to solve the 
problem but had little success. The thesis concentrates upon the 
relationship between economic theory and policy, and political 
decision-making attempting to explain the failure of policy. The 
failure is associated with the adoption by the Government of 
incompatible policy objectives and administrative incapacity as 
well as the inadequacies in economic theory and policy which are 
often the focus of existing interpretations of the period.
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INTRODUCTION
Ain
The failure of unemployment policy during the period is the centrai
issue examined in this thesis» The unemployment problem dominated
the election of 1929» It was seen as the major problem by all
(1 )political parties and by propagandists of the period . All parties 
promised remedies. High unemployment persisted throughout the 
twenties: the percentage of insured workers unemployed fell below 
10% only once in the decade . Recent examinations of the 
statistical information of the period draw attention to the stability 
of gross domestic product and the existence of growth sectors in the 
economy^^ • These more optimistic aspects did little at the time to 
alleviate the gloom of the situation. The regional and industrial 
dispersion of unemployment accentuated the problem and was a matter of 
deep concern to the Labour Party whose sympathy end support lay with 
the workers in the depressed industries and regions of the country.
Yet despite the deep concern and involvement of the Government with 
the problem, unemployment policy failed to have any impact during 
the MacDonald administration 1929-31»
(1) F.W.S. Craig, British General Election Manifestos, 1918-74-. 
London, 1975. New Statesman, The Economist, The Times, Dally 
Herald, March-June 1929»
(2) The British Economy. Key Statistics. 1900-1970« London and 
Cambridge Economic Service, Times Newspapers, London 1973«
(3) Derek ti. Aidcroft, The Inter-War Economy: Britain 1919-39, 
Batsford, London. 1970; B»W. Richardson, 'The Economic
, Significance of the Depression in Britain'. Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. *f. 1969.
3Why did the MacDonald administration of committed and sympathetic men 
and women fail to get to grips with the problem of unemployment? An 
attempt will be made to answer this question from an analysis of the 
policies proposed and implemented during these years.
This thesis examines 'the development of unemployment policy during the 
MacDonald administration. An attempt will be made to establish:-
a) the policy options considered by the politicians and their 
economic advisors;
b) how the development of economic theory affected the choice 
of policy options;
c) the factors influencing the choice and implementation of 
the policies;
d) the reasons for policy failure.
By concentrating upon the interaction between economic policy and 
political decision making, which is probably as important as economic 
theory in influencing the success of economic policies, this thesis 
provides a different perspective of policy failure from that given in 
the existing literature. The objective is not to accuse or excuse 
the Government for the management of unemployment policy but to 
attempt to unravel the reasons for the lack of success. These reasons 
appear to be much more complex than a generation of economists, bred 
in the ♦Kevnes v Classics* debate, have been led to believe^.
(1) Keynesian: is used to describe the economic model, as it
subsequently became known in the literature: the model which was 
derived from the ’General Theory* but which lost many important 
attributes in the formalization. In this model the real and 
money parts of the system are related and rigidities in the money 
market as well as the labour market can, in the absence of a 
powerful real balance effect, cause unemployment. The policy 
predictions tend to suggest direct government intervention to 
remove unemployment during a depression when it is thought 
monetary policy is likely to be ineffective. It stands in 
juxtaposition in the literature to the equally formalized
tSources
The examination of the unemployment policy is based primarily upon the 
official records of the Government which are now available in the 
Public Record» Office. These records contain the minutes and memo­
randa of the Cabinet and Cabinet Committees; Government Departments 
and advisory bodies associated with policy making» This material 
has not been used to explain the failure of unemployment policy 
although extensive documentation of the problem from other sources 
already exists.
The work of Skidelsky, based on the original papers, autobiographies
and biographies of the politicians and public figures of the period,
considers the same problem^ \  Skidelsky did not have access to the
official records of the Government which became available after his
study was completed. These documents clarify many issues and offer
a different perspective of the events of the period. Winch also
considers the period within the framework of a stxidy of economic 
( 2^policy '. Winch's work relates the policy issues to the development
'Classical' model in which real and monetary sectors are 
separated and in which unemployment exists because of rigidities 
in the labour market.
(1 ) R. Skidelsky, Politicians and the Slump: The Labour Government 
1929-31. Macmillan, London 1967«
(2; D. Winch, Economics and Policy. A historical study. Hodder 
and Stoughton, London, 1969.
I
Jof economic theory hut does not make use of official government
records. McKibbon^ surveys the policy issues of the period
reconsidering Government policy achievements; and attempting to
explain policy failure in terms of the Government’s inability to
(2)assume control of the economy - a view supported by Taylor .
Other studies do make use of the official material and are complementary
to this study: Howson's study of monetary management in Britain in
the inter-war period^; Boyce concentrates upon international trade
(4)policy ; Janeway surveys economic policy generally paying special
(5)attention to the departmental papers j Drummond considers Imperial 
aspects of Britain's economic policy^^. During the final prepara­
tion of this thesis, Howson and Winch made available some of the 
documents referred to in the thesis (i.e. the Deport of the Economic 
Outlook and the Economists^Report) in their review of the work of the
(1) R. McKibbon, 'The Second Labour Government 1929-51'• Past and 
Present. 1975.
(2) A.J.P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945. Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1965.
(3) S. Eowson, Domestic Monetary Management in Britain, 1919-38. 
Cambridge University ¿'ress, 1975»
(.4) R. Boyce, Search for Recovery; unpublished Ph.D., London 
University, 1975.
(5) W.H. Janeway, The Economic Policy of the Second Labour 
Government 1929-31. unpublished Ph.D. Cambridge University,
1971.
(6) I.M. Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy, 1917-39.
Unwin, London, 1974.
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Allen and
6Economic Advisory Council/^. These studies will be referred to in 
the text if they illuminate or conflict with the interpretation of 
unemployment policy offered.
( p)Relevant statistical material is to be found in the work of Feinstein 
Brown and Browne^} Maizels^; and the official statistical 
publications of the Government Departments.
Thomas has estimated a macro-economic model which includes simulation
(5)studies of policy proposals . This fills a considerable gap in 
the analysis of unemployment policy and challenges the view that 
public works could have substantially reduced unemployment.
Economic historians have contributed much to the understanding of the 
inter-war years. The work of Aldcroft^^; Richardson^^; Youngson^^J
(1) S. Eowson and D. Winch, The Economic Advisory Council 1930-38. 
Cambridge University Press, 1977.
(2) C. H. Feinstein, Domestic Capital Formation in the Ü.K. 1920-38. 
Cambridge University Press, 1965. National Income Expenditure ~ 
and Output of the U.K., 1855-1965« Cambridge University Press, 
1972.
(3) E.H. Phelps Brown and Margaret Browne, A Century of Pay. 
Macmillan,London, 1968.
(40 A. Maizels, Industrial Growth and World Trade. Cambridge 
University Press, 1963.
(5) T.J. Thomas, Aspects of U.K. Macro-economic Policy during the 
Inter-war Period. Unpublished Ph.D., Cambridge University, 1975»
(6) D.H. Aldcroft, (1970) op. cit.
(7) H.W. Richardson, (1969) op. cit.
(8) A.J. Youngson, Britains Economic Growth 1920-1960. Allen and 
Unwin, London, ISobé
7K, Hancock^^j D. W i l l i a m s p r o v i d e  an interpretive background to 
the study.
The biographical and autobiographical accounts of the period were 
invaluable sources providing a wealth of information about events and
i
personalities.
The Problem
The problem facing the Labour administration was one of international
maladjustment. The maladjustment had arisen during the war-time
dislocation of trade when new trading patterns emerged as countries
developed self-supporting industries and technological changes
brought large economies in the use of fuels. New competition,
especially from Japan, made in-roads into the textile market. These
C3)changes caused Britain’s share in world trade to fall sharply . The 
return to gold at the pre-war parity intensified the problem and is 
thought by some economists to be one of the biggest mistakes in
(1) K.J. Hancock, 'The Reduction of Unemployment as a problem of 
Public Policy, 1920-29'. Economic History Review, 1962-63.
(2) D. Williams, 'London and the 1931 Financial Crisis' Economic
History Review, 1963» — — — —
' (3) See Chapters One and Two below, pp. 33-190.
8British policy of the century
Associated with this maladjustment were the high levels of unemploy­
ment. Unemployment had fallen below 1.0% only once (1927» 9*7%) in 
the decade and the problem was intensified by the industrial and 
regional distribution of the unemployed. The problems were acute in 
the heavy industries which had lost export markets and these industries 
were concentrated geographically causing regional imbalances.
There has been extensive debates about the nature of the unemployment 
problem: was it structural or cyclical? Structural unemployment can 
be defined as that form of unemployment which is specific to a certain 
industry or trade and the result of exogenous technological or market 
changes. It exhibits the 'mis-match* problem, i.e. it persists in 
spite of vacancies being available elsewhere. On the other hand, 
cyclical unemployment is likely to affect all industries to some, 
but by no means equal, extent; it is likely to be responsive to 
changes in aggregate demand and is readily absorbed during the upturn. 
The technological and geographical specific attributes of the labour 
force which is associated with structural unemployment is also likely
(1 ) L. Bobbins, personal Communication. 1976. L. Bobbins,
Political Economy Past and Present, Macmillan, London 1976.
H.6. Johnson, 'Keynes and British Economists' in Milo Keynes, 
Ed., Essays on John Maynard Keynes, Cambridge University Press 
1975» Johnson distinguishes two aspects of the maladjustment 
problem: (a) the problem of the late twenties which required a 
devaluation by one country, Britain, to align its domestic 
price level with world market prices; (b) the problem of the 
thirties which required a devaluation of all currencies against 
gold as a means of increasing world liquidity.
9to respond to changes in demand and so definitions which attempt to 
distinguish the types of unemployment according to this criteria 
involve difficulties if estimation is attempted^^.
It would appear that both types of unemployment persisted throughout 
the period but that the cyclical component became more important from 
the Winter of 1930» tor our purposes it is what the politicians 
believed to be the problem that is of prime importance. Policy 
choices depended upon the form which unemployment was thought to take 
by the administration. The effect of the policy might well have been 
different from that intended.
Policies to reduce unemployment could only be successful if they 
dealt with the problem of international adjustment adequately. There 
are many interesting aspects of the process of international adjust­
ment during this period and the failure of automatic feedbacks in the
(2 )international economy to work . The problem of international mal­
adjustment called for international co-operation and expert economic 
management for which there was neither the inclination nor the 
expertise.
(1 ) For attempts to determine criteria for estimating 'structural' 
and 'cyclical' components of unemployment, R.J. Dixon and
A.P.Thirlwall, Regional Growth and Unemployment in the United 
Kingdom, London, 1975»
(2) C.F. Kindleberger, The World in Depression 1929-59. Allan Lane, 
Penguin Press, London, 1973.
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Policy Options
The policy options available to the Government and which were discussed 
during the period were of two types: those associated with a reduction 
in the supply price of the domestic product; and those concerned with 
attempts to change internal demand. Policies associated with a 
reduction in the supply price of the domestic product attempted to 
change the relationship between home produced and foreign produced 
goods so as to lower the relative prices in favour of domestic goods. 
These policies are derived from the ♦classical' model of the economy.
To be effective such policies must first of all have an impact, over 
a fairly short period of time, on internal prices. This could be 
achieved by changing the external rates directly^; by increasing 
efficiency; by changing the character at the production function or 
by reducing the cost of the factors of production - which usually 
implied a reduction in wages. If such a reduction in costs was 
possible, then the success of the policy depended upon the responsive­
ness of the demand to changes in relative prices, i.e. the elasticity 
of.the demand for imports and exports in respect to price. Thus in 
considering the potentials of such a policy, one must look for the 
possibility of a reduction in prices; the likely response to the 
changes in price; and the time scale over which the policy could be 
expected to achieve its impact. In addition, the compatibility of 
the policy with other policy objectives has to be considered, e.g. the 
stability of society and the distribution of incomes. (l)
(l) Some economists see this as the central policy and all other
policies as an attempt to achieve the same results as exchange 
rate readjustment and, so to an extent, avoiding the main issue.
H.G. Johnson in w. Keynes, 11975) op. cit.
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The alternative set of policies attempt to absorb the excess labour 
force by trying to raise the internal demand, either by monetary,
fiscal^1  ^ or direct intervention by the Government. The choice amongst 
these policies would depend upon the theoretical structure assumed.
Internal demand could be raised by increasing domestic investment 
either by reducing interest rates or by direct intervention in the 
form of public works; by expansionary monetary or budgeting policy; 
or by a reduction in leakages from the system in the form of protection 
or a reduction in foreign investment by the introduction of exchange 
contrôle. The success of these policies depended, in the first place, 
upon the ability of the Government to affect the necessary changes in 
internal demand, in a relatively short period of time, v/ithout contra­
vening other policy objectives: exchange stability, budgeting 
balance, parliamentary democracy and equity norms. Success also 
depended upon the responsiveness of the economy to the changes which 
were achieved.
There was also the possibility that international co-operation on 
international monetary matters might contribute to pulling the world 
economies out of the depression. This policy is referred to by 
H.G. Johnson as the solution to the maladjustment problem of the 
thirties^. It was probably just as relevant to the late twenties. 12
(1) Fiscal policies were not used to stabilize the economy until later 
when the theory of direct government intervention in the form of 
public works, a cumbersome policy subject to excessive time lags, 
was supplanted by the more sophisticated control of government 
expenditure generally. See Robbins (1976) op. cit.. p.9o. The 
Conservative administration had, in the late twenties, attempted 
to reduce the tax burden on industries but this was within the 
context of the balanced budget and not connected with attempts 
at expansionary financing.
(2) See H.G. Johnson in M. Keynes ed. (1975) op. cit.
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Political factors proved too difficult for an individual government to 
have much impact in this direction and in spite of Eretton Woods, the 
International Monetary Fund, the Group of Ten and the like, it 
remains a central policy issue unresolved.
Other strategies involved the redefining of the problem of unemployment 
in the labour market. These took the form of redistributing the 
excess supply amongst the age groups and then removing it by some other 
desirable social policy, such as raising the school leaving age or 
lowering the retirement age. This policy had the effect of reducing 
the proportion of the population available for work, i.e. reducing 
the activity rates. There were also policies to reduce the excess 
supply of labour by creating incentives and facilities for migration 
internally and e x t e r n a l l y . These policies implied that much of 
the unemployment was structural in nature.
There was thus a wide range of policies which could have had an effect
on the economy and on unemployment. All policies had something to
offer in terms of reducing unemployment. They were not mutually
exclusive. The problem was to choose the appropriate policy to
(2)achieve the various goals of society . Policy strategy could have 12
(1 ) I. Drummond, (197^) ot>. cit. : British Economic Policy and the 
Empire 1919-59« George Allan and Unwin, London 1972. Drummond 
discusses the progress and problems of migration during the 
inter-war years.
(2) Forty-five years later a committee has been set up using optimal 
control techniques to identify the best macro-economic policy 
by comparing the community's preferences for different economic 
targets such as inflation and unemployment. Hansard, June 1976.
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been arranged to allow 1 trade-offs1 amongst the various policies. 
Policies which affect unemployment have different effects on real 
wages and Keynes suggested to the Economists' Committee^^ that those 
having least effect on real wages and most effect on unemployment 
should be chosen.
There were two aspects of the unemployment problem which -gave cause 
for concern. One was social distress which was all too apparent and 
the accompanying fear, felt by some parties, of the possible upheaval 
of society. The other was the vast waste of resources of the economy 
resulting from the enforced idleness of large portions of the work­
force. The policy measures designed to solve the unemployment problem 
had two related, but in the short term, separate objectives: the 
removal of unemployment and the alleviation of social distress. The 
Government had little success in meeting either of these objectives.
Reasons for Policy Failure -
By far the greatest obstacle to effective policy formulation was 
associated with the prevailing economic dogma of the period which 
affected all parties. Because of their adherence to certain economic 
philosophies, political parties imposed upon themselves constraints 
which were bound to result in failure of the unemployment policy. The 
constraints which were most damaging to the possibility of an accept­
able measure of success in dealing with the unemployment problem were:-
(1) The Economists' Committee was a sub-committee of the Economic 
Advisory Committee set up by MacDonald in 1930 to advise on 
policy. See Chapter Four, pp. 282-289.
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a) the rigid acceptance of the gold standard maintained at the 
pre-war parity;
b) the doctrinnaire adherence to the policy of free trade; /
c) the puritanical belief in the doctrine of balanced budgets»
The Labour Party were further handicapped by their views on wages and
profits - refusing to consider any policies which might reduce the
former or raise the latter. They were committed to a redistribution
policy and whilst it could not be operated positively in this period,
they defended the existing position as far as they were able. The
General Strike was still a very recent event and to embark upon a
policy of wage cuts or even to suggest wage cuts was more them, any
«
administration in 1929 was willing to contemplate.
Added to the equity arguments and fears of unrest there was a general
uneasiness about the possible repercussions of.reductions in incomes
upon the level of activity which the under-consumptionists' theories
suggested. These writers highlighted the »purchasing power* as of
crucial significance to the level of activity in the economy and
although they did not have a fully developed model of the aggregate
inter-relationships in the economy their propositions were
sufficiently in accordance with a common sense approach to the problems
of the economy to raise doubts about the remedies which relied upon
(1)deflationary policies to restore equilibrium . 1
(1 ) The prominent under-consumptionists of the period were, J.A. Hobson, 
. see e.g. The Economics of Unemployment, Macmillan, jjondon 1923» 
who linked his concepts to income distribution; W.T. Foster and 
W. Catchings, Business without a Buyer. Houghton Muffin Boston, 
iy27 who based their argument on the dilemma of thrift seeing 
savings as providing via a growing stock of capital, further 
pof mtial production which would not be purchased unless all 
profits were distributed and all incomes spent on consumption;
.Major Douglas, see Credit-Power and Democracy, Palmer, London,
1920, was the great polemist in the debate advocating social 
credit, for discussions of the relevance of these theories to 
The Keynesian model, see L.R. Klein, The Keynesian Revolution, 
Macmillan, London 1950,
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Other obstacles to the successful implementation of policy were
associated with the inadequacies of economic theory. There was little
confidence in the policy suggested by either the classical economic
model or the developing Keynesian economic model. On the one hand,
it was feared that policies which attempted to reduce the supply
price could have adverse effects on unemployment because of the likely
effects of the reduction of incomes on demand, especially consumption,
and on the other hand, it was feared that any attempts to raise
internal demai^P would have an adverse effect on prices and so fail to
make an impact on the problem. These major problems arose in
connection with the debate about the validity of "Say’s Law" and
attitudes which became embodied in the'Treasury Vie wflj as to the
possibility of the Government being able to raise real aggregate
(2)demand . .
(1) Say's Law asserts that supply creates its own demand. According 
to the 'Treasury View'T which is derived from Say's Law, 
Government expenditure however financed cannot raise aggregate 
demand and is merely diversionary. See T. Stowell, Say's Law. 
Princeton University Press, 1972.
(2) This debate is well developed in the literature in terms of
'Keynes v the Classics'. It grew up out of the formalization and 
interpretation of the 'General Theory1 2.. The discussions on the 
subject are to be found in, J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of 
Employment. Interest and Money. Macmillan 1936; G» Haberler, 
Prosperity and Depression. League of Nations 19^1; J.R. Hicks,
"Mr Keynes and the 'Classics' " Econometrics, 1937; L.R. Klein,
The Keynesian Revolution. Macmillan 19^7» 0. Lange, Prices, 
Flexibility and Employment. Principia Press, 19^. F. Modigliani, 
"Liquidity Preference and the Theory of Interest and Money" 
Econometrics 195**-; A.C. Pigou, Employment and Equilibrium. 
Macmillan 19^1. The debate is now summarised in most modern 
macro-economic textbooks. For later discussion, see, D. Patinkin, 
Money, Interest. Prices, 2nd ed. Harper Row, New lork 1965.
J.E. Hicks, Critical Essays in Monetary Theory. Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1972; H.G. Johnson, 'The General Theory After Twenty Five 
Tears', American Economic Review 1961 and, "The Keynesian 
Revolution and the Monetarist Counter Revolution", American 
Economic Review. 1971; U. Winch 11969), op. cit.
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The explanation of policy failure in terms of the development of 
economic thought is extremely attractive to economists. The idea of 
two powerful economic models competing for dominance and leaving a 
policy vacuum and economic chaos is a colourful interpretation of 
events which many economists have found difficult to relinquish.
Keynes v Classics
In the optimistic atmosphere of the post-Keynesian era, it was easy 
to attribute the lack of success of the British Government in the 
depression to their failure to adopt 'Keynesian* or Radical' 
economic policies by which is meant some measure of reflation, usually 
in the form of an increase in domestic investment, crudely dubbed 
'Keynesian'. but often protection, cheap money and the abandonment of 
the gold standard were added. The literature abounds with examples of 
this approach for instance, Winch, when discussing Mosley's proposals,
"It offered a chance to deal with unemployment on a scale and 
along the only lines likely to have any impact on the problem"(3 )
or Skideleky,
"The real story of domestic policies of the inter-war period is 
the defeat of the economic radicals by the economic 
conservatives". (*»■)
(1) 'Keynesian1 2« see above page 1.
(2) 'Radical» economic policies referred to a number of different 
policies involving intervention usually to expand the economy.
They included monetary policy, consumer credit, public works pro­
grammes and protection. They were advocated by members from all 
parties, usually those inclined, towards 'radical' or 'scientific'
. planning solutions. See Chapter 1.
13) Donald Winch (1 9 6 9 ) op. cit.
(.k) Robert Skidelsky (1967) op. cit. p.ll.
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or Robbins,
"I opposed means of reflation which I now think might have eased 
the situation".(1 )
Or Kindleberger,
"The failure of economic policy is relatively easy. Throughout 
the chronological account of the depression which follows we 
shall cite instance after instance of what, with hindsight, 
appears as economic illiteracy ... There were many economists 
and a few public figures ..... who had domestic remedies which 
made sense in modern terms".(2)
A detailed examination of the documents relating to policy formulation 
indicates the need to re-examine this conventional, unicausal explana­
tion for failures in policy. Although much energy has been directed 
to attributing policy failure to the failure to adopt these strategies 
little attention has been given to the factors determining the choice 
of policy during the period. In his discussion of economic policy, 
Winch refers to the importance of considering the context in which 
policies are made which he says are such that even if advice from 
economists were Unanimous and relevant1 it might not be adopted. Ee 
continues:
"In the light of these difficulties it might be said that even 
to pose the existence of a relationship between thought and 
policy entails both an over optimistic conception of the techno­
cratic status of economics and a naive view of the process of 
political decision-making"(3)
(l) Lionel Robbins: House of Lords, official Report 28 July 1966.
Robbins' statement refers to the latter period when the Rational 
Government was in office and he along with other economists wrote 
' condemning the growth of public expenditure. Personal 
Communication.
(2) Kindleberger (1973), op. cit
(3) Winch tl969) op. cit.
18
In spite of hie awareness of the problem, even Winch's scholarly 
analysis of the period is very much in the technocratic style of 
which he warns us; e.g. he searches for Classicial and Keynesian 
models. The other study of the period which concentrates on the 
formulation and application of policy is that of Skidelsky^ who again 
uses the conflict model as an explanation for policy failure, referring-tc*.
the 'defeat of the economic radicals by the economic conservatives*•
In connection with this explanation for the failure of policy we cam 
consider how far we are justified in attributing failure to the 
Government when the policy measures were themselves largely undeveloped?
The usual reply to this is that there was sufficient specification of 
the radical policy by politicians and economists to justify government 
action« ■ This might be so, but how sound did the ideas appear to the 
decision-makers? Would they have been justified in accepting the 
various cranky views considering the plight in which they found them­
selves, except perhaps as part of an iterative policy procedure such 
as that used by Roosevelt? One needs to evaluate the advice given and 
to consider whether in prevailing circumstances it was sound enough 
to be used with confidence as a basis of policy.
It is clear that the difference amongst economists were not as deep
during this period as we have been led to believe; often by writers
(2)considering a longer time span . This is the period during which 
the academic economists were assimulating Robertson's^ work,
(1 ) Skidelsky, (1967) op. cit. p.ll.
(2) See Winch, (1969) op. cit. on the debate between London and 
Cambridge.
(3) D.H. Robertson. Banking Policy and the Price Level. (1926).
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Banking Policy and the Price Level« The central issue of the relation­
ship between the real and money sectors was a matter for debate and 
not dogma. Even at the London School of Economics, which is 
castigated as a force of reaction, academics were demonstrating 
considerable open-mindedness and were searching for new developments^^.
This aspect of the academic climate can be seen from the inaugural
(2)lectures of Allyn Young and Lionel Robbins . Young refers to the 
oppressive sense of inadequacy of his knowledge, in the light of the 
questions being asked of economists, and Robbins refers to gaps in 
existing knowledge:
•'such as the relationship between savings discount rates and 
prices in a modern credit economy. Here is a field in which apart 
from isolated efforts by Wicksell and one or two others, little 
or nothing was being done before the war. The theory of money 
and the theory of savings were kept in watertight compartments.
Yet no one, I think, can examine the path-breaking work of
D.H. Robertson in this country without the conviction that 
perhaps here, in the future are to be forged some of the most 
powerful instruments of policy. Again, we may notice the surpris­
ing gap which exists between the theories of fluctuations. I 
know no work of any importance in which any attempt is made to
(1) D. Winch (1969; op. cit. This matter appears to be overstated by 
Winch who is dealing with a longer period, winch, refers to 
Robbins 'f book on methodology which he sees as indicating a 
different approach from the interventionism of Keynes. L. Robbins, 
The Nature and Significance of Economic Science, Macmillan I932.
The break for Robbins came with the publicity of the Times letter 
advocating expenditure cuts after devaluation, The Times. Oct.
1932. Robbins, who recalls this episode with regret, had begun
to revise his views by 1937 when evidence from U.S.A. became 
available being convinced that the deficiency of demand had 
completely overtaken structural rigidities as a cause of the 
problem. He now agrees with Metty (Sir William Petty, Treatise 
of Taxes and Contributions, 1662) that in the depths of depres­
sion any government expenditure would be expansionary. Personal 
Communication 1976. See also L. Robbins, Political Economy Past 
and Present ; Macmillan, 1976.
(2) Allyn Young, English Political Economy; Inaugural Lecture, Oct. 
1927. Economica, March 192b.
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correlate the theory of the short period price equilibrium with 
the theory of periodic fluctuations. Yet surely this is a 
problem of quite first class importance"(l).
The fact that many academic economists were opposed to the Treasury 
View is mentioned in the debate on the Liberal Party policies^.
Pigou is specifically quoted as denying the rigid doctrine which was 
emerging from the Treasury and had held the view as early as 1913 
when he published his first book on Unemployment^^.
This is not meant to imply that differences did not exist within the 
academic fraternity, but that the polarization was not as acute during 
this period, as popular mythology would suggest.
Would radical policies have worked?
How far would "radical" policies have been capable of solving the 
British problem of unemployment? Even with the benefit of hindsight, 
it is difficult to answer this question. The current acute problems 
of international maladjustment leave us less confident about accepting 
the view that radical policies could have cured unemployment.
We need to examine the matter much more deeply before dismissing 
MacDonald and his colleagues as ♦economic illiterates1. It seems
(1) L, Robbins *The Present Position of Economic Science*, 
Economica March 1930*
(2) J.M. Keynes and H.D. Henderson *Can Lloyd George Do It*.
• London, 1929»
(3) A.C. Pigou, Unemployment, London 1913» See Winch (19©)
op, cit. for discussion of Pigou's position. See J.M. Keynes, 
'The General Theory of Employment♦. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. 1937» in which he replies to criticisms of the 
General Theory.
likely that some improvement in unemployment could have been obtained
by the adoption of a mixture of the radical policies. But the
quantitative changes are difficult to assess. Apart from the lack.of
quantitative evidence, there are areas in the theoretical macro-model
which are still relatively undeveloped: as recent debates on inflation
and employment theory^^ indicate, in which it is difficult to make
predictions to test the effects of the policy. The whole dynamic
underpinnings of the model are not well specified, as is indicated in
the monetarist debates. Nor are the relationships between the various
sectors of the economy and between countries fully understood. It is
often assumed that countries are in competitive relationships one with
another but in fact the predominant patterns were monopolistic or
oligopolistic. The effects of the economic policies of powerful
countries in determining the level of world activity is not well
understood but crucial to past and present difficulties. Britain in
the thirties was in a rather awkward relationship with the rest of the
world being highly sensitive to changes in the world economy; too
dependent to he fully insulated ;and not powerful enough to make
significant impact on international economic affairs alone. In spite
of these problems it would be interesting to see some simulation studies
of the period undertaken which estimate the likely effects of different
policy measures given a number of different assumptions. The models
(2)used would need to be highly complex. The work of Thomas in this 
field fills a great gap. His estimated model suggests that the values 
of the multiplier and the price elasticities of imports and exports
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(1) See for example, E. Phelps, et. al. Micro-economic Foundations
of Employment and Inflation Theory. Macmillan, London l$'/0; ~
H. Grossman, 'A general disequilibrium model of income and employ­
ment*. American Economic Review, 1971»
(2) Thomas, (1975) op. cit.
vere lees than has been generally assumed and this throws great doubt 
upon the impact of the public works programme and devaluation upon 
unemployment. The model used does not take into account the 
structural changes in confidence and expectation which might have 
accompanied such policies;and no doubt others will attempt different 
specifications of the model which will throw light upon the robustness 
of the model as estimated.
\ '
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In addition the lack of the multiplier concept made it impossible to 
estimate or set a limit to the effects of changes in investment or 
exports on income and employment and without this possibility of 
quantification, the policy lacked credence^^.
Weakness of Economic Theory
International implications of these problems were not fully developed
(2)until much later . Inadequacies in the theory of international
(1) R.F. Kahn "The Relationship of Home Investment to Unemployment"
Economic Journal, 1931. For discussion of the development of the 
multiplier concept see A. Llewellyn Wright, "The Genesis of the 
Multiplier" Oxford Economic Papers New Series, 1956; and,G.L.S.Shacks 
The Years of High Theory; Cambridge University Press, 196?. ^
(2) The extension of the debate to an open trading economy had to 
await the development of the import multiplier approach suggested 
by Keynes and developed in F. Machlup International Trade and the 
National Income Multiplier, Blakiston, Philadelphia, 1943;
L.A. Metzler, "Underemployment Equilibrium in International 
Trade" Econometrica 19^2; A.L. Harberger, "Currency Depreciation,
Income and the Balance of Trade*, Journal of Political Economy.
1950; S. Laursen and li.A. Metzler, 'Flexible Exchange Rates and 
the Theory of Employment' Review of Economics and Statistics,
• 1950{WJfito.lper, "The Multiplier, Flexible Exchange Rates and 
International Equilibrium" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1950.
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trade in particular the interrelationship between income and price
effects^1 ;^ the effects of changes in productivity on incomes, prices
( ? )and the balance of trade ; the lack of the theory of the 'second . 
best1 ; or any concept of the optimum tariff^^; and the effects of
retaliation^^| or the effects on factor prices^\ were important 
deficiencies preventing economic theory from clarifying matters of 
international trade.
In addition, the evaluation system for public utility services was
based upon private returns to the companies. Concepts of wider
social benefits of the kind which would now be included in an
(7)ordinary cost-benefit analysis were lacking , although elaborate
(l; Harberger (1950; op. cit. and Stop^/er (1950) op. cit.
(2) H.G. Johnson "Increasing Productivity Income-Price Trends and the 
Trade Balance" Economic Journal. 195^•
(3) This concept is discussed by J.E. Meade in Trade and Welfare, 
Oxford University Press 1955, whose ideas were generalised by
R. G.B. Lipsey and K. Lancaster, "The General Theory of the 
Second Best" Review of Economic Studies 1956/7. J. Viner,
The Customs Union Issue. Hew York 1950.
(k) T. Scitovsky, "Reconsideration of the theory of tariffs" Review 
of Economic Studies 19^1/2; J. de Graaf "On Optimum Tariff 
Structures" Review of Economic Studies 19^9/50. N; Kaldor, "A 
note on Tariffs and the Terms of Trade, Economica N.S. 19**0.
(5) H.G. Johnson "Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation" Review of 
Economic Studies. 1953/^5 and International Trade and Economic 
Growth, Allen and Unwin, 1958.
S. A. Ozga, "An Essay in the theory of Tariffs" Journal of 
Political Economy, 1955*
(6) W.Ffitd&ller and P. Samuelson, ^ Protection and Real Wages*,
American Economic Review Readings No. 15. L.k. Metzler,
' "Tariffs, the Terms of Trade and the Distribution of National 
Income". Journal of Political Economy, 19^9.
(7 ) A.C. Pigou, Wealth and Welfare. London 1912. The concepts had 
been discussed but were not used.
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cost-effectiveness studies were constructed on the Channel Tunnel; 
the Scottish bridges and the Inner London Roadway^^.
As far as a quantification was concerned, the statistical information
available, the specification of the model, and the appropriate
techniques, were insufficient to enable tests to be made of the various
hypotheses. There was often disagreement about the extent of the
effects of changes in the key variables, such as wages or trade and
(2 )the estimates were in many cases not much more than guesses . There
was no information about the time scale and, of course, no estimation
(3)of the likely time lags in the system . The advantages of concepts 
of economic policy making as formulated by Tinbergen, to the dilemma 
of policy making in the 1930s, is obvious.
(1 ) Studies such as those undertaken in recent years for railways and 
roads would have been useful. T.M. Coburn, M.E. Beesley,
D.J. Reynolds, London-Birmingham Motorway; Traffic and Economics. 
Road Research Laboratory Technical Paper No. 46. HMSO i960.
C.D. Foster and M.E. Beesley, 'Estimating the Social Benefits of 
Constructing an Underground Railway in London'. Journal of 
Royal Statistical Society. Series A. Vol. 126, Part I. 1963.
(2) K. Hancock. »Unemployment and the Economists in the 1920s". 
Economica 1V6u .
Hancock disagrees with this view citing the setting up of the 
London and Cambridge Economic Service and several quantitative 
articles. There is a difference between the amassing of 
statistical evidence, necessary as this is, and setting up and 
testing functional relationships in the economy and estimating 
the size of the various coefficients. The former statistical 
work is interesting and often illuminating but it is not 
sufficient to discriminate between the finer points of economic 
theories. But on this point it is interesting to recall Keynes' 
argument with Tinbergen about econometrics, see Economic Journal, 
1938.
(3) J. Tinbergen, Economic Policy Principles and Design. 1956.
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Decision Taking
The administrative system was not very effective in providing speedy 
action. Too many departments at too many levels were involved in 
implementing policy. The existing channels for international co­
operation were not exploited fully^. in international trade policy,
international or empire policies were preferred to regional blocks
(2)which might well have been advantageous • The bargaining strength 
of Britain, as a= substantial importer was not exploited during this 
period; indeed the stance was defensive^ leading to over-estimation of th® 
retaliatory potential of other countries. Drummond explains this 
failure by the fact that the acceptance of free-trade meant that there 
was nothing to o f f e r ^ .  This appears to be a naive stance from 
which to enter negotiations.
Added to these problems there were also failures in imagination in 
the formulation of policy; failures to make choices or to consider 
policy trade-offs; lack of confidence and expertise; and an acute 
failure in decision taking which possibly reflects the weakness of 
consensus decision-taking in Cabinet and devolution of power to 
smaller authorities. There was a complete lack of the facilitating 
ability which is found in great administrations.
Effect on Policy
These difficulties are examined in detail in the narrative chapters
(1) See Chapter 2, p.112 and Chapter 5t P.3Ô0.
(2) Boyce (1975J op. cit.
(3) Drummond (197^) op. cit.
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which follow, but it might be useful here to indicate the ways in 
which the development of some policies which would appear a priori 
to have been capable of reducing unemployment were affected by the 
problems outlined above. Let us consider budgetary policy, 
protective policy and public works.
Balancing the Budget
The use of the balance of the budget as an instrument for policy was 
precluded for all parties- by their belief that sound finance depended 
upon a balanced budget. Modern analysis indicates that expansion 
can take place, with a balanced budget. This is the essence of the 
well-known balanced budget theorem^^. The choice between deficit 
financing and a balanced budget is a very complex issue but by regard­
ing budgetary balance as a policy objective rather than a policy 
instrument, the Government denied themselves the use of a very power­
ful tool and also impeded the progress of other aspects of their 
policy. Throughout the two years which are the focus of this study, 
the balancing of the budget was a dominant factor influencing the 
progress of the Government's actions. Yet by adopting a more flexible 
attitude towards budgetary management, the dual objectives of the 
unemployment policy*“ the reduction of unemployment and the alleviation 
of distress - could have been achieved in the early days without 
unduly jeopardising the position of sterling. The distinctions 
between capital and revenue items in the budget were largely 
arbitrary as were the annual accounts procedures and yet they were
(l) Origins of Balanced Budget, Multiplier Theorem. History of 
Political Economy. Vol. 7» No. 1., 1975*
regarded as sacrosanct . In spite of the great potential of this
instrument, the concept of the balanced budget as a policy objective \i
emerged unscathed from the economic crisis and was explicitly stated 
as an objective by all parties in the Manifestos issued before the \ 
1931 election and was not used as part of government strategy until ; 
the forties. Even the 1 9 ^  White Paper on Employment did not :
advocate an unbalanced budget merely suggesting contra-cyclical invest- ■ 
ment programmes and compensatory adjustments to national insurance !
contributions. A more taxonomic approach to compensatory finance was 
provided by Beveridge's Full Employment in a Free Society^ ^ .  The 
budget was seen to be the main instrument of full employment policy 
and the use of the budget, balanced and unbalanced, as a compensatory 
instrument was explored. This information was not available during 
MacDonald's administration and it would be otiose to have expected them 
to have broken through this policy barrier until the issues had been 
made clear. Fiscal policies were developed in the context of the 
managed economy of war-time when Keynes's ideas as set out in the 
General Theory were generally accepted. This was quite a different 
atmosphere from the one in which MacDonald's administration was working.
\ S
(1)
(1) Ursula K. Hicks, British Public Finances 1880-1952, London 1959 
Chapter V. See Robbins ¿1976) on. cit. on the gradual erosion 
of some of these attitudes, pp. 90.
(2) IWS Craig, (1975 ) o p. cit. In spite of avowals of budgetary 
orthodoxy, a modest deficit was allowed to develop ini929/ 3 1 *
(3) Cmd. 6527
(*0 W. H. Beveridge (19^0 Full Employment in a Free Society. Allen
and Unwin, London. Nicholas Kaldor and Joan Robinson were amongst 
the economists contributing to the Beveridge Report. See also 
Winch (1969) op. cit. pp. 269/ 277*
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Debt management was a further constraint upon budgetary policy during ,
the period. Paying off the war debt was regarded as a patriotic
measure and to this end large payments were made each year to the
sinking fund. The payments to the sinking.fund were contractual
payments and the decision taken in 1923 by Baldwin - to ensure the
redemption of the national debt in 150 years - to make the payment a
fixed charge of £50m per year increased the rigidity. Nieneyer had
specifically opposed 'elasticity' with respect to the sinking fund
payments as he considered that'would mean that decisions with regard
to payments would be made on 'political grounds'. The situation was
made even more .rigid with the inclusion of the accumulator in 19 28.
This had the effect of ensuring that Chancellors had to legislate if they
did not want to make increased debt payments made possible as interest
rate charges were reduced as the outstanding debt diminished. In 1929
Snowdenwas persuaded to increase the sinking fund provision by £5m to
make up for Churchill's laxity, with regard to the budget deficit of
(1) ’£1'^ m id 1928/29. 1
(1) Janeway (1971) o p » cit. p. 70; Eow.son (1975) op« cit« pp. 42-3, 69 
Niemeyev-'s evidence to the Colwyn Committee on National Debt and
Taxation ^ rd November 1925 QQ 8797,8799« S y
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Protection
Pr’otec-cnve. policies, carefully designed, could probably have had
considerabl c effects on employment in agriculture, iron and steel anci
cotton. A  revenue tariff could hatve provided general measures of 
protection for the home market as well as providing the revenue needed 
oo meet the bu d g e t a r y  objective. Pree trade, however, was the 
objective of the Labour Party which was pledged to re:
^a *iffs^ \  The reason for the commitment to fr
smove existing
%
appear to 'be based on a n y  concept of optimal resource allocation but 
was regarded as a way of k e eping down the cost of li v i n g  for the 
w o r k i n g  classes and of exposing the industries of the country to 
competition from abroad, so guarding against monopolistic tendencies.
The theory of international trade is related to a fully employed 
economy in a world free from trading restrictions. In such conditions, 
free trade was bound to lead to the optimal use of resources and the 
maximization of welfare. Those conditions did not exist .in the thirties 
when there were real constraints to the attainment of international 
equilibrium in the form of protective policies and bounties and
chaotically unstable m o n e t a r y  movements.- Yet the'significance of 
these difficulties for tho policy of free trade wc-re not well under­
stood. Keynes attempted to explain the significance in an early state­
ment of what was later to emerge as the theory of the ‘second best* but 
he did not.succeed in pe r s u a d i n g  policy makers cr even his fellow 
economists of the justification for p r o t e c t i o n '1'1 .
(*-J Por a discussion of policies r e l a t i n g  to free trade during^ v^e 
inter-war period see C.L. Kowat, Britain Between the r/ars I9l8g. 
3-9**0. Kethuen, London 1955-
/ 2’.
\ J See Chapter k- be-low.
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**.6 Oujecuio:.s to protection, were not based on economic grounds alone, 
rnere were considerable political constraints upon the advocacy of a
protectionist policy. These constraints can.be appreciated in the context
of trade policy in the early twenties. In 1923 the Conservatives had been 
, „ \.Acefeated on a protectjist platform. Baldwin, succeeding Bonar Law as Prime
Minister, had sought a mandate to change -fiscal policy. He advocated
protection as the only way out of the unemployment problem - the precise
timing of the election was probably part of a power bid to oust Lloyd George
who was thought to be moving towards protection, (1) Slogans such as the
'free breakfast table' still had a great electoral appeal and even the
(2)Conservatives had modified their position. Snowden referred to the earlier
defeat of.the Conservatives and to his success in the first Labour
Gove iTilTw on t in removing tariffs in one of his first speeches as Chancellor
in 1929. (3)
Protectionist policies were a form of nationalism which many economists and
politicians alike found abhorrent. The Government were hopelessly divided
on the issue’ and again and again the matter was left unresolved because cf
\ *
the impossibility of arriving at a consensus decision on the matter. At
some points in the debate the issue of protection was avoided because it was
felt that once imposed, tariffs would be difficult to remove which appears the
S
feeblest of reasons. Tariffs had been and could have been removed given 
political commitment. The Labour Government's foreign policy was
\
• \ aimed at opening up relationships between nations after the \
strife of the earlier decade; aneggressive trading position would have beenI
very much put of tune with foreign policy. 1 123
(1) H.W.Lyman (1957) The First Labour Government 192^ Chapman 2nd Hall, j
London, pp 21/23- K. Middlemas and J. Barnes (19&9) Baldv/in: A Bior;rarhy- 
Weidenfeld and Nicolas. p.2l4. \
(2) See Chapter One below p.^-9
(3) Hansard Vol. 229 cols. ?4?/50. j
l
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Public Works
Public works, the other policy which would possibly have made sooe 
impact upon the unemployment problem was bedevilled in 19 2 9  b y  the 
debate about the Treasury View wrhich implied that government's invest­
ment would be merely diversionary. This argument did not have much 
impact on the policy of the Labour Government; the p r o b l e m  was to 
get a programme on public works under way. In spite of grants and 
encouragement, the projects emerging from local authorities and public 
u t i lity companies were not sufficient to have Ejuch impact on the 
problem. The Government had no control over the proposals or the 
implementation of the schemes and so had little control over the pace 
or size of the programme. Yet direct action, it was thought, would 
undermine the democratic structure of local government. The criteria 
adopted for the approval of schemes were fairly conservative; social 
benefits were.not admitted as a factor to be taken into account until 
the later months of the administration; and the multiplier analysis 
w h i c h  would have indicated the expansionary effects of the policy was 
not understood or clearly 'specified. Ey the end of 1 9 3 0 ,' financial 
problems caused local and central government to be more wary of 
public works projects and concessions were removed for budgetary 
purposes. .
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Possibilities of Success
The political and economic philosophy of the Labour Government severely 
limited their ability to find a solution to the unemployment problem 
but even within the rigid constraints in which they were seeking a 
solution, it is highly probable that more effective policies could 
have been pursued. The projects put forward by local authorities and 
public utility companies were not very exciting but one wonders what 
they might have become in the hands of Lloyd George. By far the 
greatest failure was the lack of a decision-making capacity, the 
constant appeals to experts, the touching faith in the possibility 
that consensus solutions would emerge from informed debates amongst 
*experts1. all caused endless vacillation and delay.
The question arises as to whether the other parties could have done 
better. This, like the question of whether radical policies would have 
worked, cannot be answered unambiguously even with hindsight. Lloyd 
George would have had less difficulty in taking decisions; but his 
public works programme would probably have caused a strain on the 
exchanges unless some controls on monetary movements and trade had 
been applied; and there is considerable doubt as to whether the 
Liberal Party would have accepted any interference with free trade.
The Conservatives had the great advantage of being more pragmatic 
with regard to budgetary and trading policy. They would probably 
have improved the confidence of industrialists by their protectionist 
policies but they were more likely to have imposed cuts in insurance
v
(l) The literature appears to over-emphasise the difference in the
policies of Liberal and Labour parties. The public works schemes 
exist in both, but the Liberals relying upon the repercussions of 
the policy to restore equilibrium are the more enthusiastic about 
the results. See Chapter I, pp. 7^-89.
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benefits and possibly suggested wage cuts which might well have led 
to industrial and social dislocation*
It is possible that by accepting the role of maintaining some sort 
of stability in international monetary affairs, British policy 
contributed to the maintenance of the level of activity in the world 
economy. The game-theoretic approach of Kindleberger which attributes 
the length and depth of the depression to the inability of Britain 
to underwrite the international monetary system and the unwillingness 
of the United States to adopt the role seems to have much to offer 
as an explanation of the problem^. If it has any foundation, then 
the actions and inactions of the Labour administration may not have 
been as misguided as many interpreters have suggested. This raises 
large issues in international monetary management.
Structure of The Thesis
The thesis is divided into five chapters which discuss the development 
of policy over the period. The first chapter is concerned with a 
discussion of the problem of unemployment; the policies discussed 
during the last months of the Conservative administration; and the 
policy proposals which were offered during the pre-election period.
The second chapter relates to the initial policy initiatives of the 
Labour Government. Chapter Three deals with the Mosley Memorandum, 
the setting up of the E.A.C. and the policy debates which preceded 
MacDonald' 6 personal involvement in the policy initiatives. The 
advice profferred by experts in the E.A.C. and the sub-committee of 
economists is discussed in Chapter Four. The last narrative chapter (l)
(l) Kindleberger, (1973)» op. cit.
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is concerned with the remaining eight months of the administration 
ending with the crisis. The conclusion examines the failures of the 
Government’s unemployment policy in the context of the framework 
discussed above.
Unlike most other interpretations of the period, this thesis does not 
rely upon the adoption of 'Keynesian' or 'Classical' policy measures 
to explain the failure of policies. This interpretation is not meant 
to detract from the Keynesian contribution. Indeed, Keynes, and 
Keynes alone, amongst economists of the period had the intellectual 
vitality to adapt the economic model to the context and constraints 
of the political situation^. It focuses instead upon the policy 
options considered; the process of policy formulation; and upon the 
policy dilemma in which the Government found itself. This dilemma 
was caused by the adoption of incompatible policy goals; failure to 
make policy trade-offs and the inability to take decisions. Weakness 
in economic theory, not only in macro-economics but in welfare 
economics and trade theory, which resulted in lack of clarification 
on policy issues is discussed in the context of policy formulation. 
This approach, more behavioural than technocratic, is less heroic 
than the conflict model but it offers considerable insight into the 
formulation of economic policy.
(l) This facility is seen by some (Johnson (1975) op. cit.) as merely 
an avoidance of the main issue: exchange parity. The considera­
tion of the political climate, which laid such stress on 
stability especially of the gold standard; and the empirical 
estimations of the price elasticities on imports and exports 
(Thomas (1975) op cit.) cast doubt upon the feasibility and the 
effectiveness of changes in the parity to solve the problem. 
Kindleberger's (1973) op. cit. interpretation offers an 
alternative view of the period and the effects of .British policy 
upon the stability of the world economy in general..
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CHAPTER ONE
THE ECONOMICS OF POLITICAL POLEMIC
Introduction
The unemployment issue dominated the election of 1 9 2 9 ^ »
In the period leading up to the election the electorate was
innundated by books, reports, tracts and pamphlets in addition
to the party manifestos; all purporting to offer solutions to
(2)the unemployment problem . In this chapter we shall consider
the policy measures advocated and discussed by the major
political parties, the trades unions, industry and other pressure 
*groups and individuals v;hose views we re likely to influence 
policy. Before considering the policy proposals let us consider 
the extent of the unemployment problem in 1929»
(l) e.g. New Statesman 30th March 1929.
"The single issue that will really count at the general 
election will be unemployment”.
Unemployment is also the dominating theme in the election 
manifestos. See Craig (1975)» op. cit. Lloyd (ieorge kept 
it in the forefront of the campaign although MacDonald and 
Baldwin attempted to concentrate on broader issues.
. (2) New Statesman, 23rd March 1929. The changing mood towards 
unemployment was attributed to the almost simultaneous 
publication of the Liberal Party's policy document, We 
Can Conouer Unemployment. Cassell, London 1929; the final 
report of the Balfour Committee: Report on Trade and 
Industry (1929) Cmd 3282, and the Interim Point Report of 
the Conference on Industrial Reorganization and industrial 
Relations: Melchett-Turner Conference. 1928 and 1929.
The Problem
Unemployment was by now an intractable problem. The percentage 
of the insured workers unemployed had fallen below 10% only once 
in the decade as can be seen in Table 1. The regional and 
industrial distribution of the unemployment accentuated the 
problem.
Table 1
Percentage of insured workers 
unemployed in the United Kingdom
1921 - 1929
Tear % Unemployment
1921 16.9
1922 1^.3
1923 11.7
192^ 10.3
1925 11.3
1926 12.5
1927 9.7
1928 10.8
1929 10.^
Sources British Labour Statistics
Historical Abstract 1086-1968 
Table l60 
HMSO 1971
These aspects are highlighted in Tables 2 and 3 below
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Table 2
Regional Unemployment 1929
Number of persons (insured and uninsured) 
registered as unemployed in  June each year, 
expressed as a percentage of insured 
employees at each mid-year.
Region , % Unemployment
1927 1928 1929
London if.8 if.7 if.6
South East 3.6 if.O 3.8
South West 6 .1 7.0 7.1
Midlands 7.7 10.7 9.1
North East 13 .2 15.0 12.8
North West 9.3 12.0 13.0
Scotland 9.3 10.8 11.0
Wales 19.6 21.8 19.7
Great Britain 8.8 10.if 9.8
Source: British Labour Statistics (1971) op.
Computed from Tables 110 and 162 llj
(1) For further analysis of inter-war unemployment see
D.C. Champernowne, ’The uneven distribution of unemployment 
in the united Kingdom 1929-36' Review of Economic Statistics 
1936-7; W.H. Beveridge, 'An Analysis of unemployment', 
Economica 1937; M.P. Fogarty, Aspects of the Industrial 
Areas of Great Britain London (19^5); E.M. Burns,
B ritish  Unemployment Programmes 1920-1938. London 19^1.
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Table 3
Industrial Unemployment
Percentage of insured workers unemployed, by industry in 
the United Kingdom
Industry
1927
% Unemployed 
1928 1929
Fishing 13.8 1 1 .6 11.8
Coalmining 19.0 23.6 19.0
Brick, tile, pipe etc manufacture 6.9 12.4 11.5
Pottery, earthenware etc 16.6 18.6 17.0
Chemicals 7.2 6 .1 6.5
Pig iron 16.4 18.7 14.4
Steel melting and iron puddling, and 
iron and steel rolling and forging 19.4 22.4 20.1
General engineering: engineers’ iron 
and steel founding 11 .8 9.8 9.9Electrical engineering 5.9 4.8 4.6Construction and repair of motors, 
cycles, and aircraft 8.1 8.1 7.1Shipbuilding and repairing 29.7 24.5 25.3Stove, grate, pipe etc and general 
ironfounding 10.0 12.0 10.9Electric cable, apparatus, lamps, 
etc manufacture 7.7 5.6 5.3Cotton textiles 15.4 12.5 12.9Wool textiles 11.0 12.0 15.5Linen textiles 12 .2 19.8 15.7Hosiery manufacture 7.6 5.8 7.1Tailoring 9.2 9.2 10.0
Dressmaking and millinery 6.2 5.9 6 .1
Boots, shoes etc manufacture 11.3 13.4 15.5Bread, biscuits, cakes etc manufacture 7.2 6.6 7.2
Drink industries 6.3 6.2 6.8
Sawmilling and machined woodwork 8.^ 9.2 10.0
Furniture manufacture and upholstery 6.5 5.9 6.5
Printing, publishing and bookbinding 5.2 4.6 4.6
Building 1 1 . 1 13.9 14.3
Gas, water and electricity supply 5.4 5.8 6 .1
Railway service 6.1 6.5 6.5
Tramway and omnibus service 3.7 3.1 3.1
Other road transport 11.8 11.7 12.0
Docks, harbours, canals etc service 24.5 29.1 30.7
Distributive trades 5.5 5.5 6.2
National government service 6.2 6.2 6.9
Local government service 8.2 8.6 9.6
Hotel, public house, club etc 
service 7.9 7.6 8.7
Laundry and dry cleaning service 4.1 3.8 4.3
Source: British Labour Statistics (1971)1 op. cit. Table 163.
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The high level of unemployment was a reflection of the problem
of international maladjustment which Britain was facing.
Competitive industries had developed in Japan and countries
e.g. India, which had previously Been importers of British
goods. These developments severely affected the cotton industry.
Technological advances had changed the demand for fuel imposing
strain on the coal industry. The iron and steel industry, and
the shipbuilding industry had been expanded during the war and
were not able to adjust to the changed s i t u a t i o n ^ ^ . The
geographical and industrial distribution of the protracted
unemployment gave support to the structuralist interpretation of
the problem. The committee, set up by the first Labour
Government to study industry and trade under the Chairmanship of
Balfour, supported this interpretation of the evidence when it
(?)reported in the Sp r i n g  of 1929 s
•’the first step towards putting British industries in a 
position to compete successfully in overseas markets is to 
subject their organization and equipment to a thorough 
reconditioning p r o c e s s . ”
Others stressed the deflationary impact of the return to the pre­
war parity
(1)
(2)
Some comentators have referred to the over optimistic
expectations of industrialists who expected the wartime \
activity to be maintained in the post-war period. See 1
the, forthcoming history of Beardmores by J. Hume and Michael Moss to be puolisnea m  19 7° • |
- Report on Trade and Industry (1929) op. c i t .
1
m
The general malaise in the economy can be seen from the indices 
of prices, wages and profits during the twenties. Except for 
profits there had been little movement in the indices since the 
large changes of the early twenties. Prices were gradually 
falling, wages were stationary and profits had recovered, 
though fluctuating somewhat.
Table 4
Prices, Wages and Profits in United Kingdom: 1920-1929
Year
Retail
Prices
Wholesale
Prices
Average Weekly 
Wages
Gross Trading 
Company Profits
£M
INDEX NUMBERS 1963=100
1920 52 79 4l 5201921 47 50 4o 2671922 38 4l 31 4421923 . 37 4l 28 4781924 37 43 28 4751925 37 4l 28 4-501926 36. 38 . 28 4o41927 35 36 28 4611928 35 36 28 4751929 35 35 28 499
Source : The British Economy Key Statistics 190u<- m o
London and Cambridge Economic Service
Times Newspapers. London 1973«
Re-examination of the statistics has drawn attention to other 
dimensions of the economy which were more encouraging than 
unemployment: the growth of the labour force, the gross domestic 
product and output per man year all showed modest growthf^ (l)
(l) Aldcroft and Richardson (1969) op. cit
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Table 5
United Kingdom
Employment, Gross Domestic Product and Output per man year 1920-29
Year
Gross Domestic 
Product
Output per 
man year Number in
INDEX 1963 = 100
Civil Employment
1920 **6 59 19.01
1921 ko 59 16.73
1922 **3 63 16.95
1923 *f** 63 17.32
192** **7 66 17.56
1925 **9 68 17.7**
1926 **7 67 17.32
1927 51 69 18.32
1928 51 69 l8.*fl
1929 52 69 18.71
Sources The British Economy Key Statistics 1900-1970 ( 1973)
op, cit.
Comparisons have also been made in the relative growth rates 
of the British economy and other industrialised countries/^ 
Aldcroft uses average growth rates to indicate that in the 
twenties the British growth rate was very low but compared favour­
ably with other countries during the thirties. These comparisons 
are difficult to evaluate because the cyclical patterns in the 
various countries did not coincide and the averages are highly 
sensitive to cyclical changes. There is, however, little doubt 
that the British economy was far from its full employment growth 
path during the twenties and the thirties.
(l) For the re-interpretation of the slump in Britain, see
D.H. Aldcroft, a •Economic Growth in Britain in the Inter-
War Years. A Reassessment', Economic History Review 1963; 
H.W. Richardson, 'The New Industries Betv/een the Wars' 
Oxford Economic Papers 1961.
Table 6
Average annual rates of growth of industrialised production
Country 1920-29 1929-37 1920-37
France 7.9 - 2.8 3.4Germany 7.6 3.0 5.4
Belgium 6.6 0.5 3.7Canada 6.5 1.6 4.2It sdy 6.0 1.7 4.0Sweden 5.0 5.4 5.2U.S.A. 4.0 0.4 2.3Denmark 3.2 4.0 3.6
Norway 2.4 3.3 2.8 .U.K. 2.3 3.4 2.8
Source: Aldcroft (1970) op. c i t . p.21
Policy Options
The policy options available to deal with the problems of 
international maladjustment and the accompanying unemployment, 
given the acceptance of the gold standard, were to reduce the 
supply price of production, to stimulate demand or to impose 
controls to protect the domestic market.
Policies operating on the supply side were concerned with 
attempts to speed up the adjustment process which, given the 
acceptance of fixed exchange rates and in the absence of 
protection, occurs in the internal economy affecting wages and 
prices. As relative prices fall domestically produced goods 
become more attractive and economic activity increases in 
response to the increased demand. The success of such policies 
depends firstly, upon the ability to change domestic wages and 
prices; secondly upon the relative responsiveness or
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elasticities of hone and foreign demand with regard to changes 
in prices; and thirdly upon the way in which the changes in the 
level of activity internally and externally affect the trading- 
patterns.
Policies attempting to stimulate expansion by affecting the 
aggregate demand in the economy were of three kinds. One, based 
on the quantity theory of money, relied upon the stimulatory 
effect of changes in the supply of money on prices and output.
The second type of expansionary policy was based upon the under- 
consumptionist theories relying upon changes in the distribution 
of income or consumer credit to raise internal demand and 
industrial expansion. The third policy attempted to generate 
increased demand by government participation in investment on 
public works programmes.
Public works havo a long history but became the focus of contra- 
cyclical unemployment policies at the turn of the century when they 
were recommended in the Minority Report of the Royal 
Commission on the Poor Laws largely as a result of the works of 
the Webbs and Bowley, and were later advocated by Colef-^. The 
policies recommended shifting the time profile of public works 
to take advantage of slack periods of trade and so maintain a 
higher level of employment. The concept had been developed
(1 ) Skidelsky (1967) QT>. cit. Winch (1969) op. cit.
during the formulation of the Liberal party proposals into an 
expansion creating tool capable of initiating recovery. The 
method relied upon the generated stream of income causing an 
increased demand for labour. The extent of the impact would depend 
upon the size of the induced effect of the investment upon the 
income stream which became known as a multiplier effect. The 
other expansionary policy, deficit financing was not advocated 
during the period as the balance of the budget was an objective 
and not a policy instrument^^.
Protection was aimed at insulating the internal economy from the 
effects of the international maladjustment by securing a domestic 
market for the products of industry: the protective effect} or 
raising revenue to ease the budgetary position: the revenue effect. 
The success of these policies depends upon the relative elasticity 
of demand and supply of the goods traded and the effects of the 
resulting trading patterns upon the level of activity on the 
economies concerned.
There was also the possibility of intervention in the internal 
labour market to affect the distribution of employment and deal 
with structural adjustment by retraining and internal and 
external migration.
(1) See Robbins (1976) op. cit. and E. Dalton, Call Back 
Yesterday Memoirs 1857-1931« Frederick Muller, London 
"(1953) for discussions of the development of deficit 
financing.
On the international scene there was the p o ssib ility  that co­
operative action of governments and central banks could have 
contributed to raising world prices and economic a c tiv ity .
Policy Portfolios
How did the p o lit ic a l parties interpret the unemployment problem 
and what policies were suggested to solve the problem?
The Conservative and Labour Parties adopted a structura list 
interpretation of the unemployment problem and thus concentrated 
on adjustment aspects of policy. But whereas the Conservative 
Party was to re ly  upon aids to industry and protection to provide 
the environment for adjustment; the Labour Party planned to 
reorganize the basic industries from "top to bottom” . The 
Liberal Party and sections of the Independent Labour Party and 
the trades unionists and indu stria lists  involved in the Melchett- 
Turner talks attributed at least part of the malaise to the lack 
of effective demand in the economy and supported expansionist 
policies.
Study of the policy documents indicate that the policy proposals 
included incompatible objectives which would place severe 
lim itations on the unemployment policy of a l l  parties. The 
dual constraints of the maintenance of the gold standard and 
the concept of the balanced budget were common to a ll  parties. 
Free trade was a further constraint upon the policies of the 
Labour and Liberal parties whilst the Conservative Party the 
Independent Labour jearty and the jo in t working party of
trades unionists and indu stria lists  were less doctrinaire. In 
addition the Conservatives were enmeshed in the ’ Treasury View* 
which emerged as a restraining factor in  policy formulation.
The Labour Party were also constrained by attitudes on income 
distribution.
The Conservatives, recognizing the basic problem as one of mal­
adjustment, attempted to solve the problem by attacking wages and 
prices but the unpopularity of these measures and some uneasi­
ness about th e ir effectiveness led to the adoption of policies 
to aid industry by tax concessions and protection. They were to 
maintain a modest public works programme about which they were 
increasingly doubtful especially after the publication of the 
Balfour Beportt Attempts were made to adapt the policy to 
fa c ilita te  adjustment by transfer of labour from the depressed 
areas. Th^re were elements in the Conservative party who weve 
advocating more radical policies but with the acceptance of the 
’Treasury View’ in the pre-election period i t  is  doubtful whether 
these minititers could have influenced policy.
The Labour Party's policies were directed to the problems of the 
basic industries which were to be restored to their former status 
by reconstruction but u n til this was achieved a programme of 
public works would be developed to absorb the unemployed and 
refurbish the economy. In addition early retirement, raising 
of the school leaving age and migration were advocated to reduce 
the supply of labour.
^5
The Liberal Party saw the problem as the failure  of capitalism 
which was to be remedied by state intervention. This in te r­
vention was to involve the state in refurbishing the economy.by 
national reconstruction which would improve the efficiency of 
industry as well as being a dynamic and self-sustaining mechanism 
which would cure structural and cyclica l unemployment at the same 
time.
The fringe groups saw the problem as one of lack of effective 
demand and recommended compensatory monetary policy, consumer 
cre dit, public works and protection as the major strategies to 
remedy unemployment.
We can now consider the development of these policies in more 
detail.
The Policy of the Conservative Party 
Introduction
The Conservative Party had the advantage (or disadvantage) of being 
the government in office at the time of the 1929 election: thus 
the policies which they advocated were tempered by their experience 
of the previous four years. The Conservatives by now accepting 1. 
the structura list interpretation of unemployment had, in  the 
months preceding the election, re-examined policies concerning 
unemployment including the proposals of their p o lit ic a l opponents 
as put forv/ard in the documents of the Liberal P a rty^^ and the
-----!—  ... '............. “  ..
(l) We Can Conquer Unemployment, (1929) op. cit.
Melchett-Turner Reports^.
Although the Conservative party was not united about the policies 
which they should pursue in order to deal with the unemployment 
problem, the prevailing philosophy of the party was such that 
their strategy depended upon the revival of trade, “the basis of 
all prosperity”. The unemployment policies were derived 
primarily from the Conservatives policies to stimulate trading 
activity.
Adjustment
The first approach of the Conservative administration had been to 
adjust wages and prices. This is indicated by Baldwin's 
remarks
"All workers of this country have got to face a reduction 
of wages." (2)
The attempts to reduce the wages of the miners, after the 
return to the gold standard, culminated in the General Strike.
The pressure on wages was felt particularly in the export 
industries, eg coal and cotton, which had suffered by the changes 
in the patterns of trade. 12
(1 ) Interim Joint Report of the Conference on Industrial 
Reorganization and Industrial Relations (1929J op. c i t .
(2) S. Baldwin, July 30th 1925» Quoted from Revolution by 
Reason. Oswald Mosley, I.L.P. London 1925»
^7
Keynes had much to say about this topic during 1926/27. He 
took the view that a few industries were having to bear the 
brunt of the adjustment for society as a result of the return, to 
the pre-war parity.
"On the grounds of social justice, no case can be made out 
for reducing the wages of the miners......."
"They are the victims of the economic Juggernaut. They 
represent in the flesh, the ’fundamental adjustments1 2
engineered by the Treasury and the Bank of England to 
satisfy the impatience of the City Fathers to bridge the 
’moderate gap* between iA.40 and £^.86. They (and others 
to follow) are the ’moderate sacrifice* still necessary to 
ensure the stability of the gold standard". (l)
By 1929, although wages continued to fall, policies involving
wage reductions had lost much of their appeal, partly because of
their doubtful political feasibility and partly because of the
suspicion that there was a relationship between the purchasing
power, a large portion of which was wages, and aggregate 
(?)demand • Instead, attention was paid to costs in general. 
Internal costs were seen to be the problem by the Govefnment and 
the Treasury.
"The principal cause of the problem is to be found in the 
fact that in many branches, particularly of heavy
industries, .... . costs of production ^turning upon the
organisation of both capital and labour) still tend to be
(1) J.M. Keynes: The Economic Consequences of Mr Churchill,
Hogarth Press, .London (1925). quoted in Herroa R.F. The . 
Life of John Maynard Keynes. Macmillan, London 1951. 
also The Times 4th Sept. 1925 - —  ....
(2) See Introduction above for discussion of under- 
consumptionists. p. 1^»
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excessive and that these difficulties cannot be solved 
till these costs have been placed on a competitive 
level." (1 )
A more general approach to costs is then advocated;
"There was a time when perhaps a reduction in the costs of 
production was looked upon as largely synonymous with the 
reduction of wages. In present conditions, it must be 
sought in the improved organisation and efficiency of all 
elements of industry, in the adjustments of businesses of 
the country to the changes that have taken place in world 
demand and in the supplies from different countries and in 
all that is implied in the term 'rationalization1 234". (2)
What then were the policies advocated for the reduction of costs
and the increase in efficiency? Until 1927 the Conservatives
(3 )had administered the Trade; Facilities Act which gave aid to
industry to undertake reconstruction plans which could not be
financed otherwise. In 1927» those policies changed somewhat.
Attempts were now made to stimulate and encourage private industry
by relief of burdens rather than aid. To this end, the rating
system was revised in such a way that it was alleged that the
whole of productive industry was relieved of three-quarters of
the burden of rates and there was also a reduction in the costs
(4)of railway and dock freight
(1 ) Memorandum on Certain Proposals Relating to Unemployment. 
H.M.S.O. London, und. 3351, May 1929.
(2) ibid., p. 36l.
(3) Trade Facilities Act under this scheme, cheap Government 
credits.were given as an inducement for firms to accelerate 
capital developments.
(4) Craig (1975). op. cit. p. 45. Hick« pp.-s»/«.
The success of this policy depended upon the ability of 
reconstruction to reduce prices and also upon the extent to 
•which businessmen would in periods of uncertainty be responsive 
to changes in tax burdens.
Protection
Attempts, in 1923, to introduce protectionist measures had been rebuffed
• 1 * , *• .... i #
by the electorate but a modified programme of protection was still proposed 
Dogma on international trade did not constrain the Conservative
Party. Th o u g h  there was deep dissension 'within the party on this 
natter, the differing views were reconciled in the manifesto by 
the rejection of the idea of a general tariff or a protective 
duty on food and the advocacy of the use of safeguarding duties 
and imperial preference. They were prepared to cushion' some of 
the adjustment problems by economic controls. The S a f e g u a r d i n g 
d u t i e s 1 were regarded as a great success*
"not only has employment been improved in every one of the 
safeguarding industries but coal, steel and engineering and 
building, transport and other industries have profited by 
the orders and w o r k  created. The employment thus given 
directly or indirectly has put thousands of men at work, 
has increased their purchasing power, and has thus bene- 
fitted the distributive trades. In many cases prices have 
been reduced because costs of production have fallen with 
increased output. Cl) Exports over the whole range of 
dutiable articles have materially increased; efficiency has 
been encouraged; n e w  capital has been introduced; n e w  
factories have been built and existing factories have been 
extended." (2 )
Even so, the number of the industries protected b y  duties was 
small and the general tariff has been estimated as being
(l) They did not even contemplate this as a possibility which 
might occur generally with increased demand.
(2; Cra i g  (1 9 7 5 ), op. c i t . p. 4^.
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approximately 5%^"^» This policy would probably have been
extended. The iron and steel industry had been promised
permission to.apply for a safeguarding tariff if the Conservatives
(2)were re-elected .
There was great regard for the "Empire" and thus a general 
sympathy for policies to further links for mutual benefit.
Policies in this sphere led to argument for Imperial 
Preference, the financing of colonial development and the 
encouragement of settlement in the colonies of British 
nationals:
"no question is so fateful for the destiny of the 
British Commonwealth of Nations as a proper distribution 
of the people of British stock throughout its 
territories." (3 ) 123
(1) Britain’s Industrial Future being the Report of the Liberal 
Industrial Inquiry. Ernest Benn, London, 1928.
(2) CAB 23 60 CM 5(29) 7th February 1929* The request had 
been an embarrassment to the Government who were reluctant 
to submit the industry’s application for safeguardingfor consideration.
(3) Mr Baldwin’s Election Address The Conservative Party 
(London)' 1929«
Public Works
Whilst relying basically upon the stimulation of trade they were 
also at some pains to improve the industrial fabric. The road’ 
development programme was an important aspect of this policy.
The Government was spending a considerable amount; £20M a year, 
on roads. They were proud of this record and boasted of having 
the greatest expenditure on roads of any trading nation. The 
approach to public works programmes had changed considerably 
over the period. The continuing problem of the 1 2intractable 
million* tended to cast doubt upon any cyclical explanation of 
the unemployment problem and thus any predominantly cyclical 
solution. Structural explanation gained ground especially after 
the publication of the Report on Trade and Industry^^  and 
public works programmes were questioned; previously they had 
been thought to be Justified because they,
•'filled the conception of the unemployment problem but 
this conception had been abandoned." (2)
The ’Treasury View’ began to intrude on this issue and the 
emphasis of the public works programme was now directed at 
improvements which would give immediate assistance to trade and 
bring:
(1) Report on Trade and Industry, Cmd 3282 (1929) op. cit.
(2) Hansard 15th April, 1929* Churchill’s budget speech.vd i2?ic/
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"a full return to the money expended, rather than to put in 
hand hasty and ill-considered schemes which could only 
lead to wasteful and unfruitful expenditure, and would be 
of no permanent benefit to the unemployed." (l)
Monetary Policy
The Conservative policy on monetary matters was determined during 
this period by the Treasury ambition to reduce the floating debt, 
and Churchill’s anxiety about the effect of bank rate on unemploy­
ment which reflected his growing sensitivity to the criticisms
(2)of his policy from Keynes and McKenna .
Alleviation of Distress
Conservative policy had little to offer regarding the alleviation
of distress but support of the Lord Mayor’s Distress Fund^*^ and
the postponement of the operation of the 1927 Act with regard to
(b)the 30 contributions rule in spite of the financial problems
facing the insurance fund. The policies were basically to 
facilitate the migration or transference of labour and to provide 123
(1) Craig (1975) op. cit.
(2) lowson (1975) op. cit.
(3) New Statesman, December 22nd 1928. The reaction to the 
Government's contribution to the Distress fund is :
"The uovernment has done precisely what we feared 
that it would do and has given to the beggarraan 
from the coalfields sixpence to go away. Presumably 
Mr baldwin and his colleagues will now eat their 
Christmas dinners in peace, sure in their minds that 
they have acted according to the best principles of 
Christmas charityJ"
See Chapter Two for the Labour Administrators' handling of 
this problem.
(*0 The rule that thirty contributions were a necessary 
qualification for unemployment benefit.
retraining opportunities. This policy was another facet of the 
acceptance by the late 20s that the problem of unemployment was 
structural, and to this end, schemes were set up to deal with, the 
removal of labour from depressed areas (See Table Two on the 
Regional Distribution of Unemployment), where industries were 
thought unlikely to recover, to less 'disadvantageous1 regions.
This work was undertaken under the auspices of the Industrial 
Transference Board who were pleased with their results.
"In 8 months, the Ministry of Labour has transferred about 
20,000 persons of all ages ... Perhaps another 8,000 have 
transferred themselves." (l)
But 30 or even A-0 thousand transfers in a year could hardly make 
any improvement on the employment problem which they were facing.
It became ineffective as the generalised nature of the unemploy­
ment problem led to the lack of jobs for trainees. The scheme 
was also criticised by the unions .
Conservative Dissension
The Conservative Party was far from satisfied with or united 
about its unemployment policy. On 10th October, 1928, the Prime 
Minister appointed an Inter-Departmental Committee with the
(1 ) Memorandum on Certain Proposals relating to Unemployment, p.l? 
HMSO Cma 3331» 1929
5k
following terms of reference:
"To examine ana report to the Cabinet on:
(a) the probable extent of the unemployment during 
the coming winter;
(b) what special measures may be possible to supple­
ment existing arrangements for dealing with the 
problem." (l)
The Committee was set up under the chairmanship of ¿sir Warren 
Fisher, Secretary to the Treasury and reported on 
5th November^^.
The Report differed from the previous schemes in that it 
contemplated the attraction of labour from the distressed 
districts to areas of better employment where the workers would 
have an opportunity for obtaining permanent employment. On the 
basis of this report, the report of the Cabinet Committee and 
the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 
regarding overseas development the Government formulated its 
revised unemployment policy. This was to consist primarily of 
rating relief to come into effect on 1st April and the reduction 
of railway freights from 1st December^^. In addition, they were 
to encourage the policy of land settlement and transference 
facilities by offering on more favourable terms grants to local 
authorities accepting transferred workers. 123
(1) CAB 27 378 DU 28(1).
(2) CAB 27 37« 325 (2«); 23 59 ^9 (2b).
(3) New Statesman, 17th November 1928:
"the gist of the Government’s reply to its critics is that 
until the highly problematical chickens of derating come 
home to roost there is nothing more that can be done."
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In the Cabinet meeting of 23rd January 1929,^^ a memorandum 
from the Minister of Labour, A. Steel-Maitland, was discussed«
The Minister stated that he was not satisfied with the way the 
proposals were coming forward from local authorities under the 
scheme announced in November. He raised the question of the £8l-l 
road scheme which had been rejected by the Cabinet in November 
and asked that the position should be reconsidered. The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Churchill,was against the idea of 
reopening the road scheme already rejected by the Cabinet.
Giving details of additional expenditure from relief of unemploy­
ment of nearly £7M over 15-16 months, he protested against 
additional expenditure at a time when the end of Winter was 
approaching. The increased grants to local authorities were 
announced as a compromise.
(2 )A few weeks later, 26 February , the Cabinet had before them no 
less than four memoranda on employment, from the Home Secretary, 
the Minister of Labour, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the 
President of the Board of Trade. The Home Secretary was most 
despondent about the way the Government v/as dealing with the 
unemployment problems and advocated imperial development and 
migration. The President of the Board of Trade recommended 
amalgamations within the coal, cotton and iron and steel 
industries to be aided by provision of capital by the Government.
(1)
(2)
CAB 23 6o 2(29)
CAB 23 60 9(29); CAB 2k 201 CP 27, 57; CAB 2k 202 
CP 53 57 (29).
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The Minister of Labour was less despondent than the Home 
Secretary but he too recognised that many persons were anxious 
to see the Government do something ’dramatic1 and of ’national- 
importance » . He considered that a prosperity or welfare index 
number would indicate that the average working man was better 
off than at any time in  the country’s history. Unemployment, 
he regarded as a deep seated problem which could only be over­
come gradually. Most of i t  was unemployed miners, and i t  was 
p a rtia lly
•'due to the crim inal lunacy of the coal strike with the 
consequent wastage of capital and decrease of purchasing 
power in  other industries besides coal." ( l )
He was prepared to advocate action i f  the proposals were business­
lik e . Only the road programme appeared to f i l l  the b i l l .  He was 
prepared to question some fundamental aspects of government 
economic policy: including monetary expansion and consumer 
cre d it. Underconsumptionist views were causing some anxiety 
and uncertainty even amongst the Conservative'Ministers, for he 
concluded by asking a number of questions related to monetary and 
fisca l policy which are paraphrased:
( l )  was i t  possible to give a f i l l i p  to trade or did 
orthodox theory of credit forbid?
(1 ) CAB 24 201 CP 37(29).
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(2) was consumer credit feasible: people wanted work
 ^ and goods?
(3) although he supported the return to gold, he asked 
whether anyone foresaw that the workers would be so 
resistant to a reduction in the nominal wage rate?
(4) was a rise in the Bank Rate inevitable? Could 
experts give advice?
He asked Cabinet to consider:
(1) "Have we or our predecessors, the governments of 1921, 
23» 2k% left undone anything that might wisely have 
been done in relief of unemployment without doing 
violence to the settled financial policy of the 
country?"
(2) "Has that policy dominated our actions unduly and 
prevented us from adopting ameliorative measures 
which would have reduced the numbers unemployed and 
if so is it expedient to continue to acquiesce in 
that domination?" (1 )
If Steel-Kaitland was willing to question the very basis of the 
Government's policy, Churchill was not:
"I do not advise my colleagues in the closing months of a 
Parliament and possibly an administration, to challenge the 
basic arguments upon which our monetary policy stands." (2)
Churchill felt that conditions had improved, in spite of the 
great strike period, but he felt that the country allowed itself 
to be demoralised by weekly figures of unemployment which were a 
'special culture' developed from the extension of the unemployment
ibid.
CAB 2k 202 CP 53 (29).
(1)
(2)
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insurance scheme and not a measure of national conditions« The 
unemployment figures should be the subject of quarterly reviews 
in which employment figures should play an equal part with 
' unemployment and the cost of living and the population. In 
spite of these problems he noted that the indicator showed 
unemployment to be lower than when they were elected to office:
"over 200,000 of these are so-called miners - mainly 
surface or auxiliary labourers-who have been wisely shed 
from the purged and partially re-conditioned coal 
industry." (l)
Churchill also expressed the hope that the party would not be
"drawn by panic or electioneering into unsound schemes to 
cure unemployment and divert national credit and savings 
from the fertile channels of private enterprise to state 
undertakings mainly for political purposes." (2)
Accompanying Churchill's comments was a note, prepared by the 
Treasury on the Memoranda of the Home Secretary and the Minister 
of Labour in which the possibility of development loans facilitat­
ing employment was discussed:
"in all cases the question is vfhether £1000 spent by the 
Government will give more employment than if £1000 had been 
‘ left for the public to spend. This will only occur if the 
Government is skilful enough to find ways of spending 
£100u which give more employment than the spending by the 
public." (3 )
(1 ) ibid. 
(2> ibid.
(3) ibid
59
Such statements of the ’Treasury View* were to dominate the 
debate in the next few months.
The most that could be offered was an £8w programme over 
3-4- years which had previously been rejected by the Cabinet in 
November. The results of such a programme were expected to be 
meagre compared to the results of the Government's policy of rate 
and tax reductions. The problem of the gold standard and the 
reasons for the adjustment being greater than expected are 
discussed in the memorandum. The adjustment problems were 
considered to be greater than had been anticipated by the 
Bradbury Committee because:
"the American price level instead of raising to meet us 
fell slowly but steadily throughout 1925-26 necessitating 
a much greater restructuring of our price level than had 
been expected, in order to maintain parity." (l)
It was considered that there would have been unemployment even 
if there had not been a return to the gold standard as deprecia­
tion was disguising the defects of management and equipment.
Such schemes as consumer credit were considered to be " 
appropriate for a self-sufficient country such as U.S.A. but 
not for Britain,
"where both the level of prices and the volume of credit 
must be regulated with constant regard to international 
as well as national factors." (2)
(1 ) ibid.
(2) ibid.
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The Cabinet was too busy to consider the memorandum which was 
referred to a Cabinet committee and was subsequently overtaken 
by events.
Matters did not rest there* Later in March a new memorandum was 
before the Cabinet, ' An Employment Policy for the Election1 2, a 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs,
L.S. Amery^"1"^, \
He considered that the public was demanding a definite and 
effective employment policy even though no one expected them to 
compete with Lloyd George's extravagant schemes. The method of 
financing and the timing of the scheme was regarded as crucial. 
He suggested that there should be no more taxes or loans but a 
reduction of the normal provision for debt redemption. Ee 
thought that this would be no worse than a loan to financial 
purists but less expensive to the sinking fund than an ambitious 
loan programme.
"Mr Snowden w ill  sneer, but the sneer w ill  be on the wrong 
side of his mouth, for the public will^be quite 
indifferent to anything but the actual positive measures 
we propos«. As for the C ity , i t  knows quite well what th,e 
alternatives are and w il l  control its e lf , outwardly, with 
a shake of its  head, and with unfeigned inward re lie f , i f  
we have produced a policy that w ill  help trade and keep 
us in ."  (2)
(1 ) CAB 24 202 CP 87(29).
(2) i b i d . Debt redemption at this time had been placed on a
. contractual basis and very little of the sinking fund payments 
were adjustable without legislation to change the 
provision. Janeway (1971) op. cit.70-7^; see above p 27o.
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He considered that the derating scheme had relieved industry 
generally, and the older established industry in particular, of 
an unfair burden and that, safeguarding apart, there was little 
more to be done for them. What of the newer industries? The 
motor industry was a key industry though only an infant industry, 
producing only 1/lbth of American output. The output could be 
quadrupled if cars were used as freely as in America. The tax, 
(horse power tax,) stopped this.
"No artificial measure could give anything approaching the 
increased employment and largely skilled employment as the 
abolition of a tax which is almost as prejudicial to 
expansion on the modern scale as the old law compelling a 
man with a red flag to walk in front of any mechanically 
drawn vehicle.1’ Cl)
The Memorandum of the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs was 
before the Cabinet on 26th March, 1929 » tut there was no time
to discuss it and it was to be raised after the Easter recess.
It too was overtaken by events in the form of the publication of 
the Liberal. Party's proposals and the Interim Report of the 
Melchett-Turner Conference.
In addition to these ministerial reservations there were a group 
of Conservative Members of Parliament, similarly disappointed 
with the progress of unemployment policy. This group included
ibid.
(2) CAE 23 6u 13(29)•
N»
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Harold Macmillan, Robert Boothby, Oliver Stanley, Duff Cooper 
and John Loder. Their views were published in a book, entitled 
Industry and State, 1927^^. They advocated much greater inter- 
vention in industry and a more sympathetic approach towards the 
unemployed. Their attacks in Parliament had contributed to the 
postponement of the enforcement of the thirty contributions rule 
in the administration of the Unemployment Insurance Fund.
The Policy of P o litic a l Opponents
On l^fth March, the Inter-Departmental Committee was re-convened 
for the purpose of the examination of and the preparation of 
memoranda on the recommendations contained in  the pamphlet, "We 
Can Conquer Unemployment” and the Melchett-Turner Reports^^.
The Committee met and allocated the various recommendations 
suggested in these documents to the appropriate departments for 
examination and comment and asked that the memoranda should be 
sent for collation not later than 28th March to Mr. Fraser at 
the Treasury. There do not appear to have been any further 
meetings of the Inter-Departmental Committee to consider these 
reports or the memoranda which the departments produced. The 123
(1) Harold Macmillan et a l Industry and Trade 192?, and also 
see Harold Macmillan op. c i t . ; R. Boothby I  fight to liv e  
Gollancz 19^2. L.S . Amery My P o litic a l L ife . Hutchinson 1955.
A. Marwick, "Middle Opinion in the Th irtie s : Planning,
Progress and Political Agreement", English Historical 
Review; 79 (196^)« ^
(2) Liberal Party (1929) op. cit.
(3) Conference on Industrial Reorganisation and Industrial 
Relations (1929) op. cit.
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memoranda were sent to the Prime Minister on the 2nd April with 
an accompanying letter from Sir Warren Fisher^^.
This le tte r no doubt had as great an impact on the Government as 
the memoranda:
"My Dear Prime Minister,
The notes which by your instructions have been prepared by 
the Departments concerned on the subject-matter of the 
pamphlet, "We can conquer Unemployment" and of the 
Melchett-Tillett, "Report on Unemployment11 are now avail­
able, for your consideration. As was your wish, these notes 
represent the views and experience of the various officials 
who would have the actual business of giving effect to the 
proposals contained in the two documents; no sort of 
pressure, one way or another, has, of course, been put upon 
these gentlemen and where their views differ, there has 
been no attempt to slur or minimize such differences.
There is one point that I should like particularly to 
emphasize in connection with the pamphlet "We can conquer 
JJnemn'i nvrnent1'- and that is that the timetable within which 
the programme it outlines is to effect its object 
necessitates the substitution of autocracy for Parliamentary 
Government.
The wartime D.O.R.A. would have to be restored at once; and 
the Government of the day would have to be entrusted by 
Parliament with absolute powers in a variety of matters. 
There must be powers for immediate compulsory acquisition 
and occupation of land: there must be power to over-ride 
local authorities: there must be such measures of 
industrial conscription as the enforced movement and 
engagement of some types of labour to the exclusion of 
other types desiring to volunteer; and, as a likely 
corollary of industrial conscription, control of the profits 
of the contractors and others benefitting directly or 
indirectly from the artificial diversion of the channels 
of normal trade.
(1) CAB Zk 203 CP 10^ f (29)
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Even if a Mussolini regime could be proved to be desirable 
for the 'war* against unemployment, speaking as an ordinary 
British citizen, I do not believe for one moment that the 
country would stand it. The full rigour of D.O.R.A. was 
tolerated during the war because 100% of the population. • 
felt themselves to be in urgent danger of something 
infinitely worse; today 90/o of the population have more 
material happiness and amenity than in ail our previous 
history and sad though the plight of the other 107» is 
realized to be by those of us who know, the 90% would 
never, even on that account, acquiesce in full peace time 
in a bureaucracy invested with such wide and arbitrary 
powers.
Yours sincerely,
N.F. Warren Fisher” (1 )
In his introduction to the report, Sir Warren Fisher drew 
attention to the differences of outlook between the reports.
The Melchett-Turner report, he considered to be industrial based 
upon reorganisation of industry; whilst the Liberal Party pledge 
was seen as the generation of employment by state activity pending 
restoration of normal conditions.
The memoranda were exhaustive and generally critical on both 
practical and theoretical grounds. The section dealing with the 
Liberal pledge consisted of twelve chapters containing reports 
from the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Transport, the 
Department of Inland Revenue, the Ministry of Health, the 
Department of Health for Scotland, the Post Office, the 
Department of Agriculture, the Development Commission and the 
Forestry Commission and the Treasury. The practical 
difficulties of undertaking a programme on such a scale was 
severely criticised especially aspects of the road programme. 1
(1 ) ibid.
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The possibility that such schemes might affect the aggregate level 
of activity in the economy was spelt out in some detail in the 
memorandum from the Treasury. The reaction to the Melchett- . ■ 
Turner report was also rather negative. That which was seen to 
be of value was either already being done or was not the 
responsibility of the Government; e.g. placing of orders with 
government departments and rationalisation. Other schemes were 
thought not likely to make an effective contribution to 
unemployment policy, e.g. early retirement, development schemes 
and raising the school leaving age. The suggested monetary 
explanations for the cycle were discarded along with any form of 
control over the Bank of England. These reactions were perhaps 
to be expected from departments which had already been involved 
in endless exercises exploring possible unemployment policies and 
whose opinions had become firmly established.
On 17th April^^ the Minister of Labour proposed that a Cabinet
committee should be appointed to prepare, on the basis of the
Inter-Departmental Report, a memorandum for ultimate publication
as a white paper but the Cabinet did not agree. Instead, it was
decided that the use of the material in the reports should be the
responsibility of the cabinet minister concerned who should not,
in any case, refer to the document publicly. A few weeks later,
(2)on the 1st May, the Cabinet was informed that reports had 
leaked out that the Inter-Departmental Committee had reported in
(1) CAB 23 60 17(29)
(2) CAB 23 60 19(29)
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favour of Lloyd George's schemes. At the next meeting^^ it was
decided that large parts of the report could not be published
without being detrimental to the Civil service. It was decided
that four sections under the names of the Ministers involved and
the Postmaster General should be prepared. This was done and the
( 2)memoranda were published and contributed to the pre-election 
debate. The publication of the report was criticised especially 
by the left wing press. The New Statesman dubbed it a 
'propagandist pamphlet' and considered,
"This use of the resources of the Stationery Office for 
the purpose of party propaganda is quite unjustifiable
' and sets a highly dangerous precedent ....  Not only has
it published its own partisan opinions of the Lloyd 
George's scheme at the State's expense it has also made 
the most important branch of the Civil Service - the 
Treasury - a party to its private electioneering 
strategy." (3 )
The first point made in this memorandum by the Minister of Labour 
is that not all persons on the 'live register' would be willing 
or able to accept the employment offered by the scheme, after 
adjustment for those of the unemployed who were inappropriate 
for the suggested works, i.e. women, girls and boys under 18, 
the temporarily stopped and casual workers and the highly 
skilled workers. The Minister came to the rather extraordinary' 
conclusion that there was not enough labour available for the 
schemes unless they were attracted from elsewhere by higher 123
(1) CMD 33^1 (1929) or. cit.
(2) New Statesman, l8th May 1929»
(3) CAB 23 60 20(29). ■ _ ' ..
67
wages. A remarkable view given the evidence of disequilibrium 
in the labour market. Was there so little unemployed labour, 
available at the going wage rate? Was the 'mis-match1 problem 
so acute? v
The Minister of Transport, Wilfred Ashley, thought that the 
plans were not practical in a democracy.
•'The plan, it is true, postulates, emergency powers. But 
obstacles to any such concentration of work as it 
proposes are, short of dictatorship, insuperable whatever 
powers of overriding private interests and the autonomy of 
the local authority were obtained." Cl)
•
The maximum employment provided was likely to be less than that 
estimated and was unlikely to be more than 5*000 per £1M spent 
because there was already under-employment in quarries, etc.
The implication of this factor upon prices was not considered. 
Such development might have been crucial for if employment could 
be increased without changes in prices a major obstacle to the 
acceptance of the policy would have been removed. They also 
said that much of the work was not additional to work already 
being carried out.
The memorandum by the Minister of Health was very defensive about 
the achievements of his Ministry and critical of many aspects of 
the proposals, e.g. the estimates of housing needs, the provision 
of subsidies and the failure to provide a scheme of compensation
Cl) ibid.
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for slum properties. He also questioned the increase in 
employment. The Memorandum contains the very odd assertion:
"In January 1929» the 19.9% unemployed in building compares 
favourably with 3 1.2% in the docks, etc." (1 )
The Postmaster General examining the schemes for expansion of 
telecommunications, states that the failure of demand rather than 
any lack of plant and equipment was retarding the growth of the 
industry. He also criticised the estimates of expected indirect 
employment generated by the schemes because of the high import 
content of the equipment. The impact on imports was very much 
neglected in the early discussions of the potential of public 
works programmes to generate employment. When it was mentioned 
it usually referred to the import content in specific projects. 
The aggregative concept of the propensity to import was 
developed later.
The Memorandum concludes with a reiteration of the'Treasury View.' 
The financial implications of raising £125M over two years are 
considered. The proposed diversion of investment funds from 
abroad is seen to be difficult.
"We, obviously, could not compete with the temptation 
offered by the capital appreciation of the American Share 
Market - or with the 8% time or 12% call rate which it
offered for brokers loansi..... Mr Keynes in his article
in the *Evening Standard* frankly admits that "it will be (i)
(i) ibid.
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necessary to offer a rate of interest which will compete
with foreign borrowers"..... . "We can, in fact, only
prevent funds going abroad by offering the inducements of 
higher rates at home, and the harm that such rates would 
inflict on trade and employment would certainly counter- • 
balance any benefit they got from directing funds from
foreign to home investment." ......  "To this prospect
there is no alternative under the plan in the pamphlet, 
unless it is intended to impose a drastic control over 
the direction of investment." (l)
As to the utilisation of 'frozen savings* or 'idle balances', it 
concluded that owing to the requirements of the holders, they 
could not be used for long term investments.
"It is true enough that money lent to the banks on time 
deposit is used by the banks to grant short term advances 
or credits. It is a far cry from this proposition to the 
lighthearted assumption that the issue of full Government 
securities would suffice to attract this money from time 
. deposits into long term investments." (2)
It is their opinion that:
"the additional £125M a year required for new state or local 
authority borrowing could not be found without impinging on
the supply of capital for other home requirements." .....
"The large loans, if they are not to involve inflation, 
must draw on existing capital resources. These resources 
are, on the whole, utilized at present in varying degrees 
of active employment;.and the great bulk is utilized for 
home investment and commercial purposes. The extent to 
which any additional employment could be given by altering 
the direction of investment is, therefore, at the best 
strictly limited. But the direction of investment can only 
be altered if we are prepared to offer sufficiently high 
money rates to counteract the attractions offered. If, 
however, we do so, the damage done to home trade and employ­
ment by the imposition of such high rates would undoubtedly 
be much greater than any benefit they could obtain from the
(1) ibid
(2) ibid
/
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funds that could thereby be diverted from foreign 
investment." (l)
The root of the problem is also examined:
"The principal cause of our problem is to be found in the 
fact that in many branches, particularly of our heavy 
industries, costs of production (turning upon the organisa­
tion of both capital and labour) still tend to be 
excessive and that these difficulties cannot be solved 
till these costs have been placed on a competitive
level .....  If Mr McKenna is right that time deposits are
growing extensively, the main reason is probably that our 
costs of production keep orders away, and in default of ' 
orders, our manufacturers are unable or unwilling to 
replace their plant or build up for fresh developments.
But if this is the main source of our difficulties the loan 
programme of the pamphlet would do nothing to remove it and 
if it led to a rise in our internal price level it might 
in the long run make matters worse. At the very highest, 
any scheme of this kind is but a palliative, which would 
produce only a temporary improvement. The ultimate remedy 
for unemployment is not to be found in such measures. It 
must be solved by reducing the costs of production and the 
cost of living." (2)
Having made this assertion we get a guarded statement about how 
this is to be brought about.
"There was a time when perhaps a reduction in the costs of 
production was looked upon as largely synonymous with 
reduction in wages. In present conditions it must be 
sought in the improved organisation and efficiency of all 
elements of industry, in the adjustments of the business of 
the country to the changes that have taken place in world 
demands and in the supplies from different countries and 
in the improvement of our selling methods and in all that 
is implied in the term 'rationalisation'. In the (l)
(l) ibid. See note on present state of American capital
market - where the 'Treasury View* now referred to as 
'crowding out’ is discussed. Times Feb 25 1976. For 
foreign investment during the period seo Williams Economic 
History Review 1963* Aldcroft op. cit. Chapter 8. 
Appendix.
(2) ibid.
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mean while, the procedure proposed in the pamphlet tends 
to encourage British industry and labour in false hopes 
and, thereby, prevent the steps from being taken which 
would lead to recovery.1’ (l)
Thus in their view not only were the demand remedies likely to 
be ineffective in increasing aggregate activity they were likely 
to have bad effects in so far as they were likely to increase 
rather than decrease the supply price.
The Campaign
The evidence compiled by the Inter-Departmental Committee added 
further support for the policies which the Conservative Party 
had already specified, i.e. safeguarding, de-rating and a modest 
public works programme. Certain modifications were made to 
Baldwin's address to ensure consistency. There were changes in 
the section headed ’Training and Public Works1.
"A further substantial contribution to the relief of 
unemployment has been the greatly increased programme of 
public works which has been carried out during these years, 
involving commitments in cash and credit to the amount of 
over £400M.
It was pointed out that the above paragraph was inconsistent 
v/ith the Treasury contention that public works would only 
be carried out by talcing money from the aggregate sum 
available for expenditure, and which would in any event 
have been used to give some form of employment".(2)
The paragraph was subsequently redrafted and appeared as:
(1) ibid.
(2) CAB 23 60 CP 2U(29)
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"we shall steadily expand our training system as the need 
requires and we shall continue to provide money for public 
works with due regard to the needs of the industry when the 
use of public money is necessary." (l)
Thus, now firmly adhering to the ’Treasury View1 23, the Conservative 
Party approached the electorate. There had been some slight 
improvement in the economy in which they took comfort as they 
entered the election under the slogan of ’safety first* and their 
record of the previous four years. . During which time:
"••••■ recovery has been achieved by the combined efforts of 
our people assisted by the government^ policy of helping 
industry to help itself. The establishment of stable 
conditions has given industry confidence and 
opportunity." (2)
They were not alone in singing their praises: 'The Times’
thought that the Conservative administration had been the best
(3)for 5u years .
The Hew Statesman, did not share this view, considering that
"Seldom in history has a Government gone to the country 
with such a dull record and such a negative policy. 
Sanity, sobriety, tranquility safety these are the poppy
(1) CAB 23 6u. CP 20(29).
(2) Craig ( 1975) op. clt. .
(3) The Times 5 June 1929. See also current interpretations
of the period by economic historians and economists which have 
tended to endorse the view that the late 20s were pros­
perous years: Feinstein, Domestic Capital Formation in the 
United kingdom 192U-38; Susan Howson (1975) op. cit. p.32, 
Alacroft and Pichardson The British Economy 16^ /0-1939 «
Lomax, ‘Production and Productivity Movements in U.K. since
1900* Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 1929.
Aldcroft (1970) o p . cit.
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heads which Ministers offer the electorate day by day and 
which the electorate day by day spits out with disgust." (l)
The Conservative Party manifesto’s first section is headed ’The
f
Empire*and an important aspect of their policy was concerned with 
Imperial Preference and the formation of the Colonial Development 
Fund. The second section was called ’Trade and Employment* and 
here safeguarding was their major policy accompanied by rating 
relief and the now very tentative schemes for development.
Some modest proposals were offered for improvements in social 
welfare and the importance of the training schemes was stressed.
The Conservative party policy on unemployment though meagre was 
fairly consistent with their policy priorities. Its greatest 
strength lay in the underlying pragmatism of the party on issues 
like trade and budgetary policy. Whether safeguarding, possibly 
a small budget deficit and aid to industry would have made a 
more significant contribution to the problem than the policies of 
their rivals is a matter of conjecture. It is also doubtful 
that they could have maintained these policies for long given 
the growing adherence to the Treasury View* the criticism of the 
Churchillian budgetary management and the party divisions on 
trade. The policies were extremely modest and the time scale 
was entirely inappropriate given the problems which they faced. 
They appeared to have no conception of the scale of adjustment 
necessary to regain internal and external equilibrium or the time 
which such adjustments would take or in the event did take. They 
also failed as did most others, to contemplate the dynamic
(ij New Statesman, lbth May 1929*
7k
reactions to the process of adjustment.
The Policy of the Liberal Party
Introduction
It is the policy which the unsuccessful Liberal Party offered to 
the country in 1929 which has received most attention in 
subsequent years, being central to the whole Keynesian debate. 
Y/hatever the subsequent academic merits of the policy programmes 
offered they must have appeared to the electorate as a foray into 
cloud cuckoo land. After years of suffering and growing despair, 
there was to be a miraculous solution. The policy had all the 
aura of a quack medicine advertisement, rather than a serious 
attempt to solve the problem, in spite of the hard work and 
ingenuity which had gone into the formation of the policy docu­
ments for over two years^1 .^
Lloyd George's presentation must have added to this impression. 
Mill girls idle for months and years were to hear the 'wheels 
whirring'.
(l) a. Britain's Industrial Future: being a report of the 
Liberal Industrial Enquiry. Benn 1928.
b. We Can Conquer Unemployment: Mr Lioyd George's 
Pledge. Cassell 1925.
c. Can Lloyd George Do It? op. cit. (1929).
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"He asked his audience to go with him in imagination to a
household ....  a few weeks after the Liberal Government
had come to power and he described the worker coming home, 
not pottering dejectedly from the Labour Exchange, but 
with a wage twice or three times the amount he was 
previously getting. It was the wife who had had the 
worry of distributing the 25/-; she would have the joy of 
distributing £3 ." (l)
The electorate was in no mood for fairy stories. Eut what did 
the Liberals really offer?
The prevailing philosophy of the Liberal Party, as formulated in 
the Yellow Book, was that of interventionist capitalism. It was 
felt that the economic order, in which the doctrine of laisses 
faire had had its origin, had passed away, yet the industrial 
system had not attained an adequate standard either of justice 
or efficiency. State interference in these conditions was 
necessary but they wished to steer a middle course between the 
state ownership of socialism and the harsh individualistic 
regime of capitalism.
The policies for intervention which were suggested were radical 
and wide ranging, including organisational as well as social 
change. These were to include the appointment of an economic 
general staff to provide a continual survey of national problems', 
and improved industrial relations which would be based upon a 
*wise wages policy*« Security against dismissal and employee and 
consumer share holdings. The raining industry was to be 1
(1) The Times. 10th May 1929.
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reorganised and the Bank of England reformed.
Monetary Policy
On monetary policy they recognised that the extent to which 
action was possible was severely limited since the return to the 
gold standard. But it was felt that even within these limits it 
was possible for the Bank of England to
i"regulate the volume of credit, so far as possible, with a j;
view to the maintenance of steady trade conditions. 11 (l) ]
i
i
i
They even went as far as to support reforms to the Bank of |
(England, which,short of nationalisation, would ensure that it ‘
would act as a national institution and ’not a piece of private |i
property*. as to the gold standard itself, whilst they were \
critical of the timing and manner of the return, they saw no 
possibility of a major change of policy to reverse the decision, f j 
On budgetary policy, a balanced budget was advocated and |
criticisms were made of the Conservatives ’raiding the road j
fund1. They were committed to a large amount of loan finance. (
"The Nation lent for War; it will lend for Peace and 
Prosperity." (2)
1 ...  ' ' ' 1 ~ T ~ " " ' ' ‘ 1 i
(1) We Can Conquer Unemployment: Mr Lloyd George's Pledge, p.57» |
(2) Britain's Industrial Future, p. 4-12. I
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Protection
Protection was violently opposed in any fornu
’•Protection diverts the resources of the nation into the 
the wrong directions, encourages unhealthy and precarious 
developments and poisons the springs of business enterprise 
and the probity of Government. Our policy must be to 
return as rapidly as possible to the system of free trade 
on which our industrial life and our world wide commercial 
activities have been built up ..... whilst, therefore, it 
is true that a particular trade may benefit by protection, 
a country cannot restrict imports without restricting 
exports or increasing its foreign investments. In other 
words, tariffs are not a device for increasing the employ­
ment and production of a country but rather a means of 
diverting it from one direction to another," (l)
They were clearly not willing to compromise in any obvious way
with any interference with international price ratios. These
ratios were sacrosanct in spite of the more general interventionist
approach.to the internal economy which would, of course, be
reflected in the international price ratios ultimately. The
Liberals maintained their position even in the light of their own
data on tariffs which provided overwhelming evidence that
Britain was in a •second best* world of protection and that the
( 2)British tariffs were amongst the lowest in the world . In 
1930, §}>% of Britain's imports came in duty free. 12
(1) ibid. '
(2) Britain's Industrial Future op. cit. p. 55»
Aldcroft (1970) op« cit.
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Public Works
The main thrust of Liberal policy was National Development which 
they saw in a completely different light from the Labour Party,' 
though the proposals were similar. For them it was not merely 
a structural tool to increase efficiency or a way of using the 
unemployed temporarily but a mechanism which was itself capable 
of restoring -prosperity on a permanent basis. As such it was a 
dynamic policy; a policy which would facilitate adjustment to 
higher levels of income and employment. It was to be a 
vigorous policy of national reconstruction and development, 
directed by a Committee on National Development which would 
increase Britain’s capital resources while serving to reduce 
unemployment. This plan they saw as being derived from the pre­
war proposals for curing cyclical unemployment which advocated 
that the state and local authorities should adjust expenditure 
and concentrate it in those periods when private orders were 
slack and so counteract the effects of cyclical unemployment.
"This proposal which has never seriously been put into 
practice is the counterpart on a small scale of the more 
comprehensive programme which we set out .... The setting 
up of new industries, the modernization of old ones, the 
revolution in modes of transport and in the forms of power 
and the need to house our increased population and to 
rebuild a great part of our towns in accordance with 
modern standards of health and decency, all call for a 
large expenditure of capital at home. Without it we 
cannot hope to equal the efficiency of our leading 
industrial competitors. Moreover, a greater employment of 
labour in home trades can only take place if there is a 
greater investment of savings at home." (l)
(l) Britain's Industrial Future (192b) op. cit.
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As supportive evidence of the success of such plans of national 
development,they quoted the examples to be found in Germany, 
France, Italy and Sweden,
The development plans they had in mind were examined in some 
detail and included plans for road construction, housing and 
slum clearance, electrical developments and improvements in the 
docks, harbours and canals. The schemes were to be financed by:
"organised savings through the board of National Investment, 
by the restoration of the Eoad Fund to its legitimate 
purposes, by a betterment tax and a tax on improved site 
values, supplemented if necessary by a Eoad Eeconstruction 
Loan raised on the revenues of the Eoad Fund." (l)
For the mechanics of this scheme we need to look at the 
supportive pamphlet written by Keynes and Henderson, "Can Lloyd 
George Do It? The mechanics are based on the belief in the 
cumulative propensity of the development schemes to increase 
economic activity.
"We believe that the cumulative effect of,renewed 
prosperity will surpass expectations. It may well turn 
out in practice that a smaller programme than that outlined 
in "We Can Conquer Unemployment" will be sufficient to set 
the ball rolling, and shift the whole outlook of the 
country from depression to prosperity. The patient looks 
sick. But once he turns the corner,the rapidity of his 
convalescence may astonish even the doctors who have 
cured him." (2)
(1) We Can Conquer Unemployment (1929) op. cit.
(2) Can Lloyd George Do It? (1929) QP. cit. p.8.
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The scheme was a panacea; curing at one dose, cyclical and 
structural unemployment and restoring equilibrium levels of 
income and employment. Let us consider how this was to 
happen. The process is discussed in a chapter entitled, The 
Cumulative Force of Trade Activity,
"The fact that many workk*s people who are now unemployed 
would be receiving wages instead of unemployment pay would 
mean an increase in the effective purchasing power which 
would give a general stimulus to trade. Moreover, the 
greater trade activity would make for further trade 
activity; for the forces of prosperity, like those of 
trade depression, work with cumulative effect." Cl)
This has some times been referred to as a multiplier process' . 
It was, in fact, a crude description of spiralling effects.
There was no upper limit envisaged to the process and no 
numerical measure was possible of the extent of the effects of 
any injection of investment. In addition, to this cumulative 
process, a further fillip was envisaged from expectations.
"In the economic world ....  coming events cast their
shadows before ..... and .... the knowledge that large 
schemes of work were being undertaken would give an 
immediate fillip to the whole trade and industry of the 
country." (3 )
The increase in employment was to come from the employment 
initiated by the development plans directly; by the indirect
(1) l&LsL
(2) R. Skidelsky (196?) op. cit.
(3) Can Llovd George Do It? (1929) op. cit.
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employment which could be associated with these plans; by the 
stimulus to trade given by the increased purchasing power which 
would lead to further cumulative trading activity; by the chang­
ing expectations which these activities would bring about. These 
explanations were the nearest they approached to a dynamic 
sequence analysis or to the micro/macro relationship. But 
without any clearly specified analysis, much of which was to be 
provided by the development of the multiplier approach, the schemes 
lacked credence. Until the expansion could be seen to be finite 
the policy appeared unrealistic. Mere descriptions of spirals 
were seen as flights of fancy.
The multiplier concept was not fully developed until the Summer 
of 1930 (See Economists Committee, Chapter Four below) and was not 
generally available until the publication of Kahn’s paper in 
1931(1). It was later developed in the form of the income 
multiplier in the General Theory.
The process described at this time, as well a.*.i hinting at the 
fundamental multiplier concept, which in Shackle's interpreta­
tion deals with the repercussions on consumption and income 
streams of initial injections of investment (which could of course 
be generalised to include the impact of other injections into the 
income stream) contained ideas which included shifts in 
schedules attributable to changes in expectations: mere 
descriptions of the interdependence in the economy referred to by
iJ_ ____  ____ __________  __  . t
(1) Kahn (1931) on. cit. Klein (19^7) 00. cit.
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82
Shackle as the *Leontief mechanism* and possibly a crude idea of 
an accelerator: the induced investment which arises because an 
increase in capital stock is necessary to facilitate increased" 
output
The Reception of the Policy
The Labour Party was critical but rather ambivalent about the 
policy of the Liberals. It was felt that the hesitant reception 
which the policy had received from some prominent Liberals was 
likely to ensure that,
"Britain’s Industrial Future would bear a close resemblance 
to Britain’s Industrial Past".(2)
The Labour Party and its supporting press were at a loss as to 
whether to claim the policies as their own and accuse the 
Liberals of plagiarism or to criticise the policies as lacking 
the scope of their own^K 123
(1) G.L.S. Shackle The Years of High Theory Cambridge University 
Press, 1967. pp. ox.
(2) Labour and the Nation 2nd Edition (1929).
(3) New Statesman, March 23rd, e.g.
"The liberals, as a party which cannot be returned to power 
not unnaturally promises the most; but in essentials 
Hr Lloyd George is only saying more stridently and with 
characteristic gesture, what the leading spokesmen of the 
Labour Party are also saying in a more restrained 
fashion."
or, New Statesman, 3uth March
"Now of the future Mr Lloyd George at present has told us
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The main criticism was to be found in the Memoranda on certain 
proposals relating to Unemployment^ ^ , Criticism was directed at 
the feasibility of carrying out the plans democratically given 
the legal, administrative, institutional and technical 
constraints and on the possibility of influencing aggregate 
demand in the economy: the ’Treasury View*, Liberals in the 
pamphlet, We can Conouer Unemployment* rejected ' the Treasury 
View:
"This view is hoary with antiquity and clothed in the 
utmost respectability but it is, nevertheless, 
completely fallacious." (2 )
It was considered to be false because in the first place it 
proved too much: if it were true of state enterprise, it would 
be true of all enterprise and thus trade could never improve# 
It was pointed out that not all savings were utilised and
nothing. E '2 presumably believes that, if emergency 
employment is provided for those who are now out of work 
the mere effort of setting the wheels of production moving 
again at fulL speed will be to cause a lasting revival of 
industry, or at least that the further measures required 
to achieve this call for no present definition. But can 
this be so confidently anticipated? Will not any lasting 
restoration of British trade and industry call for 
constructive measures of quite a different order from those 
which Mr Lloyd George is basing his appeal? And will the 
Liberal Party, if it follows him to the full length of his 
emergency programme be induced to make the large departures 
from its traditional policy of individualism and faissez 
faire that a permanent policy of economic reconstruction 
requires?"
(1) Memorandum on certain Proposals (1929) op. cit.
(2) We Can Conquer Unemployment (1929) op. cit«
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McKenna's figures, showing the high proportion of demand to time
deposits, were quoted* indicating a source of funds for the 
investment programme*
The view was also attacked in the New Statesman;
"Surely it is clear enough today that these supposed laws 
do not exist, and that State policy can usefully exert a 
very great influence on both the volume and the character 
of employment in the community." (l)
Can Lloyd George Do It?
Can Lloyd George do it?, the major supportive document to appear
on behalf of the Liberal party, was the contribution of two of
the architects of the original plan: Keynes and Henderson. They
discussed the criticism which had been made, i.e. number
employed, transfer problem, need for public works and the
scheme's apparent socialism. Their most important attack was
on the 'Treasury View' which they discuss in Chapter IX Will it
Merely Divert Employment from other Enterprises? It is this
chapter which contains the economic meat of the pamphlet. It
% .
begins with the argument used in the earlier pamphlet to refute
r
the Treasury View: if the view is to be believed,
"then there is virtually no question of absorbing our un­
employment by any means (other than inflation which is 
unthinkable; and that the obstacle which barred the path was 
no other than an insufficiency of capital. This, if you 
please, in Great Britain, who has surplus savings which she 
is accustomed to lend abroad on the scale of more than 
£1U0M a year. This argument is not only implausible, it (l)
(l) New Statesman, 13th April 1929
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is untrue. There are three sources available: savings from 
tin employment, savings run to waste and the reduction in 
foreign lending."
They go on to explain that:
"Savings ....  do not necessarily materialise in invest­
ments. The amount invested in capital improvements depends, 
on the one hand, on the amount of credit created by the 
Bank of England, and on the other hand, on the eagerness 
of entrepreneurs to invest, of whom the Government is the 
most important .... so fair from the total investment, as 
determined by these factors, being necessarily equal to the 
total savings,disequilibrium between these two is at the 
root of our troubles." (l)
This repudiation of Say's Law is accompanied by an exercise in 
dynamic s,
"when investment runs ahead of savings we have a boom, 
intense employment and a tendency to inflation; when 
investment lags behind, we have a slump and abnormal 
unemployment as at present." (2)
The reasons why the plans would not cause inflation are then 
given:
"not all credit-creation means inflation. Inflation only 
results when we endeavour, as we did in the war and after­
wards, to expand our activities still further after every­
one is employed and our savings are being used up to the 
hilt ... A large amount of deflationary slack has first (l)2
(l) Keynes J.M. and Henderson H.D. Can Lloyd George do it? 
Nation and Athei^ gliim. 1929» P* 20.
This is a statement of Keynes' view that savings did not 
automatically equal investment - the view expounded in 
the Treatise-. See Klein, (19^7) op. cit.
(2) ibid.
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to be taken up before there is the slightest danger of a 
development policy leading to inflation.” (l)
This is an interesting statement about the slope of the supply 
schedule during periods of unemployment which was developed as 
the basis of Keynesian inflation theory to explain the possibility 
of demand inflation in a fully employed economy. It has also been 
used to explain behaviour in the labour market. Its acceptance 
was crucial if policies to increase demand were not to be implicated 
in price changes which it was thought might have adverse effects 
on trade and so fail to increase aggregate employment.
The real difficulty in the way of easier credit policy by the 
Bank of England was the fear that an expansion of credit might 
lead to a loss of gold which the Bank could not afford. Keynes 
and Henderson agreed that it would not be safe for the Bank to 
expand credit unless it was certain beforehand that there were 
borrowers at home standing ready to absorb it at existing rates 
of interest. This concept implies that they were worried about 
an inelastic demand for funds for domestic investment rather than 
an insufficient supply of funds. This attitude may have arisen 
or been given credence by the attraction of speculative issues (l)
(l) ibid. ;
The relationship is explored in the Living Wage, op, cit.
Kahn (1931/ op. cit; and Bellerby who produced some 
tentative estimates of the relationship. Keynes later J
became ambivalent about the matter and a year later was 
convinced that if the expansion caused prices to rise then 
this might be an important step in raising profits and so 
sustaining the expansion. He also thought that the rise 
would similarly affect any other expansionary enterprise \
public or private. See Evidence to Macmillan Committee,
Chapter Three below. ;f
I
5;
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rather than industrial stocks in the late 20s^^. Given these 
problems the Liberal plan was essential, for
"it provides the necessary condition for an expansion of 
credit to be safe*"
by creating safe outlets for funds in domestic ventures. The Co ­
operation of the Bank of England was, however, essential. \
” for unfortunately, it would lie within the power of the 
Bank, provided it were to pursue a deflationary policy 
aimed .at preventing any expansion in bank credit to defeat; 
the best-laid plans and to ensure that the expenditure 1' 
financed by the Treasury was at the expense of other |
business enterprise." (2) i
I
l
The precarious position of the exchange rate was mentioned and j
it was thought that this would be eased by a reduction of foreign!
investment. The Bank of England semi-official embargo on foreign
issues was referred to as a crude instrument suitable only for
(3)temporary use and its renewal is not envisaged . instead,
they would rely on the transference of savings from foreign to
home investment as firms became more prosperous and also because
\  >of the attraction of Government stocks.
(lj Howson Cly?5J or>. cit. j
j
(2) Keynes and Henderson (1929) op. cit.
(jj 'During the war controls were placed an- foreign lending to ensure 
that the Government had access to sufficient funds to finance the 
.war.. .In the post war-period the embargo was used to protect .the 
.Governments position in the capital market,to protect the exchanges j 
during the restoration of the gold standard and to ensure that j
loans were not provided for countries which had not settled their j
war debts i.e. FranoJ; Greece, and Serbia. By late 1923 Serbia was 1 
obtaining loans from New York,and France from Holland and Switzerland) 
Much of this money was coming indirectly from London. In view of the | 
evasion the.embargo was lifted in November 1925» Sayers(l976) or-citi 
vol 111 Appen. 30, 2 Macmillan Committee Evidence, QQ 3^1^-3^22,9246; 
J. Atkin, 'Official Regulation of British Overseas Investment 191^-3; 
Economic History Review 23, 1970.
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The support of other economists is quoted (i.e. Pigou and Stamp) 
for the view that capital developments financed by the Government 
are capable of increasing employment and that the Treasury dogma 
was fallacious.
The Campaign and Potentials of the Policy
In 6pite of Lloyd George’s pledge that, before the end of twelve 
months, unemployment would reach normal proportions (presumably 
some pre-war average) the doubts of the electorate remained.
The success of the scheme was dubious given the practical 
difficulties and the rather scanty attention which was paid to 
the international monetary problem. Keynes believed that 
activity at home would divert money from abroad and provide the 
funds for development at home and relieve pressure on the 
exchanges.
They could probably have surmounted the fiscal implications of the
policy by judicious separation of capital and revenue elements in
the budget. He was criticised for this view by the Treasury who
envisaged high interest rates as being necessary to attract
these fu n d s ^ .  This problem and the problem of the unrealistic
time horizon for a democratically, constituted economy causes
one to be sceptical of the effectiveness of the policy in
(2)practice* The evidence from the work of Thomas about the
likely size of the multiplier also casts some doubts upon this. (l)
(l) Keynes eventually became convinced that the public invest­
ment could only be undertaken if some controls were intro­
duced to protect the Balance of Payments. See Chapter k.
(2) Thomas (1975) on. cit.
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The ability of the Liberals to deal with the conflicting 
objectives of unemployment policy and the exchange rater policy 
might well have been much greater than that of the other two 
parties, for they did not revere the gold standard as did the N 
Conservatives, nor were they as in awe of it as the Labour Party. 
They saw no advantage in returning to the gold standard of the 
pre-war parity but were now reticent about recommending any 
change in policy. In office, they may have been able to achieve 
a more successful unemployment policy.
The Policy of the Labour Party
Introduction
The Labour Party1s strategy was to go to the »root of the 
problem». This fundamentalist approach was to win favour with 
the electorate. Though the plans appeared dull and pedestrian 
compared to those of the Liberals they had the aura of being 
’sound* and »realistic•»
The Labour Party was a socialist party but socialism was a far 
off star to be approached stealthily and with caution. The 
policy was dependent upon the notion that unemployment was a 
continuing phenomenon in capitalist economies which could only 
be remedied by direct radical action. They had doubts about the 
ability of the capitalist economy even with Government inter­
vention to generate full employment Whilst advocating
(l) D. Winch, op. cit. for discussion of this peiVt.
90
contra-cyclical policies, they were also attempting more than a 
restoration to normal conditions: they looked for a more 
permanent reduction in unemployment and, as such, looked for 
ways of reducing the supply of labour and reconstructing the 
economy. The regional and industrial composition of unemployment 
made it imperative that this should attempt to remove some of 
the problems confronting the basic industries. The possibility 
of their achieving this aim was hampered by their rigid acceptance 
of free trade doctrines:
"Safeguarded countries have unemployment, low wages and 
sweating, poverty, generally corrupt policies and high 
costs of living.1 2’ (1 ^
and the adherence to the doctrine of balanced budgets. This is 
•indicated in Snowden's attack upon Churchill.
"In each of his last four budgets, Mr. Churchill never had | 
a genuine surplus. In two of them he admitted deficits 
which amounted to over £50M which had to be met by increas­
ing the National Debt. He has raided every national 
reserve he could lay his hands on. Last year he took £20M 
from the sinking fund and put it into revenue and then he 
boasted of a surplus of £l8M." (2)
The policy documents in which the Labour Party’s proposals were 
laid out were: Labour and the Nation which appeared in two
(1) Craig (1975) op. cit.j'The Labour Manifesto 1929»
(2) The Times, *t-th May 1929. For comparison of Churchillian 
and Snowdenian budgetary management also See Harold 
Macmillan ( op. cit.J p. 205/^.
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editions in 1928 and 1929 respectively; and How to Conquer
Unemployment« Labour’s re~ply to Lloyd George^^. These docu-
raents are often considered much inferior to the Liberal
(2)proposals , The style is less dynamic but on specific matters
such as public works the schemes were probably as well developed
as those of the Liberal Party as can be seen from subsequent
(3)examination of the latter . These documents contained a 
comprehensive survey of the prevailing situation,, a critique 
of the policies of the Government and the Liberal Party and a 
statement of their proposed policy.
The Conservative government was severely criticised for its 
treatment of the unemployed and for its failure to make adequate 
provision for their maintenance or employment. Criticism was
talso directed against the policy which forced local 
authorities to bear, in the majority of cases,the costs of the 
public works programmes and the maintenance of large numbers of 
unemployed.
Of the Liberals: they were timid and their schemes were unlikely 
to gain the acceptance of a number of influential Liberals. 
Hovrever, faced with the Liberal schemes, they were at a loss to 
see by what mechanism the public works policy, which they had 
advocated for many years, could be elevated to a policy which 12
(1) Labour Party 1929.
(2) Skidelsky (196?) on. cit.
O )  See Chapter Four Below.
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could at once alleviate the distress and provide the mechanism 
for a long term solution to the unemployment problem. They were 
incredulous and quite incapable of understanding the metamorphosis 
which had overtaken their scheme. They could not believe that 
public works schemes could permanently remove unemployment unless 
associated with a reconstruction policy.
Reconstruction
The major policy proposal was reconstruction of the basic 
industries to enable them to recover lost export markets. This 
fundamental policy was attractive and appeared rational given 
the industrial distribution of the unemployment problem, see 
Table 3 above. The implications of rationalisation/or unemploy­
ment, in the short run, and the possibility of recapturing the 
former trading position in a period of contracting world trade 
was not adequately considered.
Public Workfi
Given the constraints within which the Labour Party was to 
operate the policies advocated were comprehensive. In order 
to improve productivity, national development was to be under­
taken to improve the fabric of society. The programme for 
national development was to include housing, and slum clearance; 
land drainage and reclamation, afforestation and the development 
of small holdings; the reorganisation of railways and other forms 
of transport and the coal industry; and a programme of 
electrification. Although they had no expansionary policy^^ (l)
(l) How to Conquer Unemployment 1929 on. cit. They mention the 
lack of demand.
nIn this world of pitiable underconsumption, successive 
governments have allowed under-employment to exist without ______ the_smallest attempt to prevent it«“
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as such they had an anti-deflationary policy and did expect 
some stimulation to result from the general development plansi
"any attempt to compete by following the downward path of 
lower wages and longer hours was to take the first step 
down a slippery slope, at the bottom of which lies 
universal ruin. The course dictated by consideration both 
of common sense and humanity the Labour party holds, is 
precisely the opposite from this suicidal rivalry in 
mutual degradation.
It is not to curtail the purchasing power of the population 
of Great Britain, which offers to the British producers 
what is overwhelmingly their most important market. It is 
to maintain and increase it by every means in our 
power." Cl)
Thus, they were aware of the problems associated with the down­
ward spiral and showed (rather unrealistic) optimism with regard 
to the expansionary effects.
"There is a great market at home which can be developed 
by increasing the purchasing power of the working classes. 
There is a greater market overseas, especially in India 
and the Grown Colonies, where there are enormous popula­
tions with a very low standard of living and vast 
undeveloped resources. A Labour Government will set to 
work at once by using export credits and trade facility 
^guarantees to stimulate the depressed export trades of 
iron and steel and engineering and textile manufactures, 
shipbuilding and shipping will immediately be benefitted 
by an increase of foreign trade and the improved 
employment in those industries will be a great addition to 
the purchasing power in the home market." (2) 12
(1) Labour and the Nation (1929) cp. cit.
(2) .Craig (1975 ) op. cit.
Again the influence of the underconsumptionists is apparent.
But in spite of this the policy makers failed to comprehend the 
possible impact upon internal demand of a large development 
programme.
They viewed these policies and those of the emergency schemes 
of work rather differently from the Liberals.
It was the intention of the Labour party if elected to 
establish an Employment and Development Board which would have 
at its disposal each year a Treasury grant to be drawn upon as 
required. It would be the duty of this board to bring develop­
ment schemes to the point of execution in readiness for the time 
when they should be pushed ahead in the interests of employment 
and trade. There was, they thought, *no lack of sound schemes*, 
the urgent need for which was generally admitted. This was 
the *plaster of relief works' which, whilst admitted as 
essential
"emergency schemes of work must be set a foot on the 
largest possible scale in order to provide immediate 
employment." (l)
were,in the overall format of the policy, secondary to the 
establishment of that state of affairs which ensured, (l)
(l) How to Conquer Unemployment(1929) op. cit.
\"a lasting restoration of industry, a general raising of 
the efficiency of labour,”. Cl)
For the Labour Party, public works were temporary measures which 
could alleviate the worst periods of unemployment and which could 
with careful planning and foresight, be used to improve the 
social and economic fabric of the community rather than being 
mere relief works which were still accompanied in their minds by 
the horrors of the Poor Law.
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
\
They had little to offer on monetary policy except suspicion and
a ’searching enquiry* and more stringent controls of banking and
credit. The Bank of England was to become a public corporation.
The gold standard was accepted and they were to do all in their power
(2 )to implement the Genoa Proposals of 1922 .
The budget was to be conservatively, even puritanically managed. 
Lloyd George was upbraided for being ’ready to mortgage the fixture 
as gaily as ever*. Though they did admit a limited role for loan 
financing, as long as the capital and revenue implications were 
clearly separated, the revenue being paid off> annually and an 
adequate sinking fund established to ensure redemption of the debt. *2
ll) ibid.
(2) ibid. ^
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Supply of Labour
The other part of the strategy was to relieve the pressure of 
unemployment on the labour market directly by pension schemes' 
for the old and the disabled, to ensure honourable retirement; 
the raising of the school leaving age to 1 5 * with maintenance 
allowances; facilitating migration* internal and external; and 
by the implementation of the Washington Convention of 1919 for 
a 48 hour week.
Alleviation of Distress
The aspect of policy to which they were more committed than the 
other parties was the insurance policy which was intended to 
provide adequate maintenance for the unemployed by state grants 
and ensure that costs fell neither on the workers* contribution 
nor on the costs of production. They gave:
>
• "an assurance to every worker both of an opportunity to 
work while his powers were at their height and of honour­
able retirement when he has done his bit in the service of 
the country." (1 )
Potentials of Policy
Thus like the Conservatives they were relying upon reconstruc­
tion (though this would be undertaken in a different way) to 
reduce the costs of production, and public works to provide some 
relief for the unemployed. But there was in addition the
. (l) How to Conquer Unemployment (1929) op. cit.
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advocacy of free trade which accompanied by the condition that 
budgets were to be balanced was bound to make the task of 
restoring business activity a difficult and lengthy process. 
Thi8| then, was the official Labour Party policy but policy 
measures were being, and had been, debated by others associated 
with the Labour Party.
Melchett—Turner Reports
The Melchett-Turner Reports have already been referred to above. 
After the years of strained industrial relations, of which the 
general strike was the outstanding conflagration, there was, 
towards the end of the decade, a growing atmosphere of concilia­
tion. One aspect .of this was the discussions which took place 
between the T.U.C. and a »Representative Group of Employers' 
Under the designation, "The Conference on Industrial 
Reorganisation and Industrial Relations" referred to as the 
Melchett-Turner talks
Citrine and Bevin were the trades unionists enthusiastic about
the meetings which were disapproved of by Cook and Maxton.
The origin of the meeting is well documented in Bullock's
(2)bipgraphy, 'The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin1 2 • .
(1) The title is derived from the names of the joint Chairmen 
of the Conferences: Ben Turner and Sir Alfred Mond, later 
Lord Melchett. The name of Tillet, previous chairman is 
is sometimes mentioned in this context.
(2) Alan Bullock The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin. Heinnenan, 
London, I960. Chapter 15. Seealso Citrine, Men at Work 
Hutchinson, London 1964-.
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In response to growing interest in the activities of the group a 
statement was made on 4th July 1926 which included the objectives 
of the conference were to . •
"discuss the whole field of industrial reorganisation and 
industrial relations and to assist in the solution of the 
greatest problem confronting the country at the present 
time, namely, the restoration of industrial prosperity and 
with it the standard of living of the population." (l)
The most inter e s t i n g  report is that published on 12th March
(p)1929 . It is chiefly concerned with unemployment and begins
with an analysis of the facts about and causes of unemployment. 
Unemployment is considered to be a cyclical phenomenon intensified 
by monetary policy, the changing patterns of world trade and 
rationalization* Palliative remedies are recommended. These 
include: the restitution of the trades facilities provisions; a 
development fund; reductions in the supply of labour including 
redundancy arrangements, retirements provisions, the raising of 
the school leaving age and emigration; and some special treatment 
for agriculture ani mining* Long term measures included the 
reorganization of industry and an inquiry into the banking system 
which it was hoped would lead to better monetary management.
The Living V/age
The Independent Labour Party had prod u c e d  separate policy 
proposals a few years earlier. These proposals were quite 
different in emphasis from those of the official Labour Party.
The most interesting document is probably, " The Living Wage", 12
(1) Interim Joint H e p o r t , 4th J u l y  1928.
(2) I n t e r i m  Joint R e p o r t . 12th M a r c h  1929.
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which was produced b y  a  study group consisting of H.N. Brailsford,
J.A. Hobson, A. Creech-Jone6 and E.F. Wise. It is very m u c h  an 
economist's rather than a politician's a p p r a i s a l ^ ^ .
It is devoted to the concept of 'the living w a g e ' and the process 
by which such a standard could be achieved and maintained. Under­
consumption theories are expanded and reference is made to two 
works of Hobson, "The Evolution of Modern C a p i t a l i s m " and "The 
Economics of U n e m p l o y m e n t ". It was thought that:
"we produce less wealth than our technical resources would 
enable us to create because the mass of wage-earners lack 
’effective demand' ..... Too much proportionately, of the 
product of industry, has been accumulated and applied to 
the creation of fresh instruments of production: too little 
prop o r t i o n a t e l y  has gone in wages to make a market for the 
product of the n e w  machines." (2)
To ensure that effective demand was forthcoming, at least in the 
home market, two m a tters should be attended to: expansion of 
credit and currency to keep pace w i t h  the growth of output»and a 
wider distribution of this expanded purchasing power. It was not 
considered sufficient to increase the nation's total purchasing 
power :
"care must be taken in distributing it to ensure that a due 
proportion shall be observed, in its probable destination,
(1) Brailsford, # . N . , Hobson, J.A., Creech-Jones, A., and 
Wise, E.F. 'The Living W a g e ' , Independent Labour Party, 
1926.
» p. 8•(2) ibid
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b e t w e e n  savings and spending, or, in other words, 
between expenditure on reproductive instruments and on 
consumable goods.*' (l)
There were two ways of increasing the purchasing power. The 
first method was seen to be redistributive taxation which it was 
thought ought not to r i s k  inflation as it merely redistributed 
actual income. The second method was the raising of wages which 
though a powerful wa y  of raising effective demand was likely to 
cause inflation. To avoid inflation the policy should be 
accompanied by credit control; elimination of dealers of middle­
men by state organised importation of staple foods; and by 
increasing output by the reorganisation of industry.
The third chapter of this volume is entitled, »'Credit and 
Banking". Barbara Wootton is thanked for her help in its 
preparation. The success of the p o l i c y  was thought to depend 
upon b a n kers and the Treasury adopting an enlightened credit 
policy and deliberately controlling credit for the purpose of 
k e e p i n g  price levels stable. Alth o u g h  there w a s  m u c h  w o r k  to be 
done before the Quantity Theory of M o n e y  was fully understood, 
it was considered that the theory and practice were sufficiently 
established for the outlines of a  rational stabilisation policy 
to be developed. Such policies would need close monitoring of 
prices, employment and output by the national bank. 1
(1) i b i d , p.10
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"At the first signs of a slump, it must be the duty of the 
b a n k  slightly to expand the volume of credit and to lower 
its price; at the first signs of a boom, it will gently 
a p p l y  restrictive measures." (l)
Furthermore:
"It follows from the Quantity Theory, that as production 
expands, whether as the consequence of n e w  inventions, 
b e t t e r  organisation or the normal growth of capital, 
credit and currency must expand to an equal extent." (2)
It is claimed that these policies are in accordance with the 
accepted authorities: Mr Keynes and Mr Eawtrey • The innova­
tion introduced is seen to be the w e l d i n g  on of ^distribution*.
It was p o inted out that the benefits of stabilisation could not 
be fully enjoyed if it were adopted at the w r o n g  point of the 
trade cycle»
"If one stabilises while prices are falling or in the dead 
p e r i o d  between slump and boom, the normal volume of credit 
w i l l  be fixed at a level which fails to give full employ­
ment to the existing and available labour and capital of 
a  country." ik) 123
(1) ’Ibid, p.13.
(2) ibid, p.13.
(3) T h e y  also refer to the w o r k  of E.M.H. Lloyd,
Stabilization (1923) and I.L.O. U n e mployment in it_s .N a t ional 
and International A s p e c t s .
(*t) The L i v i n g  Wage (1926) o p . c i t . p.l^.
102
This is one of the few statements which stresses the importance 
of the correct timing of policy measures. Although the policy 
they suggested had not been adopted by either the Bank of England 
or the Treasury, the country was considered to be suffering from 
the consequences of a de facto stabilisation carried out during 
a period of extensive unemployment. Thus it was their contention 
that some expansion of credit was an essential condition for 
recovery:
"It is doubtless true, that every such expansion of credit 
in advance of production must lead to some rise in the 
price level. . But, in our view, when as now, there is 
extensive unemployment both of labour and capital, the rise , 
in the price level may be negligible and will only be 
temporary." (1 )
This view of the supply schedule wasshared by Keynes and 
Henderson.
The authors of the report felt that the policy was still feasible 
although it would have been easier to implement if Britain had 
not returned to,the gold standard or had returned at a-lower 
parity. They go on to suggest gaily: •
"It would be sufficient to lower bank rate and when 
necessary export gold freely." (2 ) y
This optimistic/ view is qualified in the later chapters where 
they say that complete success would be dependent upon international 
co-operation of the sort suggested at the Genoa 12
(1) ibid, p. 15. Keynes and Henderson (1921) op., cit
(2 ) ibid, p. 1 7 .
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Conference. In addition, a  reduction of the dependence on trade 
ia recommended
"A great part of Europe, fettered by reparations and i n ter­
allied debts, is obliged to limit imports and expand 
exports. It wou l d  b e  only prudent on our part, therefore, 
to lessen wherever it can be done on economic lines, our 
dependence on foreign trade. (1)
i
Control of the B a n k  of England would be necessary for this 
.purpose and it was suggested that a nation a l i s i n g  charter should 
state that it was the duty of the © a n k  to ensure a stable price 
level and that n a t i o n a l  policy and social u t ility should govern 
the dii’ection of the flow of credit as well as its volume.
Some of the proposals contain recommendations on similar lanes 
to those proposed in Australia, i.e. for the introduction of 
family allowances and a minimum wage agreement in an effort to
"compel this anarchial market to honour a higher l a w  than 
scarcity." (2) ^
If the community considered that cheapness of some essential 
service or commodity wa s  vital and not compatible with a living 
wage, they should resort to a bounty or a subsidy .
(1) Ibid. p. 51.
(2) ibid. p. 2 8.
(3) Keynes also advocated this view in his discussion with the 
Macmillan Committee, See Chapter 3«
The central concern of the document is the egalitarian concept 
a l i v i n g  wage which was to be facilitated by compensatory 
monetary policy aimed at m a intaining the economy at a
high level of utilisation of labour and capital. Monetary policy 
was to be implemented by a nationalised Bank of England which 
would endeavour within its powers to insulate the home economy 
from external pressures on the currency. The strength of these 
pressures are recognised and hope was once again pinned on the 
Genoa r e c ommendations for international co-operation.
Comp e n s a t o r y  monetary policy thus became the central aspect of 
the policy on to which Hobson's theories about unuer-consumption 
fit rather uneasily, for once stability is achieved, the argu­
ments for greater equality of distribution as a means of avoiding 
fluctuations became ra t h e r  irrelevant at least in the short run.
Revolution b y  Reason
Oswald Mosley's tract, Revolution b y  Reason , also had its 
origins in the Independent Labour I'arty. It is b a sed upon a 
speech which he made to the ILP Summer School in 1925« The 
proposals were dubbed the Birmingham Proposals for they h a d  been 
adopted b o t h  by the Birmingham ILP Federation and the Birmingham 
Borough Labour P a r t y T h e  tract is directed primarily,
"to the immediate and pressing problem of the transition 
f r o m  capitalism to socialism." (2) 12
(1) 0. Mo s l e y  Revolution by Reason . Blackfriars Press,
London, 1925.
(2) i b i d ,
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It was an at t a c k  on gradualism and its visionary oratory fore­
sees the imminent emergence of a socialist state out of decaying 
capitalism.
"Events move with ever-gathering momentum to conclusions 
of ever-d a r k e n i n g  shadoivs. Crisis after crisis sends 
capitalist s o c i e t y  staggering ever nearer to abysses of 
i n conceivable catastrophe to the suffering mi l l i o n s . "  (l)
The m e c h a n i s m  by whi c h  socialism was to emerge w a s  b y  the use of 
M o n e t a r y  * policy to a stage where it
"can be made an instrument of transferring economic power 
and effective demand to the workers." (2)
The central p r oblem was seen to be the lack of effective demand.
"Capitalism searches the world feverishly for fresh markets 
whilst at our own door men, w o m e n  and children are almost 
p e r i s h i n g  for lack of the goods for which we are told no 
ma r k e t  exists." (3)
Mosley attacks policies of wage reductions as they are likely to 
reduce still further the purchasing power and he attempts to 
analyse the dynamics associated w i t h  attempts to reduce the price 
level.
(2j ibid. 
(2; ibj d . 
(3J ibid
io 6
"Those who seek to solve the problem of purchasing power 
and markets through the medium of falling prices are faced 
with the unanswerable facts of post war experience. To 
give sufficient new purchasing power by this means to 
command the full productive resources oi the country we 
should now require a fall in the price level so drastic 
and precipitate that an almost fatal shock would ensue to 
the enfeebled body of present industry." (l)
He quoted Keynes on this adjustment problem.
0
He suggested that credit should be expanded, and proposed to 
facilitate this by issuing money in the shape of consumer credits. 
The inflationary effects should be counteracted by socialist 
planning. This should ensure that a greater supply of goods
t
were produced to match the increase in credit. Capitalists who 
responded to increasing demand by increasing prices instead of 
production would be 'socialized 1.
Whilst Keynes and the authors of The Living Wage, debated the 
proposition whether and by how much prices would rise in response 
to changes in demand, Mosley was to introduce legislation to 
stop them rising.
His plans for socialization of industry differs from those of the 1LP 
that he would socialize 'not the duds but the plums'. He would, 
however, adopt the ILP policy of talcing over the purchase of 
imports and cutting out the middleman. Banks would be 
nationalized and luxury industries closed.
(l) ibid. p. 10
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Mosley was in favour of managed currency which he saw as being 
in line with socialism which he defined as the conscious 
control and direction of human resources for human needs. This 
objective was seen to be incompatible with a system which made 
the vital medium of exchange dependent upon chance discoveries 
of gold fields.
"Is the employment of the British worker to be dependent 
upon a nigger digging up a. lump of glittering metal in far 
away Africa?” (1 ;
Mosley's plans were examined and expanded in some detail by 
John Strachey in a book which was published a few months later 
under the same t i t l e ^ .
The Potentials of Policy
The left-wing of the political spectrum had formulated policies 
which were potentially much more refined and radical than the 
rather cumbersome public works policy of the Liberals. And 
whilst the Labour Party offered the electorate their rather 
pedestrian policies they could, once elected, have reconsidered 
the strategies suggested by these associated groups. Whatever 
the subsequent evaluation of the policies proposed by the parties 
in the election the electorate preferred the less extravagant 
promises of the Labour Party and the Conservatives to those of 
Lloyo George. The Labour party was returned as the majority 
partji; having won a majority of seats though not votes in the 
election. 12
(1 ) ibid.
(2) J. Strach^ Revolution by Reason, Leonard Parsons, 
London 1925.
Tile policies of the official Labour Party failed to consider the 
tine scale which any policyf which was to operate for the most 
part through improvements in the general fabric of the economy, 
would need to be effective. These policies allied to denial of any 
form of protection either in the form of trade barriers or 
exchange control, accompanied by a policy of generous unemploy­
ment insurance were bound to flounder given the acceptance of the 
*
principle of balanced budgets and the gold standard.
Given the external constraints and the constraints which the party 
had willingly imposed upon themselves, the realm of possible 
action was very small and the possibility of finding a solution 
remote. Some aspects of their policy such as better maintenance 
of the unemployed, a public works programme or even a vigorous 
reconstruction policy for industry might have had side effects 
unpredicted by the advocates which could have eased the 
situation given a less puritanical and more pragmatic approach to 
budgetary policy and to free trade.
Conclusion
Diagnosing the unemployment problem as a problem of cyclical 
depression, the Liberals, the 1LP and the alliance of trades 
unions and industrialists recommended radical expansionary 
measures. The policies of the Liberals were likely to have run 
into trouble had they prev/cU. .unwilling to compromise on free 
trade or the exchange rates. The policies of the other groups 
had no potential outlet except in the form of pressure upon the
Labour Party.
io 8
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The Labour Party and the Conservatives interpreted the unemploy­
ment problem to be structural and so biased their policies 
accordingly. The policies were different for the Conservatives 
relied upon aid to industry and protection; and the Labour Party 
attempted a more direct reconstruction policy, accompanied by a 
public works programme as a short run strategy to reduce 
unemployment. This policy had the same potential to reduce 
unemployment as that produced by the Liberals but fewer claims 
were made for it. Both the Conservatives and the Labour Party 
severely underestimated the time necessary to facilitate 
reconstruction on the necessary scale.
The policy documents presented at the election in 1929 and in the 
preceding years all included policies which were capable of 
reducing unemployment and in the hands of a lively administration, 
not bedevilled by constraints of its own making, no doubt would 
have done so. The differing diagnosis of the nature of the 
unemployment problem need not have led to policies having very 
different effects upon the unemployment problem. The public 
works programme of the Labour Party which was seen as a 
temporary measure would have been as capable of revitalizing 
the economy as those offered as an expansionary device by the 
Liberals.
The Conservatives policy which attempted to help industry by 
reducing taxes would have had some impact though less than that 
generated by an injection into the economy of government
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expenditure^^. The compensatory monetary policy suggested by
the ILP and Kosley was also likely to have had some impact upon
the problem although the empirical estimates of monetary
(2)policy during the depression are not too encouraging .
A pragmatic trading policy was very likely to be useful in a 
period of serious trading disruption. Free trade optimality 
was not achievable and some tsecond best1 strategy should have 
been sought and mig&t have been sought had it not been
for the mythology and philosophy surrounding the *free trade* 
slogan.
Policies to reduce the supply of labour could make only minor 
contributions to the unemployment problem. They would have had 
some cosmetic effect, reducing hysteria about the burden on the 
unemployment fund and at the same time furthering other worth­
while social goals.
A major impact on the problem could probably have been achieved
by international agreement had the expertise and political will
been available. Although lip service was paid to co-operation
in all the documents considered no strategies were developed to*
ensure that the policy was operational.
(1)
(2)
Balanced Budget Theorem.
See Walters (1969^ op. cit.
Ill
Hone of the contributors to the policy debates saw the potential 
of deficit financing as a tool to regulate the level of activity 
in the economy. The use of fiscal policy in this way did not 
develop until the post-war era^ although after the collapse of 
the Government, in 1931, Dalton and others became interested in 
the 'unbalanced budgets1 on the continent. In comparison with 
fiscal instruments public works policies are clumsy and 
insensitive regulators.
Even within the convention of the balanced budget there was 
scope to influence policy in such a way as to affect aggregate 
demand. But little was attempted in this direction and formal 
justification of such policies had to await the development of 
the balanced budget multiplier theorem in the early forties.
The ingredients of a policy to contain if not cure unemployment 
were available in 1929. What was needed was the administrative 
ability to select and implement an appropriate policy 
portfolio.
(l) H. Dalton, Unbalanced Budgets (1932; l
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CHAPTER TWO
THE FIRST INSTALMENT 
-3rd June to 31st December iy29-
Introdu-rMon
On tbe 3rd June, 1929, with a rather shaky majority, of 27 seats 
more than the Conservatives and with no overall majority the 
Labour Party formed a government. Ramsay MacDonald's adminis­
tration had no 'hundred days' but there was an atmosphere of 
purposeful activity in the early days. Cabinet met ten times' 
before the Summer recess, nearly a hundred memoranda were 
produced and many committees were spawned. As was seen in 
Chapter 1, the party's policy had been outlined in the pre- 
. election statements and election manifestos. Predictably, they 
had been severely critical of the policies of the previous
administration which,
"by its inaction during four critical years it has 
multiplied our difficulties and increased our dangers .... 
this tory government sat supinely with folded arms without 
a policy, without a vision, waiting for providence or 
charity to do its work .... it has helped its friends by 
remission of taxation whilst it has robbed the funds of 
the workers." (l)
It was now Labour's turn to formulate the policies and initiate 
action, in this chapter we will chart their progress during the
remaining months of 1929»
(l; Craig vl975^ o p « cit.
113
The Organisational structure
It was announced in Labour and the .Nation, that a National Economic
Committee was to be instituted to create permanent machinery
through which scientific knowledge and technical skill could be
mobilised to increase efficiency and raise the standard of life.
This organisation under the direction of the Prime Minister was 
0
to be
''his eyes and ears on economic questions to keep him and 
the country informed by tindertaking a critical survey of 
economic conditions.” (il
In addition an Employment Development Board was to be created 
having at its disposal a Treasury Grant. Neither was in fact 
established.
The Team
Some attempt was made to co-ordinate unemployment policy by
using a ministerial team led by J.H. Thomas, supported by
(2 )permanent heads of departments . This team met as the Inter-
C D  Labour and the Nation (1929; op. cit.
This concept had been considered by the previous Labour 
administration and had been developed in the form of the 
Committee for Civil Research by the Conservative Government. 
The Liberal Party had also suggested a central committee*
See Britain^ Industrial Future 1192b; op. cit. Howson 
and Winch 1.197/; op. cit. PRFM  1/70,
(2; See P. Snowden An Autobiography Vol.li Nicholson and 
Watson ly^^; R* Bassett, lyjl-Political Crisis 
Macmillan 1958* About the details of the struggle for the 
foreign Office betvieen Henderson and Thomas which caused 
much ill will in the Cabinet.
13A
Departmental Committee on Unemployment (I.D.C.U.). It had the 
function of co-ordinating unemployment policy but had no executive 
power. The I7D.C.U. was to gather information and evaluate 
schemes, its powers were limited to recommendations, discussions 
and general chiding and hastening of action. The executive power 
was divided amongst the various ministers who would often attend 
the meetings when matters concerning their departments were being 
discussed.
Thomas was hardly a darling of the left and, possibly to balance 
his influence, it was announced at the second Cabinet meeting^^, 
that ho was to be assisted by George Lansbury, First Commissioner 
for Works, Oswald Mosley, ' The Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster and Thomas Johnson, parliamentary under Secretary for 
Scotland. These ministers were rather to the left of Thomas 
but Lansbury was already seventy and Mosley's unstable brilliance 
was regarded with suspicion. Only Lansbury and Thomas were 
members of the Cabinet.
General unemployment policy involved the Minister of Labour, 
Margaret Bondfield; Arthur Greenwood, Minister of Health and 
William Graham, President of the Board of Trade. The Minister 
of labour was responsible for the management of the unemployment 
fund, transfer policy and the provision and publication of 
information about unemployment. The Minister of Health dealt
(1J CAB 23 60 2nd Meeting 21st June 1929.
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with matters relating to the poor lax* provisions and the manage­
ment of the relief fund. It was the President of the Board of 
Trade who heard the monthly reports on the economy from the 
♦cattains 1 of industry and banking. Other ministers involved in 
unemployment policy in its various aspects were Philip snowden, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer; Charles Trevelyan, President of the 
Board of Education; h. Morrison, Minister of Transport;
J.E. Clynes, Minister of Home Affairs; Noel Buxton, Minister of 
Agriculture and w. Adamson, Secretary of State for Scotland.
The team was regarded favourably by the press especially the 
left wing press. The Mew Statesman considered the Government to 
be the best and strongest administration since the War^
Administrative structure
The civil servants appointed to assist these ministers were 
already steeped in the formulation of unemployment policies 
having recently reported on the policy proposals of the 
Liberals and the Melchett-Turner Report as well as surveying 
the policy instituted by the Conservatives.
■ s
Convinced of the soundness of the policies which they advocated
V
the civil servants had lost the impetus to innovate and for the 
next two years continued to advise along the lines adopted in the
(2 iMemoranda discussed above . Their attempts to influence *2
(l; New ¿statesman. 15th June 1929»
(2) - See Chapter Une above.
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policyaro discussed by Janeway who describes attempts to
(I)persuade Snowden to adopt even more stringent policies .
In addition to this constraining influence the administrative 
structure was not conducive to the formation of lively policy 
measures having no executive power and having to depend on 
Government departments to implement policies.
In addition to the Government departments the i.D .C .U . was 
concerned with policies of the e le c tric ity  commission, the y
commission, and the railway companies with whom they communicated 
either through the' ministry responsible or d ire ctly  with the 
bodies concerned.
(2)The executive chaos was so great that a memorandum was produced 
for the 1 .D.C.ÏÏ. for information and reference showing the 
departmental responsibility for items which night be included 
in a policy for the relief of unemployment.______________________ 1
(l) Janeway (19 71) op. eit. ....
(1) CAB 27 2S9 DU 16 (2y)The responsibility of the various government departments 
was summarised as follows: ^
1. M inistry of Agriculture and the Scottish Board_of_ 
Agriculture
a. small holdings and allotments
b. land drainage
c. land reclamation
d. rural handicrafts
e. sugar beet industry
f. flax cultivation
g. coast erosion, with the Board of Trade
h. stimulation of food production at hone.
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This then was the unwieldy administrative structure through 
which policies to relieve unemployment had to be channelled. It
2. The Colonial Office
Development in the Colonies and Protectorates, 
particularly of railway development and the develop­
ment of natural products, with the help of loans.
3. The Dominions Office
a. overseas migration programme
b. capital developments in the Dominions
4-. The Development Commission - various activities
5» The Board of Education and the Scottish Education
Department
a. school leaving age
b. building programme
6. Forestry Commission
a. afforestation programme
b. creation of forest holdings
7. The Ministry of Health and the Scottish Board of Health
a. housing
b. slum clearance
c. local authority works including, with the 
Ministry of Labour the Unemployment Grant 
Committee schemes
d. withdrawal of elderly workers from industry by 
increased pensions.
. . . . . .  . ^
8. The Ministry of Labour
a. . activity of the employment exchanges
b. training of juveniles, young men and women for
home and overseas
9. The Post Office
telephone developments
....... . . *■*.
10. The Board of Trade
a. mines department
b. development of overseas trade - export credits, 
trade commissioner service, stimulation of 
overseas trade
c. general industrial organisation
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was bedevilled by built-in bottle-necics and delaying mechanisms 
and under pinned by a team of administrators whose capacity to 
innovate and produce a fresh approach to the problem had been • 
eroded over the past decade during which unemployment policy 
had been a central feature of their work.
The Policy Strategy
The problem facing the Government in June 1929 was the high 
level of unemployment unevenly distributed amongst industries and 
regions of the country. The strategy to deal with unemployment 
involved an attack on the disequilibrium in the labour market 
by operating on both the supply and the demand for labour.
Reconstruction
The demand for labour was to be increased by making industry, 
especially export industry, more competitive by reducing the 
costs of production. This it was hoped would enable the *123
11# The Ministry of Transport
a. roads
b. railways including light railways and trams
c. Severn barrage
d. electricity supply and docks, harbours, canals
12. Treasury with other departments
trade facilities and guaranteed loans
13. Office of Works
building programme for government property
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recapture of old markets and the expansion of trade thus generat­
ing an increased demand for labour. Costs of production were to 
be reduced by the reorganisation of the basic industries and by 
the improved infra-structure provided by the public works 
schemes* This preoccupation with the basic industries is under­
standable given the industrial and regional distribution of 
unemployment* bee Chapter One, Tables 2 and 3» We can explore 
this problem more fully by considering the proportion of the 
aggregate unemployment in the basic industries* Mining and. 
quarrying alone accounted for nearly 20% of the unemployment; 
and iron and steel and textiles contributed a further 2W*
The regional disparities were acute as was Indicated in Table 2 
in Chapter One above. Table 8 shows the regional position 
expressed as a ratio of unemployment in the country as a whole*
The ratios do not give such a dramatic picture as the range of 
unemployment between the highest and lowest region. This was 
15*9 per cent in 1929. Almost 60 per cent of the unemployment was 
concentrated in the North of England, Scotland and Wales.
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Table 7
Unemployment in industry as a proportion 
of Total: Unemployment 1 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 2 9 J
INDUSTRY
Aged 16-64 in 
United Kingdom
1927* . 1928 1929
Agriculture
Fishing
Mining and quarrying 
Manufacturing
Non-metalliferous mining products 
Brick, tile, pipe, etc making 
Pottery, earthenware, etc.
Glass
Chemicals, paints, oils, etc.
Metal manufacture 
Engineering, etc.
Construction and repair of vehicles 
Shipbuilding and ship repairing 
Other metal industries and trades 
Textiles
Leather and leather goods 
Clothing
Food, drink and tobacco 
Woodworking, etc.
Paper, printing, etc.
Other manufacturing industries 
Total manufacturing 
Building and contracting 
Gas, water and electricity supply 
Transport and communications 
Distributive trades 
Commerce, banking, insurance and 
finance
Miscellaneous service 
Local government service 
National government service
.3 .2 .222.4 24.2 18.3
.4 .4 .4.4 .7 .6
.9 .9 .9.5 .4 .41.3 .9 1.25.3 4.3 4.56.7 5.4 5.41.6 2.0 1.84.8 4.3 • 3.9
4.3 3.7 3.510.0 12.4 14.0
.5 .4 .52.2 3.1 3.13.4 2.8 3.01.1 1.1 1.31.7 1.1 1.3.8 .7 .845.8 44.7 46.8
7.3 8.6 8.6.8 .7 • 88.8 8.4 9.36.8 6.4 7.9
.5 .4 .45.5 4.4 4.91.5 ' 1.5 1.8.7 .7 .6
Source: British Labour ¿statistics Historical Abstract 1886-1968 
ri97i) op. cit.Computed from Table 163 Numbers of insured persons un­
employed at each mid-year.
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The problem was obvious but how could the Government change the 
prospects of the basic industries given the problems which they 
were facing.
Table 8
Regional ïïnemployment in Great Britain (1929)
% TJ  ^Ur/UGB % of Total Unemploy-
London 4.6 .47
ment in Regions 
8.8
South East 3.8 .39 2.9
South West 7.1 .72 5.2Midlands 9.1 .93 14.1
Worth East 12.8 1.31 22.4
North West 13.0 1.33 23.7
Scotland 11.0 1.12 12.3
Wales 19.7 2.01 10.0
Source: British Labour Statistics (1971) op. cit.
Table 162.
The coal industry had grave problems: high unemployment, a 
shrinking labour force, falling prices and profits and a reduced 
share of world markets(l). All leading exporting countries 
except Poland suffered losses in exports and it appeared that 
exports had shrunk because of the growth of self-sufficiency, 
technical improvements in consumption and the adoption of other 
fuels. Domestic consumption was also reduced by changes in 
technology which resulted in economies in the use of coal and 
because of the problems affecting coal consuming industries.
(l) Aldcroft (1970) op. cit.
Since 1925 unemployment had not fallen below 9.5ft? the 
labour force had fallen from 1.3M to .97M since 1923» 
profits per ton had fallen from Is. 2d. per ton in 1924 to 
lid. per ton in 1928; sales had fallen by 10% and prices 
by 33-3% since 1924. W.H.B. Court »Problems of the British 
Coal Industry between the Wars» Economic History Review 1945.
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iiifcuch has been made of the relative inefficiency of the industry
j
and the fact that output per man appeared to be up to a third ;
ihigher in competing countries. Errors of measurement probably i 
caused these figures to be overestimated as there were '
difficulties in measurement of output per man shift as the 
classification of colliery workers in different countries was 
not comparable.
The textile industry, apart from the rayon sectors, was in 
difficulties: production had fallen sharply, unemployment was 
high and export markets shrank with the growth of the 
domestically based industries, especially in India, and the 
competition from Japanese industry^^. The boom in the industry 
in the early twenties had not led to the introduction of more
(l) Aldcroft (1970) ov. cit. \
Unemployment had been above 10% except for one year since 
1923, production and exports had fallen 5 8% and 36% 1
respectively, between 1924 and 1930. See also (i.C. Allen (1935!! 
British Industries and their.Organisation, Longmans, London.
y
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efficient plant and machinery. The machinery used was old 
fashioned and not very productive. But given the changes in the 
trading patterns which had occurred it is unlikely that even an 
efficient industry could have made much progress towards re­
establishing the former position.
The iron and steel industry had also suffered severely especially 
the pig iron section in which unemployment had reached in
lV26a ) . There were a large number of firms and much of the 
difference in efficiency between Britain and its competitors 
appears to have been related to the failure of the industry to 
take advantage of the economies of scale. Seventy per cent of 
British production was produced by twenty firms but the combined 
output of these firms was one third of the United States Steel 
Corporation. In America 55# of the output was produced by two 
firms and in Germany five firms produced 705b of the output.
B"ven after some reconstruction the average output in Britain was 
only 83,000 tons in 1V37 compared with 2lu,000 tons in the 
United States and 125,000 tons in Germany.
Shipbuilding was another major industry which suffered severely 
as can be seen from the unemployment figures in Table 3, see 
Chapter One a b o v e T h e  wartime economy had left the industry 
with vast spare capacity and it was estimated that less than 
■Jrd of the capacity would have been sufficient to have provided 
all the work required. This was not a peculiarly British 12
(1) Aldcroft, (1970/ on. cit. Allen (1935) °b* cit.
(2) L. Jones, Shipbuilding in Britain (1957^*
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problem for in fact world capacity had doubled. The Government's 
policy for the shipbuilding industry, apart from minor public 
works, depended upon the secondary effects of expansion of trade 
which it was hoped would arise with the revival of the basic 
industries.
Public Works
The other policy advocated to increase the demand for labour 
was the public works programme. This was seen as an anti- 
cyclical device which could be used as a temporary measure to 
absorb unemployment. The use of public works as a method of 
creating a general stimulation of economic activity was not 
fully understood by the Labour Party. Nevertheless the policy 
was given considerable attention and after reconstruction was 
the major policy proposal to reduce unemployment.
The policy had a long history. It became the focus of attention
in the twentieth century because of its advocacy as a contra-
cyclical policy by the Webbs in the Minority Report on the Roor
L a w s u i t  was taken up by the labour Party as part of their
policy portfolio and was advocated with some enthusiasm by Cole.
After the war the Unemployment Grants Committee ^U.G.C.) was set
up under the management of I^ ord St. Davids by whose name it was
often known. Initially it was to assist authorities to carry
out useful work in areas suffering from severe unemployment. 1
(1) Royal Commission on the Poor Laws: Minority Report
Cmd. 4499, 1909; see Skidelsky,(19 6 7) 0 0. cit. pp4$-5l» for 
discussion of the acceptance of the policy.
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This regained the case until 1925 when the Government policy was 
changed and work had to he an acceleration of existing pro­
grammes in areas of high unemployment. The scheme was reviewed' 
once again in 1928 when the terms were improved and as a result 
after a period of comparative stagnation the committee had again 
entered an era of growth^. 347 schemes to the value of 
£o.l48ilhad been sanctioned during the six months following the 
revised terms compared with 91 schemes valued at kl.llw
Vbetween the years 1926 and 1928.
In addition schemes for road development by local authorities 
received grants from the road fund. Normal grants for roads were 
33^-50% for Class II roads and bridges and 5 0 -60% for Class I
roads plus 15% for schemes which used labour from depressed 
areas.
Supnly of labour
The supply of labour was to be affected by policies designed to 
reduce activity rates of the population by pension schemes,
(1) CAB 2? 391 DU 29(1)
Schemes sanctioned by the U.G.C.:
2272
1240
63
2tt
schemes £20.639
£17.366
.792
.319
1924- 25
1925- 26
1926- 27
1927- 28If
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raising the school leaving age and by encouraging and facilitat­
ing emigration from depressed regions in Britain to other parts 
of Britain and the British Empire and Colonies. Between IVZc.?-»* Ml 
Drummond reports that 23% of the natural increase in population 
left the country, going to Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand(li. The implementation of the Washington Convention on 
the permitted hours of work would also contribute to the reduction 
in the supply of labour.
Trade
The policies proposed were wide ranging but did not include the
insulation of the domestic market in any way from f *gn 
competition. The policy of free trade appeared to be related mo 
to the desire to expose the British manufacture to the rigours 
of' foreign competition, as a form of consumer protection, than 
to any belief that internationally, if not nationally, an 
unshackled competitive system had anything to offer. 
Interference with the international price relationship was in 
fact implied in the echemes for import boards, the extension of 
export credits and other efforts to aid the export industries.
Monetary Policy
The official policy of the party had little to offer in the way 
of monetary policy except the threat to nationalize the Bank 
of England and a general enquiry into money and credit.
(1) Drummond (1971/ op« cj-t* fp-*f7 ^ *
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Snowden was very anxious to reduce the burden of the national 
debt. He had been given his old job as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer which he accepted provided there was no deal with the 
Tories and that he had at least three years to do the job.
“Churchill had left the national finance in such a 
desperate state that it would require at least three 
budgets, even if trade were good, to get them into some­
thing like order, and before any reduction of taxation 
could be made." (l)
Alleviation of Distress
Policies suggested to aid the unemployed relied on the unemploy­
ment insurance fund although help was also expected to come from 
the emergency schemes, transference and migration policies and 
the other strategies designed to reduce unemployment. It was 
hoped that the burdens associated with the maintenance of the 
unemployed could be taken over from local authorities.
The Formulation of Policy
There were three phases in the formulation of unemployment 
policy during the remaining months of 1929* an initial phase of 
investigation which was energetic and purposeful; a report-back 
phase, during which progress was rather hesitant and many 
compromises were made; and a restive phase during which there was 
on the one hand the rumblings of discontent and on the other the
. „ "v.
(1) Snowden (193*0 on. cit. p T5*
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growing acceptance of constraints preventing the implementation 
of a progressive policy.
The I.D.C.U. was the central body concerned with unemployment
policy. At the first Cabinet meeting*1  ^J.H. Thomas announced
that the permanent heads of department would be at his disposal
for the purpose of forming an Inter-departmental Committee in
connection with unemployment. The I.D.C.U. met only nine
t i m e s ^  between June 1929 and March 1930. Five of these meetings
(3)were held before the end of July 1929 *
It was also decided at this Cabinet meeting that Lansbury,
Mosley and Johnson should assist Thomas. They subsequently 
attended the I.D.C^U. meetings^ and undertook specific tasks 
relating to the formulation of policy.
Thomas began by asking for proposals for public works to be 
provided setting out the employment potentials and when they 
could be begun. Thomas cautioned the committee about the 
programmes pointing out that whilst financial and other 
objections should not stand in the way of practical proposals
(1) CAB 23 6l 1st Meeting 10th June 1929» 22(29).
(2) CAB 27 389 DU (29).
(3) Mosley, 0. My Life. Nelson, London, 1968. Mosley refers 
to weekly meetings held at the Treasury which Lansbury 
and Johnson, who had other duties and who were located 
elsewhere, were too busy to attend.
ib) Lansbury attended the third meeting and all subsequent
meetings; Mosley attended the third meeting and subsequent 
meetings with the exception of the last meeting; Johnson 
attended the fourth, sixth, eighth and ninth meetings.
CAB 27 389 DU (29;.
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it was not Government policy to 'undertake relief work pure and
simple' .
Thomas Jones, who attended this meeting as secretary ^ , said 
that Thomas asked for schemes which could be put in hand 
immediately, that he had energy, and that his brain was full of 
plans. All seemed set for an attack on unemployment to begin.
The decisions reached at this meeting and the progress made was 
reported in the form of a Memorandum by Thomas to the second 
Cabinet meeting 21st June 1 9 2 9 ^  at which he gave a full account 
of the decisions he had already taken. It was pointed out that 
£190M had been spent on public works but at no time had more 
than 75,000 men been employed. Schemes for £9^M to be spent 
upon trunk roads and £23M for reconstruction were sanctioned 
and the Ministry of Transport was asked, subject to the agree­
ment of the Treasury, to open negotiations with the authorities 
concerned. Progress on transfer centres, export credits and the 
acquisition of land was reported. Much of his statement was 
incorporated in the King's Speech in which Government policy was 
restated. It was decided that the Lord Privy Seal should open 
the second day of the debate on the King's speech. On July 6th
(1) Keith Middlemas Ed.Thomas Jones
Whitehall Maries Vol.H Oxford University. Press 
London 1969.
(2) CAB 24 2U4 CP 59 (29).
(3) CAB 23 6l 23(29).
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jfche New Statesman reported that Thomas had lost no time in 
unveiling his plans for dealing with unemployment^. On 
15 July the Home Development and Colonial Development Acts were 
introduced and passed before the recess. These made borrowing 
easier.
Sub-committees of the I.D.C.U. were appointed to consider the
questions of colonial development, early retirement and the
raising of the school leaving age. The latter scheme was sub-
( 2 )sequently referred to the ¿'resident of the Board of Education 
who later announced that the scheme could be implemented by 
April 1st 1931 or if necessary by August 1930.
Other aspects of unemployment policy were also keenly discussed 
in these early Cabinet meetings. The President of the Board of 
Trade presented a memorandum^^ containing a draft announcement 
of policy regarding the safeguarding duties. The Minister of 
Health asked for an order to repeal the decision of the previous 
government so that local authorities could proceed with their 
housing programme . The Minister of Labour reported the 
difficulties which confronted the unemployment insurance fund 
and proposed as a short term remedy an increase in the borrowing 
powers and had some ideas about ensuring the long term viability 123
(1 ) Mew Statesman , 6 July 1928. Reporting.on the debate on the 
King's speech.
(2) CAB 2? 391 kth. Meeting 23rd July.
(3) CAB 2k 20k cP 15*f, 156(29) 172«.29)•
k^) CAB 2k 20k CP 157, 178*.29>.
of the f u n d ^ .  She was also preparing a bill dealing with 
hours of work to enable the Government to ratify the Washington 
C o n v e n t i o n . a  committee was appointed to consider Empire 
T r a d e ^  and the President of the Board of Trade reported that 
negotiations had reached a stage where the committee investigat­
ing the iron and steel industry could be set up and that 
discussions on the cotton industry were proceeding . Thus in 
less than two months considerable inroads had been made into the 
many aspects of the proposed unemployment policy.
There vías something of a hiatus in Government policy during 
August and the early Autumn because of the travels of various 
members of the administration. Snowden and iienderson were 
attending the reparations conference at The Hague during
August; Thomas left for Canada in early September on his trade
- (5)finding crusade and later MacDonald left for America 
First Instalments
Cabinet met again early in September but there was no mention 
of unemployment policy. The Widows and Orphans Bill was
(l) CAB 24 204 CP l69 (29)
(2,) CA3 24 20$ CP 223 (29) The Yfashington Convention was
an Attempt by the International Labour Organization to 
. secure international agreement for a 48 hour week.
(3) CAB 24 204 CP1S8 (25)
(4) <jAB 24 204 184 (29)
(5) S. Roskill Hankey Man of Secrets, vol 11 1919-1931 
Collins London 1972. pp.473-501.
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presented to the Cabinet. It was rather a disappointment being 
offered as a scheme which was thought to be as fair as could be 
devised within the limits of the money available. Cabinet was- 
urged to state ouite emphatically that it was merely a 1 23first 
instalment * . To give credence to this position a committee
was set up to consider the whole question of national insurance 
and pension schemes.^
At a later Cabinet meeting the Minister of Labour submitted a 
report  ^^  of the committee appointed to examine the question 
of relieving the unemployment Insurance scheme of the charges 
in respect of those persons who had not fulfilled the thirty 
contributions qualification. The committee thought that it was 
unnecessary and impossible to deprive these persons of any part of 
tbeir rights but rejected any further extension of the 
transition period as this was likely to bring the lund into 
disrepute. A temporary scheme to deal with the problem was 
rejected by the Cabinet. In the light of the Cabinet reaction 
to its proposals the committee merely reported*accepting the 
status m m . The unemployment insurance bill was presented and 
received a cool reception because of the limited improvements 
offered and was referred to the Minister for further considera­
tions. But after further discussions with the Chancellor it 
was decided that little more could be offered.
(1) CAB 23 61 26th July 31 (29)
(2) CAB 27 408 ; '
(3) CAB 23 6l 25th September 34(29) CP 253(29).
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Cabinet were dissatisfied by the nature and extent of the policies 
they were able to implement but were already faced, iirith the 
budget constraint which prevented them adopting more radical _ 
measures.
On the 25th September the Lord Privy Seal ^  reported on his 
visit to Canada. The results were meagre but he appeared 
pleased. He was hopeful about the implications for British 
trade of the St. Lawrence Seaway and the reconstruction of. 
Canadian railways. There was also the possibility of an order 
for shipping and that a mixture of Welsh and Nova Scotia 
coal would «oust » U.S. coal from Canadian markets.
Soon, the Lord Privy Seal was warning his colleagues of seasonal 
rises in unemployment. In the world economy matters of the 
utmost importance for the success of an unemployment policy 
were taking place; in America the stock market crashed and the 
fall in commodity prices accelerated.
Monetary policy for the past year had been dominated by the need 
to protect the £;whilst the drain of funds to New York continued, 
the American loans were greatly reduced. The bank rate was 
raised on 26th September to deal with the uneasiness in the 
exchanges, and although this was not welcomed^especially by the 
left wing,the change was generally accepted . When the
(1)
(2)
CAB 23 6l CM 35(29)
New Statesman 12 October 1929.
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crash eventually occurred conditions eased and it was possible to 
foresee a lowering of interest rates.
MacDonald left for the United States in the late September. In 
his absence Snowden took the chair at Cabinet meetings. On 
the 25th October, a special meeting was held on unemployment. 
Thomas outlined the position he intended to take at the 
Parliamentary debate and was supported by Cabinet^ \  He 
intended to emphasise that schemes likely to produce a permanent 
effect on unemployment would not show results immediately 
although as the 'weeks and months went by* the results would 
become more apparent. He was cautioned by his colleagues to be 
reserved in his comments on the live register test. Thomas 
believed that these figures did not indicate the true position 
on unemployment^2 .^ He was also urged to set up a committee on 
the transfer of workers from the depressed areas. This was 
done.
A committee, the members of which included Clynes, (Chairman), 
Thomson, Alexander and Greenwood met on two occasions at which 
they considered the policy of transfer and the modifications 
which had been made since the Government took office1 23^ .  The
(1) CAB 23 61 8 41(29)
(2) Thomas, like Churchill a few months before, was doubtful 
of the statistical evidence relating to unemployment and 
wanted to re-define the problem '
(3) CAB 23 6l 4l 129). See Public Works below.
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committee reported the need for greater flexibility in the 
transfer policy and that the transferred workers should be 
involved in national schemes of works^^. To enable them to # 
consider national schemes they asked for a revision in their 
terms of reference and for the inclusion of the Lord Privy Seal 
in the committee^. The Committee eventually reported that ' 
national schemes were not appropriate as they would interfere 
with local autonomy.
Meanwhile, out of sight of Cabinet several committees were 
beavering away preparing reports. The retirement pensions 
committee was, despite growing and dêepening divisions, prepar­
ing schemes and the IvD.C.U. was still holding meetings though 
less frequently than formerly.
The problems of organisation were becoming all too apparent.
At the Conference of Ministers considering national schemes, 
Mosley pressed for the sort1'of organisational structure which 
had been advocated in the pre-election speeches of the Prime 
Minister. Greenwood appeared to agree and said he was prepare 
ing a note on the matter. He proposed to complete the note in 
consultation with Mosley, and to discuss it at the next meeting. 
No evidence could be found of any further meetings being held.
(1) CAB 27 too
(2) CAB 27 397.
(3) CAB 27 389
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In November, MacDonald was reported^^ to have received from 
Butler, an o ffic ia l at the M inistry of Labour, a memorandum 
suggesting organizational changes to deal with the unemployment 
problem. These changes involved the formulation of an economic 
general staff under the auspices of the ¿Time Minister which 
would include expert advice from outside the c iv i l  service. 
MacDonald  ^ . whilst apparently unruffled by the growing
tensions within his Cabinet and within the House, reacted to 
the pressure in late November by calling  together a group of 
'distinruished in d u stria lists  and e c o n o m i s t s ' to advise him 
about the economic problem. The group met during December and 
produced a working memorandum on the possible composition and form 
of this b o d y^^. From amongst this group he was to select the 
team for the Economic Advisory Committee which was set up in 
the new year.
Dissatisfaction
The growing feeling of dissatisfaction which had been rumbling 
within the administration and on a ll  sides of the House found 
its  expression in the last few weeks of 1929 ^  • Thomas was 
asked to show the progress of unemployment policy compared wi*,h *3
Skidelsky op. cit. p. 155«
(2j CAB 58 15» Bee Howson and winch (1977) op. cit. and
below Chapters 3 and 4 on the Economic Advisory Council.Pren3/7(
(3) Hansard ’ November 4th. Vol 231 cols637-770; December 22nd, Vol 233 { 
cols. 1793-1866. !
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the election promises. This he did in  terse style^ \  In the 
House the lib e ra ls  asked for an a ll  party conference and were 
gently side-stepped by MacDonald*.
The Hew ¿statesman considered the f ir s t  six months a success on 
the whole but they regarded Thomas's record as the weak spot.
After Thomas's statement to the House the criticism  went further
\
i t  was now believed by colleagues and the press that Thomas had 
become convinced that there was no solution to the unemployment 
(2)problem' .
Unemployment had begun to rise but as yet little more than 
seasonal increase was apparent as can be seen from the monthly 
unemployment rates shown in Table 9.
(i;
(2)
CAB 27 397 NS 1/2.
New Statesman 7th December 1929«
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Table 9
% workers insured and uninsured 
registered as unemployed in 
United Kingdom
Month % U
September
October
November
December
July
August
9.7
9.9
9.9 
10.3 
10.9 
11.0
Source: British Labour Statistics (1971) op. cit. Table l60.
During December it was apparent that all the shcrt term remedies 
for unemployment had been abandoned, delayed or rendered 
ineffective. The retirement pensions scheme was turned down 
after receiving a cocl reception from Thomas. The raising of 
the school leaving age bill was postponed because of lack of 
-Parliamentary time, the public works schemes were not being 
produced and the transfer policy was proving exceedingly 
difficult to operate given the growing and more generalised 
nature of the unemployment problem. All that remained were 
the long terra schemes for reconstruction, which might 
initially cause an increase in unemployment; and the hope of 
trade revival.
In his memorandum issued shortly before the Christmas recess, 
Thomas reiterated his belief that,
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"the only sound policy for dealing with the present 
situation is one which, . is aimed primarily at the 
restoration of the competitive efficiency of our export 
trades on which we should concentrate our efforts." (l)
This was the policy at a time when the indicators of world 
trading activity^^ were all showing signs of problems for the 
future which would he likely to preclude anything like an 
export generated expansion. But matters of general trading 
activity were considered separately from unemployment policy in 
the organisational structure which existed and it was Graham 
and not Thomas who listened each month to the depressing accounts 
of the trading performance and prospects. All hope was pinned 
upon theimpact of a trade revival^ the possibility of cheap 
money and the long tern strategy of reconstruction.
On the question of alleviation of distress the maintenance of 
the status quo vis-a-vis the contributions requirement and some 
minor improvements in payments to juveniles was all that had been 
achieved and even these improvements were likely to burden the 
fund in the future. The terms of aid offered for public works 
were unfavourable to local authorities in the depressed regions 
in order to facilitate the workings of the cumbersome transfer 
policy.
(1) CAB 23 62 51 (29); CAB 20?, CP 3^5 (29).
(2) C.P. Kindleberger: The World in Degression Allan Lane
Penguin Press 1973« 126.
The Minister of Health had been concerned about the conditions 
in the distressed areas for some time and after an unsuccessful 
attempt to persuade Cabinet to provide him with half a million • 
pounds to ease the situation over the winter months he produced 
fresh evidence of the problems in these areas and tried once more to 
extract funds from the Chancellor. Nothing was forthcoming. At 
the Cabinet meeting immediately before Christmas his application 
was once again rejected.
Thus after six months in office the Labour administration *sat
(l)supinely by waiting for God or -providence to do its work* 
and it could not even.redeem itself by having been generous to 
its friends and supporters.
Ma?1or rolicy Strategies
Introduction
Public Works
The use of public works expenditure as an injection into the 
economy to set in motion a general stimulation of demand was at 
best not fully understood by the Labour Party,;and one must look 
elsewhere for the rationalization of public works schemes.
They were seen as anticyclical devices which could be used to 
refurbish the economy and absorb labour when trade was slack.
(1) Craig U975) o p . cit.
1*U
The Government policy on public works was initially supervised 
by Thomas. He was not too impressed by their potential and 
warned against *relief work pure and simple* pointing out the . 
meagre employment which had been gained from the expenditure on 
public works during the previous decade. At the October meeting 
of the Board of Trade Advisory Council^^ the Lord Privy Seal 
made a statement which throws light on his attitude towards 
public works.
"At home, whatever might be said of road schemes and play­
ing fields they were not remunerative. They gave work 
temporarily but at the end the same difficulties had to 
be faced. He had, therefore, resolved that if public 
money was to be spent it should only be spent in the 
direction of improving the general industrial efficiency 
of the country, that is to say by improving the railways, 
docks, harbours and power services, so that any improve­
ment in trade that might come would find us better 
equipped to meet it. *'or that reason the expenditure of 
public money that had been sanctioned for development at 
home had been restricted to public utility concerns and 
local authorities and the conditions imposed that the workwoul 
be accelerated and that it would tend to help the general 
trade and prosperity of the country." (2)
Terms and Conditions
The criteria thus seemed to involve:
(a? a positive rate of return to the undertaking 
involved;
lb) externalities which would aid other sectors of 
industry;
lc) an acceleration of work.which would otherwise be 
undertaken in the future. 12
(1) CAB 2k 2o6 CP 281 (29)
(2) CAB 2h 206 CP 281 (29)
The benefits to society in general as opposed to benefits accru­
ing specifically to industry thus appear to be discounted by 
Thomas though he mentions them with regard to colonial 
development.
The possibility of the Government underwriting some of the risk 
element of projects was considered when the railways managers 
referred to their reluctance to invest given the unsatisfactory 
condition of the industry and asked whether aid would be 
available. They were told that the Government would consider 
particular schemes which were 1 economically justified1 and 
would not otherwise be carried out. The companies were asked 
to consiuer schemes for development and indicate at which points 
in the scale of aid would the schemes be remunerative.
This more flexible approach did net apply to the schemes of 
the Electricity Commissioners. The Electricity Commissioners 
had suggested a host of schemes which would be highly productive 
in terms of employment and efficiency which they would undertake 
with Government support. They were summarily dismissed by 
Thomas who considered electricity to be a prosperous industry 
which should help the unemployment policy and not expect funds. 
Snowden was one of the few Ministers to draw attention to the 
potentials of these schemes in the next few months of the 
administration^ .
(1J CAB 27 438 UP 1.(30)
2A3
Public works were also penalised in distressed areas. This was 
pointed out by Mosley in a memorandum produced on work plans at 
the end of September. He said.that many local authorities in. • 
these areas were unable to undertake any work on the present 
terns and he speculated whether this was part of Government 
policy.-
"To what extent does this result coincide with the 
definite intention of the D.U. Committee? That body has 
been considerably moved by the argument that these areas 
are dead, and that to encourage local work is uneconomic 
and militates against transfer. This view is, of course, 
strongly contested by local opinion and the MPs who 
represent these districts. Has not the view that these 
areas are dead carried too much weight with the committee? 
Is it not nearer to truth to say that most of these areas 
have considerable industrial future, but on a reduced 
scale incommensurate with their past activity?" (l)
The major obstacle was the policy of transfer which was inherited 
from the Conservatives as a possible remedy for structural 
unemployment. Under this scheme additional aid was given to 
authorities employing workers from the depressed areas.
Thus the idea of taking »workers to the work1 had become 
established as a central tenet of policy.
s'
Some flexibility had been introduced here and there at the 
discretion of the minister concerned, e.g. the Minister of 
Transport said that he had given high rates to depressed areas
(1) CAB 27 390 vU 56 (29).
providing that only married men with dependents should he 
employed (the least likely to move voluntarily), so there would 
he no infringement of the transfer policy. The Minister of 
Labour thought that the terms of; grants were just one factor 
inhibiting the application for money from the depressed areas 
for these were already 'over committed» and 'national schemes1 
alone could provide work and these she could not support.
The terms and conditions of a i d ^  to the various works programmes 
were rather different. Differential terms were offered for 
first and second class roads; for revenue and non-revenue produc­
ing schemes; and the transfer conditions and the poverty of many 
local authorities contributed to the differential between the 
more prosperous and the severely depressed areas; the railways 
were the only form of transport which was not eligible for grants 
from the Unemployment Grants Committee# In addition to the 
anomalies created by the differential terms,there was also some 
overlap between the bodies responsible for giving aid, e»g. 
grants for coastal erosion were obtainable from the road fund,
the development fund, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
(2)and the Unemployment Grants Committee , The operation of the 
Home Development Act led to the formation of yet another grant 
approving body: The Duckham Committee. *2
(l; CAB 27 389 DU 1, 2 (29)
(2) CAB 27 3 8 9 DU 1 6  (29), See above, Administrative
Structure,
1^5
Dissatisfaction about the terms upon which grants were given was
expressed to the I.D.C.U. in the early memoranda produced by the
Ministry of Transport^ and the Ministry of Agriculture^2  ^and
(3)the Scottish Home Department . It was also clear from a very
(M  1early stage that the transfer conditions were not popular ; an 
increase of 15% in the grant was thought to be insufficient to 
overcome the reluctance of local authorities to employ 
transferred workers and a 75# grant (grant including trans­
fer payments) was much more likely to encourage proposals for 
schemes of work if the transfer conditions were removed*
Modifications were made to the scheme and greater flexibility 
was achieved by the decision made in the early Autumn as a 
result of discussions between the Lord Privy Seal and Lord St
(c )Davids ^ of the Unemployment Grants Committee. It was also 
agreed at this meeting that the rate of grant should remain 
unchanged as the uncertainty^about the terms and conditions of 
the schemes was already holding up some schemes! local authorities 
were delaying making proposals in the hope that the policy would 
be revised on more advantageous terms. It was however already
(1) CAB 27 389 DU 1 (29)
(2) CAB 27 389 DU k (29)
(3) CAB 27 389 DU 5(29)
(*0 CAB 27 389 DU 1, 3 and 56 (29)
(5) CAB 27 390 DU 37 (29).
Mbeingnwated that some areas would only be able to finance schemes 
on the basis of a 1005% Government grant.
The Scottish Homes Department asked for increased funds for 
slum clearance because Scotland was not receiving an appropriate 
share of the grants available because of the effect of the 
duration of unemployment in Scotland on the finances of the 
local authorities.
The most comprehensive review of the anomalies in the public 
works programme was produced by Oswald Mosley in his, Note by the 
.Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster on-Work Plans by LpcalL
( 2)Authorities through the U»G«C. and the Ministry of Transport . 
This was produced on the 27th September and was submitted by the 
Lord Privy Seal to the departments concerned with the request 
that they should give immediate consideration to the memorandum 
and produce observations at the meeting to be held during the 
following week. The note reviewedthe revised procedures. It 
pointed out that amongst the revenue producing schemes two 
anomalies were apparent! those concerned with the lengthy 
construction periods involved in the implementation of such 
schemes as docks and water works and schemes for which the 
revenue was largely a token and was not expected to cover the 
entire costs of the operation, e.g. wash-houses and work-houses. 12
(1) CAB 27 339 DC 5 (29).
(2) CAB 270 390 DU 56 (29).
Ik?
"It is submitted that to cover these cases an intermediate 
category of partially revenue producing schemes should be 
created with a more generous measure of state assistance 
than ordinary revenue producing schemes. A municipal 
wash-house in a poor district has conceivably more economic 
utility than a Town Hall or many other projects which in 
. the past have been considered by the committee." (l)
Thus Mosley was attempting to extend the externalities of public 
works schemes to include the value to society at large and 
indicate the anomaly which existed between the p roductive1 and
productive* (in revenue terms) schemes. Mosley also discussed 
the effect of the transfer condition which created anomalies in 
depressed and prosperous areas. He suggested that recent 
modifications should be expressed more forcefully, to make it 
clear that the Government would consider a smaller percentage of 
transferred workers in certain circumstances. He concluded that 
some transfer was necessary but the best way of ensuring it was 
by developing national schemes in addition to the local authority 
schemes and public utility schemes. Mosley suggested this would 
accelerate works in two ways: a) from the state schemes, b) from 
the increased local authority schemes which would result from 
the relaxation of the transfer conditions.
In response to Mosley's suggestions memoranda from the Minister 
of Labour(2\  the Minister of Transport*35 and the Minister of 
Health***5 were produced. There was general agreement about the
(1 ) ibid.
(2) CAB 27 390 W  59 (29)
(3 ) CAB 27 390 lU 60 (29)
(ft) CAB 27 390 DC 61 (29)
anomalies and sympathy for the depressed areas. They would not 
support changes in the terms of the grants because of the 
possibility that the uncertainty accompanying the changes would 
delay schemes and be unfair to authorities which had already 
begun to work. Some of the anomalies were removed and better 
terms were given for intermediate schemes though these did not 
have much employment potential. The I.D.C.U. set up a 
committee^ consisting of Mosley, Johnston, and representatives of 
the Treasury, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of labour 
to examine the proposals. The Minister of Transport ' produced 
a memorandum on the possibility and implications of a national 
trunk road scheme.
(3)It was decided by the Cabinet that a committee should be set
up to elucidate the transfer question. This committee,'
(4)presented an interim report' to the next Cabinet meeting stat­
ing that they were unanimous that the transfer policy was 
necessary but suggested that the terms should be more flexible 
and that the men involved should be employed as far as possible 
on national schemes of work. The committee asked for the lord 
Privy Seal to Join them and for changes in their terms of ref­
erence to enable then to consider national schemes. Thomas asked 
the committee to consider whether schemes would be generated if *234
C O  CAB 27 389 Sixth Meeting 8th October 1929.
(2) CAB 27 390 33 (29)
(3) CAB 23 62 29th Meeting 25th October 1929, 4l (29).
(4) CAB 23 82; CP 295(29).
central government were involved. The committee eventually 
rejected the idea of national schemes on the grounds of 
efficiency and local autonomy.
Administrative Problems
1^9
Quite apart from the problems associated with the terras and 
conditions of the aid there were delays inherent in  the 
administrative structure.
The most obvious delay was in the presentation and formulation 
of schemes by local authorities and public u t i l i t y  companies 
concerned? the financial problems they were encountering - 
because of the extent and duration of the depressionJ and the 
requirement that the schemes should represent an acceleration 
of work. This condition had somewhat denuded the portfolio  of 
prospective schemes e.g. i t  was stated that the recent expenditure 
had reduced the scope for further productive expenditure on 
harbour schemes^ »
A further delay occurred when the application for approval was 
made to the respective m inistry, and then referred to the 
Treasury for financial sanction. Once approved there were 
further delays in  the execution of the schemes. A serious delay 
was associated with the acquisition of land. The Chief 
Engineers Department reported on th is  matter in th e ir f ir s t
(!) CAB 27 389 I>u 1° (29)
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(l)memorandum to the l.D.C.U. ', After surveying the methods for
acquiring land it was suggested that the Special Powers and
Unemployment vCRelief Works) Act of 1920 should be used to enable
land to be acquired in about three months and possibly within
six to eight weeks. In spite of this report the matter was
still being discussed months later. In September the Ministry
(2)of Transport produced a further memorandum suggesting
procedures to speed-up the process and these were discussed by
(5)the x.D.C.U. ^ when the heads of departments were asked to
submit a memorandum to Cabinet giving the proposed headings
for legislation and asking for authority to introduce a bill as
(q.)soon n.3 possible. At the end of November the Lord Privy seal 
told Cabinet that the Lord Chancellor had a short bill prepared 
and an emergency order had been approved to vary standing orders.
(5)Mosley ^ was given the task of the 29th November of gingering 
up authorities who having received sanction for schemes vrere 
6low in executing them, and those who had not made applications. 
The Ministry of Transport reported that throiigh the divisional 
engineers steps had been taken to urge the losal authorities to 
press on with schemes^
(1)
(2)
13)
(4)
(5)
(6)
CAB 27 389 3 (29^. This matter was not adequately
dealt with until the following year.
CAB 27 289 6th Meeting 8th October 1929.
CAB 23 62 27th November, 50 (29).
CAB 27 389
ibid. 
ibid.
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Submission of Schemes . i1 , )
In reply to Thomas^ enquiry about possible schemes of work a 
large number of suggestions was submitted ranging from a  ^ ;
'■~a  *aKussel cleansing plant and a new whale house for the museum ito 
the channel tunnel, the Severn barrage and an inner-London goods 
railway. Let us consider these schemes in the broad categories 
under which they were proposed.
Roads
The road programme was a central part of the public works 
programmes of all parties. The Conservatives had rejected an 
£8M road scheme in November 1928 but they had reconsidered the 
question on several occasions before the election and the road 
programme was of course, an important feature of the Liberal 
proposals.
The report on the road schemes was one of the first memoranda 
submitted to the I.D.C.U. It was suggested in this memorandum 
that the road programme had been held back because of the 
uncertainty about the workings of the new local authority bill, 
expectation of increased grants and the bad winter. It was also 
suggested that few schemes of a substantial nature could be 
expected to be undertaken on the current terms. The schemes 
- likely to produce the greatest advantage from the point of view
(l) CAB 27 389 DU 3 (29;.
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of road policy were: an extension of the trunk road improvement 
programme, new by-passes, completion of ring-roads and sections 
of arterial roads already partially constructed, reconstruction 
of weak bridges and the removal of level crossings. The 
extensions to trunk roads were thought to be the most suitable 
for producing employment.
This memorandum was accompanied by the very energetic^report by 
the divisional road engineers stressing the urgency if works 
were to begin before the Winter. It was suggested that local 
authorities should continue their affairs during the parliamentary 
recess; that staff should be recruited to undertake surveys and 
that additional engineers should be appointed to the Ministry.
To deal with what was considered to be the major delay: the 
negotiation for land, a note was included specifying the ways in 
which land could be acquired in three months and possibly in as 
little as six to eight weeks. (l)
(l) This procedure involved the Ministry of Labour in issuing 
a certificate declaring:
"that having regard to the amount of unemployment 
existing in any area it is desirable that the 
provisions of this section should be put into 
operation with a view to speeding up provision of 
employment of unemployed persons from that area."
CAB 27 389 DU 3 (29).
The highway authority could then make an order scheduling 
the property and submitting it to the ministry of Transport 
for confirmation. The order would be advertised and 
fourteen days allowed for objections, if objections were 
raised the minister of Transport would hold a public 
enquiry having given fourteen days notice after which 
period the order would become effective upon receiving 
ministerial confirmation. Disputed questions of compensa­
tion were submitted for arbitration.
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They were perhaps optimistic about the time that would be needed 
for implementation. It was also suggested that the Minister of 
Labour could view the question of unemployment flexibly to take 
into account the areas from which labour would be drawn as well 
as the areas in which the works were to be constructed. This 
aspect of the transfer problem was discussed in subsequent 
reports and was not resolved until later in the session. This 
first report on the potential of works schemes was the most 
energetic and purposeful of any proposal» It appeared that there 
was every expectation that an active works policy would result.
The proposal for a trunk road system of £>9%M was accepted along
with a £23M programme of improvements to take place over a five
year period. There was discussion on the possibility of a
national works policy. On the 1 1 th September the Minister of
(1)Transport produced a memorandum on the nationalization of 
trunk roads weighing the advantages and the disadvantages which 
\iould be involved in the transfer to the ministry of control of 
all class one roads. Twenty four thousand miles of roads would 
be involved. The alternative forms of organization were for the 
ministry to execute responsibility for the programme or for the 
county councils to act as agents for the ministry. The former 
method was likely to be inefficient and the latter would amount 
to 100% Government grant. There was thought to be nothing 
inherently impracticable or impossible about such a project: 
grants of 100% had been given in the past for trunk roads in poor
(1) CAB 2? 390 DTI 53 (29)
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agricultural counties where the road was used almost entirely for 
through traffic and was a burden rather than a benefit to the • 
local community. The advantages of a nationalised system 
organised in this way were thought to be the standardisation, 
the power to decide priorities and control over difficult 
problems. The disadvantages were associated with the hwiclred 
per cent grant which would 'remove incentives to economical and 
careful.administration's infringe upon the autonomy of local 
authorities; upset the financial basis of the Local Government 
Act of 1929 and absorb all the money available from the road 
fund.
Railways
As a condition for the repeal of the railway passenger duty ir. 
the budget of 1929 it was agreed that the capitalised value of 
the duty less 10% should be spent by the railway companies upon 
works of development and modernization. The work was to amount 
to The proposed works should bes
“such as would yield a substantial amount of additional
employment ......  and should enable economies to be
effected on additional facilities afforded to 
traders." (1 ) 1
(1) CAB 27 389 OT 9 (29)
The duty was 5% of fares (2% in tmrfean areas and for short 
journeys). The companies were to be relieved of 
£370,000 per year.
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C h urch illf the Chancellor who had introduced the scheme, had 
suggested that the works contemplated should include such items 
as port equipment, terminal fa c ilit ie s , marshalling yards and - 
the adaptation of the railway system to deal with heavier 
ro llin g  stock,and should contribute towards the revival of 
industry, p a rticu la rly  heavy industry. I t  was also hoped that 
the works would be of a capital nature which the companies would 
have been unable to finance but for Government aid.
When the Labour Party took office only the Great Western 
Railway Company had submitted any plans. They had proposed 
schemes involving the expenditure of £880,000 which was 
£170,000 more than they were required to spend. Two of the 
schemes were of a capital nature and three were revenue. On 
the 25th June, Thomas and Morrison net the railway managers and 
the policy on public works was explained. Thomas considered 
that the railways were important because they could give special 
stimulus to the iron and steel in d u s t r y ^ .  The railway 
managers referred to the prospects of the railways and said that 
they were not able to re ly  upon the expansion of trade and were 
cautious about embarking upon new works. The London and North 
Eastern Company expected a 10% return. The managers asked 
Thomas what aid the Government would be w illin g  to give. Thomas 
intimated that works would be considered i f  they were 
'economically .justified* and would not otherwise be carried out. 
' Economically .justified ' to Thomas appeared to mean something 1
(1) ib id . Thomas was often accused of favouring the railways 
because of his previous union relationship.
between 1SJ% and non-remunerative. The companies were asked to 
examine schemes of development to consider at which point in a 
scale of possible assistance they would be remunerative, bearing 
in mind the various forms of aid that might be given. The 
managers agreed to make this survey and report their findings. 
This they did,and the next day*^. They considered they could 
undertake works; if grants from the U.G.C. were available and 
drew attention to their inability to take risks in the prevailing 
economic climate. As many of the projects would aid industry 
generally they felt that the Government would be justified in 
granting loans. Permission to buy land was requested so that 
some of the benefits attributable to the railway development 
could be recouped: the betterment *. Thus attention was drawn 
to two important externalities related to railway development. 
Complaints were made because they were required to maintain 
roads and approaches to bridges over railway lines but had no 
access to the road fund for maintenance grants.
12)In a report to the I.D.C.U. the Minister of Transport pointed 
out that they were £9M short of their standard revenue; were not 
allowed to retain any part of the de-rating relief; and that 
the Government road programme contributed to their plight by 
making roads relatively more attractive. To some extent their 
position was eased by the Home Development .Bill which improved 
their borrowing powers. 12
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(1) CAB 27 390 DU 25 (29)
(2) CAB 2? 390 DU 3^ (29)
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The schemes mentioned as possibilities for a works programme by 
the railways included a London underground goods railway; 
electrification of the suburban section of the L. & N.E.R. and. 
Southern Railways and the Tilbury-Southend section of the L.M.S.R.; 
the Channel Tunnel R a i l w a y a n d  the extension of the tube lines 
in London .
Early in the Autumn it was agreed that the promoters of the
proposed London underground goods railway should present their
proposals to Parliament in the ordinary way. ?ho only other 
(3)schemes , to get underway were those by the Great Western 
Railway for improvements at Temple' fiJeadxand Paddington stations.
♦Harbours
Harbours were not expected to play a particularly important part
in the public works programme. Their limitations were pointed
out in the memorandum produced by the Ministry of Agriculture
and Fisheries^. The work on harbours was likely to be
suspended in winter months, located in small poor fishing
communities which have.to be maintained,and the -works may reduce
the employment potential in these areas. The Ministry of
( 5)Transport ^ , also reporting on harbours, were not very 123*5
(1) CAB 27 389 OH 10 (29)
(2) CAB 27 389 PH l*f (29)
(3) c a b 27 390 jju 57 (29;
(Jf) CAB 27 389 PH 1 1 (29)
(5) CAB 27 389 PH 10 (29)
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optimistic about their potential contribution to a public works 
programme, i t  was fe lt  that £10M had already been spent on 
harbours and that this expenditure had reduced the scope for 
further schemes. I t  was pointed out however, that since the 
change in terms of the U.G.C. grants there had been some 
applications. The Ministry of Agriculture mentioned schemes 
which could begin ëither immediately or after a short delay.
These were concerned with improvements to four harbours and the 
erection of tanks to clean polluted mussels and were unlikely to 
involve more than 500 men.
Canals
The only schemes recommended by the Ministry of Transport 
involving canals were those in connection with the Caledonian 
and Crinian canals and these schemes were thought unlikely 
1within themselves to be directly or indirectly worth their cost*. 
Beports on these projects were requested and are discussed in 
Chapter Four.
Electricity schemes
* .....  ‘ • /
The schemes of the electricity commissioners were introduced in
a memorandum circulated by the Minister of Transport. These
schemes are amongst the most ambitious of any submitted. The
commissioners mention as possible ventures; the construction, 1
(1 ) ib id .
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extension end interconnection of generating stations; the 
u tilis a tio n  of water power (the Severn Barrage was being 
considered); transmission to rural areas; low tension distribu­
tion; service f a c ilit ie s ; industrial and railway use»
••The Commissioners suggest, therefore, that regarded as a 
business proposition the stimulation of e le ctrica l develop­
ment ranks high among possible methods of increasing 
employment. The amount of skilled  labour and manufacturing 
capacity available may operate as lim iting  factors against 
any immediate percentage increase in the present rate of 
development." ( l )
In spite of large investment programmes already undertaken with 
the aid of U.G.C. grants,
"the Commissioners are satisfied that i t  would be possible 
to increase the rate of expansion and consequent employment 
by well considered grants. Although the previous grants 
were successful in  their immediate object, the Commissioners 
would suggest that instead of repeating these grants a 
broader outlook is  adopted and i t  should be made clear that 
the object of state assistance was to assist in the provi­
sion at an early date of a cheap e le c tric ity  supply both 
for domestic and power purposes incidentally relieving 
unemployment and that instead of regarding the state 
assistance as given for the provision cf anything in the 
nature of re lie f  works, i t  should be regarded as given to 
enable undertakings to develop on the best lines • » ...  
special assistance for the companies standardising the 
system and moving from DC to AC, and adopting standard 
voltages as these changes are essential for an efficient 
national system." (2)
I t  was also pointed out that railway e le ctrificatio n  would assist 
the development of a national system and i t  was hoped that any
CAB 2? 589 DTI 12 (29)(1)
(2) ib id
Inegotiations with the railway companies would include 
e le ctrifica tio n  proposals.
The proposals would appear to be absolutely in  lin e  with Labour 
ia rty  policy of public works designed to aid industry and to 
refurbish the economy and increase efficiency. They were, 
however, summarily rejected on the grounds that e le c tric ity  was 
a prosperous industry.
At the th ird  meeting of the I.D .C .U . Thomas said that whilst i t  
was not his intention to hamper their work the Government 
regarded the industry as prosperous and as such i t  should help 
unemployment policy but not expect funds. This attitude was at 
odds with the transfer policy which attempted to speed up 
adjustment by giving preferential terms to prosperous regions.
To prosperous industries which also had a part to play in  the 
adjustment process the policy was punitive. A great opportunity 0  
for technological change and a substantial works policy was lo s t.
Land Drainage
The M inister of Agriculture and F ish e rie s^^ reported that 
schemes for land drainage which.were lik e ly  to be begun soon 
would provide 200,000 man weeks of employment. Further schemes 
were under consideration incxuding the Ouse scheme, and other
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(1) CAB 27 389 DU k  (29)
l6l
schemes worth £20M likely to be beneficial to the community* 
could be undertaken on the lines suggested by the Royal 
Commission on Land Drainage. Few schemes involving transferred 
labour were considered likely to be proposed on the present 
terms of the grant.
Land settlement was a popular proposal with some sections of 
the Labour Party particularly Lansbury-and-Xloyd George and other 
Members of the Liberal Party. This would have involved legisla­
tion and was thought to be a costly venture not likely to make 
much impact on the unemployment problem.
Forestry schemes
The chairman of the Forestry Commission outlined to the I.D.C.U. 
the main features on a scheme involving 330 acres which they 
advised the Government to adopt instead of a 225 acre scheme 
sanctioned by the previous administration. Hopkinsj
' s i  ■
pointed.- out that the larger schemes would not give great 
employment results or have a high return rate^ Thomas 
recommended that the larger scheme should be iidopted subject to 
the agreement of the Treasury. This was one of the rare 
occasions when a more expensive scheme was approved than that 
proposed by the civil servants^. 1
(1) CAB 27 3$0 DU 23 (29) 5th Meeting 29th duly 1929.
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Housing
The Minister of Health asked for permission to repeal the 
provisions of the previous administration relating to house- - 
building so that the housing programme might go ahead. The 
Scottish Department*^ indicated that there had been a falling 
off in schemes because of the uncertainty about the terms to be 
offered and suggested increased grants for slum clearance
to enable the work to proceed. The renewed buoyancy of the 
housing market from 1930-1932 was to make a significant 
contribution to economic activity during the recession •
Works
The First Commissioner of Works, Lansbury, presented a
13)memorandum setting out the schemes which his department 
could initiate. These included work in the royal parks, the 
erection of the new whale room presumably for the Natural History 
Museum and the development of the Montague House site to provide 
departmental accommodation. The schemes were small and could 
not make much contribution to the unemployment problem. (l)
(l) CAB 27 390 DU 5 (29;
(2; H.W. Richardson, d .N. Aldcroft, Building in the British 
Economy Between the Wars. Allen and Unwin London 1968.
(?) CAB 27 390 DU 13 (29)
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Reconstruction
'•the f irs t  step towards putting B ritish  industry in  a 
position to compete successfully, in overseas markets is  
to subject th e ir organisational equipment to a thorough 
reconditioning." ( l )
The Labour Party saw industry as being in need of a purge and 
reconstruction. The idea of improving productive capacity 
underlay the public works programme, xt was a popular policy 
lending an air of purpose and realism to the party's proposals. 
The extent of the problem facing the basic industries is 
indicated by the unemployment position in those industries in 
1929» which has been discussed above. Bee Table 7« p.120.
Promises had been made to reorganise the coal industry from 
' top to bottom* and to set up committees to inquire into the 
cotton and the iron and steel industries. The f ir s t  steps 
towards the realisation of these objectives were made before the 
summer recess when committees were set up under the auspices of 
the C iv il  Research Committee to consider the problems of the 
industries. Preparations were also made for"the drafting and 
presentation of the Coal B i l l .
The poor performance of the industry had led to inquiries being
( p )
instigated y and had prepared the way for Government intervention. 12
(1) Committee on Trade and Industry. Cmd 3897 HMSO (1931) j
(2) Coal Industry Commission '(Sankey Commission) 1919. cmd • 210. '
-Royal- Gomm-ision on -Coal -Industry" (Samuel Report )lQ26~ cmd.2600.
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Ihe Coal Mines Bill introduced in the Autumn of 1929 was an 
attempt to deal with some of the problems. The Bill introduced 
Improvements in the marketing structure and a reduction of the 
hours of work in the mines, but it was hardly a reorganization 
'from top to bottom1 2. The proposals met strong opposition in 
Parliament where the Liberals were at pains to improve* them.
The Liberals wished to see amalgamations and reorganization on 
the lines of the Samuel Report but the Bill as proposed tended, 
if anything, to prolong the life of inefficient units. The 
negotiated scheme was in fact a fairly modest affair.
The Bill was the result of some months of negotiation between
the Government and two rather intransigent bodies: the Miners
Federation euad the Miners Association neither of whom wished to
see any pits closed and neither of whom was prepared to discuss
the matter with the other. The Miners Association, representing
the owners, would not even take part in a joint conference , held
to discuss the proposed bill in November, claiming that they had
no authority to enter into any joint conference. The real reason
was felt by the Cabinet to be the Association's apprehension of
being drawn into discussions on wages.which they preferred to
discuss in districts but which the Miners' representatives were
anxious to put on a national basic. The owners also opposed the
proposal to reduce hours. The Miners Conference recommended the
acceptance of the Government plan but still pressed for better
(2 )terms . The Bill struggled through its second reading with a
(1) CAB 23 6l 25th Meeting 7th November 1929. 4-6(29)
(2) CAB 23 62 32nd Meeting 55(29)
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scanty majority of eight on the 23rd D e cember^.
Reconstruction is of course a long term measure aimed at reduc­
ing the costs of production in an attempt to ensure the 
competitiveness of goods on international markets. There are two 
problems associated with reconstruction as a policy to alleviate 
unemployment. One problem is connected with the financing of 
tjhe necessary investment for reconstruction during a depressed 
period when the expectations of businessmen are unlikely to be 
sufficiently sanguine for them to undertake the risks of new 
investment, and the investing public might be unwilling to lend 
money at rates of interest low enough to encourage borrowing.
The two Keynesian conditions stopping the establishment of a 
full employment equilibrium might well exist, i.e. a low and 
comparatively inelastic demand for investment and a highly 
elastic demand for money to hold in liquid form. The rate of 
interest may not provide the equilibrating mechanism necessary 
to equate the supply and demand for funds. The second problem 
arises because of the possibility that, at least temporarily, 
reconstruction schemes might be associated with an increase in 
unemployment. These problems both emerged in the early months of 
the administration and become more important as the months passed.
The problem of financing the necessary reconstruction emerged in 
connection with the railway investment programme when the rail­
way managers asked for Government aid in financing the proposed (l)
(l) CAB 23 62 32nd Meeting, 55 (29)
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investment where the risks involved precluded them from under­
taking the schemes independently. The first attempt to deal with 
tfcis problem was by legislation, the Home Development Act, which 
made it easier for public utility companies to borrow money.
The schemes arising from this legislation were scrutinized by 
yet another committee, the Duckham Committee. The problem, 
however, continued to arise as schemes for reorganizing of the 
other major industries began to take shape.
The second problem} unemployment arising from the reorganization, 
was also considered. Horace Wilson^^ following in the steps of 
John Barton, was given the task of analysing the situation and 
he presented a memorandum to the I.D.C.U. which set out to 
consider:
”tho probable effects upon the volume of employment of a 
process of accelerated rationalization regarding that term 
. as covering both reorganization and modernization of 
plant. In particular it is intended to consider whether 
the process of accelerated rationalization would be likely, 
over a period of say five years, to result in the 
industries in question in redundancy of work people who 
would have to seek employment in other occupations" (2)
The conclusion reached was that some redundancy was inevitable.
In the blast furnaces, for example, Britain was probably only
\ to •§• as efficient as the u.S. and Germany, and rationalization
to improve efficiency might well involve at least redundancy
(3)in that branch of industry. The Melchett-Turner reports also 123
(1) CAB 27 390 DU 58 (29)
(2) ibid.,
(3) Melchett-Turner Reports (1928, 1929) op. cit.
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foresaw the possibility of heavy redundancy associated with the 
reconstruction process and suggested that a redundancy payments 
scheme should be set up to deal with the hardship involved*
Wilson's report considered that prices were unlikely to fall by 
as much as costs because firms would wish to recoup their normal 
margin of profit and build up reserves. So far as expansion in 
demand, in response to reduced prices, was concerned it was 
thought that as a rule it would be sufficient in the course of 
time to cause as much labour to be employed as before though in 
different industries and possibly different kinds of labour. It 
was also thought that the restoration of competitive power would 
be accompanied by an increase in exports. Bow great such an 
expansion might be was thought to depend upon various circum­
stances, including those influencing the 'growth of the aggregate 
volume of world trade * and the 'ability of the British people to 
balance increased exports with increased imports.'
The inadequacy of the grasp of the theories of international 
trade was again handicapping policy. Only the crude slogan that 
exports were to be balanced by imports appears to have permeated 
the thinking of the policy makers and no attempts were made to 
estimate the likely responsiveness of exports to the hoped for 
changes in prices or the likely reaction, to the changing terms, 
by the other trading nations who were already embarked upon 
highly restrictive trade policies and busy developing their own 
industries.
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At this juncture, however, reconstruction had assumed great 
importance in the unemployment policy portfolio as the short term 
measures were gradually being given up. It was the policy which 
Thomas advocated in his policy statements made shortly before the 
Christmas recess in 1929. See above p.l3&. The potential of the 
programme, in conditions of declining world trade, was not 
great. In addition the implementation of the programme was to 
prove a difficult and lengthy process.
International Trade
The Labour administration was committed to a policy of free- 
trade although there were members of the Party who were not so 
c o m m i t t e d T h e  first statement about trade policy was made 
with regard to safeguarding duties, the procedure for the safe­
guarding of industry which was set up under the Conservatives 
was still in ferce. Before the election the application of the 
woollen and worsted industries had been considered'and a report 
had been presented upon which the President of the Board of 
Trade was committed to take some action. He raised the issue at 
the fourth Cabinet meeting and the problem,was resolved at the
(l) Attlee, Bevin, Dalton, Thomas amongst others were not
adamant free traders. ’ ¿se p.28a above for the general politics 
background to trading policies.
i
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Cabinet meeting held two days later when the following statement 
was agreed:
"with regard to the existing Safeguarding Duties we have 
consistently opposed their imposition and made it 
abundantly clear that we should reserve the right to 
remove them when the practicable opportunity arose. 
Opposition to protective duties has just been overwhelmingly 
expressed by the electorate. It must, therefore, be under­
stood that we should in no case renew these Duties should 
they remain in operation till the statutory periods expire 
and we reserve the right to repeal them at earlier dates if 
it appears practicable and desirable to do so. We realize 
the inconvenience which changes of tariff policy inflict 
upon the trades concerned and in coming to conclusions on 
this matter we must have regard to this consideration 
and also to the operation of the revenue." (l)
Thus the right to cancel the duties at a suitable moment in the
future was reserved*
Import Substitution
One of the central tenets of policy was to help the depressed 
industries and the export industries. Thomas took this aspect of 
the policy very seriously and attempted to bolster up demand for 
the products of these industries by persuading managers of the 
public utility companies to use products of the depressed 
industries instead of imported products. He badgered the tele­
phone, electricity and the railway companies about the use of 1
(1) CAB 23 60 5th Meeting 28th June 1929, 26 (29) ! uAB 2% 20*f 
CP 172 (29).
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iron,. metal and concrete for equipment instead of imported 
wood.
These pleas resulted in some extensive cost-effectiveness 
exercises by these public utility companies demonstrating the 
superiority of wood, on the 2nd July a memorandum was issued 
by the Post Office commenting upon the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of steel poles and wooden poles^^. This was
J .
followed by a memorandum from the electricity commissioners on
merits of the different poles which stated that whereas a
creosoted pole had a life of 30-50 years without repair the
steel poles needed repainting every three years and were liable
Í 2 )to corrosion underground . The comparative costs of the 
equipment showed steel to be between 35“1002> more expensive 
than wood. Further the Foreign Office said there was informa­
tion about the use of reinforced concetre poles in other 
countries but could produce no reliable technical evidence^^.
A further memorandum from the Post Office on ferro-concreto 
poles stated that their introduction would mean the use of an 
inferior article at an additional cost of £10,000 plus freight 
and erection costs; that there would be a gain to the ferro­
concrete industry of £*»4,000; and a loss of £12,000 to British 123
(1) CAB 27 390 DU 20 (29)
(2) CAB 27 390 DU 27 (29)
(3) CAB 27 390 DU *f6 (29)
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Bhipping^^. The matter was discussed at the October meeting of (
(2)the I.D.C.U. and a further spate of memoranda ensued on the
use of steel/wooden poles and wooden telephone bell sets and on
(3)steel sleepers for the railway ^ . The only place where 
substitution appeared viable was in the construction of telephone 
boxes of steel instead of wood.
Thomas’s preoccupation with this matter was in all probability 
extremely irritating to the civil servants and others involved. 
Years later Mosley recalls:
"much departmental time was occupied with the L.P.S.’s 
insistence that wooden telegraph poles should be replaced 
by concrete poles made in Britain. Reams of paper were 
circulated from the departments to prove what a disaster 
this would be and the chiefs of the whole civil service 
were regaled for long periods of our precious weekly 
meetings by the consequent debates.” (40
A related matter to import substitution was the use of British 
goods in Government contracts. This was raised by Roland Nugent, 
D i r e c t o r o f  the Federation of British Industry (F.B.I.) on 
31st July, 1929. As the schemes were designated for the maximum 123*5
(1) CAB 27 390 DU 50 (29)
(2) CAB 27 390 6th Meeting, 8th October 1929.
(3) CAB 27 390 DU 64-, 65, 66 (29)
(40 0 Mosley, My Life, Nelson, London 1968. p. 233*
(5) CAB 27 390 DU 51 (29).
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absorption of unemployed workers the F .B .I .  urged that a condition
of approval of any scheme should be that British plant and
material should be used* Two m e m oranda were r a pidly produced
dealing w i t h  the conditions relating to the origin of materials
used. One was from the Treasury which after studying Nugent's
request interpreted it as covering both the w o r k e r s  and the
contractors' plant. It was thought that only the first w a s
covered, or could be covered, b y  the regulations but they were
generally in agreement with Nugent,»6 s e n t i m e n t s ^  • The other
(2)memorandum which was produced b y  the M i n i s t r y  of Transport 
specified in detail the regulations relating to schemes 
sanctioned by that department. Under the Development Acts, the 
D u ckham Committee ask e d  applicants to disclose the amount, if any 
of the expenditure outside Great Britain but it was reported that 
none had been specified so far. The U.G.C. requ i r e d  that all 
contracts for grant aided wor k s  should be placed in Britain ar.d 
the road fund grants were subject to the regulation that if at 
all possible British made plant and machinery should be used. 
Similar assurances had been given by the railway companies.
An attempt was made to establish some guidelines to help those 
placing contracts. Mosley, Johnston and a representatives of the 
Minist r i e s  of labour, Health, Transport were asked to consider 
the formula. They agreed the following formula with the 
Chancellor of the .cocchequer for circulation to local authorities 
and public utility companiesi 12
(1) CAB 27 390 vU 31 (29)
(2) CAB 27 390 iAJ 55 <29).
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"All materials which are required for assisted works shall 
bo far as practicable be of U.K. origin and all 
manufactured articles shall be of U.K. manufacture subject, 
however, to such exceptions as the Government Department 
concerned may find to be necessary or desirable in any 
particular case having regard to all the circumstances • 
including the comparative prices of British and foreign 
articles." (l)
Unfair Competition
The sub-committee had conferred with the Deputy Director of
I.L.O. who had suggested criteria for deciding whether British
traders were suffering from unfair competition because of unduly
( 2)low wages elsewhere . The committee concluded that it was not 
practicable from the wages aspect to prescribe any rough and 
ready test which could be applied at short notice by a depart­
ment or a local authority or other body considering the placing 
of the contract. Some suggestions were made about matters to be 
borne in mind when deciding the justification of an application. 
These included the considerations of the fairness of the prices, 
the comparability with regard to prices and quality; the causes 
of any disproportionate difference including evidence of any 
artificial inflation or deflation1 of the prices and evidence 
as to the wages and conditions in the countries concerned.
When price differentials were great and the industry in Britain 
prosperous there should be no ministerial intervention if 
contracts were placed elsewhere. They also expressed the view 
that amongst foreign goods, Empire goods were to be preferred.
(1) CAB 27 390 DU 69 (29)
(2) ibid.
Empire Trade
Although the .Labour administration was less committed to Empiret 
trade than the Conservatives had been they did make some attempts
to strengthen Empire links by communications with Australia and
v Ü )by Thomas's trip to Canada, Little progress was made* To 
strengthen the links they also considered the possibility of a 1 
Trade Commissioner Service*
Export Credits
Another method of aiding the export industries was the export credit 
scheme* This was an arrangement for increasing the export trade 
by guaranteeing exports against risks of loss through selling 
goods on credit overseas. These guarantees were taken as 
security by banks and the trade was able to obtain not only 
protection against loss but the means of financing increased turn» ' 
over. The scheme begun in 1926* Each trade paid a premium
)
which formed the income of the fund whic\i was nearly self
supporting* .Unless further legislation was passed it would
(2 )expire in 1931 • The scheme was thought at that time to be
suffering from uncertainty as to its duratio^ and the Lord Privy
Seal decided at the second meeting of the I.D.C.U. to ask for 
legislation to extend the scheme to dispel the uncertainty*
The board of Trade was considering the extension of the system 
to include trade with Russia* This was eventually sanctioned 
and Russia was admitted to the scheme but asked for preferential 
credit terms involving lengthy credit facilities and much debate
(l) An additional measure was the Colonial Development Act 1929« The t 
, ^ Bill had been .considered by the Conservatives in the pre-election 
period and J.H; Thomas, finding it in line with his interest in
Colonial Affairs, introduced it in July 1929 as a modest attempt to 
link colonial development with employment policy,- See David 
Meredith 'The British Government and Colonial Economic Policy 1919-^c;
fair* 1975- •
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took place on the feasibility of these proposals. For some 
members of the Labour Party trade with Russia became a 
potential solution to the depression.
Protection
Early calls for protection came from the quarry industry which 
made an appeal to Lansbury on the subject of local authorities 
using foreign stone for road and kerbing materials. The 
committee were informed that it was sometimes necessary to use 
foreign materials and the lord Privy Seal suggested that the Ministry 
of Transport should discuss the matter with the industry in the 
light of the discussions about the use of British materials.
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Although sections of the Labour Party, especially the i.L.P. (see 
Chapter One aboveX had advocated a compensatory monetary 
policy the official Labour Party offered little except the pro­
mise of an inquiry into finance and industry. Snowden taking 
over as Chancellor had an ambition to reduce the war loan, a 
task which, considering the mess he thought Churchill had left, 
he estimated would take three years^^.*
Monetary policy during 1928 and 1929 had been dominated by the 
need to protect the pound as the withdrawal of funds from 
Europe to the United States continued. After the middle of 
1928 American loans had been greatly reduced placing further
(1) Snowden < 1 9 3 «  or. eit..?.-758. ■ Churchill had not satisfactorily covered the deficm r f"¿ lHjm in 1929* Snowden agreed to increase 
the sinking'fund payments by £5m for three years to cover the 
deficit; Eowson (19 7 5 ) op.cit. p 69; above p.27-
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pressure on the primary producing countries which were already in 
difficulties^"^. Conditions in America deteriorated causing 
strain on the London market which was met by a rise in the bank 
rate. This was hardly welcomed by the Labour Party and Snowden 
was forced to defend this action at the Party’s annual 
conference.
’’Nobody likes a high bank rate, but in this rather imperfect 
world we are sometimes compelled to submit to things we 
don't like, afraid that if we do not the consequence may 
be still more disagreeable. A rise in the bank rate is, 
under existing conditions the only means we have to 
restore unfavourable exchanges and to regulate the basis of 
credit." (2)
The press was fairly tolerant, and even the New Statesman whilst,
"unable to remain as unruffled as Mr Snowden in contemplat­
ing the probable consequences of financial orthodoxy." 
agreed "that in the circumstances it was difficult for the 
Bank to do anything else than raise the rate. It was 
difficult but not impossible. Any other action would have 
implied a fundamental revolution in financial policy.
Such a revolution may be desirable indeed we think it is. 
But it can hardly be made save as a carefully considered 
act." (3)
The crash itself was welcomed as an opportunity to launch a 
cheap money policy. Bank rate fell from in September 1929 to 
5% in May 1930 af. ~r which conditions again became difficult. 123
(1) Williams (1963) QP. cit.
(2) P. Snowden, The Bank of England
(3) New Statesman, 12th October 1929»
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S n o w d e n ’s other objective was to balance the budget and on talking 
up his job he found that the budget was already likely to be in 
d e f i c i t  He thus lost no time in clamping down on the claims of • 
his colleagues as can be seen f r o m  the discussion of the unemploy­
ment insurance fund, the retirement scheme , the raising of 
the school leaving age and the payments to the poor in
, . (l)depressed areas .
The . Ircuiry into ' Industry promised in the
( 2)policy statements was Set up in November , under the chairman­
ship of Macmillan» This Committee w a s  not yet in a position to 
advise the Government on policy and did not report until the 
summer- of 1931. ( s e e  Chapter Three b e l o w  for discussion of the 
deliberations of the committee.)
Seduction in the Supply of Labour
The reduction of the labour force was an important aspect of the 
policy advocated b y  the Labour Party in its pre-election 
publicity. It.was thought that the scheme would further social 
goals and simultaneously help to solve the unemployment problem 
b y  removing from the active labour force the very young, by 
extending the school leaving age to 15; and b y  encouraging
(1) J a n e w a y  (1971) op. cit. refers to Snowden resistance to 
even more stringent economies demanded by the civil 
servants. PP hQ-?1 2 -
(2) Committee on Finance and Industry (1931) op. cit.
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other workers to retire by p r oviding better pension facilities.
Some changes in activity rates amongst the older age groups 
had already occurred but it is difficult to interpret these 
changes as the decennial measurements are taken at different 
points in the cycle w h i c h  will of course affect activity 
r a t e s ^ \  They are also affected by changes in pension 
facilities and insurance arrangements which had also taken 
place and to regulations affecting the age at which children 
m a y  work.
A  sub-committee of the I.D.C.U. was set up on 4th July and
( ? )given the t a s k  of p r e p a r i n g  a plan. The members of the committee 
were Lansbury, Mosley, Johnston and representatives of the 
Treasury, Ministry'of Labour, ministry of Health, Board of 
Education, Scottish office, and the Government Actuary. They 
were to enquire and report to the Lord Privy Seal upon retire­
ment pensions to industrial workers and the r a i s i n g  of the 
school l e a v i n g  age.
The committee met thirteen times between July and November 1929
when a report was produced. At the first meeting it was agreed
that pensions should be considered first as a  memorandum on the
subject prepared b y  the Ministry of Health and the Government
(3)Actuary was already available • (l)
(l) C o r r y  B.A., Roberts J.A. "Activity rates and unemploymenti 
the experience of the United Kingdom 1951-66". Applied 
E c o n o m i c s . 2. i ^ l O  p jf> (J4 ~?-0\
(3)
( 2 ) C A B  27 391 LU (P and E) 
CAB 27 39u DU 24 (29)"
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They proceeded with the research by asking the Minister of 
Health and the Minister of Labour to examine the insurance cards 
of persons over 65 to see how many were employed and in which 
industries. A questionnaire was sent to some large organisa­
tions including local authorities and the railway companies 
asking about the compulsory retirement age and the pension 
facilities provided. The Ministry of Health was asked to find 
out how many persons between 65-70 were receiving outdoor relief. 
At the next meeting they took the matter a little further by 
assuming 10/- a week for life as the relevant pension and asking 
for estimates of the potential saving to the unemployment fund, 
if 250,000 vacancies could be achieved; and to the poor law funds 
if the pension proposals were implemented.
At their third meeting they considered a report on raising the
school leaving a g e ^ \  It was suggested that a bill should bi
introduced in the Autumn providing for the raising of the school
leaving age in September 1930 and for a maintenance grant
supported from the Exchequer. This scheme was overtaken by
events, when it was decided by the Cabinet that the matter was
primarily an educational one and was to be dealt with by the
( 2 )President of the Board of Education •
The sub-committee continued their investigation into pension
(3 )schemes by asking about their likely effect on industry • *23
(1; CAB 27 391 LU CP & E) 2 & 3 (29)
(2) CAB 2k 205 OP 20k (29)
(3) CAB 27 391 ¿U (P & E) 12 (29)
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committee proceeded to ask the Government Actuary to prepare
a statement of the cost of the proposed scheme including
estimates of the savings to the unemployment fund and the poor -
law expenditure and also to show the cost of including women in
the scheme» In the course of the discussion the suggestion was
made that the sub-committee should consider a temporary scheme
(for 5 years initially) of pensions at 60 to deal with the
emergency in the depressed industries and industries in which
conditions were especially arduous» The Ministry of Labour .and
the Government Actuary were asked for a list of heavy
industries in which there was surplus labour; an estimate of
the number of persons over 60 in the industries • In September
having received the report they decided to abandon the plan
because of insuperable difficulties in defining categories and
the Government Actuaries estimates showing that only a small
(1)number of vacancies would result.
It was at this point that they embarked upon the development 
of an emergency scheme of general application whereby persons 
over 60 who chose to retire should be eligible for a pension.
A draft report was prepared setting out the pros and cons of 
the echeme. This was considered at the next meeting on 
23rd October, differences of opinion as to the interpretation 
of the findings arose.
The Committee were informed by Lansbury that he and his 
ministerial colleagues were unable to sign the report in the form 
in which it was presented and that separate reports by (l)
(l) Ibid. 7th Meeting 17th September.
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Ministers end Offic/afs might have to be submitted. The Ministers 
made a study of the draft to see if they could make amendments 
or additions which would lead to an agreed report. These were 
thrashed out at the next meeting, un 4th November they met to
unable to sign the report because of the nature of the general 
remarks. It was finally agreed to present a report consisting 
of three parts: a general introduction and classification of 
schemes to be signed by all; an addendum by the ministerial 
members; and an addendum by the civil servants.
(2)The final report was agreed by the committee at the
thirteenth meeting on 13th November 1929« On the 22nd November
Thomas Jones reported^^ that he had received an unusual
(4)Cabinet Paper : it was the report on Retirement Pensions.
The report commented upon a number of schemes and combinations of 
schemes, their possible cost and the numbers of vacancies that 
were likely to arise which could be filled by the unemployed.
The scheme recommended by the Ministers was 'O', a scheme by 
which workers subject to the unemployment insurance scheme who 123
(1) CAB 27 391 DU (P 8e E) 25 (29)
(2) CAB 24 207 CP 341 (29) DU 67 (29)
(3) K. Middlemas, Whitehall Diary Vol.II, 1926/1930 Ed. 
DUP London, 1969, p.215.
CAB 24 207 CP 341 (29) DU 67 (29)
members again found themselves
(4)
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had r e a ched 60 on an appointed d a y  and who were w i l l i n g  to 
retire would get a pension for life of 20s. plus 10s. for a  
wife. It wa s  assumed that some 390,000 persons would retire and 
they would create vacancies for rather more than a quarter of a 
m i l l i o n  workers# The ministerial members of the committee saw 
the scheme as ma k i n g  an important contribution to the unemploy­
ment p r o b l e m  and as one which had already been recommended to 
the Government by Par t y  Conference, b y  the T.U.C. and by the 
Melchett-Turner Conference. The Ministers attempted to answer 
possible criticisms of the scheme# The obvious objection was 
that such schemes wou l d  increase the costs of production. They 
replied:
*'We anticipate the familiar argument that a n y  scheme financed 
by the Exchequer w h ich attempts to deal w i t h  unemployment 
or any subject of social reform will in fact increase the 
costs of production and will consequently reduce the 
competitive power of British industry and its capacity to 
provide employment. This argument has been rejected by 
the Labour Party and by the Colwyn Committee in both 
majority and mino r i t y  reports." (l)
In any event they explained that the cost wa s  so small that it 
could not be significant in r a i sing the costs of production. 
Arguments that the scheme would lead to calls for extensions 
were countered by their saying that the acceptance of such 
arguments would lead to the paralysis of Government. It was 
accepted that the scheme would create anomalies and grievances 
but these would be no greater than those implied in the Widows' 1
(1) ibid
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and Orphans' Act and the temporary nature of the proposed scheme 
would they thought make it easier to handle such criticism.
"For above and beyond any such considerations is the benefit 
to the national interest and the strong support from the 
whole nation which must be evoked by such a scheme that 
for the first time in nine years goes to the heart of the 
unemployment problem. At one stroke this plan reduces by 
about •} the number wholly unemployed. It does so at a 
quarter or less of the cost per man employed of any other 
scheme for the provision of work considered by the present 
or any other government."
They estimated it would provide work for the cost of £60 instead 
of £200 implied by Public Works Schemes.
"No one can deny the gravity in terms» economic and human 
of the present unemployment situation. No one from any 
quarter can suggest a remedy which deals so rapidly and 
effectively with that situation. In submitting what we 
believe to be the most potent instrument yet devised for 
meeting the unemployment problem we desire to express our 
warmest thanks and appreciation of the work done by our 
Civil Service colleagues, whose unstinting labours and 
trained abilities have made possible the production of a 
practical measure to combat the greatest evil that 
afflicts the Nation."
On this ringing note of conviction which could only have been 
' (l)drafted by Mosley the Ministerial members let their case rest. 
Lansbury„ had since September asked Thomas to support the scheme 
in Cabinet. It must have been a shock and a disappointment for 
him to read Thomas's memorandum which accompanied the report.
He disdainfully set aside the ministerial recommendations (l)
(l) This is confirmed by ükidelsky (1967) op. cit
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referring to his earlier policy document^^ in which he had 
announced that the main employment policy was
"to ensure revival and expansion of industry at home and 
in the Empire, by improving organisation by re-equipping, 
by fresh capital, and by better transport facilities.
This proposal does nothing to further this end. Moreover, 
revival and expansion of industry - no one has yet pointed 
to any other practicable way of permanently reducing 
unemployment - cannot come unless costs of production are 
covered, by whatever measures of taxation we meet the 
expenditure involved in this scheme, together with the 
increased expenditure on Widows Pensions and Unemployment 
Insurance ..... the cost must tend - even if it be 
indirectly - to hamper productive industry and by raising 
the costs of production to contract the volume of 
employment." (2)
Thomas thus scorned the advice of his ministerial colleagues and 
accepted the views of the civil servants.
This damning statement was accompanied by the report of the non- 
ministerial members which began by stating that there vras ample 
scope for expansion of industry provided a suitable level of 
costs of production could be reached and maintained.
They considered that the scheme would not increase employment 
but it would merely substitute one set of workers for another: 
one group of state pensioners with a permanent right to their 
pensions and debarred from making any contribution to the 
national wealth would be substituted for another group whose 
rights in the form of unemployment benefit were conditional and 
temporary.
(1) CAB 24 206 CP 287 (29)
(2) CAB 24 207 CP 341 (29)
185
To add further condemnation a memorandum was submitted by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer who pointed out that the proposals 
would involve paying about 390,000 at a higher rate than 
250,000 by whom they were to be displaced and out of a different 
funds pensions instead of unemployment benefit^.
The main financial difference was that the whole cost would fall 
upon the Exchequer. Snowden was, of course, right for the scheme 
was as much a venture into social security as into unemployment 
policy. It could, however, have been developed under an 
imaginative and purposeful administration into a redundancy 
scheme which would have eased the process of reconstruction in 
a way which may have reduced the burden on the threatened 
Unemployment Insurance fund.
To cope with this difference of opinion the Cabinet referred the
matter to yet another committee. This committee consisted of
Alexander, Lawrence, and Smith who reported to the Cabinet in a 
12)memorandum on the 19th December. Alexander and Lawrence 
were impressed by the case advanced in support of the adoption 
of scheme *C* as an unemployment measure but after careful 
consideration had been forced to recognise the weight of the 
arguments against the proposals and rejected it. Smith 
reported in favour of the scheme: *2
Cl) CAB 2k 207 CP }kk t29)
(2) CAB 2k 207 CP 366 (29)
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"The conclusion, I have reached after very careful 
consideration of the whole question is that this emergency 
scheme of retirement pensions would, if put into operation 
imnediately, materially relieve the present unemployment 
situation and that its cost could be justified and its 
limitations maintained on this ground alone. Further, on 
balance, I consider that the benefits likely to result from 
its adoption would outweigh the political and administrative 
difficulties to which attention has been drawn. The 
consideration to which I attach the greatest weight is that 
the scheme will give opportunity of work to young persons who 
have at present no prospect of obtaining employment." (l)
The fate of the retirement scheme was decided when Cabinet
settled for the majority view formally at a meeting held after
(2)the Christmas recess on 15th January, 1930 •
Raising of the School Leaving Age
Raising the school leaving age was mentioned in the king»s
speech as being considered both on grounds of alleviation of
unemployment and of providing better educational results. As
was mentioned above it was first considered by a sub-committee
of the I.D.C.U. but later Cabinet decided it was purely an
educational matter and referred it to the President of the Board
of Education, Charles Trevelyan, who presented a plan to raise
the school leaving age to 15 on 1st April 1931 and suggested
(3)that this date should be announced . He offered to bring 
forward the date if it was urgently desired to use this means of 
reducing unemployment. The memorandum included estimates of the
ibid.
CAB 23 62 15th January 193c, 2(30) 
CAB Ih 205 CP 204 (29)
(1)
(2)
(3)
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costs of the proposals; the Implications in terms of vacancies 
to be expected ,100,000; and the estimated relief to the unemploy­
ment scheme which was believed to be £4J million.
In November, Trevelyan was to answer a question in Parliament 
and wished to announce that he would be introducing a bill 
shortly, that various matters were still under consideration 
and that the maintenance grant was to be an integral part of the 
scheme^. Cabinet agreed to this. Late in November, Trevelyan 
reported that he had met representatives of local authorities to 
discuss the maintenance grant and they were against a universal 
allowance and in favour of help to the needy cases. The Party 
he thought would be against this but those Tories who were in 
favour of raising the school leaving age would not support the 
Government if the maintenance grant were universal. He did not, 
therefore,propose a universal or a compulsory scheme for 
maintenance grants upon local authorities, lie had got Snowden's 
agreement that a grant of 6 0% would be given to encourage local 
authorities to pay maintenance. It had also been agreed with 
the Chancellor that five shillings a week should be paid to 
parents who were earning less than £150 per annum. The 
Chancellor wanted the scheme to be for a fixed period of five 
years but Trevelyan would only agree to it being subject to a 
review after five years. The cost of the scheme was estimated 
to be £5 million.
(1) CAB 24 207 CP 348 (29)
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A memorandum^ from Adamson, Secretary of State for Scotland,
accompanied Trevelyan's memorandum. Adamson would have
preferred to see the allowance a permanent feature of the
educational system. He objected that 5s. was not sufficient and
that the £150 per annum was too low a level at which to stop
granting the allowance. He also complained that a Government
grant of 6 0% was not enough to persuade the local authorities,
many of them Tories, to make the grant. Snowden also submitted 
(?)a memorandum pointing out that the cost of raising the school 
leaving age was so large that he was hesitant on financial 
grounds about agreeing with the proposals but recognising the 
temporary hardship he agreed to make the payment for a definite 
period of five years.
The C a b i n e t a p p r o v e d  the proposals on the 15th November 
although the Prime Minister stated that there would not be time 
in the Parliament ary time-table for the early presentation of 
the bill which was shelved for several months. Nevertheless 
Trevelyan did appear to have been one of the few Ministers who 
were able to stand firm against Snowden's pressure for 
financial restraint.
Migration
The transference schemes aimed to move surplus labour from 
depressed areas to prosperous districts. 12
(1) CAB 2k 207 CP 352 (29)
(2) CAB 2k 20? CP 350 (29)
(5) CAB 23 62 47 (29)
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As we saw above the transfer scheme was not proving very 
satisfactory and was unpopular both with the unemployed, the 
unions, and the local authorities. It was also too limited to 
have much impact on the unemployment problem and was bound to 
flounder as unemployment became more generalized. Land settlement 
was still being discussed although it had been demonstrated to 
be too expensive to be a practical solution.
Emigration overseas, the great hope, was running into 
difficulties in Australia as conditions there deteriorated and 
although there was still a possibility of increasing emigration 
to Canada, which had recently benefited from reduced transport 
fees, it too had limited impact on the problem.39,000 left under 
this scheme in 1929 but only 12,000 in 1930^^. Thomas had been 
able to ensure the minor concession that pension rights should 
be available to those migrating.
Hours of Work
The Washington Convention was proving to be rather difficult to 
implement given the numerous trades and condition to be considered 
but Margaret Bondfield struggled on over the Bummer and Autumn in 
an attempt to be able to introduce legislation which would enable
( p )Britain to ratify the convention • 12
(1) See Drummond (197*0 op. cit.
(2) CAB 2h 205 CP 223 (29).
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Alleviation of Distress
It was upon the unemployment insurance scheme that hopes lay 
of helping the unemployed. It was less than twenty years since 
Britain had taken the first tottering steps towards social 
insurance and the insurance principle was still sacrosant to 
many in spite of the fact that it had been violated because of 
the pressure placed upon it during the twenties. Hopes had been 
raised during the election of more generous treatment for the 
unemployed as well as the introduction of a much more 
comprehensive system of social security. The Minister of Labour's 
first statement to the Cabinet on the state of the insurance fund 
indicated that these hopes were to flounder.
"The unemployment insurance scheme is in serious financial 
position and I regard it as one of my first duties to put 
it on a sound footing in thi3 respect."
The intention not to borrow for the fund smacks of the 
puritanical ethos which surrounded the MacDonald administration.
• "I-’am strongly opposed to any further increase of the 
-borrowing power, whether by itself or as a supplement to 
other measures. The borrowing power is already high 
enough and we must put a stop to the indefensible plan of 
living on our overdrafts." Cl)
What then did she plan to do? She proposed to increase the 
Exchequer contribution to the fund on the 'equal thirds'. *2
Cl) CAB 24 204 CP 169 (29)
(2) "Equal thirds" was a suggestion to increase the Exchequer 
contribution to half of the combined employer/employee 
contribution of 8d..and ?d. respectively i.e. to Yi«» 
instead of 6d.
basis from April 1 st 1929» at a cost of the JfcScchequer of 
£3i- million per annum. This would be introduced in an emergency- 
bill to be passed in the Summer session. She also wanted an 
inquiry into the problem of continuing the payment of benefit to 
those who did not qualify under the thirty contributionSrule. 
These unemployed workers were at present drawing unemployment 
benefit under a temporary scheme due to expire in March 1930.
This arrangement was thought by the Minister to be
f. -
"unfair to the insured workman and their employers that 
they should have to pay towards it ag insurance 
contributors; and it is unfair and demoralizing to the 
unemployed workman who is drawing benefit by virtue of a 
contribution qualification that he should be lumped in with 
others who are drawing what is really a 'dole'." (l)
By removing these persons from dependence upon the scheme a 
saving of £6 million could be made and 1.2 million unemployed 
could be supported from the fund. This would help but would not 
give sufficient security for the fund. The Minister impressed 
upon her colleagues the fsto-p gap1 2 nature of the measures she 
suggested.
-
The Cabinet approved the Minister’s suggestions and a committee
(?)was 6et up» the Unemployment Insurance Bill Committee , to 
consider the problem and design a bill. The Committee met for 
the first time on 30th July, 1929. Its members included the
(1) CAB 2k 20k CP 169 (29;
(2) CAB 27 396.'
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Minister of Labour, the Minister of Health and the Secretary of 
State for Scotland, secretary of State for Dominions and 
Colonies, and a representative of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, I4r Upcott, and representatives of other departments. 
The terms of reference specifically stated the desire of the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer that the Minister of Labour should 
keep in closest touch with the Treasury during the drafting of 
the Bill,
At the first meeting the Minister of Labour said that without a 
substantial increase in income which must come from the 
Exchequer since it was impossible to increase the contributions 
of the employers and workers, the insurance fund could not 
continue to be responsible for supporting those not fulfilling 
the contributions requirement. The thirty contributions require­
ment^ proposed in the Insurance Act 1924,* was supposed to be 
operative in 1925» Its enforcement was delayed pending the 
report of the Blanesburgh Committee which recommend that the 
rule should be introduced:
•'persons with so poor a record of employment could scarcely 
claim still to be in the insured field; that there is 
grave doubt as to the genuineness of their search for 
work.1' (l)
It was subsequently introduced into the 1927 Insurance Act and 
the transition period had been extended annually since then.
(l) CAB 27 396 UIC 2 (29)
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The Minister of Health pointed out that there were 125*000 
adults on outdoor relief in the country who were in no way 
different from those drawing benefit from the fund without the 
necessary qualification. However, he felt it to be difficult' 
to deal with the situation without breaking pledges to make the 
able-bodied unemployed a national charge.
Various methods for dealing with the problem were discussed and 
it was agreed that a memorandum should be prepared outlining a 
scheme for persons whose benefit would cease during the next 
year. The assistance considered to be of a 'transitory' nature /v ' '
K t
to deal with abnormal circumstances and its 'curative* 
characteristics (it was to involve training) was to be emphasized. 
The question of the level of benefit was not decided at this 
juncture but the Ministry of Health thought that in some cases 
it ought to be more than unemployment insurance because of the 
chronic nature of the problem but this did not appear 
politically feasible.
At the second meeting of the committee Lord Passfield expressed 
the view that any payments made should be in the nature of 'a 
privilege and not a right* and should be subject to some form of 
industrial training and a 'needs test'.^ The view that the 
unemployment reflected to some extent on the calibre and train­
ing of the unemployed was still a dominant theme in the debate. 
‘Wilson pointed out that the scheme was designed so as not to 
place further burden upon the local authorities and that training (l)
(l) CAB 27 396 2nd Meeting l?th September 1929
19^
was an Integral part of the scheme but that the problem was not 
financing the training but finding jobs for the trainees! The 
Minister of Health again pointed out the anomaly which the 
scheme would create with those on outdoor relief. But the 
Ministry of Labour said that there was no tine to put forward a 
general scheme as the fund was urgently in need of the relief.
The scheme was produced^^ and presented to Cabinet on 25th 
September. It was estimated that about 150,000 persons would be 
affected if the transitional arrangements expired after April 
1930} *7,000 of these were in mining areas. If no action was 
taken they would fall upon the Poor Law, exposing the Government 
to criticism of driving people onto the Poor Law and also breaking 
the electoral pledge of national support for the unemployed.
The scheme proposed to give grants to those in need of them.
The Cabinet would have none of it. It was felt that the scheme 
would expose the Government to severe criticism in Parliament 
for exposing those disqualified to the investigations of the 
Poor Law. It was also felt undesirable to introduce an 
interim measure in regard to unemployment insurance as well as 
widows'; pensions. The committee were asked to re-examine the 
question and reported very quickly to the effect that as Cabinet 
was unable to sanction the intermediate scheme there was no 
alternative but to maintain the status quo and extend the
(i; CAB 2k 206 253 (29)
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transitional period for a time subject to the payment by the 
l&cchequer of the extra cost. This report was approved by 
Cabinet and the committee were invited to undertake an immediate 
examination into the more general problem of the able-bodied 
unemployed. Margaret Bondfield had lost her battle to put the 
fund on a firmer footing* but thousands of unemployed had been 
spared the rigours of the means test. The problem remained 
leaving the fund vulnerable financially and politically. The 
dilemma about hovr to get rid of the ‘transitional* category was 
not resolved until the crisis of 19 31.
After this one could hardly expect much to be offered in the
(l)Insurance Fund Bill. Margaret Bondfield reported her 
proposals in mid-October listing the reforms expected by the 
Government supporters as being: the abolition of the genuinely 
seeking work clause; the lowering of the age of entry to belcw 
16; the insurance of agriculture workers; a general increase in 
the rates of benefit and a reduction of six days waiting period 
or its abolition. On the first issue she changed the 
responsibility of proving that suitable work was available 
from the claimant to the Court of Referees. This matter was not
a.successfully resolved until the introduction of the Hayday
(2)formula at a later stage in the progress of the Bill . She 
agreed to reduce the age of entry to that of the proposed 12
(1) CAB 2k 206 CP 279 (29J
(2) Skidelsky (1967) on. cit.
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higher school leaving age from April 1931. She agreed to increase 
benefits for persons of both sexes aged 1 7 » 18 and 19 but to make 
no general increases though some changes were made in the 
classes of dependents eligible for allowances. She decided to 
make no change in the waiting period and introduced the agreed 
extension of the transitional1 period for one year. Agriculture 
workers could not be included in the hill in the time available.
The improvements made were all marginal and minor. In defence 
she said that the cost of the implementation of the T.U.C.'s
a
proposals would be £12 -^ million; the cost of reducing the waiting 
period to three days would by itself cost £2 million. The 
Minister apologised for the limited nature of the proposals.
"Mow the plain fact is that the unemployment fund has no 
monev with which to meet new charges, it was practically
bankrupt when we took office..... Apart from these
proposals I felt compelled to advise against an increase of 
the rates of benefit or an alternation of the waiting pt
period, although I should have been more than glad if money 
could have been found for reducing the waiting period to 
three days; but I want my colleagues therefore to consider 
the matter for it is certain that we shall be strongly 
criticised by our supporters." (l)
This then was the Bill which was to take the sting out of 
unemployment. One wonders why the Minister persisted with it in 
view of the derisory benefits she was offering.
The Cabinet's reservations about the Bill were severe. The 
matter of the agricultural workers* participation in the scheme
(1) CAB 2k 206 CP 279 (29)
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was referred to a sub-committee composed of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Scotland, the Minister of 
Agriculture and Fisheries and the Minister of .Labour. The 
Minister and the Chancellor were asked to confer once again on 
the matter especially Regarding the rates of benefit and the 
possibility of reducing the waiting days. They reported to 
Cabinet upon their deliberations on the 30th October providing 
new estimates of the costs involved. It was estimated that the 
removal of the genuinely seeking work clausewould be £2 million; 
the cost of the improved benefits of the younger members £400,u0o;anc 
the cost of reducing the waiting period was £3 million. The 
Chancellor pointed out that he had already agreed to make 
transitional payments back dated to April 1929 at a cost of 
£3 million. It was agreed that they could increase thetene'fits- for th 
young but hewas unable to find the necessary £3 million for the 
waiting time.
The Cabinet was obviously disturbed by the failure to reduce the ! 
waiting period but Snowden reiterated the extent of the 
additional financial burden that the Exchequer had already 
undertaken and stated that he was unable to alter his decision. j
After four months of the Labour administration all that had been
l
accomplished for the unemployed was maintenance of the status «.
quo and that only after considerable struggle against the book­
keeping of the Minister and the Chancellor^^.
(1) Parliamentary progress of the Bill and the Hayday formula - a
compromise form of the 'not genuinely seeking work1 clause to the 
effect that disqualification from benefit took place only if a claimant 
had refused an offer of suitable employment - are discussed in 
Skidelsky (1967) op. cit.p 13^.
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The Bill had a very stormy passage in the HouseV and the 
Minister had to agree to a modified form of the genuinely seek­
ing work clause.which reduced the accountability of the 
Unemployed workers substantially, by the acceptance of the 
Heyday formula. The bill was a great disappointment to the f 1 
Parliamentary Labour Party and to the Trade Unions.
Grants to lNecessitoas~- Areas *
C
Another way in which the Government could have brought direct 
aid to the unemployed was via grants to Boards of Guardians to 
administer relief in cash or kind to the distressed communities. 
There was already a vehicle by which this aid could be directed 
to some at least of the areas: the Coalfields Distress Fund.
This was a fund, to which the Government contributed, raised by 
a public appeal by the Lord Mayor.
Early in the session the Minister of Health, Greenwood, drew
the attention of the Cabinet to his anxiety about the adequacy
of the fluid to meet the needs of the areas during the Winter
months. In response to this the Chancellor instigated an
inquiry into the operation of the fund from those administering 
(2)it. The report of this inquiry was produced in November.
(l) Snowden (1934) op. cit. Snowden, admired Margaret Bondfield 
and was respectful of the difficulties of her job; he says 
he always tried to sit next to her to give her support 
when she was introducing a bill.
12) CAB 24 20? CP 326 {29)
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The report stated that the fund had spent £900,000 mainly on 
boots and clothing in the first six months and had only £500,000 
left for the Winter. The lack of funds was considered to be
< •
mismanagement in the previous year when »the feeling of illimit­
able resources was in the air1 23^^. It would, the report 
suggested, be more prudently managed in the current year if 
there was no Treasury Grant. There was anxiety least they raised 
the standard ,of the unemployed to a level approaching that of 
the working men.
"A relatively small sum will in fact put the families of 
unemployed men on the same footing as those of many 
employed men." (2)
Another problem was the limitation of the fund to mining areas 
any extension of it would further anger the areas not included.
’•There is already a marked tendency in those areas to look 
upon the existence of the Lord Mayor's Fund or some equiva­
lent as a permanent arrangement providing as a right 
assistance to persons who in other parts of the country are 
left to meet their responsibilities unaided.'* (3)
There is no doubt that they preferred the unemployed to be 'equal' 
in their poverty.
(1) ibid.
(2) ibid,
(3) CAB Zk 207 CP 326 (29)
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In December the Minister of Health made yet another attempt to 
get help to the distressed, explaining his dissatisfaction with 
the efforts which were being made in the mining areas by the 
Coalfields Distress Fund and Boards of Guardians. Since his 
last attempt he had received a deputation from the Joint 
Standing Committee of Industrial Women Organisations about the 
distress prevailing in certain areas of the country. To support 
him in his application he had asked for evidence and a question­
naire was circulated to the areas concerned, no armed with 
evidence from Morpeth, Durham, Wigan, Sheffield, Pontypridd, 
Llanelly and Bridgend telling a sorry tale of misery, he 
presented the Cabinet on December 20th with his memorandum^K
The extent of the deprivation which for thousands had continued 
for years rather than months was acute. Apart from lack of foot­
wear, which in many cases had reve.vted to bindings, there was a 
lack of clothing, blankets and other necessities. He proposed 
to issue a circular to the Boards of Guardians impressing upon 
them the need for humane administration during the present 
difficulties. Greenwood asked for £^M aid during the Winter 
for the mining areas and other areas where suffering was acute.
The report of the Minister of Health was supported by a 
(2 )memorandum dated 2nd December prepared by the Secretary of 
State for Scotland. The distress in Scotland had been so acute 
that the fund had had to operate throughout the summer and had 12
(1) CAB 24 2 0 6 CP 303 (29)
(2) CAB 24 207 CP 342 (29)
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only £5*000 left.
MSo far as distress in the Scottish coalfields is concerned 
I am of the opinion that it is likely to he at least as' 
had as that of last winter and that if it is to be met a 
stun of at least £100,000 will he necessary to tide the 
mining community over the next five months." (l)
The reply from the Chancellor was acid. He referred to his 
earlier memorandum which stated that the situation in the mining 
areas was not as bad as in the previous year and that the 
resources of the fund were adequate unless it was to be used to 
supplement wages. His view he said had be6n accepted by the 
Cabinet at the time. Now the Minister of Health,
"having received a deputation of women who complained that 
the Lord mayor's Fund and the Boards of Guardians were too 
strict again produced his scheme adding, however, that it 
could not be confined to the mining areas but must be given 
to all necessituous areas, fet he seems to think he would 
still keep it to a maximum of million. The next thing 
he will discover that this sum is quite inadequate and that 
we must raise the limit to several million. And having 
given these grants for two winters we shall have to go on 
repeating them next year and on an ever higher scale, and 
so we shall go on." (2)
He continued that there was growing evidence that proposed social 
legislation was already having a depressing effect on business 
enterprise. He believed that conditions would be improved 
from April when the reorganisation of public assistance came 
into effect and that temporary relief would not deal with the 
fundamental problems of "the necessitous" areas which required 12
(1 ) ibid.
(2) ibid, my italics.
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more constructive measures«
Thus Snowden held there was no need for the aid; that the 
request would be renewed year after year;that the distress would 
be remedied by the reorganization from April of the Public 
Assistance and that more constructive measures were necessary.
Tet on this specious logic he asked Cabinet to support him in 
his 'emphatic opinion* that the Minister of Health's proposals 
should be rejected. The Cabinet concurred. Thus the £§• million, 
which even in those days was little more than a rounding error in 
any Chancellor's budget, was denied to those in need and a 
socialist Minister of Health was sent, cap in hand, to the 
voluntary associations to minister to the distressed workers^ \
Apologists might defend Snowden's orthodox financing, his 
strength and single mindedness but he stands condemned in this 
last meeting before the Christmas recess for his want of 
charity.
II| (l)
i
(l) CAB 23 62 20th December 1929, 5^ (29)
This is in sharp contrast to the Conservative administra­
tion desire twelve months previously to give generously 
to the fundi
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CHAPTER THREE 
FULL CIRCLE
■Unemployment -policy from January _to, Hay 1930 
Introduction
The New Year heralded some new developments in the unemployment 
policy of the Labour administration. MacDonald established his 
team of expert advisors which was set up as the Economic 
Advisory Council^1 2^. Thomas made some headway in the organiza­
tion of the financial structure necessary to facilitate the
reconstruction programme upon which the long term strategy of
(2)the unemployment policy depended •
The progress of unemployment policy was increasingly a matter 
for concern. The public works policy was not proceeding very 
fast in spite of the advocacy of works schemes inside the 
Government by Mosley; by Keynes in.the Macmillan Committee; and 
by Henderson, Cole and Keynes in the E.A.C. Mosley spent the 
Christmas vacation producing his memorandum which he saw as 
providing the organizational framework and policy necessary to 
deal with unemployment in the short and long term.
Unemployment mounted steadily throughout the period as can be 
seen in Table 1 below. Although there were some who attributed 
part of this increase to the changes in the unemployment 
insurance scheme, introduced by Margaret Bondfield in the
(1) CAE 23 62 3(30)
(2) CAB 24 209 21(30)
20^
Autumn, the phenomenon was accepted as being part of an 
international pattern about which Britain could do little.
Table 10
% Unemployment - U.K.
Monthly - 1930
%
January 12
February 12.9
March 13»7
April 1^.2
May 15*0
June 15 »4-
Source: British Labour Statistics Historical 
Abstract lëü6-196b. Table i60. """
There were signs of trouble in international markets as commodity 
prices fell r a p i d l y P r o t e s t s  were made by the agricultural 
sector which asked for protection against the dismal world 
conditions. Stories of the plight of the colonial sugar produc­
ing states were reaching the Cabinet. In India and elsewhere
( 2 )tariff barriers were being erected which foretold of harder 
times ahead for British exporters. The British response to 
this situation was to attempt to get international agreement 
for a tariff truce. 12
(1) Kindieberger (1973) op. cit. p. I*f2.
(2) ibid. P. 131} CAB 23 63 9(30).
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Roskill, refers to 1930 as the ‘Year of Conferences1 23^^. The
year began with discussions on outstanding natters from the
Hague Conference; reparations, the evacuation of the Rhineland.
and outstanding aspects of the Young Plan. These talks kept
Arthur Henderson and Snowden busy until mid-January. On
21st January the Naval Conference began in London and continued
(2)until mid-April. It proved a difficult conference , and took up 
much of MacDonald*s time.
The Economic Advisory Council
The establishment of a general body to review economic policy was
part of Labour Party strategy advocated in the policy documents
(3)published before the 1929 election . Indeed the concept had been 
pursued by the first Labour administration using wartime 
organizations such as the Committee of Imperial Defence as 
examples. The Government fell before such ideas could be 
implemented but the Conservative Government adopted some of the 
suggestions and set up the Committee for Civil Research.
MacDonald did little during the first months of the administra­
tion about constituting such a body; and the special reports on 
the cotton* and iron and steel industries were referred to the 
Committee of Civil Research. By the late Autumn the growing 
disenchantment with unemployment policy might have encouraged
(1) S. Roskill, Hankey, Man of Secrets. Collins, 1972. The 
British occupation force was withdrawn from the Rhineland 
in December 1929 and the Young Plan became operational
on 17th May.
(2) ibid. MacDonald wrote to the King describing the attitude 
of the Germans and the French as *deplorable* and needing 
‘delicate handling*. He was pleased that relationships 
with the United States had improved.
(3) Labour and the Nation. (1929) op. cit.
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him to give the matter some attention; and in December he was 
consulting with academics, industrialists and civil servants 
about the form and composition of an economic advisory 
committee^.
On 16th January, 1930, MacDonald presented to the Cabinet a 
memorandum on the establishment of the Economic Advisory Council. 
The purpose of the council was:
"To advise His Majesty's Government in economic matters, 
to make continuous study of developments in trade and 
industry and in the use of national resources, of the 
. effect of legislation at home and abroad; and of all 
’ aspects of national and international economy with a 
bearing on the prosperity of the country". (2)
The Council wa6 to be subject to the general direction of the 
Prime Minister but was to keep in touch with departments affected 
by its activities to ensure a comprehensive study of the economic 
problems of common interest. It had no executive powers and was 
not to interfere in any way with the functions and responsi­
bilities of ministers or of the departments over which they 
presided. The Prime Minister and four ministers: the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, the Lord Privy Seal, the President of the 
Board of Trade and the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries
were to be members. The names of the outside experts who were
(3)to be members were submitted to the Cabinet on 3rd February 
at the same meeting as the Mosley memorandum was presented. 123
(1) Howson and Winch (1977) op. cit.. discuss the setting up of 
the E.A.C.
(2) CAB 23 62 3(30); CAB 2k 2 0 9 CP 7(30).
(3) CAB 23, 62. 6(30). .
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The Council's members included representatives from agriculture, 
distribution, industry, banking, academia and the trades unions. 
The membership included: Balfour, Bevin, Blair, Cadman,
Citrine, Cole, Debenham, Duncan,Hall, Hardy, Keynes, Lewis, 
McLintock, Stamp and Tawney. The Council was to be served by a 
permanent staff of four: H.D. Henderson, A. Loveday, H.V. Hodson 
and Colin Clark,
The Council could, after receiving approval from the Prime 
Minister, initiate inquiries into and advise upon any subject 
falling within its scope. For this pxirpose it could consult with 
the departments and outside authorities and could collect any 
statistical or other information which was required. The Council 
was an experiment and its development was to be the subject of 
'study and experience*^ ^ .
At the first meeting, held on 17th February, the Prime Minister
introduced some topics which the Departments had suggested for
(2 )discussion by the Council • After discussing them it was 
agreed that sub-committees should consider: The Economic Outlook, 
193u; Empire Trade, 1930; Unemployment Statistics?and Conditions 
of British Agriculture. Keynes, Cole, Cadman, Balfour and 
Citrine were, with the help of Henderson, to provide a report on 
the underlying economic situation; Balfour, Blair, Carnegie and 
lewis were to deal with the nature of Empire Trade and the effect (l)
(l) CAB 2k 209 CP 7(30). 
(,2> CAB 58 2 EAC 1-
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of preference; Unemployment Statistics were to be considered by 
McLintock, Bevin and Wilson who,after examining the published 
returns»were to suggest methods of presentation which would avoid 
misunderstandings^"^. The Committee on the Condition of British 
Agriculture was to begin its enquiry after considering a report 
by Sir Daniel Hall on the nature of the problem. Later sub­
committees were set up to consider the Channel Tunnel, Marketing 
and the Cost of Living Index.
MacDonald’s personal involvement in unemployment policy was much
greater after the setting up of the E.A.C. From then on there
was a general forum for debate on the whole economic problem and
he, as Chairman, was directly involved in the debate. The first
opportunity for general discussion on the policy issues arose
(2)when the report on the Economic Outlook was considered . 
Economic Outlook
It was the report on the Economic Outlook which indicated the 
problems caused by MacDonald's strategy of including representa­
tives from all sectors.of the economy to act as advisors. Their 
advice was highly variable and no consensus emerged. The 
Committee met three times: 21st March, 3rd April and 1st May.
Its terms of reference were: *2
(lj Redefining the unemployment problem was a strategy 
suggested by Churchill (See Chapter One above p«57 ) 
Bondfield and Thomas (See Chapter Two above p.195)«
(2) CAB 58 2. 3rd meeting, April 10th, 1930» E»A.C. H(8l).
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to supervise the preparation of a memorandum indicat­
ing the principal heads of the investigation which should 
be imbraced in a diagnosis of the underlying economic 
situation. 11 (l)
(2)At the first meeting , Keynes who was Chairman, said that there 
were broadly three ways in which the Government could increase 
employment :
a. reducing efficiency wages in terms of money;
b. protection;
c. a programme of home investment.
External events which might contribute to a solution were:
i. a general rise in world prices;
ii. a reduction of tariffs;
iii. a general revival of trade.
Henderson prepared a report on the current situation refering 
to the lost export markets and the problem of rapidly falling 
prices: agricultural prices had fallen 13% between 1923-29 and 
commodity prices were falling sharply. A letter from Keynes . 
accompanied this report* specifying the three remedies for 123
(1) CAB 5« 3A5 E.A.C. (E.O.) 1 .
(2) CAB 58 1^ -5 1st Meeting 21st March 1930.
Keynes, Cadman, Cole and Henderson were present.
(3) CAB 58 lk5 E.A.C. (E.O.) 2.
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unemployment. Ee was doubtful about reconstruction, the 
Government's only real policy at the time. Apart from this 
remedy there was only protection or home investment. As 
protection, in any form, was still an.anathema to most of the 
Labour administration, the only remedy remaining was Keynes's 
favourite remedy: home investment.
At the next Council meeting, when this was discussed, Cadman 
complained of having been rushed and Snowden, who was unable to 
attend, sent a memorandum disagreeing with the views expressed^"^. 
Keynes agreed to take a further look at the matter. The dis­
agreements remained and at the next Council meeting two reports;
¥
one from Cole and Keynes, and one from Balfour and Cadman,were
discussed. These'indicated a real cleavage of opinion.
MacDonald saw the essential difference in the views taken on the
question of home capital development and the part which the
(2)Government should play in it •
Keynes opened the debate and skilfully attempted to pave the way 
for the acceptance of his policy. He first outlined the gloomy 
state of affairs both internal and external and predicted that 
unemployment might well rise to two million by the Autumn as the 
impact of the large falls in prices had not yet been felt. 12
(1) CAB 58 2. 3rd meeting luth April; E.A.C. H(83); E.O. (4).
(2) CAB 58 2. 4th meeting 8th May; E.A.C. H(8l)*
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Having brought up the subject of home investment, Keynes 
persuaded Snowden to resolve some disagreements by asking the 
advice of the Macmillan Committee about the possibility of home 
investment producing additional employment. He was, no doubt, 
hoping to reap the benefits of his recent lectures to the 
Macmillan Committee, (see below p.21& . on his theories, Snowden 
was to ask:
”1. Does expenditure on capital development at home, stimulated 
in some way by Government, tend to increase the volume of 
employment? 2. Or is it offset by reason of its causing 
a diversion of employment from other capital development 
which would have taken place or from the production of 
exports or in some way? 3» Does it make a difference to 
the effect on employment whether the increased capital 
development at home is the result of private enterprise or 
Government enterprise?" (l)
Balfour and Cadman, whilst considering the situation serious, saw 
hopeful signs which would be ’spoilt by large scale state action1. 
More exports and migration were required. Lewis supported them, 
disagreeing with KeynesS and Cole's views that exports were 
unlikely to solve the problem. A debate followed on the extent 
to which exports generated employment and Keynes used this 
opportunity to suggest that the Board of Trade should prepare 
a statement showing:
a. the increase in exports which could be expected in 
each of the main export trades;
b. the estimated effects on employment.
(l) CAB 58 2, 4-th Meeting, 8th May.
He was also to clarify the matter of overlap between the 
Committee and the Council.
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Mach was made of the potential price effects which might occur; 
but the possibility of achieving an export expansion when markets 
were contracting, or stagnant, received little attention. Later 
calculations, provided by the Board of T r a d e ^ \  specifically 
excluded the expansionary effect of exports because it would 
lead to an infinite series of beneficial repercussionsi The 
expansionary concept without a defined limit was not very convinc­
ing.
The difficulties associated with rationalisation were also
considered. Bevin called for a committee to consider the impact
of rationalisation and he later produced a m e m o randum on the
( 2 )problem .
MacDonald wa s  rather perturbed by the lack of hard evidence and
by the differences of opinion which emerged amongst his experts.
The failure of the committee to reach agreement, and the growing
disenchantment with the w o r k  of the Council, led MacDonald, at
the instigation of Keynes, to set up an Economists* Committee to
(3^deliberate upon the problems professionally . M a cDonald had 
expected m u c h  from his committee of experts. His zeal to have 
all groups represented in the Council was to cause hi m  great 
problems when it came to recommendations of policies. F e w  agreed
(1) CAB 58 10 H  ©2}
(2 ) CAB 58 1 0  h (93
(3) CA B
below.
58 2. 7th Meeting, 24th duly 1930. Chapter Four
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from other countries he would have achieved a great deal. He 
felt that much had been done and that a sort of stability had 
been established.
On internal matters Norman concentrated upon his new venture: 
the finance of reorganization. The Committee, recently instructed 
upon the working of the economy by Keynes, would not let him off 
lightly and wished to know more about the impact of the Bank on 
domestic activity in particular the role of Bank Bate. Bank 
Bate Norman saw "as primarily dominated by international 
considerations*' and its internal effect.
"... was as a rule greatly exaggerated - that its actual 
ill effects are greatly exaggerated ... that they are much 
more psychological than real." (l)
He was asked how far finance was responsible for recent changes 
in the price level. Norman thought that it had little connection, 
appearing like Keynes to prefer real explanations for the 
changes which had occurred. Bevin pressed him on the matter of 
going back to the gold standard in 1925» Norman considered 
that,
"... change was inevitable, made at the right time but ... 
certain misfortunes of one kind and another have sub­
sequently intervened and have made any effect which that 
change of 1925 might have had far more difficult and 
serious." (2) (l)
(l) ibid, p .212
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He appeared to have some difficulty in recollecting the precise 
circumstances.of the change and sought help from Bradbury, (a 
member of the Macmillan Committee who had been chairman of a 
committee^"^ which had advised on the currency operation in 1925) 
on the precise circumstances leading up to the decision to go back 
at the old parity. The main problem he saw as being associated 
with France, Belgium and Germany stabilizing at lower levels.
He was asked about the possibility of separating the internal 
and external markets. He thought this was impossible and that 
his attempt to restrict foreign issues, which Bevin saw as an 
attempt to separate the markets, had been for external purposes
(p)and had not worked . When asked about the effects of the 
quantity of money he replied,
"I am told, and believe it to be true, that recent 
monetary policy in this country, if not in other countries 
had little effect on recent movements in price levels”.(3 )
Norman demonstrated that his skill was an intuitive art rather
than hard headed expertise and he sensed Bevin's criticism of
this to)
/
(1 ) Committee on the Currency and Bank of England Note Issues. 
1925.
(2) ibid. 217. Embargo. See H. Clay, Lord Morman. Macmillan 
London 1957? R.S. Sayers 'The Return to Gold, 1925',
S. Pollard. The Gold Standard and Employment. 19^7-
The’policy had. become largely ineffective as loans not' allowed under 
the embargo were being floated in London by indirect means. Sayers 
vol 111 Append. 30 pp 290-295« See above p 27a. \
(3) ibid 219« \
(4) ibid. p. 221. "You may complain of me, Mr Bevin, or of those 
bankers you have seen that the evidence they have giveniyou 
comes through their nose and is not sufficiently technical 
or expert. Of course, that may in some sense be true; I 
plead guilty to it myself to some extent, and it is a j 
curious thing, the extent to which many of those who inhabit 
the City of London find difficulty in stating the reasons 
for the faith that is in them, Mr Keynes must know that^e!!1 234*
cont
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For the most part the evidence heard by the Committee during 
this time mostly from bankers»expressed support for the gold 
standard, borne academics were more ready to compromise, e.g. . - 
Bellerby, Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, was prepared to 
sacrifice exchange stability for price stability. Generally, 
the bankers' complaints were not directed against the gold 
standard as such but against its present workings. Sir Robert 
hindersley, a Director of Lazards the merchant bankers, gave his 
reasons why the gold standard was not working well at this time. 
First, there was the position of Germany. Germany had a high 
demand for credit, largely because of reparations, and the lack 
of confidence which many countries had in Germany; as a result 
the German rate was 2-$% higher than the London rate. This was 
just one example of the big variations in rates which, he thought, 
led to large movements of funds. France was unwilling to lend 
abroad and offered terms which were not attractive to borrowers. 
American policy was causing great difficulties; in an attempt to 
stabilize domestic conditions, America offered high rates which 
gave rise to enormous amounts of short-money being invested 
there. London was affected by loss of its own funds and by the 
requests for assistance from other countries similarly affected.
In Kindersley's view;
”... although New York professed to be on the gold standard
she really never allowed the gold standard to work properly
in accordance with the movement of gold in her direction ...
cont.
"Chairman: "Of course I suppose even a Trade Union leader 
sometimes acts by faith." Hr Bevin: "And finds that it 
has been misplaced."
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she had subjected the international situation to her 
domestic situation: and so far as the gold standard is 
concerned, if every country did that it could not possibly 
work. And in so much as America was such an important 
creditor nation and such a large holder of gold, her 
action in keeping up money rates compelled the whole of' 
the rest of the world to keep their rates up .»••• America 
went on bended knees, almost, to the rest of the world to 
adopt the gold standard .... but no sooner had she got 
them to adopt it than she refused to allow it to work.M (l)
Everyone had to *play the game1 if the gold standard was adopted
and to ensure this there should be an international conference.
Sir Josiah Stamp also dwelt on the problem of co-operation in his 
(?)evidence .
The Committee heard evidence at some length about the desir­
ability of foreign investment and the effects of an embargo.
The general feeling appeared to be that, though at some point 
it might have been necessary to reduce foreign lending, a closed 
economy would ultimately be a poorer one.
On Bank Kate and credit there was less consensus; Havrtrey felt 
the Bank of England had been too timid; bankers felt that 
business had not been hampered by lack; of funds; and businessmen 
felt that although guaranteed stability of interest rates was 
desirable, competition from abroad was the most depressing 
factor on activity. Evidence was also submitted about the 
possible reduction in the quantity of money held by central banks.
( D  ibid. p. 10 1.
(2> ibid. p. 252.
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The failure of demand was discussed by Hawtrey, contemplating 
differences in savings and investment; Major Douglas on under­
consumption; and Robertson on a 'Gluttabilitv of Wants”: all 
probing the disequilibrium mechanism.
Keynes
By far the most exciting evidence heard by the Committee was that 
of Keynes who expanded his views, to his fellow members of the 
Committee, on the current situation and the solutions available. 
Keynes addressed the committee on the 20th, 21st and 27th f 
February and the 5th and 6th M a rch^»
The fundamental problem, as he saw it, was the problem of mal­
adjustment. The return of the gold standard had ’started others 
off’ and all deflating at the same time had begun the spiral of 
falling prices. Ee discussed the role of bank rate as an instru­
ment for achieving external and internal equilibrium.
•'The great historic virtue of bank rate policy is, as we 
shall see, that it works on both factors in the situation 
and on both in the right direction. It brings down prices 
by causing entrepreneurs to sell at a loss, but it does 
not bring them down to equilibrium level except by operating
through unemployment .....  For the only way we can
bring down wages, which is by hypothesis required for the 
restoration of international equilibrium is by the pressure 
of unemployment. It used to be assumed that this happened 1
(1 ) Committee on Finance and Industry. Notes of Discussions, op sit
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pretty easily, but we were not then thinking of any very 
large reduction of wages; very often in the Nineteenth 
Century all that was needful was the avoidance of an 
increase." (l)
To deal with the adjustment problems associated with the return 
to gold standard, bank rate had had to achieve a 10% change in 
prices: a change for which it was not fitted to deal. Bank rate 
was unable to facilitate the necessary adjustment. It had not 
previously been expected to deal with adjustments of more than 
1% or 2%. Bradbury said that the gold standard committee had 
not expected wages to be so sticky. Keynes felt that the sticki­
ness was not likely to be the result of union pressure as there 
was no evidence of money wage rates having fallen in the past 
hundred years. A fairly intense debate ensued about whether or 
not wages had fallen. Bevin talked of the sliding scales which 
affected some workers and Bradbury referred to conditions in 
1920-21. Keynes, whilst admitting some individual fluctuations, 
was struck by the constancy of wages. Keynes said that if the 
country wanted wages to be higher than those ground out by 
market forces it should put aside a fund for that purpose and not 
expect the market to facilitate a high wage policy.
/•
He went on to discuss the preoccupation of economists with 
equilibrium situations; he wished to concentrate on the process 
of disequilibrium: (l)
(l) ibid . 20th February 1930.
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"There is no reason in the world why these two things, 
the net amount of our export balance, plus the costs of 
proauction of bricks and mortar at home, should add up to 
the amount which individuals have saved". Cl)
He then examined the consequences of inequality between savings 
and investments. When investment was
in excess of savings the result was abnormally high business
profits. When savings were in excess of investment there were
abnormal business losses. He then went on to expound the
'banana paradox1 2 . Having set up his theoretical construct
he went on to give a taxonomic account of the possible remedies:
"the remedies which are being suggested have nearly all of 
them something in them; that whilst the empirical method is 
not, by any means, successful for diagnosis, it is not by 
any means valueless in seeking the cure." (3)
The first four remedies he considered were concerned with ways 
of being able to produce at lower costs in terms of gold. The 
first remedy was the revaluation of gold in terms of sterling.
The 10% devaluation (the amount which was considered necessary) 
was likely to cost £250m but this was better than the estimated 
loss of £200m a year in national income which was presently 
taking place. However, it was felt that the 'powers that be* 
were unlikely to accept it as a solution. Keynes was very 
reticent about suggesting it and was against Allen's idea of 
sending a secret minute to the Treasury suggesting devaluation.
(1) ibid. 21st February 1930, p. 8, He does not include the Government sector in this analysis.
(2) 'banana paradox': illustrates in a one commodity economy 
how savings m  the absence of investment would result in 
a deflationary spiral, ibid. PP. 13-15•
¿HicU 28th February, pp, 7-10.(3;
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It was thought that the mere fact that the Committee had discussed 
the matter could cause the £ to drop 10 pointsi
The second remedy discussed was an agreed reduction of the level 
of money incomes. This is the remedy which Keynes had advocated 
in 1925» immediately after the return to gold. He did not think 
it was any longer practicable although he still believed it was 
in some respects the ideal remedy.
"It would consist of a great National Treaty among our­
selves. I conceive of the Prime Minister calling together 
representatives of all the economic elements in the 
country and proposing to them a National re-settlement of 
•- the level of money incomes of every description 
whatsoever."(l)
This was Keynes’s social contract. An amount of 1 0 % was thought 
to be necessary. Bevin wanted to know how he proposed to deal 
with groups who had already suffered a 20% reduction and Frater- 
Taylor asked how he proposed to deal with profits. There were 
obviously large practical problems involved but Keynes 
preferred this method to the Bank Rate method.
He found the Bank fete method of reducing wages, even if it 
worked, inequitable so far as wages were concerned because the 
pressure was unequal and placed an intolerable burden on the 
weaker industries. 1
(1 ) ibid, pp. 10-1 5 .
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The third remedy was to give bounties to exporters. The 
derating policy of the Conservatives^ and some aspects of the 
coal bill which was then proceeding through Parliament, he saw 
as examples of this.
"All these remedies would have the effect of bringing 
profits to the ordinary level. As long as you have a 
society in which profits are the driving force of enter­
prise you cannot drive profits below the level which will 
attract investment.f,(l)
The fourth remedy tackled the problem from another angle: 
increasing productive efficiency. Keynes was dubious of this as aV 
practical remedy,
"The doubt in my mind is whether it is practicable to 
increase efficiency sufficiently to bring about equilibrium, 
except after the lapse of more time than we care to 
c ont emplat e.n(2)
The first four remedies were all ways of producing at lower costs 
in terms of gold. The fifth remedy was different: it was pro­
tection.
"Free-traders like myself have been accustomed to say that 
protection is a way of increasing the profits of a 
particular class of entrepreneurs at the expense of the 
rest of the community. That is precisely what we want, 
provided you choose the particular class of enterprise 
from amongst those who require to have their profits
(1 ) ibid. pp. 15-18.
(2) ibid. pp. M OC •
(3) ibid. pp. 22-26.
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increased as any ordinary protectionist programme 
would.” (l)
Protection was a remedy if free trade conditions had broken down.
It was a short term solution - Keynes was afraid of its long term
effects. Keynes suggested retaining existing tariffs and
possibly adding one or two more - protection for iron and steel
( 2 )was one possibility' '.
Keynes then went on to his ♦favourite remedy1 23. The previous five 
remedies sought to restore equilibrium by increasing foreign 
investment so as to absorb the excess of domestic savings over 
domestic investment; the first four by increasing exports and 
the last by decreasing imports. His sixth remedy sought to 
testore equilibrium not by increasing foreign investment but by 
increasing home investment. He had no reason to suppose that an 
increase in home investment would not be additional to current 
investment providing the Bank of England was willing to 
facilitate it,
”If the Bank of England is determined that the new invest­
ment shall be a substitute for the existing investment and 
not a net addition, they can as long as they have a 
strangle hold on the money market make sure the Treasury 
View is right," (3)
Keynes was thus giving substantial ground to the Treasury View.
(1 ) ibid, p. 22-26.
(2) ibid. 6th March.
(3) ibid, p. 16.
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The inter-relationship between the domestic and international loan 
market was seen as the main problem for the banking system. He 
thought, however, that there may 'be various gadgets1 by which the 
two markets could be separated^"^. Norman, possibly disappointed 
with earlier attempts, during the war and in the post-war period^to ' 
to separate the markets pronounced it inadviseabl'e. Capital export 
control was disliked by Norman who preferred to use bank rate. 
Keynes considered that if his policy for increased home invest­
ment were adopted,
"... some abandonment of laissez-faire towards foreign 
investment will be necessary to this country as a 
permanency."(2)
It would have been interesting to see if the Liberals would 
have accepted this modification to their plan.
/
These six remedies were concerned with bringing about equili­
brium with the outside world by making changes at home. His 
final remedy relied upon making changes abroad by the adoption 
of a policy, by the leading central banks of the world, to 
prevent further falls in world prices. Keynes came close to 
Norman'’s view of the international situation but presumably 
personal difficulties prevented their bringing any concerted 
pressure to bear on policy. Keynes saw French and American 
policy as the major obstacles to progress:
(1)
(2)
The interest rates had been separated during'the V.rar by 
the special deposit schemes. See E.V. Morgan, StudieSin 
British Financial Policy. Macmillan (1952). See also
Clayvol. i i i ? 5Zppemron , „cit. Sayers(l976)4- V ci • ' op« ci
Committee on 'Finance and Industry. Notes on Discussions
OP. Cit.. P .23. .. ; .... ... j  .
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••Both in official and academic circles in France it is 
hardly an exaggeration to say that economic science is 
non-existent. French thought on these matters is two 
generations out of date. This is a very serious matter.
I think if this Committee were to invite evidence from 
some people who have been in touch with the Bank of France - 
I have talked with some of them - they would find them 
shocked by the state of mind that they found prevailing 
there. That is one obstacle. The second obstacle lies in 
the tendency for the Federal Reserve system to be dominated 
by domestic rather than international considerations.H(l)
The policy of co-operation was:
'•not only a less controversial remedy than many that I 
have discussed, but it is of first rate importance, 
particularly if one is looking further forward. A great 
deal of what we have discussed is in the nature of a short 
period problem: sooner or later we shall get out of our 
present disequilibrium; for this is essentially a temporary 
problem, it is not a thing which is to be with us for ever 
and ever, but this international problem, unless it is 
solved by co-operation, vrill be with ua for ever."(2)
On this prophetic note, Keynes concluded hie lectures to his 
colleagues.
The Mosley Affair
Mosley's approach to unemployment policy was set out in his
(3)pamphlet, Revolution by Reason • This was discussed in 
Chapter One above p.lOk, Mosley was still a very young man by 
political standards: having entered the House at 22, as the 123
(1) ibid. 7th March, p. 7«
(2) ibid* p. 8.
(3) 0. Mosley (1925), QP. cit.
*
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youngest successful candidate in 1918, he was now a Minister at 
3 3 ^ .  As a Minister, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, he 
was given the task of helping with Thomas's unemployment
(2)committee . Mosley had, during the first six months of the 
administration, presented some competent work on unemployment 
policy. As we saw in Chapter Two above,p.l^ke had demonstrated 
anomalies in the regulations relating to public works schemes, 
which resulted in modifications being made and national schemes 
being considered^^ .
He was extremely frustrated by the pace and direction of the
unemployment policy. His dis-satisfaction was increased by the
rejection of the retirement pensions plan, upon which he had
placed great hope; and by the lack of progress in the development
of national schemes of work. He became increasingly aware of the
inadequacies, not only of the policy measures, but of the
organizational structure for the development and implementation
of policies. Criticism of the organizational structure was also
(q.)made by the Ministerial Committee on national Schemes at 
which Greenwood mentioned his intention of completing a memo­
randum, possibly with the assistance of Mosley, on the organiza­
tional structure necessary to implement policy. 123
(1) R. Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley, Macmillan, 1975»
(2) Chapter Two, pp.
(3 ) ibid.pp.
(k) CAB 27 397i 2nd Meeting, 28th November 1929»
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Reacting to the continual frustration and the knowledge that 
MacDonald was busy designing a new advisory body, which was to 
become the E.A.C., Mosley used the Christmas recess to draft a. 
plan of campaign. This plan for dealing with the unemployment 
problem suggested an alternative organizational structure as well 
as long term and short term policies to reduce unemployment^^.
The short term plans were a national road scheme, the retirement 
pension scheme,and the raising of the school leaving age. The ' .•
schemes were already Labour Party policies which had been 
considered during the past months, see Chapter Two above p. 177 
The national road scheme was dismissed because of the 
Government’s unwillingness to become involved with the affairs 
of local authorities. The retirement plan had been dismissed 
on the acceptance of the advice of the civil servants rather 
than the advice of the Ministers. The school leaving proposal 
had been placed under the responsibility of Trevelyan and was 
making rather slow progress. Mosley's long term scheme was for 
scientific reconstruction, developed on expert advice from 
research teams. It was rather different from the Government’s 
reconstruction plans which were based upon rationalization of 
the basic industries in the hope that exports markets were 
recoverable.
The romantic interpretation of this memorandum is that it was 
a revolutionary document providing a blue-print of a policy 
which if implemented could have prevented the ensuing misery
(1) CAB 24 209, CP 31(30).
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of the thirties^^. The memorandum is rather a disappointment 
to anyone looking for a policy break-through and the furore it 
caused must be explained by the general dis-satisfaction with 
the existing policies and to the personality of Mosley rather 
than to the radical nature of his suggestions.
( 2)Skidelsky' ' provides ample evidence of the general dis­
affection with which Mosley was regarded by the majority of the 
members of the Parliamentary Labour Party including some 
Ministers: he was an ambitious outsider who mouthed popular 
sentiments but whose convictions might well be proved shallow.
For his part he had little regard for his Labour Party colleagues. 12
(1) See Winch (1969)» op. cit.; A.J.P. Taylor, (1965) op. cit.
Skidelsky (1975)» op. cit. '
(2) R. Skidelsky, 1975» op. cit. Chapter 8.
Skidelsky documents views of the Labour Party and the left 
.wing press about Mosley and his life style.
P. Snowden (193*0 , op. cit.
Snowden doubted whether any one could have worked well with 
Mosley unless ...
"he were prepared to meekly follow him........
..I have never had any faith in the sincerity of Mosley’s 
professions of Socialism. I was always suspicious of a 
rich man who came into the Socialist Movement and at once 
became more socialist than the Socialists. As soon as he 
joined the Labour Party his speeches were violent 
denunciations of capitalists and the idle rich and when 
addressing a Socialist gathering they were inter-larded 
with frequent references to "My dear comrades", I can 
understand the working class Socialist who knows something 
of the hardships of working class life sometimes expressing 
bitter feelings about a class which he regards as his 
exploiters but such things coming from a man like Oswald 
Mosley who enjoys all luxuries which his wealth and social
position can command give me a feeling of nausea ....
It was always felt that he was a man on the make and was 
using the Labour Movement as an instrument for satisfying 
his ambition. Mosley had considerable ability .... If ever 
Oswald Mosley had the powers of a Hitler or a Mussolini he 
would be more ruthless and merciless because weaker and 
vainer than these two dictators
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Those of whom he approved, such as Cook, he regarded in the way-
one might appreciate an earthenware pot - a good example of a
rougher kind of product. His regard for his colleagues lacked.
any feeling of common humanity^^. Ee admired supposed
intellectual brillance and activity and had an insatiable hunger
( 2 )of the appreciation of these qualities in himself .
The ideas in the memorandum were not new and they did nothing to 
untie the Gordian Knot of constraints which was strangling the 
unemployment policy of the Labour Administration. The proposals 
did not display a facilitating accumen necessary to surmount the 
problems of implementation. Many others in the Party had 
advocated, and would have supported, various aspects of the
(1) E. Skidelsky (1975) op. cit.
Morrison complained “he spoke to me like a landlord addres­
sing the peasantry".
.0, Mosley (1968) op. cit.
He delight1#  in the dropped "h's" of Thomas whom he 
considered understood nothing. Morrison he thought "a 
narrow vain little bureaucrat devoid of vision and incapable 
of movement beyond his office stool". Attlee, "had a clear 
incisive and honest mind within the limits of his range".
Dalton; “there are few things more disastrous than a third 
rate don“.
(2) 0. Mosley (1968) op. cit. He claims not only to be a radical 
politician but an original thinker;
!“Yet the long term programme in the second half of my j
speech went beyond anything which Lloyd George or even j
Keynes were suggesting. It was not until 1955 that 
Keynes began to approach this position “Keynes
wrote two articles on national self-sufficiency in the New 
Statesman on July 8th and 15th 1955? they jettisoned |
entirely the classic free trade position and in effect j
were a lucid exposition of the basic economic conclusions '
I had reached in Government". j
This is not an accurate picture of the development of the \
Keynesian position on free trade. His views were made clear 
to the Macmillan Committee, 195U; the Economist's Committee 
of the Economic Advisory Council, 1950; to Snowden 1951» 
and made public in the New Statesman March 1951»
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proposals which he suggested« Had he not been in such desperate 
need of personal adulation he may well have rallied support for 
many of the measures he suggested and thus increased the chance 
of their adoption. There is no apparent reason why the memo­
randum could not have been submitted jointly by the advisory 
ministers. It was often referred to by the press in the names 
of the three men or as the Lansbury-Mosley memorandum. (Rumours 
were also circulating that big changes were imminent and that 
Mosley was to lead a new department in charge of unemployment.) 
His character and possibly his relationships with other members 
of the Party, prevented him from co-operating and rallying 
support in this way. He went ahead alone supported very 
generously by his colleagues, Lansbury and Johnston»
On the 23rd January he submitted the memorandum to the Prime 
Minister with an accompanying letter^^*
H23rd January, 1930M
"My Dear Prime Minister,
I venture to forward to you my paper on the unemploy­
ment and general economic problem, and the organization 
necessary to meet it which I told you in a previous letter 
was in the course of preparation. I
I have already sent a copy to Thomas, whom I have 
assured that the criticism of the present situation is in 
no way intended as a reflection upon him and that, indeed, 
the present limitations of policy and machinery in my view 
make his task impossible. I have also shown the document 
to Lansbury and Johnston who I understand, are writing to 
you to say they agree with the substance of it.
(1) CAB 2b 209 CP 31(30).
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I hope very much that you will be able to consider 
it before any announcement is made or white paper is 
issued relative to the proposed economic staff, as the 
organization materially affects that body. The policy 
suggested in the paper is not advanced in any dogmatic 
spirit and certainly not at any cast iron formula. I am 
more than open to any alternative suggestion which can be 
shown to be superior. I have reached, however, the very 
definite conclusion after mature consideration that it is 
impossible to continue as at present.'1
Yours very sincerely,
Oswald Mosley.
Lansbury and Johnston wrote to the Prime Minister the following 
day supporting Mosley in his endeavours to get some changes made 
in the unemployment policy, lansbury took great pains to avoid 
upsetting Thomas whilst at the same time impressing upon 
MacDonald the need for more decisive action on unemployment.
"24th January 1930"
Memorandum by First Commissioner of Works
"Our colleague, Sir 0. Mosley, after many discussions with 
us on the subject of unemployment and the Government's 
failure to reduce the figures, decided to spend a portion of 
the Christmas vacation summarizing our views and 
experiences and also putting on record in skeleton form the 
sort of organization and some of the steps which, in his 
judgement, are necessary if we are to deal effectively 
with this, the most vital of all domestic questions now 
before the country.
I have read his detailed examination of the present 
situation and his criticisms of our present schemes for 
dealing with the problem, and without pledging myself to 
everything contained in the memorandum, I must record the 
fact that I am in substantial agreement with him and do 
most earnestly beg the Prime Minister and the Lord Privy 
Seal to give their best and earliest attention to the 
memorandum prepared by our colleague.
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In asking that this should be done 1 want to assure the 
Lord Privy Seal that our disagreement with him have no 
shape or shadow of personal feeling each of us, at public 
meetings and at deputations have done our utmost to 
strengthen his hands, to explain his policy and to ensure 
its success. I, however, believe that the limits within 
which he is working have set him an impossible task and am 
firmly convinced that the road we are now travelling 
affords no kind of immediate or even early amelioration of 
our country's economic plight. The Lord Privy Seal has 
worked day and night and done all that one man can do 
within the limits he and his advisors have decided to work, 
but I believe that these limitations of present policy 
forbid success.
In these circumstances I feel it is our duty holding the 
views we do, to ask that the memorandum of our colleague 
shall receive the consideration it.deserves. I hope that 
time will be found for the Prime Minister and the Lord 
Privy Seal to discuss with Sir Oswald Mosley in as full a 
manner as possible the present position in regard to 
unemployment and the proposals in relation thereto put 
forward by the Chancellor of the Duchy.
Signed G. Lansbury
Office of Works" (l)
Johnston's supporting letter is less generous of Thomas's 
handling of the unemployment problem. He considers some other 
machinery for the organization of policy is necessary and 
suggests an alternative simple procedure:
Scottish Office, 2^ -th January
"Dear Prime Minister,
The Chancellor of the Duchy has been good enough to 
let me.haye a copy of the memorandum on unemployment which 
he has forwarded to you and to the Lord Privy Seal..
(l) CAB 2h 209 CP 32(30).
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I think it is my duty to say that I fully endorse the 
Chancellor of the Duchy's critical examination of the 
present method of dealing with relief works schemes»
The honorary advisory Committee of Ministers as the 
Chancellor of the Duchy describes the three of us,
Lansbury, Mosley and myself, have only been summoned to a 
meeting, I think, on two occasions during the past six 
months. The belief that such a committee sits regularly 
with either deliberative or executive power is liable to 
give rise to misunderstanding among the members of the 
Government, the Party and the Public, and it is likely to 
place the three Ministers in undeserved difficulties in the 
future, as they may be held partly responsible for the 
decisions which are not theirs and about which they were in 
fact never consulted.
In my judgment, therefore, the advisory committee 
should be formally as it is in fact, dissolved, and some 
new and more effective machinery for dealing with unemploy­
ment relief schemes substituted.
Personally, I could never see any reason why we 
should not have an all Party Committee of the House of 
Commons sitting regularly examining specific relief 
projects. Whether a road or a bridge should be built 
here, or a canal cut there would seem to me as fitting 
subjects for an all party House of Commons consideration 
as are Public Accounts or the Bills submitted to the 
provisional orders committees. The execution of public 
v/orks are, of course, for the responsible Ministers or 
Local Authorities and the fixation of the limit of 
expenditure is for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the 
Cabinet and the House of Commons to determine. But the 
old administrative objections that an all party committee 
sitting and continuous sessions considering specific 
schemes and hearing evidence and making recommendations, 
would in any way hamper or embarrass the responsible 
Ministers would seem to have less validity than ever after 
our experience of. the workings of the Unemployment Grants 
Committee.
From a hurried examination of Sir Oswald-Mosley*s 
proposals it would seem difficult to incorporate am all 
party standing committee on relief schemes.
And in any case the great political advantage to a 
Minority Government of engaging representatives of the 
opposition party in the day to day consideration of such 
schemes is so obvious that I need not stress it.
lours very sincerely,
Thomas Johnston" (l) 1
(1) CAB 2h 209 CP 33(30).
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Y/hat then did Mosley suggest? He stated that his objectives 
were to point out that:
’’l. from the point of view of immediate unemployment
plans and of long term economic reconstruction a far 
larger and more comprehensive organisation is 
required than has yet been employed or is even now 
contemplated;
2. measures can be taken within the existing resources 
of the Government by which the unemployment problem 
can be materially reduced within a relatively 
short period of time;
3» the real problem of permanent economic reconstruction 
requires not only a greater co-ordination of the 
government activities, but a mobilisation of national, 
resources on a larger scale than has yet been 
contemplated by measures I will attempt later to 
suggest." (l)
He expanded in some detail on the proposed organisational 
structure; on the short and long term proposals?and added a 
section on credit policy.
In spite of the casual way in which Mosley presented the memo­
randum to Thomas and in spite of the avowed absence of any 
personal criticism of Thomas by both Mosley and Danebury?
Thomas was greatly peeved by this revolt by his associate 
ministers? and about the publicity which the, supposedly secret, 
document had received. MacDonald had to cajole Mosley into 
placating Thomas who had gone so far as to offer his
( p )resignation . The memorandum created a great stir within the
(1) CAB 2h 209 CP 31 (31) QP. c it.
(2) S. Skidelsky (1967), op cit, p. 193-1 2*.
owden
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terms of reference. At the first meeting Snowden presented a 
draft memorandum which had been prepared with a view to provid­
ing the Committee with a critique of Mosley,s document^^. It. 
expressed sympathy with Mosley’s dis-satisfaction with the 
effectiveness of unemployment policy and purports to have examined 
his suggestions in a sympathetic spirit.
The suggestion relating to the creation of a new department is 
considered first. The objection to this is that:
"A committee of 12 paid economists assisted by honorary 
committees of businessmen would lay down the entire 
economic policy of the Government". 12)
The Prime Minister as head of this body would endorse their 
conclusions and together with a Committee of Ministers would 
execute them. It was considered unlikely that the Prime 
Minister would be able to fulfil this function thus the 
decisions would become the decisions of experts and officials.
This would be irreconcilable with the principle of Parliamentary 
Government unless the organization confined itself to policy and 
submitted its proposals to the Departmental Ministers for their 
consideration and submission if necessary, to the Cabinet. But 
if this was to be the function then the structure was unwieldy. 
There seemed to be general satisfaction with MacDonald’s new 
advisory council, and Greenwood felt that there would be little 1
(1) CAB 27 413. UPC (30> 2.
(2; cab 27 413, op 134 (30).
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difficulty in persuading Mosley and his colleagues that the 
Economic Advisory Council did in fact provide the necessary 
machinery .
Mosley had attempted to separate short term relief measures from 
long term reconstruction proposals. This separation was thought 
to encourage the acceptance of unproductive schemes. Snowden 
considered the separation illogical; especially as road works 
were regarded as a short term relief measure when he felt they were 
central to any long term transport policy.
Mosley's schemes for short term policy were not very imaginative: 
there was to be a £200 million road scheme, the retirement 
pensions scheme,ana the school leaving scheme. His suggestions 
were countered by the fact that iA.5 million remained unspent 
from the 192*f road programme. National schemes were thought 
likely to undermine local authority autonomy, which had been 
carefully nurtured over three hundred years, and^replace it with 
a 'bureaucratic system of continental style'. The retirement 
pensions scheme was still an attractive proposition to some 
members of the Committee although its relevance was in some 
doubt as it was the middle-aged group who were most vulnerable. (l)
(l) Mosley no doubt felt slighted at not being involved in the 
activities of the E.A.C. From the point of view of his 
political career the memorandum was badly timed and placed —  
perhaps it would have been better to have produced it to a 
forum in which it would have received a more sympathetic 
hearing, e.g, the E.A.C. in which Bevin •, Citrine, Cole.
Keynes, Stamp and Henderson were likely to have been 
predisposed towards itso that the impact might have been 
greater.
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The long term remedy^ reconstruction was agreed to be necessary* ? 
but the Committee regarded it rather differently from Mosley. 
Mosley was looking for permanent reconstruction for which:
”... government should arm itself with the strongest 
possible economic staff, should systematically consult 
with every branch of finance, industry and commerce and 
should then make up their minds upon the future of 
industrial developments of the country." (l)
To counteract unemployment accompanying reconstruction Mosley 
suggested credit expansion.
To most of the Cabinet Ministers, reconstruction was merely the 
reconditioning of depressed industries which, with Government 
help and guidance and finance from the banking sector, should bo 
carried out by the owners of those industries.
The meeting of the Cabinet Committee, at which Lord Privy Seal
and his Ministers were present on 25th March, is not fully
(2)reported in the minutes . One outcome was a request to 
Mosley for a brief statement of his proposals for reconstruction 
of industry. This he produced^. He criticised Thomas 
scheme on the ground that the Government assumed responsibility 
but had no control. He considered that for reasons of
(1) CAB 2k 209 CP 31 (31)
(2) CAB 27 4-13 UPC 2nd Meeting.
(3) CAB 2? 4-13» UPC 3(30).
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effectiveness, co-ordination and control the Government should 
play a more important role. He proposed an organization in which 
the Government would assume the role envisaged for the Bank of 
England in Thomas's scheme. Mosley also advocated a development 
loan and a cheap money policy which he felt would be possible 
after the American crash and the subsequent reduced attraction 
of America for British funds. The reaction to this was typical 
Treasury sentiment:
"If the money could be raised it .... would only be raised 
at high interest rates dislocating general investment 
values, and thereby causing a setback in new business 
enterprise, which the policy is intended to foster. Market 
conditions, left to themselves, should improve with lower 
bank rate and easier money conditions which recent 
government issues were themselves designed to foster." (l)
They saw the development loan as likely to interfere with the cheap
(2)money policy of which they had great hopes . The argument was 
developed by referring to the problem of confidence and the 
slender resources upon which confidence in credit and currency 
was based. The memorandum concluded that:
"..... the only practicable course is to continue the policy 
of long term reconstruction which the Lord Privy Seal has 
adopted and to make definite and considered pronouncement 
that we reject retirement pension and a grandiose loan
policy."(3) 123
(1) CAB 2^ 211 CP 13^(30;.
(2) Interest rates were in fact falling sharply at this time.
(3) CAB 2k 211 CP 13** (30)
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Mosley's proposals were rather pedestrian. They were neither
original nor particularly well' developed,failing even to mention
the expansionary effect of the policies. Yet he and many others
felt that he had the answer to the problem. What was the tmder-
lying schema which gave coherence to Mosley's proposals? He is
sometimes thought of as a Keynesian but,although he advocated the
stimulation of domestic demand, public works and cheap money,to
see him as a precursor or even an interpreter of Keynes does
justice to neither. Very different behavioural models and
different policy objectives can give rise to similar policy
proposals. Mosley was not interested in the failure of the
aggregative economic system to bring about full employment
although the removal of unemployment was at this time his central
policy objective. Mosley was, as he himself says, more than a
K e y n e s i a n H e  was not searching for policy instruments
which would re-establish the economic prosperity of the nation.
He was interested in ways of controlling the economy to ensure
the policy objectives, such as the removal of unemployment,
could be rationally implemented. He was first and foremost a
planner and he had a touching faith in the ability of rational
scientific reasoning to cope with the contemporary problems.
The planning and organizations in which he was interested were
those which would enable him to control the 'destiny of the
nation'. This attitude towards planning fo\md sympathy across a
V2)broad spectrum of political opinion. The Yellow Book had 12
(1) Mosley (1966) op. cit.
(2) Britain's Industrial Future. (1928), op. cit.
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specifically rejected a laissez-faire approach to the economy 
and there were amongst the Conservatives a number of young men
e.g. Macmillan and Boothby who were advocating greater state 
intervention and planning in the economy^\ It was the 
supposed long term objective of the Labour Party but one which, 
in the existing dismal economic conditions, they did not have the 
confidence to pursue. Instead they dealt in piecemeal fashion 
with the reconstruction of specific industries and avoided the 
more difficult problems which Mosley wished them to consider^ such 
as, the appropriate structure of industry and trading relation­
ships, about which there was little information or technical 
expertise available, to enable decisions to be taken;; hence 
Mosley’s emphasis on research.
Mosley’s proposals were more a blue-print for a planning process
than a contribution to the debate on the economic crisis. The
( 2)proposals were cumbersome compared with Amery’s scheme to avoid 
the ¿not of the balanced budget by reducing payments to the 
Sinking Fund. In the memorandum^^, apart from his advocacy of 
of a cheap money policy and a development loan, he did not 
challenge orthodox financial management and he failed even to 
use the argument associated with the cumulative effects of public 
expenditure which was already spelt out in some detail by the 
Liberals. 123
(1) Macmillan, (1966) op, cit.
(2) See Chapter One- above- p • fcû .
(3) CAB 2h 209 CP 31(30).
Mosley wished to control the ’nation*s destiny* and any
constraints likely to interfere with this control he attempted
to remove. He was interested in control not intervention and so
politically he became involved with National Socialism and not
the rather tentative Fabian socialism of the Labour .Party. He
was against the gold standard not because of its inadequacy as a
system for facilitating international monetary relationships but
because it left the nation vulnerable to a ♦nigger in Africa
digging up gold1 2 He wanted a protectionist policy not only
because he realised the nation was trading in a second best
world of protection,or because it would protect some industries
from competition and dumping from abroad, but to foster national
independence insulating the domestic economy and relying upon a
buoyant home market rather than touting goods abroad on unwilling
markets over which he had no control. His demands for national
schemes of work became more strident as it became more apparent
that iocal authorities were unlikely to respond in the desired
way* and no doubt his break with the working class movements was
inevitable once he saw them as a »barrier to anyone trying to do 
(?)anything* '. Mosley was an activist whose sympathies for a 
short period seemed to coifhide with those of the Labour Party 
but when they appeared unwilling to assume control of the economy 
he went on his way.
His departure began with his resignation from ministerial 
office after the discussion of the Report of Snowden*s Committee.
(1) 0. Mosley, (1925) op. cit.
(2) R. Skidelsky (1975) op. cit
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MacDonald had been engrossed in the Naval Conference during the 
early part of 1930» but emerged to deal with the Mosley crisis. 
After the debate cm the report on Mosley's memorandum a 
Conference of Ministers was convened tinder his chairmanship^"^. 
This Conference of Ministers met six times between 13th May and 
Vth June. They were gloomy meetings. The world slump was 
getting worse and there seemed little that could be done about 
it. Mosley argued that more money should be provided for public 
works but Thomas and others doubted whether the money would be 
spent. MacDonald was very doubtful of the effects of the 
policies which were being pursued on business activity:
we reduce hours, put on burdens, make the outlook even 
gloomier ... we are not sure how to handle the problem."
Mosley retorted,
"... you must make greater effort or throw up the 
sponge." (2)
At the third meeting of the Conference it was announced that
(3)Mosley had resigned . He was called again to the Conference. 12
(1) Conference of Ministers
Members: MacDonald, Thomas, Greenwood, Morrison, Bondfield, 
Lansbury, Mosley, Johnston, Secretary: Tom Jones. 
CAB 27 ^37. C.M.U. 30.
(2) K. Middlemas. Thomas Jones. 'Whitehall Diary. Vol. 11, 1926/
. - 1930. Oxford University i r^ess 1969» p. 237.
13) CAB 27 ^37 CMU 30, kth Meeting 20th May.
In spite of MacDonald’s assurance that Snowden's Report had not 
been adopted by the Cabinet but referred to the Conference,
Mosley saw the position as being himself versus Snowden and 
decided to go. The discussion was, according to Thomas Jones, 
a very melancholy affair. Thomas according to Jones said, ”1 am 
tired. I took a .job with no kudos, a rotten .job.” The Prime 
Minister was also tired. Johnston wanted to ’Pope in the 
Conservatives and Liberals’ but MacDonald felt that their support 
could not be obtained during the crisis.
Mosley resigned in spite of MacDonald's attempt to persuade him 
to stay and Lansbury's impassioned defence. Lansbury reacted 
very strongly to the Snowden Memorandum. In a memorandum which 
he submitted in May, he refers to explicit policies of the party 
which had been *contemptuously' rejected:
"... the workers who pinned their faith to us and our 
declarations in ’Labour and the Nation*, in our Election 
Manifesto and the broadcast appeals of our Leaders, are 
now to be told we have no immediate measures for dealing 
with the evil other than an extension of those adopted by 
our predecessors and various proposals for development 
of private enterprise." ll)
He says that the land settlement proposals, to which he was so
committed, were being treated with humorous indifference.
Settlement in the Coloniesas a possible outlet for unemployed
(2)workers was now thought to be politically impracticable • 12
(1) CAB 2k 211| CP 1^5(30).
(2) Drummond (197^) op. cit., migration was falling sharply 
at this time. .
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He was bitterly disappointed that the pension scheme had been 
dropped» He was particularly disturbed by the idea that it 
should be repudiated as suggested by the Snowden memorandum.
If the repudiation referred to the Party proposal, which was laid 
down at the 1928 Conference, then he considered that no decision 
of Cabinet could bind the Party, whose policy was laid down 
only by the annual conference.
All was to no avail. Mosley bowed out after a characteristically
powerful speech; took his cause to the Party Conference in the
Autumn; and thence out of the labour Party^^. He ceased to
have any direct impact on the formation of unemployment policy,
although he continued to press his views forcefully in
Parliament and in the country. After presenting his proposals
to the Labour Party Conference he went on to publish his
(o')manifesto and to form the New Party in 1931 .
Full Circle
After this heartrending session, activity begem. In the shadow 
of the dismal trade report for May which showed a decline in 
coal, iron and steel, cotton and wool, the whole policy for 
dealing with unemployment was re-examined. MacDonald launched 12
(1) Oswald Mosley, (1968) op. cit. See also Snowden (193*0 op. cit. 
for account of the speech.
(2) Mosley Memorandum Daily Telegraph. 8th December 1930.
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new machinery for administering the policy which proceeded to 
re-examine the retirement policy; the raising of the school 
leaving age; public works policy; migration and land settle­
ment. The re-examination was to involve not merely the newly 
constituted Panel of Ministers but the E.A.C.; a Committee of 
Economists; a Conference of Local Authorities; and the opposi­
tion parties^1 2^. The policy had come full circle and was as 
open as it had been when the administration had taken over the 
previous year. They were ready to begin again.
Major Policy Strategies 
Public Works Policy
Progress of the t>olicv
The public works policy was floundering: schemes were not 
forthcoming and the employment potential was not very 
impressive.
The public works programme had by this time assumed a very
unimportant role in the unemployment policy, Q-lthough some
Ministers including Lansbury, Mosley and Johnston were still
hoping for a more active programme. Policies for the expansion
of Government investment were also being advocated by Keynes
in the Macmillan Committee; and by Henderson, Cole and Keynes
in the E.A.C. During the discussions on the Mosley memorandum
on 3rd February it was generally agreed by the Cabinet that
additional Unproductive* schemes of relief should not. be
(2)encouraged.
(1) CAB 2h 212 CP 176 (30;.
(2) CAB 23 63 7/30.
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In March the nord Privy Seal reported the progress of the 
schenes^^. The total value of the schemes approved in the 
first ten months, was approaching £1U0M and was expanding.
Mosley's proposals involving the expenditure of £200 million 
fti'ighi have employed 300,000 men for three years but he was taken 
to task very severely for his optimism and his failure to 
suggest suitable plans.
''You might as well'have suggested £1,000m"
the Treasury Memorandum taunted him. greenwood, Morrison and 
other ministers became convinced of the impossibility of 
additional schemes being brought forward. They saw the constraint 
as the lack of suitable schemes not money. Thus to raise a loan 
of £200w was useless for the works would not be forthcoming.
They preferred to make the monetary arrangements when necessary. 
Mosley believed that psychologically the availability of a large 
grant would encourage local'"authorities to undertake more
ambitious plans. ^
\\
have"bean’ \
There appears to / a complete failure of imagination. The \
depressing advice from the civil servants in the earlier months
appeared to have sapped most of the motivation to look for new i
1
avenues of development, ‘i'he debate revolved around the road issue 
and whether local government could survive national schemes; and 1
(1) CAB 2k 211 CP 120 (30).
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whether Thomas was prejudiced in favour of railways* There was 
little appreciation of the wider social benefits involved in 
some of the schemes although Mosley had indicated their existence 
in his reference to the benefits of municipal wash-houses etc., 
in the Autumn. It would be interesting to compare the evalua­
tion of the proposals with modern cost benefit analysis*''1 23'^ .
Snowden alone seemed to see the possibilities of development
in the electricity industry whose requests for aid had been 
. ( 2)summarily dismissed by Thomas . These schemes might well have
gained Treasury approval as contributing to the reduction in
costs of production. Snowden did not press the matter and no
one else took it up. Mosley is reported to have said on one
occasion that 'Napoleon could have spent £ 2 0 Q M  in three
(3 Jyears' ^ , but Napoleon was not around and Mosley did not offer 
much.
Criteria
The Treasury seem to have adopted an extremely narrow definition 
of ’productive’: narrower than that held by the Interdepartmental
(1) The later study of the Victoria Line which in terms of - 
mere revenue evaluation would not have been justifiable, is 
an interesting example. See C.D. Foster, M.E. Beesley, 
•Estimating the Social Benefits.of Constructing an 
Underground Railway in London’, Journal of Royal Statistical 
Society, 1963«
(2) CAB 27 413 UPC (30), 1st Meeting l4th March 1930.
(3) Middlemas (1969) op. cit. p. 258.
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Committee of Unemployment, whose criteria had been criticised 
and extended somewhat by Mosley in the Autumn. An indication 
of the Treasury attitude is to be found in the memorandum on 
Mosley's proposals:
"The Government must be prepared to direct itself to the 
application of schemes which will not only fulfil the 
condition that they provide immediate employment, but 
which also stand the test of reducing the cost of 
production and adding to the economic power of the 
country." (l)
The criteria applied appears to have become very rigid for in
(?)February, Lansbury was complaining that the restrictions had 
become so tight with regard to development schemes that his plan 
for the redevelopment of the Montague House site wa s  not thought 
to be justified. The scheme had been proposed because there was 
an urgent need for be t t e r  accommodation for civil servants and 
the employment component of the project was only a  secondary 
consideration.
Incentives
Little consideration was given by either the proponents or the 
opponents of the public works programme to the conditions under 
which schemes might be forthcoming: to whether the criteria 
adopted were too narrow or the terms too low. This is indicated 12
(1) CAB 2b 211 CP 13M30).
(2) CAB 2b 210 CP 67(30).
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by the way in which the Charing Cross Road Bill was dealt w i t h ^ \  
Cabinet refused to allow the London County Council and Westminster 
Councils a grant of 75% to enlarge St. Martin's Lane before the 
opening of a new bridge. The Councils rejected an offer of 50% 
and said that they were not prepared to accept less than 60%, In 
spite of the progress in the Autumn towards a more flexible 
approach to development works, the Minister of Transport and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer were both agreed that it was 
important to resist such high grants in the London area - 
unemployment was rising generally at this time. Cabinet were 
advised to insist on a maximum of 50%: and to place the responsi­
bility of refusing on to the Councils. A report from the 
committee studying the Channel Tunnel Scheme was available and 
it was reported that:
"If it appears that the required financial support will not 
be forthcoming to enable the tunnel to be built by private 
enterprise, we are of the opinion that the evidence in the 
report regarding the advantages of the channel tunnel to 
the country as a whole is not sufficient to justify His 
, Majesty's Government either of itself constructing the 
tunnel or giving financial assistance to enable it to be 
constructed."(2)
Although the Government complained that schemes were not being put 
forward little was done to support schemes which were suggested^.
(1 ) CAB 2k 209 k2 C30J
(2J CAB 23 63 2l(3o)
(3) CAB 23 63 23(3o;? CP 72, llM30>:
Roskill (1972), op. cit. p. 522 for Hankey's role in the 
rejection of this scheme, which he had always disliked, by 
persuading MacDonald of its 'lack of economic attractiveness1 *3.
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Problems and Commitment
During the process of reconsideration of the schemes, attention 
was drawn to matters which were impeding the progress of the 
current programme; plebiscites^"^, administrative and parliamentary 
failuresC2).
The debate about a .bill to speed up the compulsory acquisition 
of land by local authorities was deferred in February because 
of the pressure of work on the parliamentary draftsman*“^ .
In addition to the problems associated with putting forward a 
public works programme, there was growing sceptism about the 
value of public works schemes as a way of alleviating unemploy-
i I f)ment. This is referred to in Snowden's Memorandum and in 
Thomas' statement of 7th April.
"Practical experience of carrying out a policy of develop­
ment works shows clearly how small a contribution even very 
large programmes of public works can make towards an 
appreciable reduction in the live register. A few weeks 
of depression in Lancashire are sufficient to throw on to 
the register numbers which completely obscure any contribu­
tion which a programme of development works may make".(5)
(1 ) These had to be held in areas v/here there 
to Councils' schemes.
was opposition
(2) Thomas was to ask for co-operation of the House of Commons 
on portions of bills from local authorities which involved 
employment schemes. CAB 23 63; 6(30).
(3) CAB 23 63, 12(3u); CP 66 (30). -
C M CAB 2.b 211; cP 13*f (30).
(5) CAB 2h 211; CP 120(30).
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Reconstruction
Reconstruction was one of the few remaining policies at the 
beginning of 193u.
The Treasury remained committed to the policy
appropriate to the unemployment problem, which they considered
to be largely structural.
"The problem is to restore prosperity to the four staple 
industries of cotton and wool, iron and steel and engineer­
ing, coal, and shipbuilding and all these are more or less 
export trades. The revival of the first three would 
automatically solve the problem of the fourth. ” .(l)
The policy was given a boost by Thomas’s negotiations with 
Norman and some bankers about the financial arrangements for the 
policy. On 22nd January Thomas presented Cabinet with a memo­
randum outlining his plans to which he had already alluded in
( 2 )a speech a few days before in Manchester • He said that the 
City was ready to consider sympathetically proposals that were 
put forward to assist the reorganisation of industry. Although 
he did not expect any immediate results from his scheme it,
(1) CAB 24 211 oP 134(30).
(2) CAB 23 63 40(3; OP 21130). This scheme developed into the 
Bankers1 Industrial i»evelopment Company. Norman was 
enthusiastic about the plans when he gave evidence to the 
Macmillan Committee.
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"»*»• represented a determination to put before the leaders 
of industry both an offer to help and a measure of optimism 
designed to encourage them to continue their efforts to 
reduce the costs of production and so expand the export 
trade.*' (l)
Thomas still pinned his faith on the recovery of exports in spite
(piof a rather dismal Trade Outlook for January, when Graham
reported that although coal and iron and steel seemed to be
holding up, electrical goods, cotton and wool were all being
adversely affected by the spreading depression abroad, increased
competition and the erection of tariff barriers. Nevertheless,
Thomas with the aid of several »prominent * industrialists and the
Governor of the Bank of England, was going ahead with plans to
organize financial aid for reconstruction. He also attempted to
involve the Trades Union CongpoSS, for it was widely accepted
that any reconstruction plans would swell the unemployment
figures. This factor was not to "... deter ns from encoiiraging
(3 )healthy reconstruction however drastic."
Apart from hints here and there of a need for a redundancy 
policy there was little attempt to deal with this problem except 
by Mosley who suggested in his memorandum that: ;
"Only one known factor may offset the tendencies of long 
term reconstruction ... to increase the unemployment 
figures. That factor resides in the sphere of monetary 123
(1) CAB 24 209; CP 21(30).
(2) CAB 24 209; CP 24(30).
(3) CAB 24 209; CP 21(30).
policy ... cheaper money accompanied as required by an 
enlargement of the basis of credit would have an early 
and beneficial effect on the unemployment figures 
although it is doubtful whether it would very much more 
than counteract the rationalisation measures." (l)
Mosley's Criticism
Mosley was very critical of Thomas '5 scheme for financial 
reconstruction. His first criticism was that the 
other advisory ministers had had no hand in the plans and knew 
little more than the general public. His second criticism was 
about the extent of control given to the banks. The Government 
should assume effective control and not abdicate its responsi­
bility to the banks.
He did not consider that British banks had the industrial 
experience, unlike theifGerman counterparts, to enable them to 
deal with industrial organisation. He challenged the obsession 
of the Government with the revival of the basic industries.
Mosley was critical of the focus of reconstruction on the basic 
industries because he wanted more attention paid to the 
appropriate industrial structure of the country and to this end 
advocated a strong research staff to consider the problem. Under 
the reconstruction programme advocated by the Government, invest­
ment was directed towards the depressed industries and as such (l)
25h
(l) CAB Zh 209; CP 31(30)» Empirical evidence relating to the 
effect of money supply during this period indicates that 
the impact would have been on prices and not employment. 
See Walters (1969) op« cit.
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might he regarded as defensive investment and thus likely to 
have delayed the transfer of capital to growth sectors of the 
economy.
He did not think the potential of exports to generate a revival 
in home demand had been *scientifically e x a m i n e d 1; although 
he quotes Clay's estimates that a £ 5 0 m i n c r e a s e  in exports 
was li k e l y  to increase employment by 225*000. On this aspect 
of macro-economic p o l i c y  Mosley did not mention induced effects 
from the increase in exports which were implicit in Thomas's 
arguments.
He was b e i n g  realistic, however, as exports were not holding up 
well and fell in value and volume by about 20%  between 19 2 9  and 
1930.
Mosley was probably right to challenge the reconstruction concept 
as an instrument for the re-establishment of economic prosperity, 
but he failed to take the offensive and make suggestions for 
more profitable departures. The expansion of the electricity 
industry referred to by Snowden was an obvious possibility;
Amery had recommended the expansion of automobiles; the railway 
managers were asking for aid to electrify the service; and the 
chemical industry might well have been expanded. Mosley left 
this matter to his prophetic experts.
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Keynes 'SDoubts
Keynes was also doubtful of the potential of reconstruction 
policy. His views on the issue were expressed in the E.A.C. 
report on the Economic Outlook.
"... to expect an increased efficiency in these trades 
sufficient to absorb, within a moderate period of time, 
the bulk of the men now unemployed, both in these 
industries or in other industries would be quite 
unreasonable." (1 )
Specific plans
Coal: There was a considerable problem with Liberals over the 
(?)Coal Bill . The President of the Board of Trade said that it 
had been made plain that Lloyd George was strongly opposed to 
the quota provisions in their present form. He reminded the 
Cabinet that considerable concessions had already been made to 
secure Liberal support and that further concessions would strain 
the relationship with the miners and the coal owners. Thomas 
reported that there was some anxiety lest the proposals forced 
up the costs of production. The Bill continued on its tortuous 
progress on to the statute books. *2
(1 J CAB 58 1^3, EO 3 .
(2) CAB 23 63 7.(30; Feb 3rd, 1930.
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Agriculture: Agriculture was in a sorry state. Early in the 
New Year, the Minister of Agriculture presented his Agricultural 
Marketing Bill^^, which was to facilitate the organisation o f  
producers into associations or co-operatives for greater unity 
of effort in marketing. These attempts were dwarfed by the 
growing clamour for protection. Reorganisation seemed a puny 
effort compared to the immense problem of the agricultural 
sector. An Agricultural Policy Committee and a special sub-
(2)committee of the E.A.C. were set up to consider the problems
Iron and Steel: The Iron and Steel Report was ready in the late 
Spring. It suggested a rationalisation scheme of £15M and the 
merits of its publication were being considered in May. The 
Macmillan Committee discussed the idea of protection for the 
industry and were generally sympathetic^.
Tariff Truce
Trade
Officially, the Labour Government was committed to free trade 
and to further this policy negotiations were begun to organise 
a tariff truce. On February 12th, Graham reported to the 
Cabinet that his proposal, providing for the organisation of a 
conference to arrange a tariff truce, had been carried at the 123
(1) CAB 2b 210, CP 79(30).
(2) CAB 23 63 13(30; 5 March; CAB 2b 210,
CP 76, 78, 79, 80, 8l, 82, 8500;.
A special Cabinet meeting was convened to discuss the 
problems.
(3) Committee on.Finance and Industry (1931) on. cit.
■ Notes on Discussions held on Friday, 28th February 1930, p2b.
last meeting of the League of Nations^. On the 17th February, 
Graham left for Geneva to offer proposals to the international 
conference. Thirty countries, which did not include the U.S.A. 
and included twenty-six European countries, accepted the invita­
tion to attend the conference. There was some sympatha»- at the 
early meetings, although the Italians were not enthusiastic, in 
favour of a truce. This was to be a preliminary stage in a 
programme of multinational negotiations to reduce obstacles to 
trade. Whilst the Conference was in session, the French 
Government fell and the new administration could not accept the 
proposals. After some rather stormy sessions, new proposals 
were presented which Graham felt lacked the ‘binding and precise 
character' of the original proposals. He, nevertheless,
I?)recommended their acceptance .
Pressure on Free Trade
Meanwhile, tariffs were sprouting up everywhere. France and
Italy hardly left the Conference before announcing tariffs on
cars. Australia introduced a general tariff in April; and in
the United States the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill was being prepared
which was to cause considerable retaliatory action when it
f 3)became law in the Summer , 123
(1) CAB 23 63, 10,(30); CP 43(30).
(2) CAB 24 211, CP 130(30).
(3) Kindleberger(l973) op. clt. on the introduction of
protectionist' measures and the tariff truce.
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In February, the Cabinet were discussing the Indian Government's
decision to raise tariffs on imported cloth. The Indian industry
had suffered severely and was in a desperate position. In spite
of the diffidence of the Secretary of State for India, Wedgwood-
Benn, about any interference in Indian affairs, it was decided
to approach the Viceroy of India to ask that consideration be
given to Britain because of the plight of the Lancashire cotton
industry'^. India's response was sympathetic and some
preference was given to United Kingdom goods by introducing
a differentiation in the form of an additional charge on 'plain
( ? )grey goods' from outside the Empire
The Colonial sugar producing states asked for support in the form 
of Imperial Preference. There were vast stocks of sugar and 
prices had fallen 60% in the past months. A free trade speech, 
by Snowden, had contributed to the problem having 'knocked the 
bottom out of the West Indian supar m a r k e t It was pointed 
out that the West Indian producers were suffering losses even 
with the existing preferences. Mauritius, meanwhile, was asking 
for a grant-in-aid because of estimated losses. Barclay's Bank 
reported that they had already advanced up to the whole of the 
costs of production, a Committee consisting of the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Secretary of State for the Colonies and First 
Lord of the Admiralty, was set up to consider the problem of the 
colonial sugar industry and reported that the, 12
(1) CAB 25 65, 9(50;; CP 59(50).
(2) CAB 25 65, 11(50); CP 4$ 5i(3u).
(5) CAB 25 63 10 11(30); CP 40(30).
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”... present world wide depression in sugar is due to over­
production which is largely the result of encouragement by 
bounties, subsidies and protective tariffs", (l)
The problem was seen as a long term imbalance and thus adjustment 
was the solution not support.
The domestic sugar industry, an ’infant industry'. which had
grown up sheltered by protective tariffs was having problems.
Noel Buxton said that if the industry was to survive and the
country to recoup the benefit of its investment in it, the
( 2)existing protection should be retained .
By far the biggest challenge to the free traders came from the 
agricultural sector. The Scottish Office reported that 1929 bad 
been a bad year for agriculture in Scotland after a series of 
bad years and that in their present mood, farmers would welcome 
any system of control of grain imports. Though the industry 
realized that there was no chance of a tariff they welcomed an 
import board which was a central facet of Labour Party policy.
The situation became more urgent because the Conservatives 
suggested a policy of subsidised prices and the Liberals requested 
a debate on the matter. A special meeting of the Cabinet was 
called to discuss the problem on 11th harch. Buxton and Adamson 
drew attention to protection and aid given to agricultural 
producers in other countries. 12
(1) CA B  2k 210, CP 90(30).
(2) CAB 23 63 12.30; CP 57(30)
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’’The present depression among cereal growers is 
practically world wide, but whereas wheat producers in 
nearly every other country in Europe ... are protected by 
tariffs or assisted by special legislation British 
agriculture is called upon to face unfair competition 
rather than that the national should run the risk of 
injury to our export trade ... There is no free market 
for wheat as the exporting countries control sales so the 
British consumer is subject to the vagaries of 
Governments, pools and combinations of firms". (1)
How useful the general theory of the second best would have been 
in this debate.
Buxton produced a memorandum setting out alternative ways in
which assistance could be given to agriculture. Protection he
considered to be impossible for political reasons, subsidies and
bounties he considered too difficult to implement and so ho
suggested the adoption of a two tier price system for home and
foreign wheat. If this was not possible, he considered the
iburty’s import board policy should be implemented. He thought
that whatever scheme was adopted the existing low level of wheat
prices and the general lack of confidence among British farmers
in the future prospects of wheat growing made it necessary for
some state assistance to be given. He recommended that by
organization and contingent financial assistance, the British
producers ought to be able to secure ’50/- a quarter for wheat of
good milling Quality’-. The cost of this proposal to the
Exchequer assuming that total production of wheat in Great
( 2)Britain remained unaltered, would not exceed £AjM. • 12
(1) CAB 2k 210; CP 78(30), CP 9l(30),. CP 8u(30)
(2) CAB 2k 210; CP 78(30).
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Adamson felt that,
" ••• grain growing for sale has reached its limit. No 
advance can be made on yield per acre and costs of 
production cannot be reduced to the scale of becoming 
competitive with other countries." (l)
As a way of coping with this situation, he considered that,
"An Import Board is a means of self-defence and a wheat 
purchasing board for home grown wheat is a way of giving a 
subsidy and is of doubtful utility. A policy which takes 
a long view with the object of encouraging those systems 
of agriculture which are capable of competing in the world 
market is the best interest for the country." (2)
The lord Privy Seal pointed out the importance of imports in 
terms of facilitating the demand for exports. He nevertheless 
considered it vital that reasonable stability in agriculture was 
maintained for it was still the largest employer of labour and 
he felt the depression could not be allowed to spread to affect 
all towns and villages. He returned to his idea of import 
substitution by ensuring that home grown wheat should be 15% 
of all flour milled. He was against anÿ direct subsidy from 
the state and considered import boards unwieldy^^.
After considerable debate, the Cabinet referred the matter to a 
Cabinet Committee, who were to submit policies short of 'a
(Ij.)crude subsidy or a protective tariff* . The Committee met 12
(1) CAB 2k 210; CP 80(30)
(2) ibid.
(5) CAB 2k 210; CP 85(30).
ik) CAB 23 63; 17(30); CP 10M30).
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nine times during March but although they debated many issues, 
including import boards, a quota of British wheat in flour, etc, 
they remained fundamentally divided and were unable to put 
forward any proposals to the Cabinet^^. During the course of 
the discussions, Henderson urged that there was a real need for 
special measures to safeguard farmers against abnormal prices for 
a year or two as,
"... there was a danger of another ’South Wales' in the 
Eastern Counties ... The remedy adopted must impose a 
burden on someone. In the present circumstances it was 
clearly right for the consumer to bear it. The price of 
a loaf is due to fall, it is bound to go up again, and it 
is while the price was in the dip that the burden could 
most easily be carried by the consumer." (2)
He suggested a levy on imported grain milled in Britain and on 
imported flour. His scheme was rejected because, even though 
it was far removed from the market for grain, it was thought to 
contravene existing agreements. The committee reported that it 
could not agree and Cabinet referred the matter to Buxton who 
subsequently produced a scheme for a quota of British wheat in 
flour. He was pleased with his scheme which he saw as ensuring 
the producer a definite share in the home market, thus stimulating 
the wheat growing areas. In addition, he felt it would not 
interfere with international obligations and would not impose 
any burden on state funds. 12
(1) CAB Zk 211 CP 104- (30)
’V.
(2) CAB 27 *U3 8th Meeting, 20th March 1930.
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DissenSions: Polarisation of the views within the Party on ' 
trade issues were now explicitly formulated. On the one hand, 
there were those sympathetic to support for producers largely 
because of the implications for employment, e.g. the statements 
of Buxton, Thomas and H.D. Henderson. On the other hand,
Adamson and Snowden felt that protection would merely prop up 
an industry which was in decline, and which should be allowed 
to decline further and subsequently be replaced by more profit­
able production. Snowden's argument however, v/ent deeper than 
this and highlights Snowden's attitude to the whole unemployment 
problem and calls in question the standard view of Snowden as a 
force of reaction within the party. The policy of protection 
for Snowden carried the implication that to the
"fextent to which it is successful in artificially rising 
the price of a loaf it must affect the cost of bread and 
so depress real wages. It is based on the same assumption 
which underlies the proposals made from other quarters for 
currency inflation or for fiscal protection namely that 
the remedy for our industrial troubles is not increased 
efficiency but reduced wages. To such conception I am 
unalterably opposed, and I am not prepared to commit myself 
to the proposition that because wheat growing may not be 
profitable in this country under present conditions it is 
our duty to make it profitable by raising its price 
artificially at the expense of the consumer." (lj
Snowden had thus cut through to the heart of all policies for 
readjustment of the economy and concluded that they all attacked 
real wages and attempted to increase profits. Conservative 
and puritanical he might have been in his financial management 
but in the central distributional issue of wages or profits
(l) CAB 2k 211; CP 139(30).
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there v/as no doubt where his sympathies lay. What he was not 
clear about was whether there was any trade off between real 
wages and unemployment.
Whilst there was little movement towards the introduction of 
protection» there was similarly little movement towards the 
removal of the existing barriers to trade in the form of the 
safeguarding duties. Much fuss was generated abotit the 
possibility of the removal of existing tariffs in the pre-budget* 
period but in his budget Snowden was able to do little. He found 
some money to compensate for some of the smaller safeguarding 
duties but he was unable to accommodate the loss of revenue 
which would have been associated with the more important ones,
"I cannot touch the McKenna or the silk duties this year."(l) 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
The easing of the external position during the early months of 
1930 had allowed bank rate to be reduced steadily from the 
Autumn peak of 6.5%« The conversion policy had reduced the 
floating debt by £100M and the Government was able to borrow at 
2§% in April. High hopes were held for a cheap money policy 
and were expressed in the Treasury memorandum which discussed 
Mosley's plans; 1
(1 ) Middlemas,(1969) on. cit.. p.253!
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"Market conditions left to themselves should improve with 
the lower bank rate and easier money conditions which 
recent Government issues were themselves designed to 
foster", (l)
Some expression of the Government's financial policy at this time 
is apparent in Snowden's budget. It was a traditional budget 
which had taken great care to ensure that a balance was struck 
after adequate provisions had been made for the sinking fund. 
Pressure to influence the content of Snowden's budget had grown 
throughout the Winter. The right vring of the political spectrum 
came to the defence of profits and raised the old bogeys of 
confidence and the taxable capacity of industry on all possible
( p \occasions. The budget itself must have been something of a
relief being castigated by "The Times" as "A Socialist Budget"
(3)and by "The Daily Herald" as "A Conservative Budget" ^ .
Snowden had found the £47^M needed to balance his budget by a 
neat series of tax changes. He chose to manipulate income tax 
because, 4
"this is always the simplest thing to do because it 
produces a large revenue, costs little extra to collect 
and involves no dislocation." (4)
(1) CAB 24 211; CP 134
(2) The discussion of the budget by Cabinet is traditionally not 
minuted. This section relies heavily upon the Diaries of 
Thomas Jones who was secretary at the meeting.
. ' I4'1 234(3) The Times lApril 1930
The Daily herald.'/April 1930.
(4) Middlemas, (1969) op. cit. p.253.
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He raised the tax threshold from £225 to £250, lowered the 
lowest tax rate by three pence» and raised the standard rate by 
sixpence. He was apparently well pleased with the progressive 
nature of his proposals which ensured that -£m taxpayers would 
pay no extra tax and some would pay less whilst Cabinet 
colleagues earning £5uOO would have to pay £8l5 more tax.
Surtax and death duties were also raised. Egalitarian though 
the budget undoubtedly was it had little to offer in terms of 
unemployment policy. The redistributional effects of the budget 
may have been slightly expansionary but it was balanced and 
offered little inducement to industry.
For an exposition of less orthodox advice on financial matters 
during this period one has the evidence to the Macmillan 
Committee, see above, p.213» which though not yet published 
and, as such did not have any influence on policy, does throw 
some'light upon the advice which was likely to have been given 
to the Government by academics, financiers and businessmen 
during this period.
Supply of Labour
s'
Retirement: The plans to reduce unemployment by introducing a
scheme for early retirement was formally rejected by the Cabinet
in January. In spite of this, there were attempts to revive the
proposals. Mosley included the retirement scheme in his short
(1) 'term plans to reduce unemployment . (l)
(l) cab zb 2oy; c p 3 1(30)
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Inquiries were made about the demise of the policy from many 
quarters. The advice to Ministers dealing with such questions 
was that they should either say that such schemes were unlikely 
to have much impact on unemployment or that the matter had been 
referred to the Cabinet Committee which was considering national 
insurance and pension schemes. The Snowden memorandum on the 
Mosley proposals was much harsher, suggesting that the Government 
should announce the rejection of the scheme. This statement 
made Lansbury very angry as he saw it as interference with 
accepted Party policy^1 .^ The matter was raised at the
Conference of Ministers; by the Panel of Ministers; and in
(2) /Thomas last memorandum on unemployment . ^
School leaving: The policy for raising the school leaving age 
was also mentioned as a short term remedy by Mosley. This policy 
was not progressing very fast. It was decided that although the 
Government would do its best to provide time for the passage of 
the Bill this could not be assured because of the pressure on 
Parliamentary time^^.
Migration: The migration issue was also raised again by Lansbury 
who felt that it had not been treated seriously. The debate on 
the issue was forestalled by submitting the matter for considera­
tion by the Economic Advisory Council. The condition in the *23
(l; CAB 2b 211; CP 1^5(30).
(2) CAB 2b 212; CP 178(30).
(3) CAB 23 63; 12(30).
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receiving countries was also deteriorating and the migration 
flows were decreasing sharply^"^.
Transfer: The transfer policy was again under scrutiny and
attempts were made to extend the policy of re-training by
changing the terms of benefit for the single and able-bodied
men in depressed areas and by making the duties of the new poor
law authorities more constructive: providing training rather
than giving useless tasks. Mosley once again drew attention to
the anomalies created by the scheme which favoured ♦Brighton*
(2)rather than ’South Wales* .
Washington Convention; Meanwhile, the Minister of Labour was 
attempting to introduce a Bill concerned with hours of work so 
that she could announce some progress towards the ratification 
of the Washington Convention at the International Labour 
Office meeting which was to be held at the end of April. The 
Attorney General expressed the opinion that the Bill could be 
interpreted as complying with requirements for ratification. 
Later there were problems relating to salaried workers and it 
was agreed that Government representatives should take no active 
part in the negotiations until more information was provided^.
(1) I. Drummond,(197^), op. cit.
(2) CAB 24 209; OP 31(30).
(3) . CAB 23 63, 23, 29(30); HA 18/30.
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The Alleviation of Distress
Unemployment Insurance
The conditions relating to the unemployed under the insurance 
scheme changed little over this period, apart from the threat to 
remove the benefit from single, able-bodied men in depressed 
areas who Refused to avail themselves of the offer of training*
The fund itself was in difficulty because of the general worsening
of the unemployment position and Margaret Bondfield had to ask
for an extension of borrowing powers before the Easter recess*
The new Act was now in force and was blamed for exacerbating
the problem by opening up areas for abuse. In her request for
funds, the Minister said that of the increase of in the number
unemployed since Labour took office; 50,000 could be attributed
to the new Act; 200,000 to seasonal factors and 250,000 to the
(2)trade depression.
She was still extremely worried about the long term viability of the 
fund and suggested an all party committee on Unemployment 
Insurance though she wondered if this might be treated as a 
confession of failure. She pleaded for something to be done 
about the able-bodied unemployed who did-not have the required 
subscription. 'Something must be done before the Autumn* she 
insisted. 12
(1) CAB 2k 209; CP 51(30).
(2) CAB 2k 211; CP 105(30)
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Poor Law Authorities
The Minister of Health drew up orders for the new Poor Law 
Authorities and tried to make sure that the new regulations were 
less daunting than formerly* by relaxing the request for 
institutional relief ; requiring the provisions of outdoor relief 
and encouraging the introduction of training and instructional 
classes.
National Insurance Schemes
The main hope for improved facilities to help the unemployed and 
other needy sections of the community was placed on the delibera­
tions of a committee set up in late September 1929»
"to undertake, in accordance with the statement contained 
in the king's speech, a general survey of the various 
national insurance and pension schemes, and to consider 
the larger policy of the Government thereon ....." (2)
This committee met under the chairmanship of Clynes and began to 
collect information about insurance schemes. The third meeting 
was not held until June 1930, when Lord Arnold took the chair, 
and made a suggestion which ensured that the second instalment 
of social legislation would be as disappointing as the first. 
Because of the 'national finances' he proposed that the committee 
should postpone the discussion of expansion or otherwise of the 
social insurance schemes and concentrate on the 'gaps', 
'overlapping' and 'amalgamations1 2 of the existing schemes.
(1) CAB 23 63, 8,30; CAB 2b 209 CP 37,(30).
(2) CAB 27 b08', NIC 29(1),-
CHAPTER FOUR
272
ON EXPERT ADVICE 
- June - December 1930 -
Introduction
MacDonald, the tired man of May, emerged in June as the man of action. 
Having taken command of unemployment policy he set to work to get 
things moving. . He had to ensure the swifter implementation of 
existing policies, and explore all available strategies, which might 
be adopted, to ease the 'unemployment problem. To help him with these 
tasks, he sought advice and support from all quarters. The adminis­
trative machinery for dealing with unemployment was reorganized; an 
all party conference was held and all party advisory committees were 
set up; conferences of local authorities were called;and more experts 
were involved in policy in the form of an economists'sub-committee.
A complete policy review was undertaken which took into account, not 
only general policy issues, but the whole question of procedure and 
implementation, in order to identify bottlenecks in the application 
of the policy. Before the summer recess, legislation - the Public 
Works Facilities A c t - w a s  produced, aimed at removing some of the 
constraints and speeding up the administrative procedures which had 
bedevilled the public works programme. The Liberal Party programme 
was scrutinised by the new administrative body in an attempt to make 
sure that no feasible projects were left out.
Reports on the possibilities for reconstruction of the iron and steel 
and cotton industries .were ready as were the reports on the large 
development projects involving the Channel Tunnel; the Tay, Forth, and 
.Humber bridges; and the canal in central Scotland. The Bankers
2?3
Industrial Development Corporation was available to finance an active 
reconstruction programme.
The Unemployment Position
In the early summer of 1930 it appeared that, once again in this 
policy saga, all was ready for action to be taken on unemployment; 
but the depression was deepening. Unemployment, which had been rising 
sharply since the beginning of the year, continued to rise end the 
expected seasonal :fal| -s did not occur as can be seen from the 
statistics in Table 11.
Table 11
% Unemployment in the United Kingdom
1922 #u
June 1 5 .k
July 1 6 . 7
August 1 7 . 0
September 17-5
October 1 8 . 5
November 18.9
December 19.9
Source: Britis;h Labour Statistics
Historical Abstract 1886-1968 
Table l60
TbSsedata provide a rather daunting picture. The problem appears 
even more dramatic as presented in the memorandum to the Panel of 
Ministers in the early summer of 1930.
Table 12
% Unemployment by Industrial Composition (May 30th 1930)
Industrial Composition %>U
Coal 22.1
Iron & S t e e l . 29-0
Other Metal 19 .0
Engineering 13*9
Vehicles . 10 .0
Ship building 28 .8
l
Metal Trades 14.2
. Cotton 39-1
Wool 22.4
Other Textiles 2 2 .?
Clothing 5*5
Boots and Shoes 13 * 8
• Food, Drink and Tobacco 11.0
Building 12.5
Public Works Contracts 25*9
Transport 17*5
Distribution 8.5
Other industry H . O
Total industries 15-2
Source: CAB 27 439 UP (3 0 )
In addition, it was stated that coal mining and cotton represented 
25% of total unemployment; kj>% of the males unemployed were between 
24— 45 years old and of them had been unemployed for a year or
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more This statement was supplemented by the June figures relating
to the distribution of unemployment by region.
Table 13
% Unemployment by Region at 23rd June 1930
Region #U
North 7.0
South-east 6 .2
South-west 8.9
Midlands 14.9
North-east 19 -2
North-west 24.2
Scotland 1 7 . 2
Wales 2 5 .8
Great Britain 15-5
Source: CAB 27 439 UP 6/30
The structural and regional imbalance explains the preoccupation of the 
Government with reconstruction policies in spite of advice from the economists 
that this was unlikely to have any impact upon the problem in the short run.
World trade was contracting sharply. The monetary value of Britain's exports
(2)was only 55^ of the 1929 value . This material was not presented as a 
matter of course, to either of the policy review bodies. The data were dis- . 
cussed each month at the Board of Trade and appear.; as a Cabinet memorandum. 12
(1) CAB 2? 439 UP 30. '
v
(2) ,_■ Colin Clark, Statistical Studies of the Present Economic Position 
of Great Britain. Economic Journal 1931-
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Policy
New problems of confidence in the pound were anticipated as the
easier monetary conditions of the early months of the year became
more difficult to maintain These fears had a paralysing effect
on policy which appeared to be bedevilled by 'heads you win tails I
lo se philosophy1 23. It was thought that appeals for international
(2)co-operation would be interpreted as signs of weakness ; protection
was thought likely to raise prices or lead to retaliation and was in
(3)any case morally distasteful to some economists and politicians ;
expansion of financial support for development would, it was thought,
cause further problems of confidence and impose burdens in the form
(4)of national debt upon subsequent generations ; reductions in wages
were considered unfair and impracticable and so were any suggestions
(5)to reduce unemployment benefits y . All the policy
(1 ) S. Howson op.cit. p.fc?.
(2) CAB 58. 2. 9 (30). The consensus on this matter which is revealed
in the discussion of the EAC leads one to suspect that fears
were real but whether they were justified is a different matter. 
MacDonald said that although without international action 
Britain's plight would remain or become worse, the British 
Government as such, would be unwise to initiate any movement 
towards international action.
(3) CAB 58 2, 12 (31); EAC H. 127. Although economists had pointed 
out that the free-trade theory was inappropriate for conditions 
in which tariffs were being erected and unemployment was high, 
the theoretical model had not been developed sufficiently to 
clarify the debate. There was no 'second best' theory at hand.
(*+) CAB 27* *+39, UP 7 (3C)* Bee discussions on public works below
p.319 . This is one of the few discussions of the time profile of 
the National Debt.
(3) CAB 58 2. CAB 2*+ 211, CP 13*+ (3 0 ). See discussions on the
Economists Report below p.310 and 'Alleviation of Distress' below 
p. 35^»
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strategies were in difficulty by the end of the year.
Policy Failure
The reasons suggésted in the introduction of the thesis for policy
failure are all apparent during this period. The effect of the
reverence fcr the gold standard and the constraints which this imposed
upon policies became important. The associated need to 'balance the
budget1 23 was again a dominant issue, although improved terms were
obtained for accelerated works programmes The budgetary
frugality contributed to the crisis in the management of the unemployment
insurance fund in the Autumn . The free-trade commitment,
unsupported by any solid theoretical economic^ in periods of high
(3)unemployment, blocked other policy strategies . The pre-occupation 
with distributional issues prevented the adoption of strategies which, 
by helping industry, might have reduced unemployment, e.g. by subsidies, 
financial support or protection. The administration had become 
reliant upon experts for advice yet was unable to use the advice given. 
This can be attributed to the nature of the advice given and to the 
lack of decision making capacity. Let us consider these developments 
more closely.
(1) See belowp.319 Public Works.
(2) See below p.35^ - Alleviation of Distress.
(3) See belowp.340 Trade
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The Panel of Ministers
Once again the structure of Government was adapted to deal with the 
unemployment problem. The new contrivance was the Panel of Ministers. 
MacDonald dissolved the Conference of Ministers after discussing with 
them many policy issues and he started afresh with the new administrative 
structure. He outlined his proposals for this body to Cabinet on 23rd 
June. He proposed that a Panel of Ministers should be formed,
"with a view to developing the policy of the 
Government in regard to employment and unemployment 
and supervising, energising, criticising and making 
suggestions as to execution". (2)
The Panel of Ministers included the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of State 
for Dominion Affairs, the President of the Board of Trade, the Minister of 
Labour, the Lord Privy Seal, Secretary of State for Scotland, the First 
Commissioner of Works and the Minister of Transport joined later in the 
autumn by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
The task of co-ordinating unemployment policy was given to the Lord Privy
Sealj Vernon Hartshorn, who had taken over this office from Thomas in May.
He was to keep in touch with the Prime Minister and&inisters and c ivil
servants involved with unemployment. Thomas, now the Secretary of State for
(3)the Dominions, was to continue to organise finance for reconstruction ^ . 123
(1) Which had been set up to deal with the matters arising from the Mosley 
Memorandum. CAB 27 3^ 8 , CUP l6th June 1930.
(2) CAB 23 31/30; CP 215, 00.)
(3) The task was gradually taken over by Graham, President of the Board of 
Trade. But at this time, MacDonald stressed the benefits of continuity - 
he was probably bowing to Thomas’s desire to continue and attempting to 
take the sting out of his removal from office.
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Work of Panel of Ministers ¡;¡'
The Panel of Ministers was to meet as frequently as necessary 'to keep |
things g o i n g '. The first meeting was held on 20th June and seventeen morel1
meetings were held before the end of the year. To assist the ministers a j
j
secretariate of specially selected civil servants of the 'highest experience', 
was appointed led by Sir John Anderson H.D. Henderson, from the staff
of the E.A.C. was to help his secretariate.
The Panel of Ministers undertook a thorough examination of Government policy: 
arranged meetings with local authorities; conferred with the Liberals and 
their expert advisers about the Liberal Party's proposals; and drafted a Bill 
to facilitate public works. The reports, which were being submitted regarding 
the feasibility of major works, export credits to Russia and regional policy 
were also considered by this Committee . During debates about the unem­
ployment insurance fund the Committee, by excluding the civil servant members 
became, in effect, a Cabinet Committee advising the Minister on possible 
action which might be taken
\
An examination of the unemployment problem was undertaken during the early
weeks of the functioning of the Panel of Ministers. In a memorandum entitled,
. S
The Significance of the Unemployment Statistics in their bearing on the 
practical application of Government Policy, an attempt was made to analyse 
the components of the unemployment problem Three distinct types of
unemployment were identified: 1234
(1) Permanent Secretary, Home Office, subsequently to become Chancellor of the 
Exchequer 1943-45.„ See John Anderson: The Organisation of Economic 
Studies in Relation to the Problems of Government. Stamp Memorial 
Lecture, London 19^7*
(2) See Public Works below p. J19.
(3) CAB 27 *+38 12 (30). See 'Alleviation of Distress', below p. 35U.
(4) CAB* 27 439 UP 30 (11).
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A. Normal unemployment:
(i) that associated with job changes;
(ii) that arising from seasonal problems;
(iii) that associated with other intermittent employment;
(iv) the problem of unemployables.
B. Unemployment attributable to the world depression;
C. Unemployment associated with Britain's special difficulties.
Pre-war unemployment was ; r&rely under 2% and this included only the 
unionized unemployment and was thus likely to be an under-estimate- , as 
unionized labour tended to be predominantly skilled labour which has lower 
than average unemployment. Since the war three factors had tended to 
increase unemployment:
1» The Unemployment Insurance Scheme had caused employers to be
less reluctant to dispense with workers and had encouraged
' those who were not 'genuinely seeking work': married women,
causal and seasonal workers to register as unemployed. These 
factors added 600,000 workers to the unemployment register.
2. The world depression was thought to be the cause of 750,000
workers being unemployed.
3* Britain's structural problem resulted in the unemployment of 
some 500,000 workers and involved widespread repercussions 
which were not estimated.
The world depression was, it was considered, the type of catastrophe for 
which the insurance fund had been designed; and for which the remedy was 
public works. . Possibilities for works schemes were thought to have been
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eroded during the past ten years on inappropriate schemes to deal with the 
structural problem. The solution tothe structural problem was reorganization; 
stimulation of new industries; location policy and a transfer policy to 
deal with the difficulties of the depressed regions. Having formulated the 
problem in this way, the strategies were deceptively clear. No attempt was 
made to explore the possible interaction or compatibility of the policies.
Their views on finance were clear: recovery depended upon confidence and, 
although fiscal and monetary policy were outside their province, confidence 
was felt to be undermined by budget deficits.
Renewed criticism of the organizational structure
In the autumn, Attlee criticised the new structure in a memorandum on
organization and policy He found the structure cumbersome and bemoaned
the fact that no executive action could be taken. He was subsequently asked
( 2)to attend the meetings .
When considering the proof of the White Paper on unemployment in November,
the Cabinet decided that as soon as the Cabinet Committee had examined the
various reports before them, steps would have to be taken to see to what
extent arrangements could be made with the Liberals to secure the speeding
(3)up of work generally J . It was also decided to examine the
extent to which recourse should be made to emergency powers, particularly 
with reference to reconstruction. Thus, once more the organizational 
structure was challenged.
"It was suggested that what was really needed was 
some centralized co-ordinating authority which 
could arrive at quick decisions". (4) 12
(1) CAB 24 213, CP 283 (30) The Problems of British Industry.
(2) CAB 23 64; 6 1 (30).
0 )  CAB 23 64; 70 (30).
( 4 i  j
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The basic difficulty was, as MacDonald pointed out in the early summer, 
that the o inisters did not have the time or were not able to assimilate 
the advice offered in order to make decisions. This difficulty was
not remedied by the use of experts as the progress of the deliberations\
of the E.A.C. and the Economists' Committee indicate.
Economic Advisory Council
MacDonald's other policy review body was the Economic Advisory Council. 
MacDonald had hoped that a consensus view would emerge from the 
Council but the differences of opinion which resulted in two reports 
on the Economic Outlook being submitted to the Council indicated a 
real cleavage of opinion which was not clarified by debate To
resolve some of the differences it was decided, on Keynes's advice, 
that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should ask the Macmillan Committee 
for an interim report setting out their opinions on whether capital 
development could increase the volume of employment or whether it
(2)merely offset other developments which were already taking place 
In other words, they vrere asking for an opinion about the 'Treasury 
View' . Keynes had recently < r\sW“iA.cV£<X. < the Macmillan
Committee on these matters and probably was hoping that his instructions 
had been digested and accepted by the Committee and would be reflected 
in any reply which they might make 123
(1) CAB 58 2; EA.C CAB 5 8 , 1^5* See Chapter Three above p' • 205»
(2) He also sought their views on the EAC instituting an 
independent inquiry on the matter.
(3 ) See Chapter Three above for discussion of Keynesk analysis of 
the situation which he developed for his colleagues on the 
Committee, p Ai-i*
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At the next meeting of the Economic Advisory Council, it was announced 
that Macmillan had replied that it was quite impracticable to prepare 
an interim report,and that,as the matter did come within his terms of. - 
reference, he would ’deprecate1 2 the institution of a separate inquiry}
The Council 'took n o t e 1 of Macmillan's reply, the effect of which 
would have made nonsense of any consideration of an effective 
unemployment policy prior to the publication of the Royal Commission Report 
which was not available for a further year.
on 10th July. The Chancellor of the Exchequer complained that much 
valuable material had been amassed but insufficiently used: nothing 
had emerged to enable the Government to put forward new proposals for
work. MacDonald referred to a fundamental problem associated with 
democracy of that period, which was that ministers, with their heavy 
responsibility for action, tended to become divorced from ideas. The 
Council he saw as having three functions: to carry out research in
committee; to criticise in Council and Committee and to guide
• • (2)ministers .
"... such a course seemed to him to be deplorable 
for if two committees considered these questions 
and produced divergent conclusions the results 
would be deplorable". (l)
General dissatisfaction was expressed at the meeting of the Council
action. Keynes complained of the lack of thoroughness in the Council's
(1) CAB 58 2; EAC 5 .
(2) CAB 58 2; EAC 6 .
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MacDonald's Intervention
In an attempt to get a clear picture of the views of the various 
experts in the Council, MacDonald produced a questionnaire which members 
were to complete and return to Henderson who was to report on the 
views expressed. The questions were:-
"(1) What, in your view, are the chief causes 
of our present industrial position?
(2) What, in your view, should be the trade
' policy adopted by His Majesty's Government 
to restore trade?
(3 ) How, in your view, can the home market be 
developed and thus put more people in a 
position to earn a living and to command 
effective power to consume?
(4) How, in your view, can the volume of exports 
be increased?
(3) What, in .your opinion, would be the framework 
of a definite Imperial trade policy as regards 
markets, tariffs, organization for supply and 
purchase of bulk produce like wheat?" (1)
Henderson reported general agreement amongst the members of the
Council that the worsening conditions were attributable to the world
(2)slump, a temporary phenomenon . There was only limited possibility 
of Britain's doing anything to hasten the recovery. Some members 
feared that the slump would be longer than had been expected. Keynes 
described it as amongst the most important that had ever occurred 
and argued that recovery was unlikely unless interest rates fell. 
Although he considered that the Bank of England understood the problem (l)2
(l) ibid
(2) CAB 38 I50; EAC (H) 113.
2Ö5
and was proceeding along the right lines, he felt it should go further: 
a cheap money policy should be adopted even if it meant the loss ofk
gold, increasing the fiduciary issue,and arranging a loan from the 
Federal Reserve Bank. Cole suggested that the Government ought to 
attempt to secure the stabilization of world prices and should call a 
world economic conference. Stamp also advocated international action. 
There was an underlying acceptance that world prices were at the root 
of the problem. There was little evidence of the confusion of issues 
as suggested by Johnson . The difficulty was the implementation 
of policies which would have any impact upon the problem. Many of 
the memoranda concentrated upon the underlying structural imbalances 
emphasizing that the relative position of Great Britain had been 
unsatisfactory for many years. Costs of production were the basic 
problem. Although a reduction in the exchange rate was an obvious 
solution to this mal-adjustment problem few would even mention this 
strategy. There was no explicit consideration given to the respon­
siveness of exports to price reductions, but the tenor of the
(2)discussions implied that it was likely to be high . The possibility
1
of any rapid or substantial increase in exports was thought doubtful
(3)given the current trends in world trade . Income effects were 
dominating any price effects that might have been achieved. 123
(1) Johnson (1973)» op.cit.
(2 ) See Thomas (1973), op.cit. estimates rather low price elasticity 
of both imports and exports.
(3 ) C.G. Clark (1931), op.cit. Kindleberger (1973), op.cit., p. 1 2 6 .
Imports Value Million Dollars 
December
1929 1930
U.S-A.
Germany
1228
33*f
26k
307
20k
201
I63
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Protection was generally looked upon with favour - though some 
members were averse to any form of protection. These views apparently 
had quite an impact upon MacDonald and Thomas who became more 
favourably disposed to tariffs from the Summer 1930 as we shall see 
in the discussions of the tariff truce below P % 1  . Keynes was impressed 
by the reluctance of the employers to declare that wages should be 
reduced; and suggested that trade unions should meet the employers by 
offering more efficiency at existiig wage rates. Keynes had yet to 
specify his model in which even if wages were responsive unemployment 
could result. This condition was not spelt out until much later 
when the monetary and real sectors were integrated in the General 
Theory.
All felt that reconstruction should go ahead; if this did not
proceed voluntarily, Duncan considered some element of compulsion 
should be introduced. Little attention was given to providing 
incentives to industrialists to embark upon the necessary investment 
involved in reconstruction. Lansbury had seen this as a way of 
controlling industry but the Government was reluctant to assume control 
This failure to assume control of industry is cited by McKibbon as a 
reason for policy failure Several members advocated some new form
of state organization in order to stimulate and control the develop­
ment of new home industries. Tawney proposed an Economic Planning 
Commission to take on the planning of transport, housing and slum
(1) Snowden 0-93*+ ) , op.cit.
(2) CAB 58 (2) ;
(3) McKibbon (1975) 1 op.cit.
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clearance on a national basis and Cole advocated the provision
of new agencies under national, control to take charge of roads and 
housing.
The burdens of taxation and social insurance were mentioned. Balfour
considered that the reduction of taxation could be the most effective 
%
step to help industry. Debenham stressed- the importance of,
"a reduction of public expenditure and if necessary 
a limitation of public services until the country 
is able, to afford them". (2)
Keynes considered that the avoidance of further direct taxation was 
essential to the promotion of confidence; and recommended that 
expenditure on new social services'should be postponed until -better 
times. He also said that a revenue tariff on manufactured goods was:
x
"... essential to a social budget in present 
circumstances" (j)
Stamp takes a similar position advocating public economy expansion 
of indirect taxation aid- a modest revenue tariff. /
These attitudes indicate •
the growing dominance of the confidence issue. The situation on the 123
(1) Tawi^rhad been involved in the drafting of Labour and the Nation in
which such schemes were advocated.
(2) CAB 58 150; EACH (llj).
(3) ibid
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exchanges began to deteriorate in the middle of 1930 when the Bank 
did not revise its rates downwards with the change in New York rates. 
Foreign issues declined in Britain and America and the progress 
towards an easier money policy stopped
The Economists1 23*5 Committee
Before there was time to digest the expert advice, MacDonald announced 
another attempt to extract a consensus of economic opinions. He set 
up a committee of economists
"The Prime Minister said that there were a number 
of fundamental points of a purely economic 
character connected with the present economic 
situation on which it was desirable to obtain an 
authorative expression of opinion. He accordingly 
appointed a Committee of the Economic Advisory 
Council". (2)
Keynes was appointed Chairman and Pigou, Robbins, Stamp and Henderson
(3)were invited to serve as members. . Each of these economists had
been involved with matters concerning unemployment policy during the
previous years. Keynes and Henderson had been involved in the
(L)
policies of the Liberal Party . Pigou had advocated many short­
term strategies and had had his name mentioned in connection with
(3)the invalidity of the'Treasury VieiS . Both Stamp and Pigou had
(1) S. Howson (1975)» op.cit.
(2) CAB 58 2; EAC 7.
(3 ) Howson and Winch (1977) op.cit. for setting up Committee.
(A-) J.M. Keynes and H.D. Henderson (1929) op.cit.
(5) Winch (1969), op.cit. for Pigou's position.
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given, evidence to the Macmillan Committee Bobbins had been involved
in work with Beveridge on unemployment and had expressed considerable 
open-mindedness on policy issues in his inaugural lecture :in January and - ‘
(2)he subsequently published his seminal article on the supply curve of Labour
Meanwhile the Council continued its consideration of the unemployment problem 
- unemployment was approaching two million and although this figure was 
thought to include:
tens of thousands of persons who years ago 
would not have been part of the unemployment 
problem ... . The Government were giving the
problem their closest possible attention but 
till now it had baffled them". (3)
This refers to the extension in the coverage of the unemployment scheme to 
include married women, seasonal and short-term workers. Thus increasing 
the apparent activity rate of the labour force and opening up areas of 
so-called 'abuse'. In September, MacDonald was again asking for solutions:
"••• could a practicable scheme be devised for 
using part of the money now expended on unemploy­
ment benefit so as to stimulate industrial 
activity and employment?" (*0
The assumptions 'v/tfère. that 'productive expenditure' would have a greater 
stimulative effect than mere transfer payments such as 123
(1) The Committee on Finance and Industry, Minutes of Evidence (1931)i op»cit.
(2) Robbins (1930)» op.cit.
(3) CAB 58 2; EAC 7.
W  CAB 58 2; EAC 8.
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unemployment benefits and would also have greater social value. 
MacDonald had been sent a scheme from Scotland suggesting that some 
of the money spent on transitional benefits should be used to aid 
agriculture. He clutched at all such straws and was also anxious to 
do something for the agricultural labourers who had such low wages 
and were not covered by the unemployment insurance scheme.
Economic conditions were getting worse. At the September meeting
Keynes said that the recession in the United States of America was-
now so great that he felt that prices must now be nearer ’bottom1
though further falls in commodities might occur. It was pointed out,
however, that whilst the British index of production showed a fall
of 8% in the June quarter of 193® compared with June 1929» the
(1)American, index had fallen l8% and was below the 192^ level
The Committee of Economists
The group of economists held their first official meeting on 10th 
September. Keynes, Henderson, Pigou, Bobbins, Stamp and the 
secretaries, Hemming and Kahn were present. The minutes of the 
proceedings do not provide a very full account of what went on at the 
meetings as they are mainly minutes of decision. Copies of the 
memoranda submitted and discussed (over 70) are available and these 
throw considerable light on the matters discussed. The group met on 
thirteen occasions during September and October 1930* These meetings 
included two very energetic weekend meetings held at Shortlands, the 
home of Stamp, on 26th-28th September; and at Cambridge on l8th-20th 
October. Even so the report was rushed because of the attempt to meet
(1) CAB 58 2; EAC 8 , 11th September 1930.
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MacDonald's request that the report should be available in time for 
it to be considered before Parliament reassembled on October 28th
The terms of reference of the Committee were extremely wide, too wide 
perhaps. They were:
"To review the present economic conditions of 
Great Britain to examine the causes which are 
responsible for it and to indicate the conditions 
of recovery". (2)
The Report would have been more useful and the advice offered more unani­
mous had the scope been constrained to the production of short­
term remedies to contain unemployment. Instead, a general review of 
the problem, its causes and possible remedies were to be produced 
within six weeks! It is little wonder that Keynes was accused of 
trying to steamroll the committee: any chairman would have had to 
control the proceedings vigorously.
Framework for Discussions
The answers to the Prime Minister's questionnaire, with Henderson's
memorandum reporting on the replies, were available to the Committee
(M
at the first meeting . In addition copies of the evidence given 
by Pigou, Stamp and Robertson, and the statistical reports of Bowley 
to the Macmillan Committee were requested. Robbins suggested that 123
(1) CAB 58 l^O.
(2) CAB 58 2 ; EAC 7 .
(3 ) Even Pigou had already tentatively advocated protection. See Howson 
and Winch (1977), op.cit. pp.65-66.
(k ) CAB 58 2 (7 ); EAC H 1 1 3 .
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foreign economists should be involved but this matter was deferred.
The group considered procedural matters and a memorandum, by Kahn, 
suggesting matters for discussion together with comments by Keynes; 
and Robbins' memorandum which suggested possible topics for discussion.
Robbins suggested a review of the position of Great Britain before the 
world slump; the extent and nature of the depression and the degree 
of disequilibrium, using for this purpose the most reliable statistics; 
the rigidities in wages and prices; monetary malaise; the return to 
gold and the gold policy of other countries; comparative conditions 
in the United States, France and Germany and the raw material producing 
countries; conditions for recovery including acceleration of recovery 
by'gold policy, public works policy, tariffs and taxes, wages and 
prices.
In his consideration of Kahn's proposals, Keynes raised a mass of 
questions of a theoretical and practical nature . What was the fall 
in wages necessary to restore equilibrium? What was the elasticity 
of the supply schedule? How would palliative measures affect ultimate 
efficiency? Was the feared rise in price level a phenomena which 
would accompany an ordinary trade revival? How would prices be 
affected by a tariff on iron and steel on the assumption that the 
supply schedule of British industry is elastic? How would a revenue 
tariff contribute to the Exchequer? Could employment to new 
industries alone be subsidised? Would policies be vitiated if the 
trade unions were to maintain real wages or the banking system was 
unwilling to co-operate?
(1) CAB 58 l^O E (7).
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This amorphous approach would obviously not get the proceedings very 
far and at the next meeting Keynes attempted to achieve some more 
systematic statement of the views of his committee by producing, 
MacDonald style, a series of questions for their attention. These 
questions were an attempt to elicit the theoretical framework in 
which the members were working and also to get some estimates of the 
quantitative changes necessary in some of the key variables ^ .
He asked in what way would British employment, prices and wages be'
affected by an increase in investment in the world and in Britain? 
oii
by a tariff,/by a reduction in money wages. How much too high were 
real and money wages? What did they estimate had been the increase 
in real wages and productivity per head since 1910-191^+? .If the 
increase in real wages is higher than the increase in per unit of 
production, how do members explain it?
Individual Opinions
The replies were full and serious but the members found it difficult 
to leave their familiar conceptual framework and enter into the 
■realm of international macro-economic models into which Keynes was 
attempting to lead them. Their replies, often defensive and critical, 
did not throw any new light on the problem. 1
(1) CAB 58 150 E (8).
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Henderson
Henderson, who was very critical of the questions which he found 
’’unhelpful” . considered that home investment would increase employment- 
in the short-run but that its long term effect would depend upon the 
nature of the investment He found it difficult to say whether
or not an increase in investment abroad would increase employment 
in Britain. Here again he thought it would depend upon the nature of 
the investment. It might raise world prices and so ultimately 
British prices but it might well result in increased competition for 
exports. A  tariff would increase employment in Britain but its effect 
on real wages was indeterminate. Wages he considered were too high 
to permit a rapid rate of industrial expansion but he was not certain. 
Wages were probably 10$ too high; it had been estimated that the 
increase in production since 1910-191^ was about 20$, production per 
head had probably fallen because productivity had not made good the re­
duction in hours worked. Unemployment was higher than necessary
(2)because of the insurance funds. Henderson wanted an.appraisal in the 
broadest way of the significance and the implications of the complex 
depression from which Britain was suffering. He considered it unwise 
to gamble on short-term policies which may have bad long term effects. 
Although he agreed that it was not the time for financial stringency,
* we should be on the right side of the l i n e * . He advocated protection 
for purposes of revenue and for industry. His comments indicate
the paucity of a descriptive analysis as a basis for policy. At the
(1) op.cit., CAB 58 150-E (9).
(2 ) The existence of the fund was thought to encourage workers who 
might otherwise have merely become, inactive to register as
• unemployed.
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disaggregative level the policy predictions were not very clear: 
about all the crucial variables there is hardly even a prediction as 
to the direction of change. It also reflected how far Henderson had 
moved from the path he had adopted during the election campaign when 
he had defended Liberal Policies in the pamphlet which he had written 
with Keynes - Can Lloyd George do it?- and diiring the debate on the 
Economic Outlook in May. His exposure to the information and policy 
re-assessments had probably made a great impression on him but it 
might also imply an over-estimation of his original stance
' V-
Pigou .
Pigou considered adjustments to the real wage rate the only Way of 
increasing employment. Investment or tariffs would only increase 
employment in so far as prices rose more than wages. Equilibrium 
level of wages he defined as:
u ... that at which all work people are employed 
and are so distributed among occupations that 
the wage rate is everywhere the same for people 
of a given quality. No way of telling what it 
is ... possibly above the level in the depressed 
industry. No more possible except using useless 
weighted average". (2 )
Pigou felt he had little to add to the evidence already submitted to 
the Macmillan Committee.
Robbins
Robbins was scornful about the possibilities of getting a better
(3)estimates of wages and productivity than Bowley and Stamp in ten days! 123
(1) Howson and Winch (1977), op.cit. discuss this change of position.pp (, (3/
(2) CAB 58 150 E (12).
(3) CAB 58 150 E  (13).
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He was a young man respectful of the difficulties of obtaining useful
data quickly. Using Bowley and Stamp' s work he estimated that
between 19 2*1-1928 real wages had risen between 5-6%  and had since
continued to rise. He quoted the London and Cambridge series of
average wages and the cost of living for 19 2*1— 19 3 0 .
Table 1^
Year Average Weekly Wage
Average Cost 
of Living
192*+ 10 0 .0 100.0 .
1925 105.0 10 0 .6
• 1926 1 1 0 .0 98.3
1927 10 0 .5 95.7
1928 99.5 9^-5
1929 99.0 9*k 0
1930 98.5 89.O
Source : CAB 58 1 5 0 , E (13).
He also referred to the work done at LSE and by Ry.eff which ( J
indicated a high correlation between unemployment and the ratio of 
wages to wholesale prices. He found it impossible to give an answer 
on how far out of equilibrium real wages were. (Robbins had recently 
published his article on the supply of labour in which he had considered 
the relationship between wages and hours of work. The micro-aspects 
of the problem dominated his thinking. This combined with his 
structural approach to the problem, derived from the Austrian Capital 
Theory, made it unlikely that he could proceed far with Keynes on the
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aggregative level. He was, however, also aware of the work of 
Wicksell and Robertson and sympathetic to their approach ^ . )  This 
was not merely because of the paucity of statistical material, but 
because he like Pigou does not find the average a meaningful concept.
"We know that the labour market is not cleared.
To what extent are we justified in assuming as
an axiom that rates are wrong? But we should I '
only be justified in assuming that they are
uniformly wrong if we could be certain that the
labour force was "properly” distributed or that
there was sufficient effective mobility in each
short period to ensure proper reduction if
changes in relative prices made it desirable.
The average is not in any way causal ... It 
is not high wages but rigid wages which are the 
. cause of the trouble". (2)
Robbins had obviously been taken to task for his attempt at theoretical 
purity in discussion for he says:
"Jt has been urged in our discussions that 
whatever the theoretical validity of this 
•analysis, its practical value is small compared 
with that of a plain statement with regard to 
the height of the wage level. It is not clear 
that this is a convincing reason for blurring 
the theoretical issue. But it so happens that 
I believe that the practical argument is all in 
favour of theoretical purity. For once the 
interests of truth and the interests of 
expediency are identical". (3 )
He thought that nobody in practical life was going to bass policy on 
statistics as dubious as those upon which they had to rely.
*
(1) Robbins (193^)» o p .cit.
(2) CAB 38 150 E  (13)
(3 ) ibid.
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The argument that wages were 5% too high could easily be countered by 
arguments to show that the estimates were too high or too low. On 
the other hand, it was known that wages were rigid and transfer was 
held up by the perfectly ridiculous restrictions and inflexibility 
which had crept into industry in the past ten years. Unemployment 
insurance was leading to further problems and abuses.
"Finally concentration on the rigidity 
of rates rather than on the absolute 
height of average earnings enables us 
to focus attention on the position of 
those whose interests the community 
pretends to be most anxious to safeguard - 
the unemployed - those who are precluded 
from selling their labour at prices which 
will command a buyer - not to mention those 
workers who are compelled to accept inferior 
wages because they are excluded from the 
better paid industries". (l)
He goes on to add a note of caution about the uncertainties existing
within the discipline of economics. He mentioned that there were at
(2)least five theories of the cycle . He considered it:
"important when we are called upon 
to deliver the verdict of economic science 
that we should continually guard against 
the appearance of feeling greater certainty 
than we have. It is not only in 193^ that 
the world will have need for the advice of 
economic experts". (3 )
He explores the analysis of Keyne^ and because he has not yet finished 
the book (presumably the Treatise), he uses the terminology of 123
(1) ibid.
(2 ) Robbins had recently completed a review of Trade Cycle Theory.
(3) CAB 58 1 5 0 . E  (1 3 ).
(*0 Howson and Winch, (1977), op.cit. confirm this.
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Wicksell and Hayek - according-to which fluctuation is caused by 
disparity between natural and money rates of interest. When money 
rates are below natural rates prices rise and there is a disproportionate 
increase in the production of capital goods. When the money rate is 
above the natural rate, the rate of investment fall short of that . 
which is desirable.
Keynes's view he said was that in recent years, in the world at large, 
the money rate had been above the natural rate, largely because of 
the financial operation of needy, nervous governments. If this view 
was correct then all that would be necessary to produce a speedy 
recovery was for America to undertake a sensible monetary policy. Only 
a simple change in the initial assumption with regard to the natural 
rate were necessary and the whole picture underwent a "Kaleidescopic 
transformation" . If the natural rate had been above the money rate 
then disproportionate developmeni^would have occurred and different 
policy measures would be indicated. He says that the matter rests on 
an assumption which is incapable of statistical verification. But in 
his view the natural rate of interest had probably been high since the 
war as working capital has been destroyed and technical changes 
had been great. Since the last meeting he had held his own survey.
He had asked five professional economists, all under 3 5 , which was the 
most likely. They had all chosen the higher alternative! Because 
of the unfamiliarity with the notions involved, he again appealed to 
the committee to invite one of the continental theorists over for 12
(1) This is an allusion to the Austrian Capital Theory.
(2) A view which current research work appears to be establishing.
See Williams (19°3.>, op.cit. ^
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discussions.
"I am not suggesting that anything has yet 
been published elsewhere which approaches 
the complexity and the great aesthetic beauty 
of the theories proposed by Mr Keynes. But 
the broad notions are familiar to those who 
walk in the paths of Wicksell and Mises and 
the habit of judging events in those terms is 
much more widely diffused. I believe that we 
should find a day's conversation with let us 
say, Dr F.-jA. Hayek, whom I regard as being the 
foremost monetary expert now actively working 
on the continent, more helpful at this stage 
than many days spent in elucidating our private 
differences". - (l)
As expedients he suggested on the international front anything which
would rationalize the utilization of the gold supply. He would oppose
any artificial creation of cheap money. On the national front he saw
no hope except for the introduction of greater flexibility in wage
structure and the sweeping away of the great mass of obsolete restrictions
which prevent labour from being sufficiently productive. To meet the
\ •
budgetary problem he advocated a tax on drink and tobacco and if 
necessary a reduction of the austerity of the sinking fund policy. This 
policy was much neater and possibly, given the structure of the asset 
portfolio and the lags in the public works programmeras effective a policy 
as public works. A policy of inaction was deprecated, 1
(1) CAB 58 130 E (13).
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"... it may be asked, why not just sit tight 
avoid the horrors of an attack on wages and 
trust to increasing productivity eventually 
to do the trick. Such a view, I suggest, does 
less than justice to the position of the 
unemployed who are the people who will have to 
sit tight.V.hat possible grounds of equity or 
economy can there be for the perpetuation of a 
state of affairs in which these unfortunates 
are prevented from obtaining employment because 
recovery is delayed by the fact that monopolistic 
observances of producers prevent them from 
selling their labour for what it is worth. We all 
think this is very contemptible when we see it 
practised by professional associations of men 
against women or by aristocratic white unions 
against coloured labour. We may think it is 
more misguided than contemptible in the case of 
the British Trade Union Policy but this is no 
reason for being less outspoken about it"...
... "We are confronted with an issue of principle 
of the first order of magnitude. It is not 
Liberalism versus Socialism at all. It is the 
issue of whether having organized our whole system 
of production on the price basis we are going to • 
admit the principle that the prices of the various 
kinds of labour must never be fluctuated in a 
downward direction... But it will be urged it is 
unthinkable that any government least of all a 
Labour Government should institute an assault upon 
wages ... The question of expediency seems 
irrelevant. I take it that the business of the 
economist is to make a correct diagnosis regardless 
of whether the politician is prepared to act upon 
it. We may have improved on John Stuart Mill and 
his friends in many ways. In respect of willingness 
to say the unpopular thing they seem to remain our 
superiors". (l)
On public works he found it difficult to decide a priori but he 
mentioned four conditions which such a policy should fulfil: a clear 
opening for the work should exist; it should be speedy to operate, no 
demobilization problem should arise; and the timing should be right. 1
(1) CAB 58 150 E 13
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He asks,
"How much better off would we have been if 
Lloyd George's scheme had been put into 
operation last September?" (l)
But he does not answer.
His principles were deeply affronted by the
prospect of interference with the capital market and by the whole 
philosophy of economic nationalism. He made no pretence that his 
feelings on this matter were based solely upon economic criteria:
"I confess that I find it surprising that 
twelve years after the World War rational 
beings should find the prospect of a series 
of right little, tight little, national 
economies, busily engaged in reducing the 
volume of international exchange to a 
minimum, the sort of world they are willing 
to accept without a fight". (2)
He conceded that in a system where money wages were held rigid above
equilibrium but in which there was mobility of labour and unions were
willing to let real wages fall then a tariff could raise prices and
lower real wages and so reduce unemployment. He refers to an article
*
written by Keynes for Nation and Atheijfeum in November 192^, and 
quotes from it: ■ .
"If there is one thing that protection 
cannot do it is to cure unemployment". (3 ) 123
(1) ibid.
(2) ibid.
0»
(3 ) J.M. Keynes, Nation and Atheijeum, 192^.
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This statement remained true, in his view, because Mr Bevin and his body
of trade unionists were unlikely to be so self-sacrificing and docile
as to allow real wages to fall. A  policy of protection he thought
was probablistically even less certain than a system at Monte Carlo
and protection would tend to expand,
"How many slumps before we achieve 
self-sufficiency?" (l)
The answers which Keynes received were disappointing. The complexity 
of thinking was great but the framework in which they were working did 
not provide a suitable vehicle for making aggregative policy statements.
Much of the advice about the effects were mere guesses about the size 
of the various co-efficients,- debates which are in principle amenable 
to statistical estimation but about which economists often prefer to wrangle.
Keynes
Keynes attempted to put his own thoughts into a more familiar form for
(2)the members of the Committee . He saw the problem as one of internal 
versus external equilibrium which had been made worse by the return to 
the gold standard and the erection of tariff barriers and the level of 
foreign investment. Because of the importance of these international 
factors he began his model by extending the theory of equilibrium wages 
to the open economy. He considered that unless the relationship 
between domestic money wages and money wages abroad was such that the 
amount of home investment, at the rate of interest set by world conditions, 
was at least equal to the amount of home savings, business losses would 
occur. *2
Cl) CAB 58, 150, E (13).
(2) CAB 38, 150, E (15).
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Janeway refers to this model as Keynesls equilibrium terms of trade model.(2) 
Keynes is concerned with the external balance and explains the mal-adjustment 
problems in terms of adverse movements in the terms of trade. The equilibrium 
terms of trade are determined by factors affecting the magnitude of the ' 
foreign trade balance and the pressure to lend abroad. The foreign balance 
had deteriorated because of the introduction of tariffs and increases in 
efficiency abroad, by the decline in foreign markets and by changes in 
relative monetary standards. The pressure to lend had been affected by • 
relative increases in the demand for funds abroad and by the change in the 
relative attractiveness of foreign investments. Given these problems the 
remedies are divided into those which attempt to meet the terms «f trade, • !. '••• 
i.e. by a reduction in effeciency wages;and by those which attempt to 
change them by reducing tariffs abroad or imposing them at homeland by affecting 
changes in the willingness to borrow or lend for home investment. He .
to.)
prefer/'the remedies which attempted to change the terms of trade.■/
He then explores the remedies available to solve the mal-adjustment problem.
\
The remédiés are an extension of those which.he had previously discussed in 
the Macmillan Committee and in the Report on the Economic Outlook.(2)
He now introduces the multiplier concept.recently developed by Kahn and 
attempts to formulate a model in which even if wages are reduced unemployment 
can persist. *2
Xl) Janeway (1971) op..cit. p . 7. Append. 1.
(2) Moggridge (1973) The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes vol.xlll. 
The General Theory and After Part 1. Preparation. Macmillan.
He offered a 'little caricature' in which he examined the relationship 
between two countries, England and America. These countries had 
access to labour of equal efficiency; were both on the gold standard, 
with unrestricted foreign lending and immigration controls. He 
assumed that:
a) in England savings grew faster than population;
b) in America population increased faster than savings;
c) America had a tariff based on the difference 
between the costs of production at home and abroad and 
raised it whenever the difference widened;
d) the stock of gold which England was free to export 
was insignificant compared to that of America.
In these conditions, the rate of interest in England would have to 
rise to a level above the level at which savings were absorbed by 
investment. Unemployment and business losses would follow. Wages 
would be said to be too high and if they were reduced the American 
tariff would be raised and the same situation would recur:
"wages will always be too high, so long as there 
are any Englishmen alive; and when the last economist 
expires he will at least be able to claim with his 
dying breath that he has always had the courage of 
his convictions about wages being too high and he 
has always been right", (l)
This is an important development in Keynes views on wage changes 
and the restoration of equilibrium. He had set up, in the 
international sector, conditions in which changes in wages would not
(l) ibid.
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restore equilibrium. He was still ambivalent about the position 
of wages internally and appeared to believe, at this time, that a 
fall in real wages was not only necessary but would accompany any 
expansionary activity, i.e. there would be an effect on prices.
He considered changes in real wages accompanying the
expansionary process would be more equitable and lead to less 
resistance, than cutting money wages. Before he could extend his 
special case to the internal economy he needed to break with the 
quantity theory of money in so far as it determined the price level; 
integrate the real and money sectors and place constraints upon the 
demand for investment and the demand for money to hold with respect 
the rate of interest. He considered attempts to reach equilibrium, 
by reducing costs, would be difficult given the elasticity of the 
demand for British exports and imports? & scepticism justified by 
Thomas's estimation of the relevant elasticities
He then set out the solution he would have chosen if he had had only 
himself to please. His favourite remedy was to increase investment 
which he explained would create secondary employment, irrespective 
of the form of primary employment, though the induced effect would 
be less if the newly employed spent their money on foreign goods.
This is one of the few references to leakages from the system. He 
thought that it would be possible to test the quantitative effect of 
an increase in investment on employment. He then uses Kahn's 
tentative estimation of the employment multiplier which suggested that 
a given.amount of primary employment produced an equal amount of 1
(1) Thomas (1975), op.cit.
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secondary employment, i.e. the multiplier was in the region of 
• 2 ^  • If home investment were to be increased by £75m and the 
foreign balance was reduced by the same amount then he concluded 
that unemployment would be substantially cured. He was now confident 
that his policy was no more inflationary than any other policy which 
would increase employment: all expansion would affect prices. He 
suggested that a reduction in savings was likely to be as effective 
in reducing unemployment as an increase in investment.
"if government were always prepared to step 
in and borrow enough money and spend it on 
something however unproductive there would 
never be any unemployment". (2)
In thiscainectLonhe pointed out that increasing the dole by borrowing or 
the suspension of the sinking fund would represent negative savings 
which would have an expansionary effect. did not take up this point in 
the policies which he pursued nor carry the idea further to the 
concept of the balanced budget multiplier. He considered a tariff 
would help in many ways even if it had a negligible effect on the J
real wage for it would raise business confidence and ease the budgetary 
stress. 12
(1) Thomas (1973)» op.cit., estimates that t h e ’induced effects would 
be 1.44 after four years, p p  2.3ifjX'
(2) CAB 38 150; E (15).
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He expanded the case for the tariff by indicating how his thinking 
had changed. He considered the case of specialization of manufactured 
goods was over-rated.
"Any manufacturing country is probably just 
about as well fitted as any other to manu­
facture the great majority of articles ... 
now that nearly all the manufacturing countries 
of the world have decided on a certain measure 
of self-sufficiency, a country which does not 
follow suit may pay a much greater price in 
instability than it gains through specialization 
... If I were to believe that these industries 
would be crippled without a tariff I should 
regard that as a conclusive argument for giving 
the tariff ... There are, moreover, certain 
industries which I should wish to preserve, even 
though it was clear that we were in some measure 
relatively inefficient in them. I mean particularly 
agriculture". (l)
Preparation of the Report
These early memoranda brought a series of skirmishes. Keynes and
Pigou differed on theoretical grounds. The difference arose,
according to Keynes, because Pigou, having stated that international
problems existed, argued as if the economy were a closed system.
Keynes and Kahn also argued with Pigou about the possibility of
(2)secondary . employment . Colin Clark's estimates of national income 
were made available to the committee at the time and provided some 
quantitative material for them to study. 12
(1) CAB 58 150; E (15).
(2 ) Howson and Winch (1977) state that this argument was the reason 
. for the exclusion from the report of the multiplier, p Zj.Cj
In spite of the differences the drafting of the report began - 
contentious sections being redrafted many times in an attempt to 
achieve some agreement. The remedies to be preferred were those 
which,unless they were inadvisable on other grounds • 
were likely to have a large effect on employment and a relatively 
small effect on real wages. There is little attempt in the final 
report to indicate which policies do this.
Keynes produced a proposal for a 'tariff-bounty1 scheme giving a 
bounty to all exports and placing a tariff on all imports. This 
had the same effect as devaluation except that it left the sterling 
international obligations unchanged in terms of gold. It would also 
be equitable, and would produce revenue for theExchequer. This 
scheme was not acceptable. Pigou had reservations of a theoretical 
and practical nature and Robbins dismissed it as of academic interest 
only The development of economic theory, especially the theory
of the 'second best' but also concepts of the optimum tariff and 
exploration into the possible effects of retaliation would have added 
clarity to this polemical and pedantic debate.
Henderson had reservations about the way the report was developing 
and felt that the main issue- reduction of costs-was being avoided.
(1) Robbins still contends that the scheme was administratively 
impracticable and merely an attempt to affect a devaluation 
Personal Communication 1976•
309
He felt that Wellington's judgement would be an appropriate 
comment on their study.
"All the clever fellows were on one side and 
all the damned fools were on the other, and 
by God all the damned fools were right", (l)
It was on the tariff issue, however, that the major dissension arose 
For Keynes the theoretical case for free trade remained sound but it 
was not relevant to the existing situation. He explained his 
position in what must be one of the early statements of the second 
best theory.
"Natural forces will not bring about the ideal 
distribution of production as between different 
uses, as predicted by Free Trade, unless they 
have free play. If there are obstacles to the 
transfer of labour and more particularly, if 
tnere were obstacles to money wages falling to 
.those levels both on average and as between 
different industries, at which the whole of the 
labour force would be employed then free trade 
may fail to bring about the right distribution 
of resources. It is indeed conceivable, if we take 
for granted the rigidity of money wage rates 
that the distribution of resources under a 
tariff will approach more nearly those under Free 
Trade to what it would be under Free Trade given 
the fluidity of money wages. Free Trade is, in 
fact, part of a general system of bringing about 
an advantageous equilibrium by the free play of 
forces. We cannot therefore allow our economic 
system to be rigid in certain respects and yet 
expect the same result from Free Trade as in a 
fluid system. The case for Free Trade would be 
immensely strengthened if all the other numerous 
restrictions on mobility and fluidity were to be 
removed at the same time". (2 ) 12
(1) CAB 58 150 E (9).
(2) CAB 58 15 0  E (3 9 ).
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Safeguarding was considered audit was argued that a case existed for 
giving protection to iron and steel provided reorganization went 
ahead.
Pigou could not go along with the whole of this part of the report 
and eventually added many dissenting statements. Robbins who until 
shortly before the final version felt unclear as to what the 
committees' views were on certain salient matters, was not willing to 
sign the report. Keynes consulted Hanley , Secretary to the Cabinet, 
about the precedents involved in producing a minority report of-one 
member of a committee. Robbins soon found many precedents and 
insisted on submitting a report giving his own views ^ .
The majority report was finally agreed on 23rd October, hardly in time 
for consideration by the Government before the assembly of 
Parliament^ but only three days later than the target date set by Keynes 
in September. •
The Report
The report began with a discussion of the causes of the depression. 
These were considered to be international problems: the adjustment 
after the war; the changes in the demand for exports; the political 
problems in Europe; the restoration of the gold standard and tariff 
policies of other countries. As far as the internal problems were 
concerned, the report dwelt upon the rigidities and internal mal­
practices reflecting Robbins'S strong views on these issues. Falling 
prices and the effects of large changes in the value of money were (l)
(l) Robbins, Personal Communication. 1976.
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discussed. A critical phase in the world depression was thought to 
be approaching. If, during this phase, other manufacturing countries 
cut their costs of production drastically, Britain would be forced to' 
follow suit:
"But it would be a far better way out for
everyone if the route back towards equilibrium
was not sought in this direction, but rather
by raising the prices of staple commodities so
as to make wage cuts less necessary. We think
that the most strenuous effort should be made
for international co-operation to this end,
precisely because, failing such an effort, we
•fear that a w a g e .cutting campaign amongst the
leading industrial countries is a real possibility
and may prove a serious menace to social stability", (l)
The possibility of wage cuts was examined but no evidence was produced 
to estimate the relationship between wage reductions and an increase 
in employment. Though it was thought that a cut in money wages of 10% 
would leave real wages somewhat higher than in 19 2 -^, the problems of 
equity involved in wage cuts was considered and a scheme which would 
include money incomes generally, including those of the rentier, was 
recommended. This involved a sort of social contract which Keynes had 
in fact been advocating since the resumption of the gold standard in 
1926 and had reiterated in his discussions with the Macmillan Committee 
As an alternative to wage cuts, wage subsidies were considered. The 
practical difficulties in implementation were thought to be great and 
whilst Pigou, Keynes and Stamp thought the problems could be overcome, 
Henderson did not. 12
( 2)
(1) CAB 2*+ 2 16 ; CP 358 (3 0 ).
(2 ) See Chapter Three above p. 2 1 3
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Concerted action by the central banks of Britain and America was 
recommended to ease the terms for short-term credit and support loans 
to South America, Austria, China and other countries in difficulties,' 
bo as to avoid any further currency catastroph~.es.
Bings, monopolies, trade unions and the unemployment insurance fund 
were attacked for.causing rigidities in the internal economy making' 
adjustment more difficult. Ways of increasing efficiency were also 
considered but not much was expected from the reconstruction process 
which was regarded as being concerned more with orderly contraction 
than with efficiency.
A further section considered ways of increasing business confidence 
which it was thought could only be achieved in the long-run by 
increased profits. Ways of increasing home investment were mentioned, 
cheap credit was essential for this purpose and although the recent 
government manoeuvres had reduced short-term rates, action was needed 
to reduce the long-term rates. Regulation0 of foreign issues was - 
discussed but thought to be ineffective and open to abuse. A public 
works policy was advocated though schemes were to satisfy certain 
criteria if they were to be acceptable. The criteria were those 
referred to above, set out by Bobbins in his memorandum to the Committee.
The case for protection was examined in great detail and the case for 
free trade was demonstrated to be invalid in conditions of abnormal 
unemployment.
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"In the present conditions the imposition of \
reasonably devised protective duties (though j
one of us, Professor Pigou, thinks they i
would be hard to devise) that should exclude I
a substantial portion of the imports that now
compete with our home industries would, for j
some time to come, directly increase the :
aggregate volume of employment in this country ;
and by so doing would set up repercussions 
through the savings on the unemployment benefit
and so on would by indirect processes increase ;
it still further. The gain would probably be ^
associated with some increases in the cost of j
living and a corresponding reduction in real wages j
and in the value of money incomes generally; but j
since the main alternative remedy for unemployment - |
a reduction of money wages - must also involve an
equal or greater reduction in real wages this i
consideration is not of great weight. The important j
question is to decide whether the effect would be 
great or small", (l)
Except for Professor Pigou who thought that the advantages were likely 
to be small the other members of the committee were hopeful about 
the effects of a tariff. The pros and the cons of protection and the 
different forms of protection were examined in great detail with the 
disagreements amongst the four signatories clearly stated.
Devaluation was also considered but not recommended because of the 
effect on international credit?
"... we should not put out of our minds
the possibility that it may become necessary |
in the future for a number of countries to . i:
join together in making drastic changes in j
our international currency system which is j
serving us so ill". (2 )
(1 ) ibid.
(2) ibid.
1
1
j
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Attached to this report was Robbins'$ statement. He agreed with the 
early parts of the report which discussed the diagnosis of the 
problem - he had in fact redrafted much of this section - but found • 
the remainder of the report dwelt disproportionately upon measures 
which were neither practical nor desirable. His statement continues 
in a high moral tone on rings, monopolies, restrictions on foreign 
lending and wage subsidies all of which he deplored. Public works 
were given a conditional blessing being thought to cause waste and 
mal-distribution. On free trade he was adamant. Tariffs were an' 
expedient for avoiding effects on money wages by reducing real wages 
and if this could not be done by ^calm straight forward reasoning*, 
he did not feel it should be done by indirect means.
"A tariff is an affirmation of separatism, 
a refusal to co-operate, a declaration of 
rivalry...
If we tax Danish bacon, it is concievable 
that for a time we may raise some little 
revenue not at the cost of the English . 
consumer but at the cost of the standard 
of life of the Danish peasant producer. To 
some of my fellow countrymen this may appear 
desirable. To others it may appear mean and 
despicable", (l)
Reception of the Report
The report did not prove very helpful. The group were economists 
amongst economists holding firmly and even pedantically to the finer 
points of doctrine. Keynes, as always, was pragmatic about the policy 
issues, being able to manipulate all the policy variables and to 
suggest alternative strategies for achieving some recovery. He must 
have hoped to convince his colleagues of the soundness of his policies (l)
(l) ibid.
315
but instead he appeared to have been occupied for the most part with 
keeping the peace and ensuring that the discussions continued. The 
final report contained more of his colleagues' idiosyncracies than 
his own. The report, hedged with academic provisos, was the very last 
kind of report that MacDonald needed. The group failed to put forward 
any policy proposals which were capable of being carried out 
confidently by the bewildered executive.
(1)On November 7th, the Economic Advisory Council considered the report 
Bevin immediately reacted very strongly to the parts referring to 
trade unions and Lewis protested against the accusation that industry 
was behaving anti-socially. The politicians and the industrialists 
were not able to evaluate the relevance of the finer points of the 
academic debate and as nothing new was suggested, one by one, the 
possible remedies were examined and discussed in the familiar way. 
International co-operation was thought to have a bad effect on 
confidence if initiated by Britain. Devaluation was thought to be 
disastrous for international confidence. Cuts in money wages, even 
when part of a general reduction in money incomes were considered i n ­
equitable. Tariffs, too, were unfair and rationalization was thought 
unlikely to make much impact on the problem. MacDonald, however, said 
that if it did not proceed on a voluntary basis he would take
i
compulsory powers to implement the programme. ^
remedy that the economists were agreed could do little to achieve 
reduction in unemployment but it was' the policy upon which the L&bour • • 
Government placed a great deal of faith; partly because its- (l)
(l) CAB ^8 2,9th Meeting.•
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sympathy, and support lay largely amongst the (would be) workers in these 
industries. The experts had failed to provide a solution to the (
governments policy dilemma.
Policy Under Attack
Meanwhile the Government had to face a stormy House of Commons when 
presenting their programme for the session. There was a very grim 
reception for the proposals.
"In every quarter of the House the contents of 
the programme have been received with the contempt 
which belongs to such a cart load of political rags 
• . and bones” . (l)
It had been hoped that following the discussions with the Liberal 
Party and Mosley's speech at the Party Conference, some new initiatives 
would have been made. MacDonald was also hoping for these to come 
from the deliberations of the economists. But there was nothing.
Oliver Stanley thought,
"Government went through the whole 65 points in 
Labour and the Nation and left out the five which 
really mattered there were, "many old
friends trotted out which spent j>6k days in pigeon 
holes of the Ministers and came out on one day to 
take a bow and receive few melLifLuous compliments 
from the Prime Minister". (2 ) 12
(1) Hansard 4th November, 1930, Frank Owen, Vdl* 1 C.0 1,7 7 3 ,
(2 ) ibid.. Oliver Stanley j v/*i. *<*«4 col. îl.
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T h e  D a i l y  H e r a l d  was fairly pleased with the King's speech but The 
M e w  S t a t e s m a n  was cool. The Tory press were preoccupied with the 
issue of 'protection' and 'abuse* of the insurance fund
Problems in agriculture and trade in general led to strong industrial 
and political pressure for protection. This pressure had some support 
from Keynes, Stamp and Henderson but was confounded by the free traders 
in the Cabinet. The whole issue led to fierce debates in Cabinet which 
were brought to a head during the Imperial Conference in the autumn and 
not resolved. 'There were angry debates in the House of Commons where 
the Conservatives announced their plans for protection:
"We are ready to put into immediate operation 
a plan which I might describe in a sentence as 
immediate protection in one form or another; 
by some method or another of the home markets". (2)
ym
In the midst of this growing body of discontent, Mosley produced his
Manifesto which had been narrowly defeated at' the Party Conference in
(3)October. A number of disgruntled M.P.'s signed it • The New 123
(1) New Statesman .8th, 15th, November, Daily Herald 29th October, 
The Economist ist Noy ember.'
(2) Hansard. *rth November 193°* v'dll-¿2kk-. 6öi-.S508. Chamberlain.
(3) Skidelsky (1975) op.cit. p. 239*
The signatories included: Oliver Baldwin, Joseph Batey, Aneurin 
Bevan, W.J. Brown, William Cove, Robert Forgan, James Horrabin, 
James Lovat Fraser, John McShane, John McGovern, Sydney Markham, 
Cynthia Mosley, Oswald Mosley, Henry Muggeridge, Morgan Philips. 
Price, C.J. Simmonds and John S t r a  chey.
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Statesman commented:
"The Tories of course like the protectionism 
in it, but dislike the Socialism. The 
Liberals dislike both. I.L.P. think it smells 
too little of Socialism and too much of 
Imperialism, and Mr Maxton has found himself 
in the unusual position of having to administer 
a disciplinary talk to his members who put their 
signatures to the document. The Labour Party 
is divided on the issues of tariffs and Empire 
but it will be pretty well united in its 
opposition to the National Government of five 
Ministers without portfolio, and will have ample 
support for this from the other parties", (l)
This view was fairly typical of the left wing press who feared a 
coalition. Letters appeared in The Times in, support of the Manifesto 
from Macmillan and Boothby and others, and the right wing press mij.dly 
applauded its spirit.
By December the predominant hopes for the unemployment policy lay in 
the development of a regional policy and the belief that the bad 
conditions in other countries, particularly in the U.S.A., during the 
vinter would hasten the movement towards international cooperation.
On matters of maintenance of the unemployed,the stalemate which had 
existed since the Labour Party took office was continued by the setting 
up of a Royal Commission to examine the UnemplQyment Insurance Fund.
No action was possible until the Commission reported and so the 
problems of the 'transitional1 benefits, the 'able-bodied' unemployed, 
supported by the poor law authorities and the question of 'abuses' 
remained.
(1) New Statesman. 13th December 1930*
Major Policy Strategies 
Public Works
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Public works, as we saw in Chapter One, were part of the Labour Party's 
strategy for dealing with unemployment but no powerful expansionary 
effects were anticipated. The scheme relied upon applications coming 
from local authorities and public utility companies., Scant progress 
had been made in spite of efforts by Mosley to 'ginger up' the local . 
authorities in the autumn of 1929* (See Chapter Two above.) Attempts 
to formulate national schemes had been abandoned in November 1929 
but were revived during the discussion of the Mosley Memorandum and 
the opening up of all options by MacDonald in the Summer of 1930*
With the deepening of the world depression the cyclical component of 
the unemployment problem was apparent once again. In the Summer of 
1930 a great effort was made to accelerate and expand the public works 
programme which was seen as being essentially an anti-cyclical policy.
(.See discussion of Panel of Ministers above . p.2?i)
The inappropriate use of public works in the past to deal with structural 
problems was blamed for the failure to get a vigorous programme underway.
"It would seem that too much reliance has been 
placed on the provision of temporary work as a 
remedy for unemployment which it is now clear 
was not due to temporary depression of a cyclical 
character". (l)
(1) CAB 27 ^39; UP 30 (1 1).
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Economists and Public Works
The public works programme, as such, had the support of the economists' 
committee which stated in its report, discussed above, that in the _ . 
prevailing conditions:
"the policy of public works is in principle a 
sound policy.for the state to pursue". (l)
This approval was qualified by certain conditions: public works should 
be useful, productive, speedy to implement, lead to no demobilisation 
problems and be an acceleration of existing programmes. Little 
attention was given to the problems of carrying out the policy or to 
the lag structure involved. The idea that such activities might be 
merely diversionary was denied and stress was placed on the possible 
secondary employment which was likely to result from such activities. 
Kalin's multiplier with its numerical estimations of the repercussions, 
including the concept of the limit, was not included in the Report, 
probably because the, concept at this stage of its development was far 
from being acceptable to or even understood by all members of the
(p)committee . The Committee was sceptical of the possibility of a 
public works programme being sufficient to outweigh the effects of the 
world slump. The scepticism was justified if Thomas's estimations 
are correct 123
(1) CAB 2k 216; CP 363 (30).
(2) Howson and Winch (1977), op.cit., confirm this interpretation.
(3 ) Thomas (1975)» op.cit.
3 2 1  .
Public Works as part of Industrial Strategy
Suggestions were made to direct the public works' policy towards 
industrial investment as part of an attempt to get a more compre­
hensive industrial strategy adopted with more planning and control 
of industrial and geographical developments. It lay§ less emphasis upon 
the depressed industries and more on positive development.
After seeing the relevant documents of the Conference of Ministers 
in May,, Henderson produced a memorandum challenging the policy and 
indicating a change of heart since his earlier support of the public 
works programme of the Liberals.
"I have formed a definite opinion that only 
the most meagre results can follow from the 
attempts to expedite schemes of work by 
Local Authorities and the proposed conference 
of Local Authorities is likely to prove 
disappointing ... the only promising field 
for schemes of capital expenditure which has 
not yet been fully explored or exhausted is 
industrial reconstruction", (l)
He suggested the establishment of a special Industrial Reorganization 
Fund, administered by the Lord Privy Seal, financed by the proceeds 
of a tariff. The scheme was to provide a grant from the government to 
any authority willing to accelerate a scheme which had been sanctioned 
by the Bankers Industrial Development Corporation.
Attlee also wanted a public works programme geared to industrial 
development. 1
(1) CAB 2b 212; CP 19 6 (3 0).
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"The underlying economic principles on which 
we should be working would be the utilization 
of a period of slack trade to re-equip our­
selves fer more efficient production in 
future", (l)
He hoped that about 0^0,000 men could be employed on vital works of 
industrial re-equipment. His_ concept of public works was very much
that traditionally held by the Labour Party; .an anti-cyclical device.
Progress of the Schemes
The Conference of Ministers deliberating on unemployment policy after
the Mosley debacle had suggested that a conference should be called
of representatives from local authorities in an attempt to see what
(2)could be done to make the policy more effective . This recommen­
dation was endorsed by the Cabinet and a conference was called on 
June 17th. On the agenda were: the speeding up of work in progress 
and work not yet begun; the examination of the possible expansion of 
the existing road programme and consideration of the ways in which 
the administrative process could be improved.
At the first meeting of the Panel of Ministers, a report on the
(3)Conference of Local Authorities was presented by the secretariate 
In this it was urged that powers for compulsory purchase of land should 
be extended to give local authorities powers similar to those which 
they had for housing land; removing their obligations to arrange local 123
(1) CAB 2h 21k; CP 283 (30).
(2) .CAB 23 6k 31 (30); CP 193 (30).
(3) CAB 27 3^8; UP 30 (1 ).
- It
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plebiscites before presenting a local bill and suggesting procedural 
changes.
The conditions of transfer were still causing problems because of the 
unpopularity of introducing men from outside into an area where local 
men were unemployed as was increasingly the case as the depression 
deepened. These schemes were unpopular with the unions local 
authorities and the receiving communities. Yet the authorities were 
in need of the higher grant which accompanied the transfer conditions. 
The policy of transfer had some support from a few representatives of 
local authorities in depressed areas who felt that the more prosperous 
regions should make some contributions to the problem. The Minister 
of Labour, always a staunch supporter of the policy, now stressed its 
importance in securing jobs for persons leaving the Ministry's Training 
Centres.
The secretariate of the Panel of Ministers interpreted the objections
to transfer as being largely an expression of a demand for improved
.. . (1)grants and made some suggestions to improve the terms The Panel
of Ministers, however, saw the transfer conditions as a major obstacle
to the public works policy and asked the Cabinet to abandon the scheme.
It also suggested that the improved terms associated with transfer
schemes should be given, for a limited period, to authorities willing
(2)to accelerate their programme 12
(1) CAB 27 b39; UP 30 (1).
(2) CAB 27 3^8; UP 2nd meeting.
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The problems of the depressed areas were also discussed and it was
reported that local authorities were too financially constrained to
provide relief works; rates were already high and councils had many • '
debts owing to them and by them. The Lord Mayor’s Fund had given
some help in the past but was no longer in operation. The Prime Minister
had had many appeals for help A modest grant of £.5 million was
available for the provision of works in these areas, the sum for ,  ^'/f 1 / , . ' V
which Greenwood had pleaded the previous Christmas,(see Chapter Two
above).
As soon as the Cabinet had agreed to the proposals work began on 
drafting the Public Work Facilities Bill to enable legislation to be 
passed before the recess. This was necessary if any progress was to 
be made before the Winter. Budgets of local authorities for the coming 
twelve months would be finalised in the next two months and any pro­
gramme not included would be postponed for a year. The Prime Minister 
said that the House would have to remain in session until 9th August 
if necessary to facilitate the passage of the Bill.
The Bill removed the requirement for private bills to sanction works 
schemes and substituted a departmental order. Previously all works 
had to be submitted each year by 17th December. This -deadline caused 
considerable delay in the programme. The Bill also gave local 
authorities the power to acquire land much more easily.
Cl) cab 27 *f39; up (30) 2k.
A thorough examination of the progress of the various schemes was 
undertaken during the Summer and regular reports of schemes approved 
were made to the Panel of Ministers. The value of approved schemes 
in November 193^  was £lV7-3 million compared with £^ 8.1 million in 
November 1929» So some progress was made.
•Hartshorn had assumed his new office under the impression that the 
public works programme was not large enough but after
''fully examining the position I am satisfied 
that not much more is possible than is actually 
. being done", (l)
The Liberals
Lloyd George as part of the co-operative effort had agreed to supply 
copies of the data upon which the Liberal Party policy was based.
These documents were scrutinized by the civil servants and pronounced 
of doubtful value. The data waee often wrong and there was a tendency 
to disregard matters of importance. Humphreys, who had been respon­
sible for the estimates of the road programme,said that he had under­
taken the survey in three weeks using data which ware already sub- . 
stantially out of date. He appeared to agree with the officials that 
the survey was inadequate and that it was probably impossible to spend 
£1^ 5 million in two years . Hartshorn reported that Lloyd George 
had himself agreed that the Government's road programme encompassed 12
(1) CAB 2b 21b; CP 293 (30)*
(2) CAB 27 3^9; UP 25 (30).
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his own . The differences revolved around the width of road; the 
amount of work done in the ordinary course of maintenance; the feasi­
bility of reconstructing sections of roads and bridges without severely 
disrupting traffic flows; as well as administrative matters of
implementation. This did not preclude the schemes being included in
(2)the Liberal Policy initiative in the Autumn
Lloyd George was not impressed by the programme. In his memorandum 
to the Prime Minister in October, he commented:
"It earlybecame clear that the main differences 
concerned not the principle of our proposals 
but the execution.of them. The government 
machinery seemed to be jogging along at a normal 
pace and to be incapable of removing or surmount­
ing the obstacles which invariably present them­
selves in the way of vigorous and progressive 
action ... Broadly speaking, it was our view 
that road development could be carried through 
in two years where the government allowed five 
years. J.The difference from the point of view 
of unemployment is enormous. While the Govern­
ment programmes will provide work for not many 
more than 100,000 men a year during the next two 
years our proposals, including district roads 
and bridges provide work for 350,000 men a year 
,.. Even the programme which now seems to be 
contemplated will only be carried through if 
there is far greater concentration of energy 
and resources than seems to have been hitherto 
applied and if there is clear recognition that 
the urgency of the probiea squire that machinery and 
personnel should be organized on an emergency 
basis". (3 ) 123
(1) GAB 2b 21 *t; CP 293 (30).
(2) Liberal Policy, How to tackle unemployment (1930)*
(3) CAB 27 A39 UP 27(30)
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His views on the function of the public works programme approximated 
more to the views of Attlee than Keynes in spite of his earlier con­
version.
"The proper remedy for cyclical depression is an 
intensified and accelerated programme of 
national development and reconstruction so that 
those thrown out of work are given useful and 
healthy employment instead of being kept in idle­
ness and opportunity is seized to improve the 
national equipment, so that the country may be 
better prepared to take advantage of trade recovery 
when it comes". (l)
The Liberals went ahead and published much of the material in this
report in the form of a policy document on 'How to tackle unemployment?
(2 )and this document came under scrutiny of the Government . The speed 
with which the road programme could be implemented; the assumption 
that the regional plan provided a scheme of work and the advisability 
of raising a larger government loan was challenged. Bevan made a plea 
to the Government to finance to the full extent schemes in depressed 
areas. (This had also been advocated by Mosley). He thought such
financing was unlikely to undermine local democracy providing the
(3 )rate payers did not have to pay for national schemes . 123
(1) ibid.
(2) Liberal Party (1930)
(3 ) Hansard, f^th. November 1930/ Coli. yiC*?.
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Finance
Whilst there was general agreement that works of some kind should be 
undertaken, there was much less agreement about the financing of 
schemes. In July the Panel of Ministers produced a memorandum on the 
finance of public works specifying the conditions under which borrowing 
could legitimately be undertaken to facilitate public works schemes 
It was considered that public works were justified when the works were 
capable of yielding a money return sufficient to pay the interest and 
sinking fund on the loan; were largely for the benefit of subsequent 
generations and which could not be carried out without great cost to 
present ratepayers. Other types of expenditure which gave little 
prospect of actual benefit to future taxpayers should not be financed 
by-borrowing because the burden would simply be transferred from one 
generation to another.
It was thought that much of the new road works, the pre-war schemes 
of public building and naval reconstruction fell into this category. 
Lloyd George was still advocating a large loan programme in the Autumn
in the same policy document that recommended strict economies for
(2)public expenditure 12
(1) CAB 27 k39; UP 30 (2).
(2) Liberal Party (l93^ )» op.cit.
Individual Schemes
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Three large schemes concerning bridges over the Tay, Forth and Humber 
had been examined in cost-effectiveness studies constructed on.
the basis of statistics of traffic flows. The schemes for the 
Tay and Forth were thought not to be viable, especially as the local 
authorities concerned were unwilling to make more than a token con­
tribution to the costs. In spite of a rather impassioned appeal from 
the Secretary of State of Scotland, Scotland waited another thirty 
years for its road bridges on the east-coast route. The Humber scheme 
was thought to be a more reasonable investment which had received very
strong financial support from the local authority and it was agreed that
(?)it should go ahead .
•
The major canal project proposed was for a canal across Scotland, 
roughly from the Clyde to the Forth. A study was undertaken to 
investigate its potential^ «^The scheme was thought not even to justify 
a physical survey without which the costs could not be estimated 
accurately. The Secretary of State for Scotland fought this decision 
but there were environmental issues at stake and a general lack of 
support for the scheme. The Minister of Transport said of the scheme:
"I am satisfied that we should not cut a 
chasm across Scotland which would remain 
for all time as a memorial of ill-considered 
panic legislation and expose the principles 
of public ownership to unanswerable criticism" (*+) 123
(1) CAB 27 V59; UP 1*+ (30)
(2) Humber bridge is currently being constructed amid a certain amount 
of scepticism about its viability.
(3) CAB 27 '+39; UP 13 (30)
(*+) ibid
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A scheme for a London outer-circle goods railway was also examined.
The general managers of the railway companies concluded that the 
commercial possibilities of the proposed railways were not sufficient" 
to justify the expense involved the expected revenue only being
a quarter of that needed if the investment was to break even. The 
Government were not satisfied with the existing provision for goods 
traffic in London and asked for improvements, but would not intervene 
to support the scheme.
On the criteria adopted by the Government the Victoria line would
never have been built. One wonders what a more thorough cost-benefit
analysis might have indicated. They did agree to extend the provisions
of the Home Development Act to include transport and so give support
for improvements in the terminal facilities at railways and collieries
(2)to enable larger wagons to be used
The Minister of Transport reported in December that in spite of the 
improvement in the terms offered to docks and harbour authorities, 
by bringing them within the terms of the 1929 Development Act, there 
were no applications for grants which would fulfil the conditions 
regarding the acceleration of works. 12
(1) CAB 27 *09; UP 30 (12).
(2) CAB 27 *09; UP 30 (1 9 ).
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Reconstruction
Reconstruction policy, as the economists' committee of the Economic 
Advisory Council had pointed oui* by concentrating on the basic 
industries, had had more to do with the 'orderly contraction of 
industry' than with increasing productivity 1 its supposed aim being 
to restore British industry to a competitive basis. The relevance 
of such a strategy in view of the severe contraction which was taking 
place in world trade was not appreciated
The possible contribution of the policy towards the removal of unem­
ployment was by now extremely doubtful: it was much more likely to 
contribute to the problem than to remedy it in the short run. A more 
positive approach was needed and was advocated by Henderson, Hartshorn, 
Attlee, Stamp and Cole.
By-the Summer of 1930 the Economic Advisory Council's committee reports 
on iron and steel and cotton were available and the Coal Bill was 
making some progress. Finance was being organized by the Bankers 
Industrial Development Corporation: a body of bankers and industrialists 
gathered together by Thomas and Norman. Thomas was left in charge 
of these arrangements even after the re-organisation of the adminis­
trative structure for dealing with unemployment policy and the replace­
ment of Thomas by Hartshorn as the Lord Privy Seal. MacDonald had 
said that Thomas had inaugurated the scheme and should deal with the 
unfinished aspects of it.
(l) The Panel of Ministers had been convinced that it was the only policy 
to deal with Britain's 'special problem'.
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Later Thomas reported progress of the scheme and recommended that the 
work should be taken over by the President of the Board of Trade., 
When the report was considered by the Cabinet on 9th July, it was 
decided that the new Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Attlee, 
should be invited to make an ’immediate and intensive* study of what 
was wrong with British industry and suggest remedies. He was to be 
helped by a member of the secretariate of the Economic Advisory 
Council and was to have ministerial cooperation and access to the 
material of the Cabinet and the E.A.C.
Pegional Policy
One of Attlee's first taste for the Panel of Ministers was to produce 
a paper on the situation. Attlee did not take long to produce his 
paper: The Problems of British Industry It was ready by the
2*rth July. In it he stressed the point that rationalization of 
industry could not solve the problem and that the repercussions of 
rationalization and the utilization of social capital should be 
considered. For the first time a positive regional policy emerged.. 
This had become possible once the policy of transfer with emphasis on 
many workers had been abandoned. Attlee stressed the geographical 
counterpart of industrial transformation and complained that:
"... development is taking place without plan 
or control from any outside agency. We are 
attempting to patch up the appalling defects 
created by the unplanned career of the last 
industrial revolution ... yet we are letting 
similar things happen". (2 ) ^ 12
(1) CAB Zb\ CP 233 (30).
(2 ) ibid.
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He suggested a Ministry of Industry, staffed by experts on labour, 
management, finance, transport, power, housing and town planning, 
to put 'ideas into action' and to 'control the nation's economic . - 
life'.
Attlee was asked to attend subsequent meetings of the Panel of Ministers
and expanded his views at a meeting ^ o n  30th October. He stressed
the point that reorganization alone was not sufficient and that it
(2)was likely to leave large areas derelict . Bevin was always worried 
by this problem and had produced a memorandum to the Economic Advisory 
Committee. He suggested that the Government should give financial 
assistance for reorganization to stimulate the establishment and control 
the location of new industry.
The Panel of Ministers considered the report in December. The 
Minister of Health discussed the problems of the maintenance of services; 
the Minister of Labour considered mobility in the labour markets and 
the President of the Board of Trade was concerned with the problems of 
directing industries to the regions. He rejected incentives as likely 
to be ineffective and uneconomic. The southern counties were preferred 12
(1) CAB 27 ^3 8 , 16th Meeting.
(2) Mosley had referred to regional problems but did not suggest a 
general policy; and Horace Wilson had made some desultory 
attempts to discover whether industry could be attracted to the 
depressed areas. (See Chapter Two above). The Liberals had also 
aspired to a regional policy which was scrutinized in the Winter 
19 3 0 / 3 1 hut it was felt to have little to offer in the short run. 
Hansard, November 1930. V©l. a cols.
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by manuf&c turers because of tbe consumer market * the private capital 
market; flexible labour .force and the amenities of life in the South 
East. It was not thought that the. older areas had much potential. . -
"Any attempt completely to turn the stream of 
industrial development back into the older 
industrial areas is not only doomed to failure 
but is probably fundamentally uneconomic". (1 )
The President of the Board of Trade was not the only one to have some 
doubts about the regional revitalisation. Thomas considered that the 
older areas were not suitable for new industries and Keynes was not 
able to go along with Attlee's plan for encouraging new industry for, 
whilst the depression continued, the problem . he said, was to raise 
demand. MacDonald raised the matter at the December meeting of the
E.A.C. when a section of the Committee of Economists' report 
entitled, I n e r t i n g  Industrial Efficiency^, was being
discussed. The Committee, whilst advocating rationalization did not 
consider it had any immediate potential for reducing unemployment.
w i n n i n g  to have doubts about the policy, said that MacDonald^who was beginn e,
' „ r a t i n g  problems in many areas and that rationaliza- rationalization was ere 6 r
tion in future should be carried out iron, the point of vie» of the 
interest- of' the work people and the state, as well as the interests
„ (5 > Thus the wider social costs and benefits of the employing company
4. lad- being recognized. MacDonald also referred of policies were at last oexng 123
(1) CAB 27 4¿9; UP 42 (30).
(2) CAB 58 2, 10th Meeting.
(3) ibid.
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to the problems which would emerge as the coal industry reorganization 
proceeded:
"pit after pit would be closed and that 
whole villages would be thrown out of 
employment. Would it be possible to 
organise somebody representing employers 
and men for dealing with the situation so
created?" (l)
Attlee lid not appear to understand the macro-economic aspects of 
the policy to which Keynes (2> referred but there doesjitt appear to be 
any reason why the regional policy could not have been encompassed 
within the public works programme except that it was still regarded as
a long term policy.
Lloyd George had advocated garden cities and satellite towns in the
pamphlet, ’How to tackle unemployment1 but the Government’s appraisal
of the Liberal scheme stated that little could be done in the short
/ _ \
. 1  -ni was not a scheme of workrun as a regional pian was i
(3)
ibid.
D. Winch, (19^8), op.cit., refers to Keynes's reluctance tn ^  • 
in the finer details of resource allocation and ° ,/rtrnersed
detailed industrial planning. Keynes had been very involv d 
in the miners' dispute and in the problems of the cotton 6
industry.
Committees were appaLrited to examine the points raised bv th 
Liberals in respect of garden cities and regional policy 6
See below Chapter Five.
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Industrial Policy
Henderson had recommended a scheme for the general reconstruction of 
industry This was to be an emergency measure financed from a - *
tariff. It was in fact an acceleration of schemes approved by the 
Bankers Industrial Development Corporation. If these schemes were 
undertaken rapidly, it was suggested that they should be eligible for 
a government grant. A similar scheme for agriculture was suggested to 
be financed by a tariff on cereal imports.
(2 )Hartshorn too recommended a more positive industrial policy making 
in which he included the development of new industry such as that 
designed to get ’oil from coal* 1 23. He also suggested that attention 
should be given to the constraints hampering industry such as fuel and 
transport problems and wanted consideration to be given to a
hire purchase scheme for industrial equipment. This would have been an 
important policy departure, but he did not press for fiscal assistance 
for investment. .
( 3 ) a b o it ^Attlee was scathing <£f existing schemes which he saw as the product 
of crisis management and lacking conscious direction of industrial, 
development. The coal-subsidy he considered was the worst instance of 
help being given to industry unconditionally in a way that was unlikely 
to correct what was wrong. Export credits and safeguarding were
2if
(1) CAB/212; CP 196 (30).
(2) CAB 2k 2lV, CP 293 (30)*
(3) CAB 2k 21k\ CP 283 (3 0 ).
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similarly derided as being -'essentially gifts to industrialists* with­
out the extraction of conditions for reforms. He wanted much more 
planning in the industrial sphere and, if necessary new machinery to ' 
deal with it. He complained of the administrative problems in 
implementing policy. One man should be in charge of developing export 
trades and the introduction of the reorganization of British industry 
including the planning of the 'nation's economic life*. For this 
purpose he suggested the Lord Privy Seal working under direction of 
the Cabinet. His main executive organ should be an Industrial 
Development Board consisting of an industrialist, a trade unionist, . 
a finance expert, an expert on transport and an accountant. The first 
function of the Board should be to invite schemes 'of reorganization 
from the more progressive men in each industry and failing this to 
develop schemes on its own responsibility. He suggested the old Trade. 
Facilities Act should be revised. The Board should, with Treasury's 
approval, be able to raise loans and issue stock. It should be given 
powers to demand amalgamations, organize selling agencies, direct the 
location of industry and employ transferred labour. Powers to 
investigate accounts should be given and the Board also should be able 
to direct the form of transport or power to be used.
Meanwhile the industrial policy for reconstruction of the major industries 
was getting under way on an ad hoc basis.
Individual Schemes ---
Cotton
The report on the cotton industry, produced by a committee of the 
Civil Research Committee later under the auspices of the Economic
338
Advisory Council, was ready in the early Summer Its recommenda­
tions for technical improvements and re-equipment, the formation of V
larger units and the extension of co-operative effort by the cotton 
traders organization,were discussed by the Cabinet. It was decided /
that the Government should take every step in their power to urge the 
employers and operatives in Lancashire of the importance of considering 
the possible means of reducing costs. Costs might be reduced by the 
introduction of short staple cotton and mixtures of cheaper cottons; 
the use of ring spindles and high draft spinning and high speed winding 
machinery, automatic and semi-automatic looms and the use of shift 
systems and amalgamations.
By September, the Home Secretary was reporting that there had been 
some progress towards cooperative effort but that progress on amal­
gamations and re-equipment was slower and that unless some progress vas 
made the Government should take greater powers..
Further attempts were made in October by Graham and Clynés who reported 
on their Manchester meeting in early November. By this time unrest in 
India was making matters worse: conditions were deteriorating rapidly 
and further falls in cotton prices were reported. The next visit to 
Manchester was even more disappointing although it was hoped not 
useless! It was thought that the 'age old individualism 1 of Lancashire 
was not easily converted. The trade was overwhelmed by adverse world 
conditions so that it was far from easy to see that the economies 
derived from reorganization would do anything to overcome the difficulties 
in world markets associated with the boycott; the unrest in China and
(1) CAB 2k 213; CP 208 (3 0 ).
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the cheap labour in Japan. The cotton industry, however, continued to 
decline throughout the next thirty years.
Iron and Steel
The report of the E.A.C. committee on Iron and steel indicated that no 
recovery could be expected until the costs of production were reduced 
to competitive levels (l). The first step was to be large regional 
amalgamations to secure the economies of mass production (for the units 
were very much smaller than those of Germany and the U.S.A.) and the 
allocation of orders to the plants best suited for them; to obtain 
finance to bring plants to the highest level of technical efficiency; and 
to evolve a national production and sales policy.
MacDonald convened a conference to discuss the proposals and on the 
9th July it was reported to the Cabinet that a scheme was being 
prepared.. This, however, soon ran into difficulties and the Cabinet 
was told that the representatives of the iron and steel industry were 
asking whether the Government would consider safeguarding . The
report had ruled out protection.
"Protection at the present time would we 
believe actually delay reforms that are 
urgently required, as it would lead to the 
maintenance of a number of plants not 
designed for efficient production or suit­
able for amalgamations". (2 )
(1) CAB 2* 2 12; OP 189 <3°>-
^2) ibid."The"industry had been attempting to get this aid si
Conservative Government was in office. See n~eee Chapter One above.
Only if reorganization failed to make the industry competitive would 
safeguarding be imperative. The Cabinet saw the industry s' requests
as an ultimat.um and threatened to replace the representatives of
the industry at the conference if they strayed from their terms of 
reference.
Other advice to the Government was not so adamant about safeguarding
for iron and steel. The majority of the Economists' Committee were in
favour of protection and Balfour asked for it to be considered in his
. .  ( 1 )letter on the economy in the Autumn
5kO
Coal Industry
The Coal Mines Bill was having great difficulties in its passage through
the House of Lords where'an amendment on the hours of work, held up
the Bill for two months until the Government agreed to '.spread over' of
^ a neriod to allow some flexibility. The Billthe reduced hours over a perxuu
. , . „„j it was claimed in the Autumn that the B m  hadbecame law in August and it was o *
hiisis which would enable it to promote marketing put the industry on a Dasxo
, n-rc-anize to deal with international problems on and sales policy and to orDaniz
I that of its competitors abroad, a footing more equal to that oi
Trade
 ^ trade was fervent. In the Cabinet it occurredThe debate about free
... +Vl- tariff truce, the Imperial Conference,'the m  connection with the
j 0icn in general discussions of unemployment agriculture policy and 1
(1) CAB 2b 216 i 33°
3kl
policy and budgetary problems. It also took place in the Economists’ 
Committee and in the meetings of the E.A.C. The debate was mostly 
emotional rather than rational. And in spite of much discussion on . • 
highly theoretical as well as practical matters* the disagreements 
remained. For many free trade was an article of political faith rather 
than a policy of instrument as the discussions during this period amply 
demonstrate. Free trade was part of an international stance which many 
felt it was immoral to abandon.
The Tariff Truce
On 6th August 19 3 0 , six Ministers met for a Cabinet meeting. They were 
MacDonald, Graham, Greenwood, Benn, Addison and Bondfield. Graham was 
asking for guidance about his reply to a circular from the League of 
Nations. He was embarrassed by the possibility of having to present 
Britain's case for non-ratification of the convention.
«It would be very difficult at the Assembly : 
rv-F tv,«* League of Nations to have to admit 
that the Government of the United Kingdom 
S d  not intend to ratify a convention which 
they themselves had been instrumental in pro- 
moting. Moreover, such an admission would 
bring to a standstill the forthcoming important 
7-io-Hnns for example, in regard to 
textiles and’machinery and would destroy the 
whole policy".
. . ■ „Mr)feA 0ut that from the point of view of agriculture ,Other Ministers poini a
, - 0r from the point of view of the Imperialand industry m  Britain o
„ . , . unwise to ratify the convention in September.Conference, it would oe
(1) CAB 23 6k, k9 (30); CP 28V 5  (30).
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Budgetary problems were also mentioned and it was thought that the 
ratification would preclude raising a tariff for revenue purposes and 
this might lead to further tax increases and have depressing effects ' 
on industry.
It was decided that Graham should point out that since the previous 
conference, the attitude of other countries towards Britain had not 
been in the spirit of the convention for:
"instances could be given to show that the 
trade of this country had been attacked by 
many means, not necessarily by increases in 
■ tariffs so much as by dumping, choosing this 
moment for taking advantage of ad valorem 
facilities". (l)
Graham was advised to ask for negotiations prior to ratification 
to ensure that other nations intended to act in the spirit of the con­
vention and a reply was drafted subject to the approval of the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer!
On 2nd September, this time with Snowden in the Chair in MacDonald's
(2)absence, the matter was reopened . Graham said that since the last 
meeting his anxiety about the decision had increased. He had received 
inquiries from Germany, Italy and other powers about Britain's 
intentions. He considered that Britain's position in Geneva would be 
quite untenable if it was decided not to ratify the convention. 
Ratification, he argued, would in no way embarrass the Government and 
as a change in fiscal policy could only be affected by the Budget
CD ibid
(2 ) CAB 23 65 50 (3 0 ).
in April, it was still possible by giving notice by the first of ' 
February to be free from obligation in time for the Budget. Ee did 
not give much weight to the argument that ratification would prejudice' 
the discussions at the Imperial Conference.
Of the members attending the meeting only three had also attended the 
August meeting. The Prime Minister and the Minister of Agriculture 
and Fisheries who had felt strongly on the issue were both absent but 
had sent messages supporting the earlier decision. Passfield who was 
at neither meeting had written in favour of ratification. Thomas was 
left to support the case for non-ratification at the meeting. He said 
tha>t practically every section of British trade and commerce was hostile 
to ratification; since the signing of the convention, many European 
powers had increased tariffs and from the British point of view he 
considered the damage had been done before ratification. He also felt 
strongly that there was a possibility of obtaining benefit from the 
Imperial Conference which would be jeopardised by ratification within 
weeks of conference. Shaw would have liked to see the matter postponed 
but failing postponement, he thought that the Government should ratify. 
Henderson came out in favour of ratification and felt that the Government 
should announce that there was no change in the traditional 'Free Trade 
Policy of the Labour Party 1
Snowden argued that once ratification had taken place, negotiations for 
reducing tariffs would begin. If on the other hand Britain did not
!
ratify, then the action would be taken to indicate a change in fiscal f 
policy and tariff wars would take place. He denied the relevance of 
the arguments against ratification on the basis of fiscal freedom for 
the Government to impose duties.
(l) ibid.
Obviously, whilst he was Chancellor, he had no intention of imposing 
tariffs for revenue purposes. He concluded his remarks by stating 
that the 'national honour was at stake_'_. On this rallying note the - ‘ 
Cabinet, by a majority, decided that the President of the Board of 
Trade should announce at Geneva that the British Government had decided 
to ratify before 1st November.
the Autumn of 1930 provided few possibilities
The Imperial Conference 
The Imperial Conference iu 
for improvements in the trading relationships given the Government's 
views on free trade. Ihomas and Graham, however, had pat in considerable 
effort to make it appear that the Government were interested in 
co-operation and had something to offer in exchange for the Dominions' 
agreement not to impose further tariffs on British goods. There 
were three issues' the possibility of a wheat quota! existing preferences 
«id improved machinery. Graham asked for Cabinet approval to make
4- matters hut was told to be non-commttal when thestatements about these matters
matters were being discussed. After much'soul searching, it was agreed 
that he should ask the Economic Committee to provide the pros and cons 
of a wheat quota. The matter of existing preferences remained and he
a i-uof Government should make a statement to the effect had suggested tnat uue
•«f0ntion of removing tariffs on the goods on which that they had no intention
iwondv eranted. He considered such a statement could preference was already s
•4- wrvvwpcipnted the position which the Government would 
easily be made as it rep
next few years because of the financial problems
have to accept for the
. „ nv. tariffs. The Secretary of State for the associated with removing the t a r m
s . 4-w D-pt from Cabinet an agreed statement on Dominions attempted to g
, . , rould take to the conference. In the Government policy which he
(1) CAB 23 65 , 63 , 6A and 65th Meetings October 1930.
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framework of this statement he left the portion relating to existing 
preferences blank and the Chancellor agreed to complete a draft of 
this part. This he did. He gave the histoiy of present tariffs, 
explained the present difficulties* but made it clear that the Government 
could not agree to abandon their policy for the remission of taxes 
on food if the financial situation changed; but explained that it was 
unlikely to be possible for some time. Thomas apparently said at the 
end of this Cabinet meeting that such remarks would make matters worse. 
Snowden reacted with a storm of petulant rage and a further Cabinet' 
meeting was held in the evening to sort the matter out. The Prime 
Minister and Henderson were obviously disgruntled by the re-emergence of a 
matter which they considered solved. Snowden was defending a matter 
of principle: budgetary autonomy
»it appeared that to get an agreement that would 
^.fy the Dominions we must give up something
S  neoule who have never given us anything, but,
ol t tfc o n ire -7 , l* “ tari£fs  ^ ainst “ S" ‘ ( l )
Thomas protested that benefits had been obtained from existing arrange-
t d th Prime Minister said that Britain was offering no more than
«them to say thank you* . Thomas and Graham was necessary to enao -----------------------
their difficulties. They had agreed withasked Snowden to appr
,  ^ all they wanted was a statement to say thathim about the wheat quota, j
unon which preference was granted and inhe would not remove t a r n
 ^ vp obtained from the Conference not to raisereturn an agreement could be o
„ -j. Graham then appealed to Snowden in terms thattariffs against Britain.
, , , „„ advance upon the path to free trade. It wasthe agreement wou-i-d e
, . - the ’Dominions wanted tariffs wea sort of tariff truce he said
« The revenue position he said was so clearwanted to gvnid them.•• •
(1) CAB 23 65» 65 (3°)*
that Snowden could easily make such a statement. Henderson appealed 
to Snowden, couldn't he make a concession? No he couldn't make bargains 
about the power to deal with taxation - he had, of course, argued the - * 
opposite case in the discussions of ratification of the tariff truce! 
Eventually, with the Prime Minister absent, Henderson and the others 
were able to placate Snowden and he agreed to make a statement softened 
slightly by adding two instead of three years to the period during 
which the Government would agree not to remove the tariffs. Just as 
.agreement appeared to have been reached, MacDonald returned and said he 
would prefer that the statement was not hedged by financial conditions. 
This threatened to reopen the whole issue but it was agreed to leave 
MacDonald and Snowden alone to arrive at a compromise. A crisis was 
avoided but the dissension on the matter of trade policy remained 
inside the Cabinet. I n  the House of Commons the Conservatives were 
meanwhile pressing for a protectionist policy and had stated their 
willingness to face the electorate on the issue.
"wg have tried economic internationalism 
pretty thoroughly for several years and 
it has landed us in a pretty mess and there 
is no indication at the present time that 
it is going to lead us in any thing else but 
a mess in the visible future. ...The home 
market is about the only asset we have left 
and we might as well use it for our own benefit 
and not for the benefit of every country in 
the world except our own", (l)
Commons in November. On the other hand there was also opposition to 
protection as a ‘repugnance* 1. Frank Owen, for example, accused Mosley of
protection in
Boothby, Mosley and others supported/ the debate in the House of
. OvJtrv i
(1) Hansard November ^th, 1930.
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"hiding behind the barbarity of economic 
isolation" adding "Birmingham was always 
distinguished for its extremism", (l)
Agricultural Policy
The differences in opinion on trade policy were also brought out in 
the formulation of agricultural policy. Many memoranda were spawned 
causing the Secretary of State for Scotland to remark in yet another 
memorandum
"If the production of memoranda upon British 
agriculture could have saved agriculture it 
would have been a highly prosperous industry 
• by this time". (2 )
An Economic Advisory Council Committee was set up to consider agriculture 
and this committee reported that they saw no reason that agriculture 
should be singled out for protection. Dumping was not thought to be 
a problem except for oats. Tariffs were a much more important factor.
The Minister of Agriculture was trying to make some progress on the 
quota scheme and Import Boards as these were measures which were likely 
to help agriculture but fell short of protection. He did not meet 
with much success and his later plans for bulk purchase bought a further 
stronger memorandum from Snowden who asked ;What is the objective? Low 
prices for consumers or higher prices for producers? 1 He considered 
these objectives to be mutually exclusive. The reply was to the effect 
that the schemes were Labour Party policy aimed at reasonable stability 
and a fair price for the producer and to arrest the decline in culti­
vation and employment in addition to safeguarding the consumer against 
unfair prices. *2
(D ibid. \/olt 3 . l i k ; co 1 - l S O l l  .
(2) CAB 2k 21k 25k (30).
iKeynes by this time was supporting a policy of protection for 
agriculture because the industry was of strategic importance and should 
not be left to go under during a period of cyclical disturbance. But many 
members of the Government like the many members of the Economic Advisory 
Council were too doctrinaire in their approach to free trade to allow 
any such short term expedients to influence them. Some saw the problem 
not as a short term cyclical problem but as a reflection of the mal­
adjustment in the structure of British industry and as such any policy \
to ease the situation was likely to slow down the adjustment process 
by which it was felt that Britain would move towards those sectors of 
agriculture in which there was likely to be a comparative advantage - 
dairy farming was often quoted as ah example of \this.
i
Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
Lack of Fiscal Initiatives
Perhaps one of the outstanding puzzles of the period is the failure of 
the Government and its advisors to use fiscal policy to increase 
economic activity. This failure is partially explained by the dominance 
of the ideas of 'sound finance', implying a balanced budget, which 
became even more pronounced as the confidence problem emerged. There 
was scope for action even within the confines of a balanced budget,
but the concepts of compensatory finance were yet to be developed and 
could not be regarded as viable policy alternatives available to the 
Government at this time. (l).
(l)' Robbins (1.7 6) on. cit.pp 88/91» Winch(l969) oo.cit. 268/277-
3^9
Fiscal policies were suggested by Robbins and Stamp who advocated 
increases in indirect taxes as a way of balancing the budget: Stamp,
Keynes and Henderson advocated a revenue tariff and Robbins was bold 
enough to call for a less stringent sinking fund policy. Fiscal 
policies had been suggested by the Independent Labour Party as early 
as 1926 .
Keynes had pointed out that expansion could come as readily from a decrease 
in savings as an increase in investment and had even considered
the use of unemployment benefits in this respect. He failed to pick 
up these ideas and apply them to budgetary policy even when his pet 
schemes had little chance of being accepted. Without firm direction 
in this respect Snowden was able to begin the progress towards 
implementing the cuts in public expenditure which led to the break up 
of the Government in the Summer of 1931*
Cheap Money
The Government, the civil servants and the bankers were anxious to 
implement a cheap money policy which had become possible after the 
collapse of the speculative boom in the United States. In July the 
Panel of Ministers stressed the importance of this policy in a memorandum 
relating to the feasibility of raising large government loans to 
promote public works.
"The country at present in common with other 
countries in the world enjoys cheap money.
It is one of the few factors of hope and 
encouragement in the present situation". (2 ) 12
(1) Independent Labour Policy (19 26), op.cit.
(2 ) CAB 27 ^39; UP 30 (7 ).
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For this reason they did not support large loans and tried to ensure 
that loans which were undertaken had a sound financial basis. Snowden 
reiterated this position in his review of the Liberal Party proposals 
which he obviously found financially illogical. The possibility of debt 
conversion operations he considered were good provided they were not 
impeded by the adoption of ill advised expenditure proposals. Support 
for this policy also came from the Economists' Committee though it
was pointed out that although short term rates had fallen there had been 
little impact on long term rates which were considered to be more important 
for investment decisions.
Revenue Tariff
The use of a revenue tariff as a budgetary instrument was also advocated
during this period. The matter was raised by Henderson as a way of
financing an industrial programme.(see above page3 ^»^;/by some members
(3)of the Cabinet in August as a reason for not ratifying . ^  . Keynes
(k)considered it essential if the social programme was to be maintained-* « 4
and the Committee of Economists,v - OklbeiV with seme important provisos
from Pigou and Robbins commentedj favourably on the potential of a 
revenue tariff. Snowden rejected any notion that the budgetary problems
(5)
should be resolved by resorting to a revenue tariff. He felt so strongly 123*5
(1 ) CAB 2k 2 16 ; CP 363 (3 0 ).
(2) CAB 2k 212; CP 196 (30).
(3) CAB 23 6k; k3 (3 0 ). .
(*0 CAB 38 150; H (113).
(5) .CAB 2k 2 16 ; CP 363 (30).
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on the issue that its adoption would only have been feasible if he had 
been replaced as Chancellor of the Exchequer. His objections were 
centred upon the real wage issue about which he felt strongly as can be . 
seen from the debate and the Treasury memorandum quoted by Janeway
The Deficit
Budgetary problems he was prepared to admit. Budget deficits were 
already being predicted in July. The estimates for 195^ had indicated
à small surplus^£2*3 million but the estimates of the costs of transi­
tional benefits were wrong and a supplementary estimate of £7*5 million 
had to be added, in addition the conditions of trade were thought likely 
to affect receipts. Snowden fought to avoid further budgetary implica­
tions during the discussions on insurance benefits and in December, he 
was very averse to the Government's decisions to allow transitional 
arrangements to be extended to health benefits. The Liberals had, in 
their policy document, called for a review of public expenditure and 
severe reductions in it as well as 'reductions of taxation on enterprise1 23. 
Snowden said that he could not accept a 'Geddes Committee1
"If a reversal or modification of policy is 
also contemplated in directions such as 
these of social insurance, housing and education, 
then it is, in the Chancellor's submission 
inconceivable that the task of review should be 
entrusted to an outside body such as is proposed" (3)-
(1) CAB 23 65 50 (30).
(2 ) Janeway,(1 9 7 1), op.cit. p-
(3) CAB 2b 216; CP 392.
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Thus Snowden was to balance his budget, as far as he was able, by methods 
of his own choosing and without resorting to the aid of tariffs. His 
view was to be modified dramatically over the next three months which 
culminated the setting up of the May Committee.
The Supply of Labour
The Labour Party had been committed to reducing the supply of labour by 
operating on the activity rates of the population both as a social measure 
and as a way of reducing unemployment. This was to be done by reducing 
the number of persons entering employment,by postponing the school 
leaving age and by facilitating early retirement, by giving better 
pensions. It was also hoped to reduce the hours of work by implementing 
the recommendations of the Washington Convention. Migration both 
internal and external was to be encouraged.
These policies had not been very successful so far. Ironically the 
legislation relating to the terms upon which unemployment benefits were 
granted was at this time possibly increasing the number of registered 
unemployed by encouraging married women, short-time workers and 
seasonal workers to register'and so receive benefit when they might 
otherwise merely have retired from the labour market.
The retirement scheme had been shelved and the bill for the raising 
of the school leaving age was still not on the statute books being 
delayed because of tactics of the Liberals. The implementation of the 
Washington Convention was proving more difficult than had been con­
templated but in November, Margaret Bomfield asked Cabinet's permission 
to present her bill which it was hoped would enable Britain to ratify 
the convention.
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The migration policy was badly hit by the depression. Internally the
ending of the transfer conditions was a set back to those who hoped for
greater mobility; although most persons appeared to go of their own
accord and migration was contributing only to a very small extent in
the unemployment problem. Externally conditions in Australia and
later in Canada and the other Dominions were causing emigration to be
dramatically reduced. This is indicated in the memoranda submitted to
the Panel of Ministers in July 1930 Migration in the first half
(2)of 1930 appeared to be less than half of that of 1929
In response to those in the party who believed so ardently in the policy, 
a sub-committee of the Economic Advisory Council was set up in the 
summer of 1930 to consider the question of migration from the United 
Kingdom to overseas parts of the Empire both in the short term and in the 
long term. This sub-committee which consisted of Carr-Saunders, Cole, 
Aston, Ellis and Turner concluded that,
"In the interests of all parts of the Empire, 
migration policy should be directed towards 
securing a redistribution of the white population 
within the Empire; and should be so framed as 
to encourage and develop the mobility of labour 
and indeed the free movement of population generally.
Economic difficulties of the present time are 
such as to render impracticable any immediate 
extension of migration. The most that can be done 
is to take advantage of such opportunities as offer 
for assisting the migration of persons following 
occupations for which even in the circumstances of 
the moment there are openings in the Dominions.
When the present difficulties have passed a reason­
able expenditure of public funds by His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom on migration to 
the Empire is desirable". (3 )
\ 1*3
(1 ) CAB 27 bj>9 UP 8 (30)
(2) Drummond (197*0 op. cit.
(3) CAB 2k 216. CP 329 (30)
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Lansbury ^  still had some hopes of migration policy and in one of his
periodic memorandum on unemployment policy he referred to the Passmore
scheme for colonizing Australia and ' reconditioning1 2 of land was mentioned
(2)m  the King's speech . But with the report of the committee any hopes
of migration as a short term remedy for unemployment must have been 
dashed.
Alleviation of Distress
Insurance Fund
The conflicting policy objectives of the Labour administration were 
apparent in their management of the unemployment insurance fund. There 
is no doubt that they were committed to the 'adequate' maintenance of 
the unemployed in spite of their puritanical obsession with the 
so-called 'abuses' but they also believed that the insurance scheme should 
be placed on a sound actuarial basis and accepted the view that the 
budget should be balanced;in a deep depression these policies were 
incompatible.
The possibility of reconciling these objectives was remote. At the end 
of May average unemployment had reached Vj°/o\ kj>% of the unemployed 
were men between the ages of 25-^5 i*e. the group who were most likely 
to have dependents; and 8% of this group had been unemployed for more 
than a year. By October the Minister was reporting that the debt of the 
fund was increasing at £56 million per annumj contributions from employers 
and employees were £30 million per annum; the cost of the ordinary
(1) CAB 2k 216; CP 39O (30).
(2) CAB 23 6 5; 62 (30).
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benefit paid was £77 million per annum and in addition to this £?.l 
million per annum was paid by the Exchequer under the transitional 
arrangements to persons who did not fulfil the contribution requirement.' 
The real value of the rate of benefit was increasing as the cost of 
living fell. The comparative rate for a married man with two children 
was 27/- in 192^ and had risen to J>0/- in 19 3 0 ; meanwhile the cost of 
living index had fallen from 70 to 55
Snowden was getting restive. In a letter submitted to a meeting of 
the Panel of Ministers he said that anxiety to make adequate provision 
for the unemployed had led them to ’overshoot the mark* and had caused 
them to undermine the whole structure of the scheme. He complained 
that the transfer of the cost of transitional payments to the Exchequer 
had placed upon it an almost unbearable burden which in addition to the 
provision of the £3 million for the implementation of the raising of 
the school leaving age and for the agricultural policy, was likely to 
ensure an increase in tax in the next budget with adverse effects on 
psychology and confidence.
Abuses
The transitional payments continued to be the central problem confronting 
the fund but since the passing of the new act other 'abuses' were causing 
much anger and resentment. These were:
a) the payments made to seasonal workers - 
persons who would normally be employed 
for part of the year only; _ * 1
(1) CAB 2k; CP 318 (30) .
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b) the payments made to persons on short-time 
work - firms were organising short-time 
working in such a way as to ensure that their 
employees could benefit from the unemployment 
insurance fund on the days on which they were 
not employed;
c) the payments made to married women - many of 
whom it was thought were not genuinely 
seeking work.
These groups were what might be referred to as secondary workers who 
might have drifted from the labour market had it not been for the 
conditions associated with the granting of insurance benefits. There 
was no suggestion that anyone was obtaining benefits frauc^ently but that 
the Act was being interpreted in such a way as to allow benefits to be 
paid in circumstances in which they were not intended. Some of the 
claimants were, quite reasonably, maximising their claims on the fund.
But this was regarded in the sombre political climate of the day as 
an effrontery which could not be tolerated. The evidence was largely 
anecdotal but some attempts were made to establish hard evidence of 
abuse In July there was an inquiry into the number of married women
seeking benefit-although the numbers had increased since the 19 3^ Act 
so had unemployment, especially in the cotton industry and so the evidence 
was difficult to interpret. On the problem of seasonal workers, evidence 
was even more difficult to obtain and.they had to resort to the case of 
a 'Kipperer' in Northern Scotland. It was thought that employers and 
employees alike were taking full advantage of the benefit rules by so 1
(1 ) Hansard 29th October 1930* Hartshorn said he had been in close 
"touch with the Minister of Labour since the Summer and every case 
of alleged abuse had been checked. He had been amazed at the very 
small amount of evidence. The Press were mounting a campaign 
against abuses in November. Vof. A«***- c*/. i07.
adjusting their work as to maximise benefit. Garforth Collieries and 
the London Furnishing Trades were mentioned as operating such schemes 
to make up for loss of wages and also, to avoid discharges ^
The Debate
Discussions about the problems of the unemployment insurance fund were 
endless. The matters were raised in the Cabinet, in the Panel of 
Ministers and in the Economic Advisory Council and they were also 
considered by three sub-committees. In July, when the Minister of Labour 
was requesting an increase in borrowing powers, Cabinet asked for 
details of transitional benefits and the benefits paid to married women. 
Some of this material was provided in memoranda and presented to the 
Cabinet meeting at which it was decided to refer the matter to a special 
sub-committee of the Panel of Ministers. The Panel of Ministers 
discussed the matter on the 17th July and considered the report of the 
sub-committee, The report said that two inquiries were necessary: one 
to consider transitional payments and another to consider the scheme as 
a whole. In deciding the form which the inquiries were to take,it was 
felt that speed and the avoidance of party political controversy were 
essential. Speed was thought to rule out a Royal Commission and also a 
select committee, which could not meet during the recess. The Prime 
Minister suggested a committee composed of ministerial representatives 
and two representatives from each of the opposition parties. On the 
wider issue, the Prime Minister thought that the only appropriate body 
was a Royal Commission. 1
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(1 ) CAB 27 k39
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All Party Conference
The three party conference was part of the general efforts to secure 
greater co-operation amongst the parties. The committee met for the 
first time on 28th July. The Government representatives wereBondfield, 
Greenwood and Hartshorn. Elliot and Betterton represented the Conservatives 
and Brown and Foot the Liberals The Minister of Labour explained
the terms of reference to the committee. It was to consider the 
situation of the fund and to come to agreement about the way the problems 
should be dealt with but it was not to get involved in matters of 
national policy of a controversial character. If the transitional scheme 
was not to be merely extended any changes recommended would need to be 
presented in a bill before Christmas. After discussion of the problem, 
the committee were inclined to the view that transitional benefits should 
not be continued; that merely ending them was not feasible and so an 
intermediate scheme appeared to be necessary.
In the Committee, the Conservatives had been pressing the view that the 
fund should be made to balance by relating benefits to the cost of 
living; reducing the abuses .chargeable to the fund and to transfer the 
rest to the Exchequer. News of this suggestion reached Snowden:
"My Dear Margaret,
I am greatly perturbed about your three 
party committee on Unemployment. As far as I 
can understand from the minutes of the second 
meeting you seem to be moving in the direction 
of restoring the solvency of the fund by simply 
transferring to the Exchequer the margin by which 
its income fails to cover its expenditure.
My position is this there can be no question 
of the Exchequer assuming an increased liability 
for Unemployment Insurance". (2 ) 12
(1) CAB 21 325.
(2 ) ibid.
359
The Minister replied quite forthrightly that the major cause of worry 
was not the abuses but the high unemployment and that their problem 
was what action was possible, given' party policy ■ that no part of 
the cost could be thrown on the rates and that the contributions could 
not be raised?
On 10th October, Margaret Bondfield reported that, although she could 
not be precise about the suggestions the committee would ultimately make, 
she believed that there was an agreement about the need for a review of 
the able-bodied unemployed which probably should be by a Royal C o m m i s s i o n ^ . 
On other problems, she reported there was no agreement. Progress was 
rather slower than was hoped for given the position of the fund. The 
borrowing powers would have to be increased beyond the existing limit of 
£60 million which would be exceeded in January. This was the only policy 
available unless contributions were increased or benefits reduced. At 
this point she examined tentatively, in a footnote, the possibilities 
involved in such changes and the justification for them. The reduction 
of benefit was the most direct and probably most effective way of 
reducing expenditure. Justification of the reduction could be made in 
terms of the financial position of the fund and the country as well as 
by reference to the increasing real value of benefits since 192^. A 
reduction of 2/- would result in a saving of £9 million per annum.
"Any reduction would, of course, be criticised 
as reactionary and the political difficulties 
are formidable unless there can be agreement 
between the three parties". (2 ) 12
(1) CAB 2 16 . CP 3 18  (3 0 )
(2 ) ibid.
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It could be argued, she continued, that when the revenue of the fund was 
so much smaller than the expenditure steps ought to be taken to increase 
the revenue of the fund i.e. increasing contributions. This had been . - 
done in Germany where it had been accepted as the natural policy to 
adopt. A 3 d increase would increase the revenue by £16^ million. The 
argument against an increased contributions was based on the fear of 
imposing additional burden upon industry. Even a 3d increase in the 
employer's contribution would probably increase costs of production by only 
• 23% and would be no more likely to cause disturbance to industry than the 
existing insolvency of the fund.
On the transitional benefits the advisory committee had started with a
predisposition towards a compromise between the unemployment insurance
scheme and the public authorities schemes upon which many able-bodied
men, similar in many respects to those claiming transitional benefits ,
had to rely Such a scheme would have gone some way towards making
unemployment a'national charge, a policy measure which had been promised
in 'Labour and the Nation1 2 and in the 'Yellow Book' and which had been
referred to in many speeches by the Liberals. Some problems associated
(2)with the formulation of such a scheme had been reviewed and after 
consideration of the problems raised there had not been much support for 
an intermediate measure. Failing such a scheme the remaining alternative 
was to transfer to the Public Assistance Authority the burden of those
(1) The Minister of Health had constantly referred to the injustice of 
this distinction.
(2) Similar proposals had been considered twelve months before. See 
Chapter 2, pp. 190-198.
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unemployed who at present received payments under the transitional 
arrangements- The Public Assistance Authorities were unlikely to be 
able to take on such a commitment. She suggested that transitional 
short term and seasonal payments should be made discretionary and that 
married women's rights could be limited by legislation so that benefit 
should not be paid until the women had worked a certain minimum number 
of weeks after marriage: presumably showing their commitment to the 
labour force.
The Minister's proposals were discussed by the Cabinet The
Chancellor of Exchequer pointed out that none of the recommendations 
made any appreciable reduction in the cost of the insurance fund and 
he stressed the need to avoid any increase in expenditure. The matter 
was referred to the Panel of Ministers. The Prime Minister expressed 
the hope that they would deal 'boldly' with the abuses as neither 
Parliament nor public opinion was likely to be satisfied merely with 
the appointment of a Royal Commission.
Panel of Ministers
The Panel of Ministers (excluding officials because it was a matter
of policy) discussed ways of securing the financial position of the
(2)scheme . They considered reducing benefits, increasing contribution 
and making transitional benefits discretionary. To remedy the 'abuses' 
seasonal workers were to be paid only if payment was sanctioned by a 
Court of Referees; payments to short time workers were to be made only if 12
(1) CAB 23 65 61 (30).
(2) CAB 27 438; UP (1 1 ) 3 0 .
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there was hardship; and benefits to married women were to be paid 
only if such a woman was customarily employed. The possibility of 
voluntary work by those drawing transitional benefits was discussed 
but reports of earlier schemes in South Wales indicated that they were 
not very successful as they tended to cause union problems. After much 
debate it was thought neither desirable or practicable to transfer 
to the Minister discretionary powers. A Eoyal Commission was preferred 
to ministerial discretion and was set up to consider: the scope and 
the provision of the scheme; and the basis upon which it could be made 
self-supporting. They recommended that the Commission should be 
asked to produce interim reports on transitional benefits and abuses.
Royal Commission
At the Cabinet meeting which was concerned with the drafting of the 
King's Speech it was agreed that a Royal Commission should be set up.
The announcement of the Royal Commission met with great anger from the 
opposition members of the all party advisory committee. At their fifth 
meeting, Betterton, Elliot and Foot protested against the action of 
the Government in announcing their decision to set up the Commission 
before the advisers had arrived at any conclusions. In their memorandum, 
Brown and Foot said,
"it is apparent that the policy of the 
Government had already been determined 
and therefore further consultation was
made unnecessary ..... We have devoted
three months to the anxious consideration 
of the duty committed to us, and we believe 
there would be serious resentment if we did 
nothing more than suggest another inquiry 
involving indefinite delay. We have considered 
the suggestions as to the appointment of a
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Royal Commission and in our-opinion this 
proposal is open to grave objection.
..... Inter-departmental Committee would 
be a better way of sorting out these technical 
details" (l)
Betterton complained of the treatment in the House of Commons where 
a very1 23acrimonious debate on the issue was taking place. Oliver Stanley 
took up the attack:
"The Rt. Hon. Lady thought all Summer but 
she did nothing. Then she got honorary 
members of this side of the house to think 
with her. They gave up their holidays, 
they sacrificed their health and they all 
sat down and thought with the Right 
Hon. Lady. Now more people are to be 
summoned from all over the country to 
give up their business in order to think 
again. I am all in favour of thinking 
about this matter but when is somebody 
going to do something?" (2 )
Members of Parliament were not the only ones to be rather suspicious
of the proposal of the Royal Commission: the Economic Advisory Council's
Sub-committee considering unemployment insurance was just completing
(3)its report after Henderson's visit to Germany ^ . They were not in 
favour of a Royal Commission because of the delays but welcomed with 
a certain academic relish the depth of the study which it would facilitate. 
Their own suggestions for changes in the insurance scheme included the 
separation of the finance of that part of the scheme which could be 
properly treated as insurance from that which could not. It was also
(1 ) CAB 2 1 , 325; CP 3 7 ^ (30).
(2 ) Hansard. November 1930* \Jol • J-b1*)
(3 ) c a b  zb 217; CP if26 (30).
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recommended that the ratio, of days benefit to contribution should be 
restored and that after the expiry of the insurance rights, benefits 
should be related to the applicant's ability to establish his claim on 
the basis of need and that where such a claim was granted it should be 
associated, where possible „vt’H«. work or training. The granting of 
benefits to workers working on a short-time basis and other matters 
open to abuse should be dealt with by the State Commission by means 
of orders and regulations applying to particular classes of workers.
The T.U.C. were not at all co-operative about the Royal Commission; 
they were unwilling to suggest members to sit on the Commission and 
said that if the Government wished to consult them 'they ’should do so 
in writing' I ^  ^ Skidelsky reports fully on the row with the T.U.C. and 
MacDonald's attempt to smooth things over. His interpretation of the 
Royal commission as an instrument for stalling on insurance matters 
does not fit in too well with the anxious, if rather frenetic, attempts 
to find a solution in the period leading up to the decision to call a 
Royal Commission. The alternatives were means tests, higher 
contributions or lower benefits, or the acceptance that during periods 
of unusually high unemployment the fund was unlikely to be in balance. 
These were not palatable to Ministers. In spite of the criticism the 
terms of reference were set out in November and members were appointed. 
It is difficult to see what the Government can have expected the 
Commission to provide other than some higher sanction for unpleasant 
policies. The available
(1) CAB 23 65, 67 (30)
(2) Skidelsky (1967) op»cit.
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alternatives had been well spelt out for them and it was unlikely that 
the Royal Commission would offer much that was new.
Regional Problems
The situation was now acute: unemployment was steadily rising and its 
regional and industrial distribution was such as to cause distress in 
many areas. In the summer of 1930« unemployment in the North West was 
2^.2$; in the North East it was 19*2%; in Scotland 17.2/6 and in Wales 
25.8%. In the cotton industry it was about 39-1%; 29% in iron and 
steel; 28% in shipbuilding; 2 2.2%  in mining and 22% in wool and other 
textiles. See Table 13 above.
The Prime Minister received a petition from the Pontypridd Trades .
Council and from the Taffeswell and District Miners' Lodge (unemployed) 
appealing for help and the reopening of the Lord Mayor's Fund in the 
coming winter . The 'Necessitous A r e a s ' were having great difficulty 
in even maintaining services. Rhondda was reported to have a 23/“ in 
the £  rate; large unccllected rates; a heavy bank overdraft and no 
credit upon which to raise further loans. Far from such areas being 
able to provide relief works there was serious difficulty in their being 
able to provide essential services. Previously they had been helped 
by the Lord Mayor's Fund but there was little prospect of that continuing. 
The Government were reticent about giving state aid, for fear that 
other areas would exert pressure to be included, although they had made 
£.5 million available to the depressed areas in the Summer. 12
(1) CAB 27 *+39; UP 30 (2k).
(2) CAB 23 63 9 (31); CP 1(31).
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The Prime Minister raised the problem of the depressed areas at the 
Panel of Ministers' meeting and the secretariate produced a note on 
reported problems of the regions. The Minister of Health reported that 
the conditions were less acute than had been expected, were mainly 
financial and could be eas. ed if certain services were transferred to j  
the counties. The Minister of Labour found it difficult to estimate 
the size and distribution of the labour force which would eventually be 
absorbed in these areas and was still pressing for the 'recognition of 
the necessity of finding work elsewhere'.' The President of the Board 
of Trade pointed out that the fate of the depressed areas was bound up 
with the future of the heavy industries and that although the development 
of economically sound smaller industry would be an advantage, he 
believed that manufacturers preferred to be nearer to a large market where 
they had access to a large private capital market and to a flexible 
labour force. Ee-location he considered would be difficult: if 
incentives worked they were likely to be fundamentally uneconomic:
The transfer policy had been abandoned in the early Summer. With the 
abandonment of this attempt to solve the regional problems by moving 
the workers the way was now clear to consider the alternative policy 
of moving industry to the depressed areas. Only very tentative steps 
had previously been made in this direction by Horace Wilson who under 
the auspices of the Interdepartmental Committee on Unemployment had 
consulted various business interests.
There were now several moves afoot to do something more constructive. 
Attlee in his memorandum, written soon after he took over the office 
of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster from Mosley, drew up a 
plan for reconstruction of industry. In a memorandum entitled,
Cl) CAB 27 439 UP 42 (3 0 )
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The Problems of British Industry, Attlee said,
"The industrial transformation has its 
geographical counterpart, which is visible 
to the dullest observer. New industry is 
streaming into the South East to the big 
cities like Birmingham and Manchester, and 
away from the industrialise!countryside of 
Lancashire and Durham but par excellence the 
tide is flowing to Greater London. We are 
allowing to go derelict some of the best- 
equipped industrial areas in the world from 
the point of view of fuel, power, transport 
and labour supply. At the same time London 
and many other areas are being allowed to 
grow at an unprecedented pace". (l)
The Prime Minister raised the matter of the regional effects of 
rationalisation at the last meeting of the Economic Advisory Council 
for 1930.
"If rationalisation was to proceed on purely 
economic lines the country would be faced with 
the problem of a water-logged population con­
centrated in particular areas. It was essential, 
that rationalisation should be carried out not 
merely from the point of view of the employing 
company but with regard to the interests of the 
work people and to the general interests of the 
s t a t e ....." (2 ).
In spite of the gloomy prognosis of the President of the Board of Trade 
a fundamental issue had been raised and the way was clear for the change 
in regional policy towards the concept of taking 'work to the workers'
■— — " ... ........ 1 ■ ■' --------------i:
t;
V i
(1) CAB 2k 2lk\ CP 283 (3 0 ).
■>»
(2) CAB 38 2 10th meeting, 11 December 1920.
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which had originally motivated the policy of the unemployment Grants 
Committee which attempted to stimulate public works in depressed 
regions^. The Liberals laid great stress on regional policy in their ’ 
policy document and a joint committee was set up to study the proposals *2
(1) See St. Davids'. Report, CAB 27 396; DU 29 (2). In the early ' 
twenties the committee had considered works which were 
accelerated in areas in which unemployment was over 10$. See 
Hancock (1972) op.cit.
(2) PREM 1 1/109
CHAPTER FIVE
SOME SACRED COWS
January to August 1931
Introduction
Snowden's statement on economic prospects set the scene for 1931;
"The budget prospect for 1931 is a grim one .... 
with no sign of lifting of the world economic 
crisis the financial prospect constantly and 
steadily deteriorates ...." (l) .
Prospects were bleak. The report on the State of Trade for January showed
exports and imports had fallen 22% and lk.k% respectively, in value terms,
(2)during the month . Gold continued to flow to France although it was
hoped that the reduced rates there and in the United States would help.
(3)Clearly the cheap money policy was in jeopardy ^ . To contribute to the 
gloom, the year began with strikes in the coal and cotton industries.
In December, the number unemployed had passed the two-and-a-half million 
level representing 19-9^** of the insured population. It rose to 20% in 
the New Year and remained above 20% until June 1933* The unemployment 
rates during the remaining months of the Labour administration are shown in 123
(1) CAB 2k 218; CP 3 (3 1}
(2) CAB 2k 218; CP 12(3lX
(3 ) ibid.
Williams (19 6 3) op.cit.; Howson (1975) op.cit. for discussion of the 
Bank of England's management of the flow of funds during this 
period.
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Table 15, below:
Table 15
%  Unemployment in the United Kingdom
Month
¿ 22i
%  u
January 2 1 . 1
February 21.3
March 2 1 .0
April 20. A
May 2 0 .3
June 2 1 . 2
July 21.9
August 21.9
Source: British Labour Statistics
Historical Abstract lSS^-1968.
Table 160
The trade policy was still undecided and the debate continued until the 
Summer when the free traders prevented the inclusion of protection in the 
agricultural policy. . ^
•
Pressure built up in Parliament and in the country for action. Lloyd 
George's speech in the debate on the vote of censure in February expressed 
the feeling of the period:-
"It is in order to get something done that we 
propose this motion. Why have we introduced it? 
Let me say at once that it is not in order to 
push a quarrel with the Government. I have said
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so before and I say so now. It is in order to
have the opportunity of securing a Parliamentary
discussion which will encourage, stimulate and
stir the Government and, above all, give them
the assurance, that, if they proceed boldly, they ,,
have the support of the House of Commons behind them ..." (l).
Budgetary pressures caused a further crisis in the management of the 
unemployment insurance fund and threatened the public works programme.
During the heated parliamentary debates of February, the Government.capitu­
lated to the Liberals' demands for an inquiry into public expenditure and 
so forged the weapon which was to be used against the Government and the 
country in the Summer. Even the modest measures, which had been taken to 
ease the employment situation and the lot of the unemployed, were gradually
rstrangled in an attempt to maintain the more sacred objectives of a 
balanced budget, free trade and the gold standard. For the first half of 
1931 the Government floundered in the logical impasse which they had 
forced upon themselves.
The frustration and stress of this unhappy situation probably contributed r\ , 1 ^ 
to tie deaths and illness of members of the administration in the Spring. (»> r 
Meanwhile external events indicated that little help could be expected 
from a recovery in the wider world. The international monetary system 
ground on relentlessly towards the crisis. Let us trace the policies of 
the Government through the last painful months of the Labour administration. 12
(1) Hansard, 12th February 1931* V O  I • C o K ? ^ 8 .
(2 ) Skidelsky (19 6 7) o p c i t .
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Public Works
The public works policy was generally accepted by the Labour administration 
as a way of reducing unemployment during periods of depression by utilizing 
the excess capacity in the economy. It had been a central phalanx of their 
policy but had been unsuccessful. The Government had not initiated schemes, 
relying instead upon the incentive effect of grants to encourage the 
executive agencies to put forward schemes. This method had been chosen 
because of the belief in the importance of a strong, devolved administration. 
As we have seen in the previous chapters there were also technical and 
administrative obstacles to the implementation of the programmes. The 
budgetary constraints did not appear important, in the first instance in 
spite of Mosley's argument that the provision of a larger sum would be 
psychologically important, see Chapter Three above p. 2^7.
The Government had made much of the fact that lack of funds was not 
impeding the programme of works but Lloyd George made a rather telling 
comment on the matter in the February debate:
"I am quite willing to accept what has been said 
by the Rt. Hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer that no undertaking which has been 
presented up to the present has been met by any 
refusal on his part to find the cash. But I 
cannot help thinking that, in spite of that, the 
knowledge that the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
is not very open to suggestions of this kind may 
have a restricting influence upon the energies of 
Ministers. He is a very formidable person to 
approach when he is in a particular mood, and if 
I were a young Minister I would think twice before 
I approached him to ask for £2Cta for a project
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of mine. He would probably say nothing but his 
look would be enoughl" (l)
The spirit to go ahead on a vast programme was lacking and this was not 
merely the fault of Snowden's budgetary policy. The crucial problem was 
initiating schemes. The Government were reluctant to intervene directly 
or to provide adequate incentives to ensure that schemes were undertaken 
The criteria which included the demand that, the schemes should be productive 
and represent an acceleration of. schemes already planned, were unduly 
restrictive.
By 1931» Snowden was saying plenty. The financial problems of the
Chancellor of the Exchequer were impinging upon the programme. Snowden was
tightening up his budgetary policy and was trying to force Morrison to fix
time limits on the preferential terms which had been offered in the
acceleration drive in the Summer of 1930- (See Chapter Four above for the
revised proposals for schemes which were begun immediately.) Snowden wanted
to ensure that even schemes previously approved should only qualify for
the improved terms if begun before May 3 1 st 1931* la spite of Morrison's
arguments, the Panel of Ministers did not countermand Snowden's requirement/
and in January, Morrison was asking for powers to use his discretion in
that
interpreting the new rule ^ . He also pointed out/the terms on which 
grants were given would be less favourable than those offered by the 1
(1) Hansard ¿¿February 193T» vol. 256 col. '112--3* -Janeway op. cit pp 40-52 shows 
there was great pressure from the civil servants, especially Upcott,
upon Snowden to resist schemes.
(2) CAB 27 439; UP 45 (30).
y?h
Conservative administration two years before . See Chapter Two above.
Some discretion was allowed. In May the Chancellor of Exchequer agreed
that schemes worth £7^- million (of the £ 1 3 ^ million) should go through.
Morrison asked for authority to allow further time to authorities, which
had already incurred considerable expense either in surveys or in the
purchase of land, to begin work. It was agreed that such schemes should
( ? )be discussed with the Treasury on their merits
In addition to the Treasury's growing stringency other constraints were 
being imposed on the schemes by local authorities. Morrison cited a 
resolution of Somerset County Council which had been published in the 
Western Morning News to the effect. ' .
"That this Council, in view of the urgent need 
for the strictest economy in national and local 
expenditure is of the opinion that all pending 
public schemes involving additional outlay be, 
whenever possible, held in abeyance until a new 
improved financial position warrants their being 
put into operation and definite instructions be 
given to the Accounts and Estimates sub-committee 
to scrutinize with the utmost vigilance all 
proposed expenditure of the council in every 
department so as to secure drastic and immediate 
reductions". (3 )
By,the Summer the programme was about £100 million above that of 1930 But 
reversals were about to occur as part of the Economy Bill presented in
(1)
(2)
(3)
CAB 27 ^38; 
CAB 27 ^3 8 ; 
CAB 27 439,
UP 24 th Meeting 6th March.
UP 27th Meeting 20th May; CAB 27 439;
u p  43 (30).
u p  78 (30).
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September. The largest increases had occurred in the approval of schemes 
sanctioned under the Development Act, Part II administered by the U.G.C.i 
though the trunk road scheme had doubled and the five-year programme had 
increased three-fold during the period. The progress of the approval of 
the schemes over the period can be seen in Table 15*
Regional and Industrial Policy
As we saw in Chapter Four above, Attlee and Henderson had tried to move 
public works and reconstruction policies towards an integrated regional and 
industrial policy. Progress in this direction was being made. Graham 
updated his previous reports on the progress of local initiatives in the 
North West and North East The matter was also discussed by the Panel
of Ministers ^  and the E.A.C. ^  and preparations were made for the 
setting up of a committee to advise on the development of policy.
At the Panel of.Ministers' meeting early in the New Year, the railway 
managers were asked what contribution they could make to the revival of 
the regions, It was thought that although a 40% reduction for cotton and 
a yy/o reduction for rail freight had been successful in getting traffic 
back from the roads, it had not had much impact on production in Lancashire. 12
(1) CAB 27 ^39; UP if7 (30).
(2 ) CAB 27 ^38 2^th Meeting, March 6th 1931*
(5 ) CAB 58 2, 11th Meeting, 12th February 1931*
EAC 5 (5 )? EAC HI3 6 , 137, 1 3 8 .
Table 16
Progress of Approval of Unemployment Relief Schemes
Nov. Feb. June Nov. Jan. Feb. March April May June
£m
July
1929 1930 1930 1930 1931 • 1931 1931 1931 1931 192.1 1931
Dev. Act P.I 7.6 13-1 2 6 . 1 32 -2 3^-2 3^-7 3^-7. 34.8 35.3 35-3 35.4
Dev. Act Pt IX (UGC) 12.5 2 6 .2 3 8 .5 49.6 52.8 5 6 . 1 6O .3 69 .0 70.4 72.9 75-4
Road Schemes 
Trunk 9.0 1 0 .0 13.7 16.9 17.0 17-5 1 7 .6 1 8 . 1 18.4 18.5 18.4
5 -year programme 13-3 14.0 23.1 3 6 .3  • 36 .9 37-6 38.5 37-9 41.5 42.5 43.4
Colonial Dev. 3-7 5-6 6 .6 8.7 8 .8 8.9 9.0 9.2 8.9 8.9 9.0
P.0. Dev. • '1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 . 1-5 1-5 1.5 . 1-5 1.5
Mise. .2 .6 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 .2 2 .2 2.3 2.5 2-5 2.5.'
TOTAL / 48.1 70.6 1 1 0 . 1 147-3 153-3 158.5 I6 3.8 172-3 178.5 182.1 I85.6
Source: CAB 27 439; UP.(30).
\
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do
The Managers felt they could/io more unless the Government could provide 
capital This indicates that there was a certain responsiveness to
incentives which could have been utilized to elicit more attractive pro­
posals from the public utility companies.
The Prime Minister reported the results of this meeting to the E.A.C in 
February but offered no incentives to the railway companies . The 
Council discussed progress of the policy. Two local planning committees 
in Lancashire and Tyneside had been established and a regional survey had 
been initiated. A survey on the location of industry had indicated that 
industry was not moving out of the derelict areas but dying out. Attlee 
believed that location could be controlled given national assistance; 
others preferred to rely upon local initiatives.
(3)Attlee wanted a much more drastic interventionist strategy ** . He pro­
posed a public corporation to direct new industT'y into , localities where 
it was needed and at the sarnie time obtain a means of control and direction 
for the state. A start should be made by bringing under public control 
and ownership new and expanding industries. He • ' protested against
the idea of a further committee for the first step he considered should be
also
a decision by Government on policy. He/protested about the membership of 
the proposed committee,
"It was no use setting up a committee of persons 
whose attitude of mind was opposed to the principle 
of public control of industry and it was little use 
for the committee to consist partly of such people 
and partly of those who sympathised with the 
principle". ( W  123
(1) CAB 27 ^3 8 , 20th Meeting, 29th January 193^5 OAB 27 ^39; UP kZ (30).
(2) CAB 58 2, 11th Meeting, 12th February 1931«
(3 ) CAB 27 439; UP 66 (30).
(!0  ibid.
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The matter was discussed in the Panel of Ministers Both the Prime
Minister and Thomas took the view that there was a need for the advice 
of businessmen, Attlee, whilst conceding that on practical details such 
advice might not be necessary, considered the issue a matter of policy 
and as such
"the Government is perfectly well able to come 
to a decision without lengthy discussions". (2 )
Attlee had indicated one of the major problems in the MacDonald adminis­
trations use of advisors. There was an extensive use of external advisors 
to v/hom major policy issues were referred for advice in the hope that 
rational discussion'amongst persona of wide experience and differing persuasions 
would lead to the emergence of the distilled wisdom in the form of a
consensus decision. Instead, there was conflicting advice and excessive
\
delays in policy making.
Meanwhile the committee on the potential of town planning, set up to
answer the criticisms Lloyd George made in his statements in November,
(see Chapter Four above), reported that not much could be achieved in this
field. Even Lloyd George's nominees to the Committee agreed with Greenwood,
that little could be done. It was also agreed that a new executive authority
(3)was not needed as financial assistance was more important . Later in 123
(1) CAB 27 ^38 2*fth Meeting, 6th March 1931; CAB 27 ^39; UP 5 8 , 6 5,
66, 67 (30).
(2) CAB 27 3^9; UP 66 (30).
(3) CAB 2k 220; CP 83 (3 1 ).
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April snags were also found in the Liberals' suggestion for rural housing 
schemes ^ .
Other big schemes which were afoot were to electrify the railways and the 
homogenization of oil from coal. These two schemes were the great white 
hopes: the North S,ea oil of the thirties. A report giving the details of 
the potential of the railway schemes was produced. This report recommended 
a comprehensive plan, to reap the full advantage of the scheme. The work 
should be undertaken over a period of 15 - 20 years. The new capital 
required was estimated to be £261 million. After meeting interest charges 
on the new capital, the yield would be 2 This was thought to be too 
narrow a margin given the risks involved but it was pointed out that this 
took into account only the direct benefits and ignored
•'a number of substantial advantages including
speed, comfort-amenity and improved service,
the value of which cannot be expressed in money". (2 )
What a challenge for contemporary cost-benefit analysts. The plan to 
research further into the possibilities of producing oil from coal was 
.however agreed. 12
(1) CAB 2t 221 CP lot (3 1 ).
(2 ) CAB 2k 220; CP 82 (31).
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Reconstruction
The other aspect of policy was tied up with reorganization of industry. .- 
This policy was proceeding painfully slowly. The committee to consider 
and report upon the present conditions and prospects of the iron and steel 
industry was set up on 31st July 1929* It reported on 30th May 1930^. The 
report mentioned the increase in imports amounting to one million tons or 
50% between 1910 - 1913 and 1929» At the same time, exports had fallen by 
300,000 tons. Britain had failed to retain its share in world trade in 
spite of the increased capacity during the war. Profits had been low and 
often no adequate provision had been made for depreciation. During the 
same period continental industries had flourished.
British plants were small and there was a lack of co-operative machinery 
which could ensure plants were run at full capacity and reduced costs. 
Regional amalgamations to ensure economies of scale and plants of the highest 
technical efficiency were recommended. Provision of the necessary capital 
had been promised by Norman providing schemes were satisfactory. Only 
after such reorganization had taken place in the most efficient way should 
resort be made to safeguarding. The Government were advised to carry out 
the necessary changes as quickly as possible.
( 2 )A conference was convened to recommend how best to implement the proposals
The conference immediately asked for protection but was rebuffed by
MacDonald who threatened to replace the committee. The rumblings continued
■**. 12
(1 ) CAB 38 127; CAB zb 212 CP 189 (3°).
(2) CAB zb Zlb CP 265 (3 0 ); EAC 58 2 5th Meeting, 19 June; EAC H 88.
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and pressure for protection mounted as conditions in the industry
deteriorated. The issue was discussed at the E.A.C. Balfour and Keynes
were in .favour of a tariff and MacDonald hinted at compulsory powers.
Bruce Gardner later produced a confidential report(in February 1931)
drawing attention to the deteriorating situation; exports had fallen 25.8#
since 1929 whilst imports had remained unchanged and production had fallen
2b. 5% - He produced a scheme for reorganization based on steel producing
combines. He continued to negotiate with the leaders of industries about
( ? )the implementation of the scheme, of which there was little criticism ~ . 
Conditions in the industry got worse and unemployment rose. Reports through 
out the Winter told of the growing problem. In February it was reported 
that 20 out of 40 blast furnaces in South Wales were not working and the 
Middlfesborough industry was also in trouble ^ .
Protection was again suggested during the debates with the industry on the
(k) 'terms of the Bruce Gardner Report . The Prime Minister wanted guarantees
on prices for the home market before granting any form of protection and
this the industry could not give. The industry also complained that without
protection the capital to reconstruct would not be forthcoming. The Governmen
\
threatened intervention if action was not taken- But at the rumour
of nationalization Norman threatened to withdraw his support for recon­
struction. The industry continued to seek Government aid: 1234
(1) CAB 2  ^220 CP 55 (31).
(2) CAB Zb 220 CP 66 (31).
(3) CAB 27 bbO UP 64, 68 (31).
(4) CAB Zb 220 CP 33 (3 1).
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"Considerable finance would be needed to put 
the various schemes into operation and I am 
informed that in view of the recent history 
and present position of the trade the leaders 
of the industry see no likelihood of obtaining 
the money from the investing public, and if 
indeed money were advanced by the Government or 
the country, it could only be on terms that no 
payment of interest or repayment of capital 
could be made unless and until profits were
e a r n e d .......... It is quite clear that in the
existing unsecured state of the home market it 
would be quite impossible to put forward a pro­
posal that would have at least a chance of obtaining 
from the investing public the money needed for 
the schemes", (l)
This is illuminating in so far as it relates to the potential availability 
of credit and the rate of return on ventures: the two blocks which Keynes 
later used to build up the conditions under which no increase in the supply 
of money or reduction in wages would be sufficient to re-established full 
employment.
The cotton scheme was making modest progress . The report on the cotton 
industry had been available since June 1930* It had recommended improvements 
in spinning and the formation of larger units and co-operation between 
different sectors of the industry. Throughout the Autumn, Graham and Clynes 
had visited Lancashire to take part in discussions to reorganize the industry 
but little had been achieved. Conditions had deteriorated and the incentives 
to reorganize were becoming less apparent to the cotton manufacturers but 
negotiations continued and it was hoped that a plan would be formulated by 
the end of July . The Minister of Labour expressed concern in June about
the plight of Lancashire where redundant mills were being closed 123 (3)
(1) CAB 24 220 CP 90 (3 1).
(2) CAB 24 221 CP 136 (3 1).
(3) ' CAB 23 6 7, 30th Meeting, 3rd June 1931*
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Trade
The protection issue was no nearer resolution. Agricultural policy was h.eld 
up by the debate. A final decision was, by one ruse after another, stalled 
until the early Summer when it was finally rejected. Keynes made public 
his pronouncements on free trade in the Spring of 1931* Harrod recalls 
that he found the move, a move towards something less good in itself for 
the sake of temporary expediency, but as he says he had not had the 
advantage of:-
"seeing all the other exits from our present 
woeful prison bolted and barred by the 
inexorable logic of Hopkins and other 
experts", (l)
It was not only Hopkins and his colleagues who were to be blamed for 
'bolting and barring 1 all viable policy routes, but the accepted economic 
philosophy of the administration.
Economists were not impressed by Keynes' advocacy of protection although 
Bellerby pointed out that Keynes was concerned with the present dilemma 
not the elegant equilibrium model which his academic friends were playing 
with in their ivory towers. Keynes was angry and impatient with them:
"Is it the fault of the odium theologicum 
attaching to Free Trade? Is it that Economics 
is a queer subject or in a queer state? Whatever 
may be the reason, new patterns of thought have 
no appeal to the fundamental of Free Trade. They 
have been forcing me to chew over a lot of stale 
mutton, dragging me along a route I have known all
(l) R.F. Harrod,Life of John Maynard Keynes, Macmillan 1951-
about as long as I have known anything, which 
cannot as I have discovered by many attempts 
lead one to a solution of our present difficulty 
- a peregriination of catacombs with a guttering .
■candle". (l)
He tried to tempt Snowden with his view but his memorandum was returned 
unread by Snowden, and summarily dismissed by-Mrs Snowden:
"we are as strongly convinced that it is wrong 
as you are that it is right". (2 )
Agricultural Policy
The Government were still under pressure to state their agricultural policy 
upon which Snowden had given certain assurances during the debates of the
• (3 )previous Summer The Agricultural Development Committee
(M
had prepared a quota scheme but could not reach agreement . The
majority recommended that a bill should be presented to give effect to the 
scheme but the First Lord of the Admiral ty and the Financial Secretary 
to the Treasury, the dissenting members of the committee, considered that 
the advantages claimed for the scheme were not sufficient to outweigh the 
objections and condemned the scheme on political grounds as it involved 
food taxes and the abandonment of free trade. The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, of course, was against the scheme and had sent a note from his 
sick bed! His health delayed the matter until April when .he 
returned to the Cabinet. The Minister of Agriculture stressed the importanc 123
(1) ibid. p (^ 3f
(2 ) R. Skidelsky (19 6 7 ) op»cit., p. 327»
(3) See Chapter Four above
ib) C/IB 23 66, 16th Meeting, 4th March 1931> GP 52 (31)*
(1)of taking into account the dire state of the cereal growing areas 
He stated that no new principle was involved as the coal and sugar beet 
policies'raised the price in order to assist the industries. The free 
traders argued that there would be a clamouring for protection from other 
agricultural and industrial interests if the scheme went ahead. The 
adjustment problem was also raised: it was thought,
"wrong to give fictitious assistance to cereals, 
which were already greatly over produced in the 
World. Fair wages would be achieved more 
successfully by the adaptation of agriculture to 
economic conditions". (2 )
Such touching faith in the ability of the market to adjust to structural 
imbalances is remarkable from a socialist administration.
The problem of equity for Scottish farmers who were not so heavily involved
Ol
in wheat growing was also mentioned but was dismissed asjsolution by the 
Secretary of State for Scotland. The political attractiveness of the 
scheme was also considered as it was thought that taxation on food would 
be a major issue in the next election. Further meetings were held and it 
was felt that no decision could be reached because of the 'close balance 
of argument and opinion 1 2 in the Cabinet. The Prime Minister even quoted 
from Labour and the Nation to clarify the position on trade and eventually 
the opinions of the agricultural Labour M.P.'s were sought. The M.P.'s
were similarly divided but only two out of nine were against the scheme.
(1) CAB 23 66, 22nd Meeting, 15th April 1931. Agricultural workers were 
not included in the insurance schemes and the depression fell heavily 
upon them. The agricultural wage was about half the national average.
(2) ibid, a good illustration of the structuralist's view that readjustment 
provided the answers and that temporary alleviation would merely delay 
the process.
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.Those in favour of the scheme considered that Trade Union policy was 
founded on the principle that a living wage should be a first charge upon 
industry. In their opinion socialists were confusing free trade with cut 
throat competition. They recommended that the scheme should be accompanied 
by the formation of a wages board to ensure that reasonable wages were 
paid.
The movement of socialists against protection was not confined to Britain.
In Germany a 'rye' scheme had had the effect of pleasing no one and had 
united the socialists and communists in their opposition to tariffs on 
food ^ . This debate was eventually overtaken by the Conservatives' next 
step in the direction of protection - the announcement of a plan for a wheat 
quota and a fixed price. In face of this proposal the Government's proposed 
policy, which passed on the increase in price, was thought unlikely to be 
attractive. The Government would not have been able to get support for 
the scheme even if it was presented, so the policy was abandoned. The only 
strategy adopted was on the lines of Snowden's suggestion that agriculture 
should be developed in areas which were more likely to be self-supporting
and which might reduce imports (2) \
(1) CAB 24.221; CP 1 3 3  (31). '
(2) Snowden (1934) op.cit. The Snowdens were actively promoting a joint ; 
campaign by the Liberal and the Labour party for free trade to be ! 
launched in the Autumn. Snowden gleefully suggested that Thomas should 
be the spokesman for the Labour Party knowing that Thomas had moved a ; 
long way towards protection by this time.
In spite of liis fierce oppositicnto the plan, Snowden was present, as 
Lord Privy Seal, at the Cabinet meeting in November which approved 
what was substantially the wheat quota scheme and a policy to restrict 
the imports of other agricultural produce!
In January Snowden and the Samuelite Liberals were threatening to break up 
the National Government on the trade issue but were eventually persuaded to 
remain in the Government by the relaxation of the Cabinet rule of 
collective responsibility which allowed them to speak and vote against 
protection. D. Marquand,(1977) MacDonald Jonathan Cape, London, p. 713« 
Snowden (1934) op. c i t a t i o n .
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.Iron and Steel
The iron and steel industry and the cotton industry were anxious to achieve 
protection. The issue of protection for the iron and steel industry was 
discussed in a meeting of the E.A.C. in the Spring. It had also been an 
issue raised with the Conservative Government with respect to safeguarding. 
Bevin favoured protection if accompanied by nationalization and Keynes was 
also sympathetic to the idea. Stamp, however, considered that difficulties 
would remain even after the adoption of a tariff and reorganization for he 
considered efficiency wages to be as much as below competitors .. As 
we saw in earlier chapters, the small scale operations of the iron and steel 
industry wgfÇ’p reventing their recouping the economies of scale which 
were being exploited by American and German industries.
Dumping
The issue of dumping, especially from Russia, was raised by many industries. 
It was examined by a committee set up by the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs in February. Nothing was done about the matter however, until the 
National Government introduced its protectionary measures.
Tariff Truce and Customs Union •
Whilst the movement for protection continued, the Présidât of the Board of ,
Trade was persevering with the remnants of his Tariff Truce. Only seven
European countries were now involved and they were not willing to make any
moves to remove tariffs and the operation appeared to be merely a holding
one. The moves were probably counter to all European activities of the
( ? )period which as Boyce points out were towards regional grouping of which 12
(1) E.A.C. 58 2, 12th Meeting, 12th March, 1931«
(2) Boyce (1973) op.cit.
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the proposed German and Austrian scheme for a customs union was but one. This 
scheme caused a great deal of consternation and a great debate as to its 
legality under the post-war agreements made in 19 2 2.
Henderson, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was dealing with the 
international problems which were associated with the suggestion. France 
was bitterly opposed to the proposal but Henderson recognised the dangers 
in the situation and felt that none of the parties should be left to feel 
grieved by the outcome. A particular worry was that failure might mean 
the collapse of the German Government which he felt might bring about a 
revival of Hitlerism. One of his suggestions was that other states should 
join the union in the hope that it would ’flounder under its weight*. More 
constructively he suggested that European Governments should elaborate 
some economic solutions which both France and Germany would find acceptable 
and offered himself as 'honest broker* between France and Germany. With 
Graham he tried to arrange a reduction in tariffs of protectionists countries 
(and a stand still on British tariffs for three years) to allow the Austrians 
and the Germans access to markets
Revenue Tariff .
The revenue tariff was discussed in the E.A.C. on March 12 as part of the 
discussion of the Economists' Report. Keynes introduced the discussion of 
the relevant sections of the report and concluded that:-
"a revenue tariff was an essential link with 
the recommendations contained in the earlier 
part of the report. If any of the bolder 
schemes there discussed were adopted, either 
development plans or steps to secure inter­
national financial co-operation, it was certain 1
(1) CAB 2k 221; CP 115 (31)
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that their initial effect upon either the 
budget or the balance of trade or both, would 
be adverse. It would be difficult to proceed 
with any such plans unless the. budget was not 
• only balanced but had such a margin that causes 
for an immediate anxiety were allayed". (l)
Keynes stressed the importance of being seen to be doing something. The 
Government should he said, secure the budgetary position and to do so 
quickly; and this could only be done by^revenue tariff! But in spite of 
Keynes' valiant attempts to spur the Government on, nothing came of the 
matter until it was discussed again in the crisis debates.
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Snowden had issued dire warnings about the problems he faced in the coming 
year in his January memorandum. This contained a detailed rationale of the 
desirability of balancing the budget and on the importance of making pro­
vision for the sinking fund. Any curtailment of such provision he con­
sidered would so upset the credit market that the advantages would be 
out-weighed. The cheap money policy would be put in jeopardy.
"This country cannot afford a budget with any 
sort of deficit ...." There were, "disquieting 
indications that the national finances and 
especially the continuously increasing load of 
debt upon the Unemployment Insurance Fund are 
being watched abroad .... There are already 
signs that London is losing confidence of foreign 
markets and it is believed that there is a steady 
trickle of money being transferred from this country
abroad ....  Any flight from the pound would be
fraught with the most disastrous consequences not 
merely to the money market but to the whole economic 
organization of the country". (2) 12
(1) CAB 58 2, 12th Meeting 1931. See also Janeway (l97l) op.cit. ; Snowden 
on revenue tariff. Note Keynes'-? change of stance since his advocacy 
of the Liberal schemes, Chapter One, p.85«
(2) CAB 2k 219; CP 3 (3 1 ).
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This statement indicates the importance to Snowden of the exchange parity 
and also the recognition of the long term problem of international 
liquidity. Such uncertainties, it was thought, would make international 
co-operation impossible and thus impede any progress towards the 
rationalization of the use of the gold available.
Meanwhile Lloyd George was offering some advice to the Chancellor on 
monetary affairs:
"I urge him again not to be frightened of the City 
of London. Since the war the City of London has 
been invariably wrong in advising the Government. 
...... These men who have mishandled this monetary
question not merely advise us what to do, but 
establish a veto upon every proposal which is made 
for National Development. We got rid of the veto 
of the Lords. Take care that you do not establish 
a more sordid one", (l)
In the event his April budget did not prove to be so fierce as was expected 
for :he used the pending Report of the May Committee (into which the 
Government had allowed itself to be pressurised in order to facilitate the 
.acceptance of the Unemployment Insurance Bill in February) as an excuse for 
postponing action:
"Criticism missed altogether the motive I had in 
producing what I admitted was a stop-gap Budget.
It would have been quite impossible at that time 
to get the support of the House of Commons to drastic 
reductions of expenditure and to the impositions of 
heavy additional taxation. The question of National 
Expenditure had been remitted to the May Committee 
which was then at work, and I had no alternative but 
to await the Report of that Committee, jÆten I should
(1) Hansard. 12th February 1931. to/* ?3h
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have its authority for producing reductions in 
expenditure. I anticipated then that when the 
Report of this Economy Committee was made a 
second Budget in the Autumn would become 
‘necessary". (l)
It is unlikely that by taking further steps in April he could have stopped 
the crisis but may. be he could have done something to lessen the impact of 
the Reports. But Snowden's policy portfolio was empty. He had done all 
that could have been done by bullying his colleagues to reduce expenditure 
and needed the support of the Reports before he could make further cuts.
He considered tax increases were likely to damp down any possibility of a 
trade revival and as a free trader would take no comfort from protection.
The Bank of England policy appears to have the same characteristics of
internationalism as the British free trade policy. For the evidence
discussed by Williams suggests that the Bank was providing short term
facilities at a time when foreigners were disinvesting in sterling and when
it was itself unable to 'borrow in order to lend', which was its usual
strategy when attempting to finance a depression. This time traditional
sources of funds from creditor countries were not forthcoming and they were,
largely for internal banking reasons, actually withdrawing funds from
London. The Bank of England did nothing to protect itself and in the event
the task of financing the depression as well as the financing of the
(2)liquidity of foreign owned assets proved too difficult . The Bank over (l)2
(l) Snowden (193*0 op.cit.
(2) Williams (1963) op.cit. p.SUb*
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estimated the confidence in London.
The international monetary situation was being discussed at the E.A.C.
meeting in April ^  when the Prime Minister brought along Lord D'Abernon
to give his views on the international monetary situation. He discussed
ways in which prices could be raised considering that central banks in
harmony could achieve the desired results possibly by the release of gold
from France and America« Keynes suggested an alternative method by
varying the gold content of the currencies and so doubling reserves. All
agreed that co-operation was necessary but again as in the November meeting
there is the fear that a call for co-operation would be interpreted as a
cry of distress and it was considered that co-operation would arise from
•4
other quarters if the slump lasj^long enough. There appears to be plenty
of evidence that the problem of international liquidity was identified as
crucial to the containment of the depression. The problem was, given the
political uncertainties and tensions, how to achieve action on the matter.
Progress in the subsequent forty years gives some measure of the difficulties
(2)involved in surmounting the problem
Citrine felt that some risks should be taken in the hope of improving the 
present situation and Bevin said that he did not regard the gold standard 
as sacrosanct and wondered whether the inventive genius . of financial experts 
could not find an alternative. Keynes sympathised with Bevin's view but 
was fearful least the mere discussion of the matter would create a crisis 
of confidence.  ^12
(1) CAB 58 2 13th Meeting, l6th April 1931*
(2) H.G. Johnson (1975) op.cit. suggests the policy makers failed to recognise 
this aspect of the problem.
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Events did force the issue as the plight of the European banking system 
. (i)became acute . By May a run had developed on the Austrian Credit Anstalt.
In June there was an Anglo-German discussion at Chequers at which the
Germans reported that in spite of the work of the expert Geneva committees
they could not await their deliberations before taking advantage of the
( ? )safeguards embodied in the Young plan . When the Governor of the Bank 
of England arrived at the meeting, he asked immediately if the Germans 
had come to explain that they could not continue to pay reparations ^ .
The Germans explained to Norman that they had merely come to explain their 
difficulties. Norman was rather dismissive of their plight: Germany had 
come through many crises which would have been fatal to other economies.
The problem was South East Europe. He explained that the previous day he 
had received telephone calls from Basle and Vienna and he regarded the 
situation in Austria as critical. Unless everybody co-operated there 
would be a catastrophe which would not be confined to Austria. The only 
thing was to get Austria out of her present difficulty and do nothing 
that would disturb confidence further. He did not believe in raising 
the question of reparations at Geneva, for America-would not be ripe for 
a discussion of reparations for twelve months or more. Yansittart thought twelve 
months was an optimistic estimatej in view of the i imminent elections,
it was likely to be two years. Arthur Henderson thought that things were 
changing rapidly and asked what could be done? must the Government merely 123
(1 ) -I see ijo evidence for the statement in Bentley B. Gilbert, British Social
Policy, 191^1934, Batsford, London 1970» P- 16^, that "until this time 
(July 15) not only the Government, but almost..unbelievably, the City and 
the Bank of England had taken little notice of the events in Central Europe
(2) CAB 2b 222; CP 15 7 (3 1 ).
(3) Norman had been working very hard throughout the spring attempting to 
bolster up the tottering finances of some of the European states, trying 
to get support for his scheme for an international loan to help them and 
generally working for better agreements amongst central banks.
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'sit back with folded arms?'^' Norman said that if there were any fresh 
shocks to confidence the Geneva committees would not have to diagnose the 
difficulties in Europe but to conduct a post mortem on a corpse.
The Prime Minister asked the Germans to have frank discussions with the 
French, but learnt that overtures had been rebuffed. The Germans spoke 
more of their domestic problems including the growing danger from Nazis 
and Communists.
At this point, the meeting was interrupted dramatically whilst telegrams 
from the United States were read out. It appeared that the statement made 
by the Germans the previous day had upset the Americans and was likely to 
have an unfavourable effect on German credit. The Germans purported not to 
understand the fuss. .They had made similar statements in the Reichstag. 
Norman was rather brusque with them. He considered that the passage in 
their statement:
" 'that the economic and financial situation of 
the Reich inevitably compels the relief of 
Germany from the intolerable reparations obli­
gations', was pretty emphatic. He understood 
the Americans and hoped Germany had no other 
surprises to spring in the next few months". (2)
Whatever the merits of German tactics, the effect was to ensure that the 
moratorium which only minutes earlier had been forecast as unlikely within 
the next two years was in fact in operation within a matter of days;on 
20th June. In fact the very next Cabinet memorandum referred to the 
Government's acceptance of the Hoover proposal and hoped it would have effect 12
(1) CAB Zb 222; CP 157 (31).
(2) ibid.
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before 1 5 th July when the next payments were due 
London Meeting
In the event there was considerable delay in reaching agreement on the 
me,rat opium largely because of the problems with the French who were the 
main losers under the scheme. The good effects of the announcement were 
largely nullified. The pressure passed to Germany and at long last the 
Prime Minister was able to announce that an International Conference was 
to be held, for Heads of Governments, with Great Britain as the host nation. 
The meeting was held in London on July 20. The political difficulties 
between France and Germany prevented anything positive coming out of the 
conference and within days the pressure spread to London where there had 
been considerable disturbance of the rate for some days;, and the rise in the 
Bank Rate to by two changes of 1$ on 23rd and 30th July, did little to
stop the flow. Loans were raised from United States and France to stave off 
the immediate crisis.
, Unemployment Insurance
Margaret Baidfield had never been able to accept, or persuade her colleagues 
to accept, the impossibility of ensuring that the insurance fund was actuarily 
sound during periods of prolonged and unpredictably severe unemployment. 
Instead, at regular intervals, she was forced to present bills to Parliament 
asking for her borrowing powers to be raised thus parading the problems of 
the fund before a hostile Parliament containing those clamouring for more 
and those clamouring for less to be granted to the unemployed. The 
political problems from those claiming that increases in contribution could 1
(1 ) CAB 2k 220; CP 1^8 (3 1 ).
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be borne by industry and those who were unwilling to consider any cut in 
the benefits made it impossible to use those changes to remedy the plight 
of the fund and after endless and indecisive discussion the matter was 
farmed out to a Koyal Commission. It was hoped that this Commission would 
produce a speedy interim report to enable the Minister to 'sugar the pill' 
of the next request for funds with an announcement of the renewal of the 
1 abuses'. By February, however, the committee were unable to produce 
anything like an interim report. The Cabinet Ministers were asked about 
the policies which they preferred in the event of a crisis in the fund.
4 memorandum on this issue was produced by the Prime Minister, the 
Chancellor of Exchequer and the Ministry of Labour. It contained proposals 
for emergency measures to deal with the unemployment insurance scheme and was 
circulated at the meeting', but then withdrawn and appears in the confidential 
annexes of the official records^.The scheme involved a reduction of 
benefits of tvo shillings for a limited period and the removal of benefits 
for some claimants: married women, casual and seasonal workers. The 
proposals were not adopted because of the distributional aspects.
"The Cabinet were asked to bear in mind that if 
the proposals now under consideration were 
adopted without corresponding financial sacrifices 
elsewhere, the burden would fall exclusively upon 
the unemployed, that is to say, the poorest element 
of populatbn". (2)
Further evidence about the sort of things discussed might be obtained from 
a memorandum from Lansbury which appears, probably in error, as a Panel of 
Minister^ memorandum. Lansbury considers! that the abuses were small 
proportionately and that much could be done to ease the situation • 12
(1) See Confidential Annexes; CAB 24 218 CP 32 (3l)*
(2) CAB 23 65 12th Meeting, 5th February 1931» CAB 24 219; CP 3 1  (31)*
He considered that the plans laid out by Attlee should be adopted and 
that:
"We cannot go to the country or admit in Parliament 
that we fail both in finding work and also in securing 
full and adequate maintenance ... I'm compelled to 
give my view as to whether we should raise contri­
bution or lower benefits. I'm against both, but if I 
must choose, it would be in favour of an increase in 
contribution. The amount of benefits at present paid 
is in most cases miserably small' especially in centres 
where rents are high", (l)
The Cabinet in the'end decided that the rehabilitation of the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund could not be dealt with as an isolated problem and only as 
a  part of a comprehensive policy for spreading the burden of the existing 
financial difficulties throughout all classes of the community, a task 
which had to await the Royal Commission report.
The Reports
Boon the reports of the Macmillan Committee, Unemployment Insurance
Commission and the May Committee, which had been commissioned earliei?.were
coming home like pigeons to roost. First came the Royal Commission on
Unemployment Insurance. On 20/May, it was reported to Cabinet that the
Report was imminent and a Cabinet Committee consisting of the Secretary of
State for War, the Minister of Labour, the Minister of Health, and the
Financial Secretary to the Treasury was set up to make a preliminary survey.
(? )On kth June Cabinet was told that the interim report was much more 12
(1 ) CAB 27 V*0; UP 6l (30).
(2) CAB 23 6 7, 31st Meeting, hth June 193^* First Report of the Royal 
Commission on Unemnloyment Insurance 1931. CKD 3872.
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formidable than had been anticipated and additional members were added to 
the Committee*- Henderson, Thomas and Johnson. The Report suggested cuts 
in benefits, the shortening of the period of benefits, raising the con­
tributions, the introduction of a means test for beneficiaries of 
transitional payments, and suggestions for dealing with 'anomalies*.
The political impact of the proposals was such as to raise a great deal
of anxiety amongst the supporters of the Labour Government and amongst
trade unionists, who organised marches and published a pamphlet entitled,
'Fair Play for the Unemployed' . Attempts elsewhere, in Germany and
Australia, to reduce benefits had been associated with political upheavals.
The Government trod warily. They made it clear that it was not intended that
the major recommendations should be adopted but a difficult problem faced
the Government for they needed to raise the borrowing powers of the fund
yet again. It was necessary that a Bill should be passed before the recess.
As a gesture, the Government produced a Bill to remove the anomalies at
(2)the same time as introducing the Bill for more borrowing powers
Miss Bondfield introduced the Bill in a rousing way. The Economist 
considered Miss Bondfield's speech more satisfying than earlier ones and 
that the strong words in the passage dealing with married women indicated 
that she meant business and
"if so some tangible contribution would be made 
both to the cause of economy and sound finances 
and also to the cause of public morality!) " (3 ) *23
tl) R. Skidelsky (1967) op.cit.
(2) CAB 2k 2 2 2; CP 153 (3 1) .
(3 ) The Economist, July 1931*
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The • greatest hostility, it was reported, came from the New Party and 
the Labour Party back benchers. Sir Oswald Mosley making his first speech 
from the-opposition side of the House criticised the Government for putting 
people out of benefit instead of putting them into jobs
The anomalies were to be dealt with largely at the Minister's discretion.
Even this caused some .dissension especially fromthe I.L.P. and some
modifications were made with regard to part-time workers, but it was reported 
that there had been some considerable agreement from the General Council 
on the anomalies issue. The strategy was successful in the short period as 
the borrowing powers were extended, but the procedure could not have con­
tributed to the confidence amongst others that the Government was willing to 
take unpopular measures to balance the budget.
Macmillan Committee Report
On 1st July it wasannounced that the Committee on Finance and Industry
( 2'had reported and arrangements were made for a meeting to discuss the Report ' 
Keynesian ideas were generally adopted in the Report with some modifications. 
Central banks were to concern themselves with the flow of savings and 
investments at home and abroad and with long term investment. By 
international co-operation prices should be raised and maintained. Legal 
requirements for gold reserves should be relaxed and balances with other 
countries and the B.I.S. should be treated as gold. The majority report 
said little on public works but the minority report which was signed by 
Keynes, Bevin and others reported in favour of public works. The Report 12
(1) Hansard, July 1931* Vo /. ¿ £ 4 , •
(2) CAB 236 7 36th Meeting, 1st July; CP 160 (3 1 ). (op.cit.) CMD 389? 1931-
too
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according to Harrod was worthy of taking its place in the history of great 
British Monetary Reports . The Economist felt it was unfortunate that 
the Report should have been published during the week when the pre- • 
occupation waswiththe monetary crisis and few could absorb it. They did 
not however regard it as offering any quick remedies. , Stamp's review 
of the Report for the Economic Journal in September said:’
"The worst that can be said about the Macmillan 
report is that in the face of our present tre­
mendous and urgent problems its recommendations 
for immediate relief seem feeble and nerveless; 
but no one ought to make this criticism unless he 
is prepared to assert that there actually exists 
a field of active possibility which has been 
unexplored".
Whatever the academic merits of the Report, it was of little practical 
help to the distracted administration. As advice to a Government in acute 
crisis it offered little that was new and nothing that was easy to implement.
y
The international conference^which was held in London late in July^ (p)
illustrated the problems of achieving any international
co-operation at that time. The Report did reveal the volume of London's 
%
short-term debts and probably increased doubts about the solvency of the 
The May Committee Report
It was the May Committee, which Snowden had set up in March, going back
considerably on his views of November about .outside.interference, which
«
was the greatest blow to ‘financial confidence, and- to the administration. ■
(1) Harrod (1951) op»cit. p ^ 23 C2) See below 395-
p
(*>' Howson (1975) on. cit.| and Williams (19 6 3) op.cit. .
j ‘ l  1. L
■ . . ¡ • ' I  l .1
I , I
The report pronounced, that the borrowing for the Unemployment Insurance
Tund and the Road Fund should be regarded as a revenue liability and on
this basis, including the usual redemption of debt, the deficit was likely
to be £120 million They • that the electoral programmes of each
successive party .in power had been prepared with a view to gaining electoral
support rather than considering the national interest'. Nothing but the
strictest regard for . economy and efficiency would restore the trade of
the country. Thus savage cuts were proposed. Rates of pay for all personnel
of the fighting services were to be reduced to the level of 19 2 5; teachers'
pay and all Unemployment Insurance Benefits were to be reduced by 20%; and
the police pay by 12^%. Cuts were also announced in the expenditure of
all departments including the Road Fund and the Unemployment Grants
Committee. Given that economies were to be made, the savage cuts across
the board paid little heed to priorities and the minority report found
this particularly unpleasant quoting the cutting of the plans for improved
maternity services for which Greenwood had fought so hard and which were
( ? )expected to save many lives . By highlighting the budget deficit as a
threat to the economy they attacked one of the few negative feedbacks in
the system which might have helped to contain the employment position.
/
Keynes considered the Report one of the most' foolish documents which he 
had ever read. It was hysterical and inaccurate and as Keynes said:
"gave not a moment's thought to the possible 
repercussions of the programme either as to 
the volume of employment or to the receipt 
of taxation ...." (5 )
(1) ibid. PP 15, 215.
(2) pp 25^.255. _
(3) Harrod (1951) op.cit. P ^38 See also Keynes Is letter to MacDonald
in early August on reason for not recalling E.A.C. . Howson and Winch (1977). cp.pit', pp.oo- 90*
koi
Snowden announcing the Government's agreement to set up a Committee had 
said,
’ "in view of the 72 Committees already appointed 
by the Government since they came into office 
they would not oppose the proposal of the Liberal 
party for a further inquiry into the economy in 
Government Departments" (l)
Snowden said that:
"X welcomed the agitation for reduction of expenditure 
because I realized no Government could embark upon a 
drastic reduction unless it were supported by a strong 
public opinion". (2 )
Yet of all the 72 committees reporting this was the one which the Government 
could well have done without. The committee was appointed under the chair­
manship of Lord May. The membership was not conducive to the formation 
of policies likely to find sympathy with the Labour Party. It was probably 
a bad decision to set up the committee and having set it up the terms of 
reference were too wide for a matter so central to the policy of the 
administration. Set up on 17th March, the terms of reference were:
"To make recommendation to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer of effecting forthwith all possible 
reductions in the National, expenditure on Supply 
Services having regard especially to the present 
and prospective position of the Revenue. In so 
far as questions of policy are involved in the 
expenditure under discussion they will remain for 
the exclusive consideration of the Cabinet but 
it will be open to the Committee to review the 
expenditure and to indicate the economies which 
might be effected if particular policies were ■ 
either adopted, abandoned or modified". ■(3) 123
(1) CAB 23 66, 1 3 th Meeting, 11th February 1931*
(2 ) Snowden (193*0, op.cit.
(3) CAB 2k 222; CP 19 ^ (3 1 )
or one might add, on the international monetary system. Its effect was 
described as cataclysmic. It undermined the attempt at international 
co-operation in the highly volatile money market. The credit so recently’ 
obtained from France and U.S.A. was soon rushing away.
The Economist considered that it overpainted the gloom of the budgetary
prospects, but they strongly denied the proposition of the minority report
that the redistribution of benefits was likely to reduce purchasing power -
it was merely a transfer - thus once again there was a denial of a balanced
(0
budget multiplier. Snowden, with the report in his hands, said in the
House of Commons on JOth July that it was absolutely essential to balance
(i)the budget. As he had previously stated that an increasedtaxation would 
be the last straw Tie Economist felt that this implied a determination 
to effect all possible economies.
The Report was published as Parliament began its Summer recess. The 
Cabinet, possibly underestimating the impact of the Report, left it in the 
hands of a Cabinet Committee composed of the Prime Minister, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Secretary 
of State for Dominion Affairs and the President of the Board of Trade who 
were to meet and to report as soon as possible. All departments were 
to send observations to the Treasury by lj5th August and the Treasury was 
to prepare a co-ordinated report, including Ministers' salaries. So even 
prior to the crisis a package was being prepared which could be presented 
as equitably distributed economies in Government expenditure for balancing 
the budget. The Cabinet left with their vacation homework and the warning that 
they might be recalled. The Prime Minister left for Scotland. 12
(1) The Economist. S i i 1931.
(2 ) Hansard, 30th July 1 9 3 1 . \f6 { . ¿ * 5 , C f t h U U .
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Ten days later he was recalled to London. Meanwhile the situation had
deteriorated and the French and American loans were practically
exhausted. The Cabinet Committee met on Wednesday 12th and on three
subsequent occasions and drew up a memorandum ^  which Cabinet discussed
along with proposals for a revenue tariff and the suspension of the
(?)sinking fimd . Ministers were reluctantly willing to accept as a 
temporary measure, certain economies but they were not prepared to entertain 
the main recommendations of the May Committee?', the proposal (also rejected 
by the Cabinet Committee) for a reduction in unemployment benefits and 
also a suggestion that transitional benefits should be abandoned and the 
responsibility for the provision of long term assistance to the unemployed 
be handed oyer to the public assistance authorities. Instead they adopted 
the conclusion of the Cabinet Committee that the budget must be balanced 
by the application of the principle of 'common sacrifice and effort 1 23
and approval was given to the proposals to increase revenue by means of 
additional direct and indirect tax; expenditure cuts and the removal of anómalii 
reduction of the period of benefits to 26 weeks and the increase of con-
(3)tributions and the imposition of a premium • A committee was given
the further task of finding an additional reduction in expenditure of 
£20 million.
The economies agreed now amounted to £78*575 million and it was proposed 
to raise revenue by £62 million direct taxation, and £2o «5 million indirect
(1 ) CAB Zk 2 2 2 ; CP 205 (3 1 ). •X.
(2) See Bassett (1931) on.cit. for description of the crisis meetings.
(3 ) . CAB 23 67 ^3rd Meeting, 21st August 1931*
kQ5
taxation and to defer the question of a revenue tariff until 21st August. 
Outside Cabinet a series of flurried consultations were taking place with 
the opposition parties, the Labour Party Executive and the Banks.
On 20th August, the Chancellor informed the Cabinet that he and the Prime 
Minister had met the leaders of the opposition parties and had outlined 
the proposals to them. There had been doubts about the feasibility of 
securing cuts in the fighting services and it had been intimated that 
the proposed savings on the unemployment insurance would fail to satisfy 
expectations and that unless larger economies were made the scheme would 
be ineffective. The revenue tariff was not mentioned but both parties 
had been opposed to raising taxes. The Liberals favoured more drastic 
cuts in unemployment insurance and had suggested a temporary suspension 
of the sinking fund and indirect taxation'
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had consulted • -Ith representative
groups of the Labour Party: that is the Consultative Committee and the
National Executive. The National Executive had agreed to leave things
(2)to the Government . The Chancellor had met the TUC Committee. The 
representatives of the TUC said that in their.view the Government had been 
mistaken in their method of approach; and the Government thought that the 
General Council had no real appreciation of the seriousness of the 
situation and the statements made were based on a 'pre-crisis mentality1 2
and were statements with which, in other circumstances, the Government
(1) CAB 23 67 *t2nd Meeting, 20th August 1931-
(2 ) ibid.
would have agreed. Citrine had stated that the General Council were
opposed to any interference with the existing conditions and terms( of
the Unemployment Insurance Fund and all attacks on salaries which would
merely lead employers to attack wages. They were also opposed to any cuts
in the public works programme. The only cuts they did not oppose were
cuts in the Ministerial salariesl They suggested increases in direct
taxation and suspension of the sinking fund. The matter of the revenue
(l)tariff was referred to Congress for decision
The Prime Minister reported on his meeting with the Deputy Governor of 
the Bank of England who said that arrangements for balancing the budget 
without recourse to very substantial economies would have a most detri­
mental effect on the situation: one-third of the deficit met by economies
/
was not enough, it must be at least half; and to satisfy foreign interests,
substantial parts of this must come from the unemployment fund. Meanwhile,
the Cabinet Committee had not got very far in raising £20 million finding
only £*f million by increasing workers' contributions. Cabinet was reminded
that unemployment benefits were J>0/o higher than in 192^ when the budget
, (2)was m  surplus /•
(1) ibid.
(2) CAB 23 67 *f3rd Meeting, 21st August 1931. "" ■
The pre-occupation with money value in an acute depression with rapidly 
falling prices is an interesting behavioural characteristic which one 
could compare with the predominant interest in real wages during an___ inflation* /
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The Prime Minister referred to the way in which the situation was likely 
to develop and suggested that the best possible solution would be to decide, 
with agreement of all concerned, upon a programme which if carried out 
would satisfy*the situation. The Government should proceed to inc?oide 
sufficient economies to restore public confidence and to enable the 
position to be re-established and to inform the TUC that there was no 
alternative but to proceed with their proposal.
'Could1 ,he .asked, 'Cabinet accept- as a temporary emergency measure a 
reduction of 5 or 10% in benefits? 1 The average cost of living had fallen 
by U-g% since 1929- The Cabinet were not prepared to take a fall in the 
cost of living as a basis for a reduction in benefits and there was little 
support for a cut of 3% and the Cabinet was equally divided on the proposed 
10% cut. In the circumstances, the Prime Minister informed the Cabinet
that ' his only reason for proceeding with the review was in order that he
\
might be in a position to submit the scheme as a whole to the heads of the 
opposition parties and representatives of the Bank of England later in the 
day.
The discussion proceeded and the issue of the sinking fund was again raised. 
The Chancellor warned of the serious consequences of the proposal. The 
position regarding the revenue tariff had changed since the last meeting as 
it had been rejected by the Liberal Party who had accepted the principle of 
the suspension of the sinking fund which it was claimed made the revenue 
tariff unnecessary. From the debate emerged considerable support for 
the proposition that the revenue tariff should be excluded from the 
proposals if and only if no further economies were made in regard to
unemployment insurance. Tensions on this issue were great and no one 
was open to trade-offs between the extremes of the policies. The Chancellor 
objected to any commitment to the revenue tariff and the Prime Minister ' 
stated that it would be clearly understood that no decision of any kind 
had been reached on the subject of the revenue tariff. MacDonald said 
he would re-submit the proposals, which included the suspension of the 
sinking fund, but would not include a reference to the revenue tariff 
or the insurance benefits to the leaders of the opposition parties. Cabinet 
approved the attempt, by the Prime Minister, to reconcile the differences and 
decided that a statement should be made to the effect that a scheme to 
balance the budget was to be brought before Parliament as soon as possible. 
Arrangements were to be made for the reassembly of Parliament; notification made 
to the TUC; and ministers were to be informed of cuts in salaries. The 
Ministers should be ready for an emergency meeting ^ .
Matters appeared to be settled but not for long. By Saturday morning
(2)things had changed considerably . The Prime Minister reported that 
the financial situation had deteriorated and the representatives of the 
Bank of England and leaders of the opposition parties had rejected the 
proposals. The opposition parties had called for greater economies. It 
was considered that all attempts to 'camouflage the situation by recourse 
to the sinking fund would be detected. The budget should be balanced in 
an 'honest fashion1 2. Could Cabinet find a further £25 million?
(l) ibid.-
(2) CAB 25 6 7, kkth Meeting, 22 August 1951*
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The tenuous agreement was shattered and the argument was reopened.
The Chancellor threatened the Cabinet by alluding to the possibility 
of a Government taking office and introducing economy legislation based 
on existing proposals plus further substantial cuts in Unemployment 
Insurance. He went on to warn them of the consequences of any departure 
from the gold standard:- • .
"So far as he was concerned he had ho doubt 
whatever, if he was compelled to choose between 
retaining the Labour Movement in its present form 
and reducing the standard of living of workmen by 
^0$, which would be the effect of departing from 
the gold standard, where his duty would lie; he 
felt confident that his views would be shared by 
every responsible leader of the party". (l)
After Snowden's dire warnings, the Prime Minister asked if the Cabinet 
would be prepared to add a further £20 million made up of £122 million 
by 10$  off unemployment benefits and £7i million in other ways. Cabinet 
were not prepared to make this offer: Snowden and Thomas dissenting The
Prime Minister then spoke of the difficulties which would arise if Cabinet 
could not agree to further economies? 'could he ask the opposition if a 
further £20 million cut would be satisfactory? 1 2 He was given permission 
to make this informal proposal and a little later in the day he reported
©
that he felt that the banking interests were prepared to regard the pro­
position as adequate and that opposition parties would accept it if the 
Bankers would, though Chamberlain made reservations to the effect that 
acceptance must not be taken to preclude them from pressing for further
(1) ibid.
(2 ) ibid.
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cuts when the legislation was before the House of Commons (1)
The Prime Minister was forcing his colleagues into a corner.
"How embarrassing if after an affirmative reply 
had been received to a hypothetical question the 
Cabinet were to decide that they could not 
implement the cuts! " (2 )
The Cabinet spent a tense Sunday awaiting telephone calls from America.
After 7 p.m. on Sunday, Harrison had expressed a personal view that the
new proposals would be satisfactory but he needed to confer with banking
(3)interests in New York . Opposition parties had agreed to the proposals 
and this was understood to mean that they would facilitate the passage of 
the Government's proposals without changes. The Prime Minister had also 
seen the King and advised him to consult with the leaders of the opposition 
parties.
One question remained: would Cabinet be prepared to sanction the cuts in 
unemployment benefits? A message, later that evening from America indicated 
that the economies would be supported if the Bill was presented soon. 123
(1) CAB 23 6 7, 45 th Meeting, 22nd August 1931*
(2 ) ibid
(3 ) CAB 23 67, 46 th Meeting, 23rd August 1931. Harrison was Governor of the 
New York Federal Reserve Bank.
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MacDonald.made his final appeal to the Cabinet:
•’’He most sincerely hoped that the Cabinet would 
now accept the proposals as a whole. If, however, 
the Cabinet were unable to accept them, then it 
was clear that the loan which was essential to 
avert the crisis would not be forthcoming and it 
was unthinkable that the Government could remain 
in Office and prevent some other Administration 
being given the opportunity of deciding that the
money should be found...... . a situation had now
to be faced of a peculiarly difficult character 
because if the Labour Party was not prepared to 
join with the Conservatives and Liberal Parties in 
accepting the proposals as a whole; the condition 
mentioned in Mr Harrison's message regarding a 
national agreement would not be fulfilled. .So far 
as he was concerned he was strongly in favour of 
such acceptance while at the same time making clear 
that the scheme represented the extreme limit to 
which he was prepared to go.
The country was suffering from lack of confidence 
abroad. There was, as yet, no panic at home, but 
the Prime Minister warned the Cabinet of the 
calamitous nature of the consequences which would 
immediately and inevitably follow from a financial 
panic and flight from the pound. No one could be 
blind to the very great political difficulties in 
which the giving effect to the proposals as a whole 
would involve the Government. But when the immediate 
crisis was over and before Parliament met, it would 
be possible to give the Labour Party that full 
explanation of the circumstances which had rendered 
it necessary for the Government to formulate such a 
drastic scheme which could not be given at the 
moment. The only alternative was a reduction not of 
10 $ . but of at least 20$ and he could not
believe the Labour Party would reject the proposals 
when they knew the true facts of the position; he 
was confident, indeed, that a majority of that Party 
would accept them. A scheme which inflicted reduc­
tions and burdens in almost every other direction but 
made no appreciable cut in unemployment insurance 
benefit would much alienate much support and lose the 
party their moral prestige which was one of their 
greatest assets. In conclusion, the Prime Minister 
said that it must be admitted that the proposals as 
a whole represented the negation of everything that the 
Labour Party stood for, and yet he was absolutely
satisfied that it was necessary in the national 
interest, to implement them if the country was 
to be secured. He then pointed out that, if on 
this question there were any important resignations 
the Government as a.whole must resign". (l)
Each member.of the Cabinet then expressed his views on the question of 
the inclusion or otherwise in the proposals of the 10 % reduction in 
•Unemployment benefit. It became apparent that the adoption of the 
scheme would involve some major resignations from certain Ministers. The 
Prime Minister said that he would inform the King. Cabinet agreed and 
authorised the Prime Minister to state that all Cabinet Ministers had 
placed their resignations in the hands of the Prime Minister. The Prime 
Minister saw .the King that evening and the following morning before the 
last Cabinet meeting of the Labour Administration^ He said that
"he had proposed to His Majesty the resignation 
of the Government. He had not failed to present 
the case against his participation in the proposed 
Administration but in view of the gravity of the 
situation he had felt that there was no other course 
open to him than to assist in the formation of a 
National Government on a comprehensive basis for 
the present emergency" (2)
He explained that the National Cabinet would be small and would exist for 
no longer than was necessary to dispose of the present emergency after 
which the political parties would resume their respective position;
(1) CAS 23 67 kGth Meeting, 23rd August 1931» 9 p.m.
(2) Janeway refersto a note in the MacDonald's papers on which MacDonald had 
analysed the options open to the Government- one of' which was that a 
nucleus remained to form a Rational Government - they would be slaughtered 
at the next election. There is little to suggest from the conduct of'the
• meeting that MacDonald had any other objective but to persuade his 
colleagues to accept the cuts which had been forced upon them. The con­
spiratorial model could only be supported from other evidence.;'.op. cit .p260.
ëw is-also "support ed'bjr Bassett" (1932) 'ôp. -cit; Mar quand ' {1977) 
op. cit*  p -630- 1 ..  ^..; _ u:...
"The Administration would not be a Coalition 
Government in the usual sense of the term, but a 
Government of co-operation for this one purpose’1 23. (1 )
The 'nine* ^ ^ w h o  disagreed bowed out into the annals of Labour Party 
mythology: the well sung heroes of the left. Yet they were without an 
alternative ‘policy and merely made way for those with stronger stomachs 
to make possibly even more severe cuts.
MacDonald was not so lightly let offx the hook . After issuing the press\
release announcing the Government's decision he had to deal with the 
Bankers' negotiations and was patently impatient at having to await the 
decisions of yet another banker, (this time Morgan's, representing the' U.S.
Government)! to see if the proposals which had devastated his
(3)administration were acceptable to the Americans
y
^All hell broke loose*in the Labour Party and Executive and T.U.C. produced
a Manifesto within days of the fall of the Government. Vindictive debates
took place inside and outside of Parliament between erstwhile members
y  (if)
of the Government. The Conservatives pressed for an election . The 
heroics and melodramatics were not sufficient to save the pound, which 
continued to deteriorate. As early as 10 September
(1) ibid.'
(2 ) Henderson, Graham, Adamson, Lansbury, Alexander, Johnston, Greenwood, 
Clynes. They accepted protection only as a  last ditch defehce and 
were not for the most part fully convinced of its usefulness.
Hansard, September 193L.
(3) Prem. 1 / 96.
Hansard, vol. 256 cols.' 112-3.' Mew Statesman' 19 th 26th Septimssr, 
J^ ^ -Ep-Qhpmisk 29th August and 5th September. Reported favourably of ‘ 
tne reaction ..abroad to the new administration.
before the Economy Bill had been presented the £ was already in jeopardy 
as a letter keeping the Prime Minister informed of the financial situation 
stated: •
"Considerable doubt prevails in financial circles 
regarding the possibility of our maintenance of 
the gold standard and consequently many institutions 
and firms are directing their attention to the 
desirability of selling sterling securities and 
investing dollars, francs and guilders .... They 
proceed upon the argument that as trustees for 
shareholders they are bound to take this action 
unless the Government makes it illegal". (l)
For the next week or so the conditions got worse until on September l8th
r
the decision to abandon the gold standard was taken. It had become apparent 
that no further help was likely from the Americans although the French 
were willing to help as is indicated in a letter to Snowden from the French 
Minister of Finance:
"I hastened back from Geneva in the desire to do 
everything in my power to help you to maintain the 
stability of the £  sterling. One of the ways of 
doing this would have been the issue of a foreign 
loan. I was pleased to learn that the Bank of France 
had spontaneously made proposals to the Bank of 
England in that sense but I understood the force of 
the arguments which have made it necessary to 
abandon the idea. * ' ‘ * •. - ■ •
Apart from that solution the defence of the £ could 
only be assured by some extensive operation concerted 
between America and Paris markets. The last of your 
messages shows unfortunately that this is not at 
present realizable in America." (2) *12
* '  I — ■ ' ■ ■ ■  ■■ I II . I I I  —  ■ -  I !  Ia
(1 ) ibid.
(2) Prem.l 1/97.
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In one of the most pathetic meetings of the period MacDonald, alone with 
his advisors, agreed to the proclamation and procedures necessary for 
Britain to abandon the gold standard. The philosophy surrounding the event 
was reminiscence of that which was adopted towards the loss of the 
'Pobbles Toes' MacDonald asked what would be the effect of the
'upset 1 23 and was told by Harvey that the impact
"would be felt most keenly by wealthy financiers;
there were lots of people who had in fact said that
this was the one cure for our ills". (2 )
Peacock felt it would be an 'awful blow to everyone' and mentioned Irish 
and Indian peasants who had long relied on the Bills of Exchange drawn on 
London! MacDonald inquired about pegging the rate but Harvey dismissed 
the idea as a very 'complicated operation 1 and felt that the situation 
should be 'watched' before taking any decisions. 'Could not the theorists 
be used? '. asked the Prime Minister retaining his belief in experts, 'we 
ought to enlist every brain. ...It would be a case of all hands to the 
pump". ^
(1) Edward Lear, >■ ^ * ¿ 0  *• 1 ^ 7
(2) Pr^rw 1 ijq-)
(3 ) ibib.
M6
Peacock felt,
"no one could accuse this country of not having 
‘made every effort before letting the pound go, 
and it was pointed out that by having balanced 
the Budget, whatever happened, this country had 
at least demonstrated her will to play the game 
at all cost". (1 )
Honour was saved!
Postcript
In spite of the sacrifices of aspects of the modest unemployment programme,
cuts in public works and in maintenance provisions, the 'sacred cows' of
the administration had to be abandoned. First the gold standard and then
free trade. Only one remained: the balanced budget. Every policy manifesto
for the 1931 election stated specifically that 'Balanced Budgets' would be
(?)eoi objective . In the King's speech in November the policy was spelt 
out again.
"The Nation, at the General Election, endorses 
these measures for securing the economy and 
balancing the National Budget which contributes 
the first essential steps in the solution of the 
financial and economic problems with which the 
country has been confronted". (3 )
MacDonald, the man of reason, with an over optimistic belief in the wisdom 
of experts and the possibility of national debate achieving consensus 123
(1) Prem. 1  I/97.
(2) Craig (1973) opcit.
(3 ) CAB 23 69 3rd November 1931*
decisions was left to protect the interests of the unemployed against even 
more stringent cuts. He was abandoned by the Labour Party, removed from . 
its ranks by a rubber stamped notice and maligned by generations on the 
Left The Labour Party floundered for the next decade finally
emerging,phoenix like, after the war in the hands of Attlee who was able 
to implement some of the policies of which the old men had dreamed. (l)
(l) Citrine (196*0 op.cit
CONCLUSION
Introduction
There was, as Keynes had said in discussions with the Macmillan Committee ^  
something to be said for almost all the remedies advocated to reduce 
unemployment. The Labour Party had proposed most of the potential 
policies available for the reduction of unemployment. But few of these 
policies were implemented or were implemented in such a feeble way as to 
have little impact on the problem. The reasons for the failure were 
suggested in the introduction to this thesis as being associated with the 
acceptance of certain economic and political philosophies, the weakness 
of economic analysis and economic management, administrative failures 
and failures associated with personalities. We can now reconsider these 
explanations in the light of the narrative chapters which chart the 
progress of policy formulation and implementation during this period.
Economic and Political Philosophy
The Labour Party was a socialist party and as such did not have much 
sympathy with the capitalist economic philosophy or the economic model 
which was derived from the description of the operation of the capitalist 
economy. They were committed to neither the classical model nor the 
emerging Keynesian model. This did not preclude them from accepting, as 
central tenets of their policy, aspects of classical economic philosophy 
and dogma more usually associated with parties of the right: the main­
tenance of the gold standard; the balancing of the budget and free trade. 1
(1 ) Committee on Finance and Industry. Minutes of Evidence (1931) op.cit., 
Eriday 21 Eeb. 1930.
"There is something to be said for each of the different 
remedies that people have been proposing and one might 
make a concoction which in the aggregate might be of value".
Manipulation of exchange rates, the budgetary balance or trading policies 
can all be regarded as policy instruments which could be used to further 
other policy goals such as the maintenance of high levels of employment. 
For the Labour administration these potential instruments were objectives 
which operated as constraints upon the unemployment policies.
These constraints, as we have seen, impeded the development of unemploy­
ment policies associated with the provision of work' by public works :and 
the retirement plan' put under pressure the policy of maintenance of 
the unemployed; and eventually brought down the administration.
In addition to these constraints, the Labour Party had quite decided 
views on the distribution of income in the economy and whilst they were 
not in a position to do much to improve the distribution, they were against 
policies which might make it worse, so any policies favouring capitalists 
or adversely affecting the workers were resisted. This attitude is 
apparent in the discussions on agricultural protection, reconstruction 
and the management of insurance funds.
The Use of Advisors
In spite of the talk before the election of the formation of a centralized 
body to deal with the development of economic policy, it took MacDonald 
some months to develop the concept and set up the structure which became 
known as the E.A.C. The relationship between this body, a sort of 
1 think tank^ and the policy formulation and executive branches of the 
Government was never resolved.
k20
MacDonald took advantage of all shades of opinion when obtaining advice 
on matters of policy. He had an unfailing belief in the wisdom of 
experts and also in the possibility that a wide ranging body of opinion', 
if brought together in the form of a committee, would arrive at a consensus 
decision.
This view was criticised many times during the administration both by 
Ministersand Members of Parliament, e.g. Oliver Stanley on the question 
of the Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance:
"We are told that the object is to free the whole 
thing from political taint. What does the P.M. 
mean? Does he mean that he is going to form a 
Royal Commission of members entirely free from any 
party or political bias or affiliation? ... Or 
does he simply mean that this Commission is going 
to be packed with all the conflicting elements of 
political life today and that then the Govt, are 
not going to accept any recommendation unless it is 
unanimous and therefore free from political taint", (l)
One may also cite Attlee's remarks on the Committee to be formed to 
consider regional policy:
"It was no use setting up a Committee of persons 
whose attitude ' of mind was opposed to the 
principle of public control of industry and it 
was little use for the committee to consist partly 
of such people and partly of those who sympathised 
with that principle" (2 ) 12
(1) Hansard Oct. 30th 1930. Vol. , Col. S3.
(2) CAB 27 ^38 UP (30) Meeting 2^; CAB 27 MtO UP (30) 66.
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In the economic sphere, he brought together economists and industrialists 
from all sections of the economic spectrum who, not surprisingly, could 
not re.ach agreement. In the Economists' Committee of the Economic 
Advisory Council, a less assorted group Keynes, Henderson, Pigou,
Robbins and Stamp, were brought together by MacDonald who hoped for. some 
clear advice to emerge from their deliberations; instead he was:, presented 
with a pedantic report hedged in with academic disclaimers and provisos.
It.was the very opposite of the kind of report that MacDonald required 
and its interpretation into policy terms was a daunting task.
Failure of Economic Theory
The advice given was seriously deficient because of the lack of development 
of some aspects of economic theory. The issues involved were concerned 
with the debate about the 'Classical' interpretation of the depression 
and the policies likely to be effective and the emerging 'Keynesian' 
interpretation which was still relatively undeveloped. . The debate raged 
about whether reductions in wages would increase employment by increasing 
the rate of profit and encouraging investment; or whether the effect on 
income would be such as to reduce demandi cause further falls in prices 
and reduce economic activity still further. Keynes attempted to illus­
trate a case, in which no change in wages would be sufficient to remove 
unemployment, by setting up an allegory concerning two trading nations 
but he had not extended it very far in terms of the domestic 1
(1) CAB 58 150. Some of these economists had taken part in radical policy 
formulation (Keynes, Henderson and Stamp); had expressed doubts about 
the wisdom of the Treasury View (Pigou); or had expressed uncom­
mitted interest in the debate (Robbins). See Chapter Four above and 
Howson and Winch (1977), op.clt. pp fy-j
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market beyond expressing fears that reduction of wages could cause
a spiralling effect if wages in other countries also fell. Most of his
fears about wage cuts were associated with the feasibility of implementing
such cuts given the political situation of the period and he was anxious
that if the cuts were made, they were undertaken as part of an equitable
( 2)package of cuts ' . He preferred cuts in real wages, which it was 
thought might arise from some of the policies intended to raise internal 
demand, to cuts in money wages. There was also considerable discussion 
about the effect on the price level of measures to increase internal 
activity. Snowden attacked all such measures in distributional terms. 
Keynes oscillated between the idea that they probably would cause an 
initial increase in prices which he considered to be a necessary 
stimulus to the internal economy and tentative explorations into the 
production function which led him to the belief that the supply schedule 
was probably highly elastic in conditions of under-employed resources.
For Keynes's views on the impact on prices during this period, it is 
interesting to compare,
"A large amount of deflationary slack has first 
to be taken up before there is the slightest 
chance of development policy leading to 
inflation". (3)
with
"When I was advocating Government schemes of 
home investment, these schemes were sometimes 
criticised as 'inflationary' and therefore undesir­
able, because of the rise of home prices associated (l)*3
(l) For this development the money market needed to be integrated with
the real system and the special cases of investment being interest in­
elastic and the demand for money to'nold being infinitely elastic 
at going rates of interest needed to be specified. This position was 
subsequently modified by the specification of the real balance effect.
£?.mmittee on Finance and Industry: Minutes of Evidence (1931), op.cit.
(3) Keynes, Henderson (1929), op.cit.
with secondary employment ensuing on the primary 
employment created by the Government. But in this 
sense any conceivable cause of increased employment 
is 'inflationary' in the sense that the secondary 
effects cause the prices of home-produced goods to 
rise relatively to the new level of money wages". (1 )
(2)The earlier view, which later received the support of Kahn , was the 
one which he subsequently adopted and incorporated into the General 
Theory. But at the time that vital policy decisions were being made, 
the analysis to support intervention was rather sketchy. On the central 
issue as to whether the increase in internal demand would raise economic 
activity or merely be diversionary, there was surprisingly little debate 
and certainly not much support, from the economists involved with the 
Government for the 'Treasury View'. There was not a great deal added 
to the theory of direct intervention in the form of public works, except 
a somewhat conditional blessing from all members of the Economists' 
Committee. The concept which would have provided a great support for direct 
intervention was the multiplier but, in spite of the work by Kahn for the 
Economists' Committee which provided the background to the development of 
the concept, the idea was not communicated to politicians who continued to 
use rather dubious attempts to calculate 'indirect effects' of works pro­
grammes. Until the development of this concept which set a limit to the 
possible expansionary impact, the idea was extremely woolly. Lacking this 
concept, the support for public works schemes was couched entirely in 
cost-effectiveness terms - usually not extended to take into account social 
benefits - rather than as an expansionary tool.
Trade policy was another area of conflict. The arguments in support of 
free trade ranged from the excessively formalistic and pedantic approach 12
(1) CAB 58 150 EAC (E) 1 5 . September 1930*
(2) Hancock K . , "Unemployment and the Economists in the 1920's", Economica 
I960, discusses Bellerby's estimates that at about J>% the level of un­
employment at which rising output was siip&nted by rising prices. At
this point he suggested that monetary policy should be used to halt the boom.
of Pigou to the emotionally charged arguments of Robbins. Keynes argued
the case for tariffs in terms of budgetary and employment potential, and
provided formulations capable of minimizing the efficiency problem by
suggesting export bounties to compensate for the import tariffs; but his
formulations were dismissed by his colleagues as impractical, so another
potentially powerful policy received little support from the experts
This theoretical gap could have been met by the development of theory of
the * second-best1 23 but although a germinal form of the theory was mentioned
(2)by Keynes, the development of the concept did not occur until much later 
Other refinements which might have been helpful were the concept of the 
optimum tariff^and further developments in the theory of international 
trade exploring the effects of changes in factor prices and productivity 
on trading patterns incomes and prices These developments niijM'have
done much to reduce the polarization of the parties for and against free 
trade policies causing them to recognise:
"The implication as in many other problems in the 
theory of international economic policy, is that 
the answer depends on the circumstances of the 
particular case: and that anyone who asserts that 
one conclusion is universally valid is making an 
implicit assumption about the facts which ought to 
be explicitly defended - if it can be", (k)
(1) CAB 2^ 216 CP 363 (30)» op.cit. See also debates in the economic 
journals of this period on free trade.
(2) Lipsey and LancasterCgöo/7) op.cit. Meade (1955) op.cit. Viner (1950)
op.cit. h
(3 ) Kaldor (19^0) op.cit.; Scitovszky (19^1/2) op.cit.; de Graaff (19^9/50); 
op.cit. Machlup (19^+3) op.cit.; Metzler 19^2; o~p.cit. Johnson 1953/^; 
op.cit.
(*0 Johnson (1953) op.cit.
Another factor which affected trade policy was associated with the
nineteenth century pattern of colonial development which had led to the
belief that investment abroad had its counterpart in demand for exports
(1)from the domestic market • With the emergence of competition from 
other industrialized countries end from home based industries, this was 
no longer true but it was still used to support overseas investment and 
to oppose exchange controls on the flow of funds abroad.
In addition to the inadequacy of the theoretical models, the quality
of economic information and quantitative methods w£t<i not an adequate
guide for policy. This inadequacy is highlighted in the deliberation
of the E.A.C. when MacDonald was astonished to learn that there were
no estimations of the potential of export markets at a time when export
(2)expansion was one of the main strategies of the Government . Further
examples can be found in the queries about the quantitative relationships
(3 )
made by the Economists' Committee . The work of Colin Clark and Stamp? 
pioneers in the field of economic information,was available and the 
London and Cambridge Economic Service was functioning, but there is 
a difference between the amassing and description of data and the estimation
(4)
and testing of economic models . The use of advanced econometric models
and policy analysis in the style of Tinbergen would have contributed to
(5)the policy formulation 12*45
(1) Committee on Finance and Industry, Minutes of Evidence (1951), op. cit. 
See Keynes'j; discussion on this point.
(2) CAB 3 8 , 2, 5th Meeting, 19th June 1930.
(3-) CAB 58 150 E 8 .
(4) Hancock (i960), op. cit. Hancock expressed the view that sufficient 
information was available.
(5) Tinbergen (1950) on. cit.
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Administrative Problems
The difficult task of policy making was made even more difficult by the 
administrative tangle of the policy formulating and executive branches 
of the Government.
Administrative Structure
MacDonald began by appointing the Lord Privy Seal, Thomas, to take over-all 
charge of unemployment policy assisted by a small secretariate and three 
junior ministers, Mosley, Lansbury and Johnson, two of whom had other 
responsibilities. This group,with officials from the various departments, 
met as the Inter-Departmental Committee on Unemployment . and
generated a great deal of enthusiasm in the first months of the adminis­
tration, but this was soon sapped by their lack of any executive power.
They were limited to the stimulation and approval of schemes; they could 
not initiate action.
They were separated from, yet dependent uponfthe Treasury for sanctioning 
schemes and also separated from the potential spending departments, 
e.g. Ministry of Transport and the Department of Health which relied upon 
the local authorities and the public utility companies to initiate schemes. 
Mosley soon became very impatient with this arrangement and produced his 
memorandum on government organization By this time, however, the E.A.C.
was set up, but in order to meet some of the problems highlighted by 
Mosley, the Panel of Ministers was organized to develop: 1
(1) CAB 2k, 209 31 (30).
"the policy of the Government in regard to
employment and unemployment and supervising,
energising, criticising and making suggestions
as to execution". (1 ) .
This panel consisted of the ministers of departments crucially involved
in policies affecting unemployment with the Lord Privy Seal, Hartshorn,
having the task of co-ordinating unemployment policy by keeping in touch
with the Prime Minister and other ministers involved. The secretariate
was expanded and helped by Henderson who was already working with the
E.A.C. In spite of its apparent activity, this structure was also
(2)criticised quite strongly by Attlee who bemoaned its cumbersome
nature and the lack of executive power and after only six months there
were feelings that what was needed was some "centralized co-ordinating
(3)authority which could arrive at quick decisions" *
Decision Making
The failure to make quick decisions or any decisions was one of the most 
serious defects of the administration. The pattern which emerges on a 
number of issues is: the formulation of a difficult problem, probably 
involving a political as well as an economic dilemma; the formulation of 
alternatives by the Minister; their rejection; the setting up of a com­
mittee; further activity attempting to formulate feasible alternatives; 
the reporting of suggestions and their rejection usually on the original 123
(1) CAB 23 6*f, 31st Meeting 1930.
(2) CAB 27 ^39 UP J>b (30).
(3) CAB 23 6 5, 26th November 1930, 70 (30).
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grounds. The Unemployment Insurance scheme was a good example of this.
The problem was how to deal with the workers receiving benefits under 
the transitional arrangements without contravening the pledges to ease 
the burden on local authorities; not raising contributions or changing 
benefits orinposing extra burdens on the budget. As specified, the problem 
was practically insoluble and some requirement had to be relaxed. The 
matter was discussed by a Cabinet Committee in September 1929i by an 
inter-party working group in 1930» by the Panel of Ministers, by a further
Cabinet Committee in 1931» by the Royal Commission on Unemployment 
Insurance and the May Committee and the Government was dissolved before 
a decision was taken. . Was the problem too difficult? Was the imagina­
tion lacking in the quest for solutions? Or w as the administration 
incapable of making decisions which involved any kind of. compromise?
The problems were difficult and the ministers often lacked flair in 
finding solutions but so did other people considering the problem. The 
most important defect appears to be the lack of any concept of a trade-off 
amongst policy objectives. The ministers were idealists and compromise 
was not easy for them but in failing to make compromises, they were 
compromising those whom they were purporting to help; the unemployed. 
Possibly they would have been willing to take unpleasant decisions which 
went against some of their ideals if sanctioned by as many additional 
authorities as possible and so used Royal Commissions, outside experts 
and the opposition parties for support whenever possible.
Personalities
Personalities were involved in the failure of the administration to 
make decisions. Snowden was one of the most powerful personalities and 
the common factor in many issues which remained unresolved during the
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administration. Snowden is caricatured as the arch-reactionary in the 
administration. He believed with puritanical fervour that the budget - ' 
should be fairly and honestly balanced and that the national debt should 
be reduced and free trade established. On the distributional issues 
in society, however, there was little doubt where his sentiments lay.
His budgets tended to be redistributional and probably had a greater 
expansionary effect than expected. His attacks on most of the 'radical' 
economic policies were based on distributional grounds. The thing they 
had in common in Snowden's eyes was their effect on prices: they would 
all raise prices and reduce real wages. This he saw as raising the 
profits of the entrepreneur at the expense of the worker: something he 
would not be a party to. He saw the economy in static distributional 
terms and failed to see the dynamic implications of the policies, nor 
was he able to see or willing to make any trade-off between real wages 
and unemployment. His view was that if there was over-production in 
agriculture then it should adjust itself to the changed conditions; 
agriculture and industry would not complain at making profits, so why 
should they complain at making losses? Snowden was unwilling to help them 
even to the extent of ^d on a loaf For similar reasons he was
unwilling to subsidi zb wages. He appeared to believe in a structuralist
explanation of the depression and was unwilling to ease the conditions
/
during the slump by any short term measures which he saw as merely pro­
longing the adjustment process. To further these beliefs he was willing
and
to use all his political wiles from tantrum/ cunning to mere invective.
I » — »«»-1^ « ■' » I »« « «1 ill« m i I > II III < II . I ■»—  .MB.
(1) CAB 24 220 CP 52 (31).
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MacDonald could not out manoeuvre him as is shown quite clearly on the 
protection issue
Thomas, taking an unattractive job, was quickly overwhelmed by the 
difficulties and after six months had accepted the idea that little could 
be done to make any impact on unemployment. He did see the case for pro­
tection and attempted to move the administration towards it during 1930 on 
the issue of the tariff truce and the Imperial Conference, but he too was 
unable to move Snowden who was in fact mischieviously planning to get him 
to be spokesman for the P a r t y  at a free trade campaign which was being
organized for the autumn of 19 3 1 1, (2)
Of the other ministers, Morrison, Greenwood, Adamson and Johnson worked 
consistently to get the unemployment programme tinder way. Whilst 
Lansbury was unrelenting in his efforts to make some impact on 
Government policy and the memoranda are 'peppered' by his periodic attacks 
on the mediocre progress which was being made, he had little to contribute 
individually to the programme except his 'land settlement' dreams but he
supported vigorously any programme which had any potential for reducing
(3)unemployment
(1) CAB 23 64, 49, 5 0 ; c a b  23 64 65 (30); CAB 23 66 3 1  (3 1 ).
(2) P. Snowden (1934), op.cit.
(3) CAB 24 216 CP 390 (30); CAB 27 44-0 UP 30 (6l).
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Mosley* s impatience with the inaction arose early in the administration 
and his personality was not one which could have easily been constructively 
assimilated into a consensus team. Attlee coming into the team at the end 
of the second year quickly applied his logic to the situation, and in 
spite of his incomplete grasp of the macro-potentials of his policies, 
formulated a blue-print for industrial and regional planning which was 
one of the few encouraging possibilities remaining at the end of the 
administration.
Bondfield and Graham carried on fairly determinedly, if unimaginatively, 
with their rather difficult tasks but neither was able to make any sig­
nificant contribution to the problem of unemployment.
Henderson and Passfieli had.little to do with the central issues of 
policy but were usually on the conventional side when policy issues 
impinging on unemployment were discussed. Henderson was a committed 
free-trader giving little support or encouragement to any attempts at a 
more pragmatic approach to trade until the last moments of the adminis­
tration when one is dubious of the motives for the change of heart 
Passfield was also a free-trader and had a fairly punitive attitude when
he did contribute to discussions about the unemployed - benefits were
( 2)*a privilege and not a right' . 12
(1) See Bassett (19 5 8 ) op. cit.
(2) CAB 27 396 U1 (29) 3rd Meeting.
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Members of the House of Commons, such as Bevan, Maxton, and Whitfield 
consistently advocated, though not from a very rigorous theoretical basis, 
policies of a radical nature and would have rallied support for any gesture 
from the Government in this direction. In addition the Liberal Party 
would have supported more vigorous intervention a s  was indicated even 
as late as February 1931 by Lloyd George; MIf they proceed boldly, they 
have the support of the House of Commons behind them...H
•^r MacDonald»the failure of his administration to deal with unemployment 
, was to some extent determined by his failure to contain Snowden. Yet who else 
could have coped with the Exchequer? Snowden had a powerful personality 
and the competence to deal with the complexities of the financial scene. 
Although there were younger members of the team who were able, MacDonald 
did not appear to believe that they had the ministerial experience to take 
over. It was a  cabinet full of potential foreign secretaries but few 
experts on the domestic scene - perhaps an explanation of some of their 
success in the one sphere and failure in the other. MacDonald believed 
in getting the best advice and so involved many able people with the 
administration,and ambitiously took steps to involve experts from outside 
government. This led to radical improvement in the machinery of govern­
ment. The problems which he faced - using the experts constructively 
«
within the ministerial and cabinet structure - are still being sorted 
out by more recent administrations. Probably, the model which attempted 
to involve all shades of opinion was too idealistic and doomed to failure 
in terms of decision-making and the more recent model which involved
(l) Hansard. February 1931* •
b33
taking in politically 1 sympathetic 1 experts is the viable alternative.
MacDonald did not appear to weigh up the conflicting advice offered and\
use his own judgement about its merits. If there was any dissension, 
there tended to be no decision. This was perhaps a form of intellectual 
honesty, but one more suited to an academic than a politician. There was 
a need for the constraints to be recognised and if the simultaneous 
attainment of all objectives was not possible then some of the objectives 
had to be reformulated.
Major Policy Strategies
Let us reconsider the policy measures available,' their potential in 
terms of reducing unemployment and the reasons they were unsuccessfully 
implemented.
Public Works
Although the Labour Party did not accept the view that public works 
policies were merely diversionary neither did they understand the possible 
expansionary effect which such policies might have involved. Public 
works policies were considered as anti-cyclical devices which would 
simultaneously absorb some of the unemployed resources and enable 
improvements to be made to the social and economic fabric of the economy, 
which could be part of a policy of ’rational 1 organization of the economy 
This misunderstanding led to insufficient emphasis being placed on 
public works policies, but would not have prevented those which were 
implemented making a contribution to economic activity.
(l) See .Labour and the Nation (1929) op.cit.
The impact of such policies depends upon the value of the M u l t iplier1 2
but a clear operational formulation of this was not available to the
Government although in the background of the Economists' Committee,
Kahn was refining the concept. Keynes using Kahn's estimations,
implying a multiplier of two, calculated that public investment of £75
million plus a tariff worth £75 million were together capable of removing
unemployment. These formulations did not reach the policy makers who
were merely given a rather sterile report stating pros and cons of the
(2)policy and conditions under which schemes were suitable.
Public works policy was an important feature in the programme of the 
Labour Administration; why then was it implemented so slowly? In spite 
of the debates about large loan programmes with Mosley, in the first half 
o f  19 3 0 » it does not appear that finance was a major handicap until the 
last six months of the administration. The factors which held up the 
programme were:
(a) the criteria upon which grants were given;
(b) the level of the grant;
(c) the lack of any control over the initiation 
or implementation of the plans;
(d) administrative delay at all levels: from the 
initiation of the plans to their approval and 
implementation.
(1) CAB 58 150 EAC (E) 15*
(2) CAB 2h 216 CP 363 (30)
Early in the administration, J.H. Thomas warned against 'relief works 
pure and simple 1 23 and he was rather pessimistic about the impact of the 
schemes upon unemployment:
"£ 19 0 million spent on works to reduce unemployment 
between 19 18  and 19 2 8 , and that at no time had more 
than 7 5 j000 men been employed". (l)
There are few clear statements of the criteria adopted but they appear 
to have involved a positive rate of return to the undertaking involved; 
externalities which would aid other sectors of industry and an accelera­
tion of work which would otherwise be undertaken in the future. The 
benefits to society in general as opposed to benefits accruing specifically
to industry were largely discounted, although referred to by Mosley and
( 2)
developed by Attlee.
In spite of the concepts largely developed by Pigou about social benefits, 
cost-benefit analysis, as we understand it today, was not available
/
(1 ) CAB 24 204 CP 159 (29)*
(2 ) CAB 27 (389) DU 29 (29). CAB 24 214 CP 283 (3 0 )
(3 ) The development of cost-benefit analysis has its roots in welfare 
economics developing slowly from the marginalist propositions of 
Marshall and Edgeworth to Pigou. The analysis was systematized and 
extended by N. Kaldor, 'Welfare Propositions of Economics and 
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility', Economic Journal 1939;
J.R. Hicks, 'Foundations pf Welfare Economics', Economic Journal 1939» 
E.J. Mishan 'A Reappraisal of the Principles of Resource
Allocation' Economica 1957; K.J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual 
Values, VJiley, New York 1961; G. Debreu, Theory of Value, Wiley, New 
York, 1959* Attempts to utilize some of the propositions of welfare 
economics for practical application led to the utilization of the 
concepts of consumer surplus and compensation tests to develop a tool 
for decision-making, cost-benefit analysis. See J.R. Hicks, A Review 
of Demand Theory. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1958; J.R. Hicks, 'The 
Rehabilitation of Consumer's Surplus' Review of Economic Studies 1941; 
for Cost-Benefit Analysis, see E.J. Misham, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
Unwin-971, R. Layard, Ed. Cost-Benefit Analysis, Penguin Modern 
Economics Readings1972. '
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Apart from the efforts of Mosley and Attlee to introduce the concepts of 
social benefits they were not taken into account in policy formulation. • 
Social benefits were included in the rationalisation of public works 
in the 'Yellow Book1 The failure to take social benefits into
account systematically caused the value of schemes to be under-estimated. 
The Government did, however, undertake some fairly comprehensive 
cost-effectiveness studies of some projects. The evaluation of large 
schemes such as the Channel Tunnel and the Scottish canals and bridges 
were undertaken in considerable depth taking into account the traffic 
volume and hours saved in journey time.
Schemes having the highest potential rate of return were not consistently 
chosen. 'Ambiguities in the policy can be seen in the management of the 
programme which attempted to speed up the adjustment process by giving 
incentives to local authorities in more prosperous areas (providing 
they accepted workers from the 'necessitous areas') but at the same 
time discouraged some schemes suggested by more prosperous areas and 
industries. Examples of this punitive attitude can be seen in the treat­
ment of schemes suggested by the electricity industry which 'should help 
unemployment and not expect funds'., and of the scheme of the L.C.C. for 
a road bridge which was considered 'not to merit additional aid1. The 
plans for the inner London goods railway and the Channel Tunnel were 
similarly treated and could go ahead only if private financial support 
was forthcoming. But neither did they attempt to distribute the works 
according to need.
(l) Britain's Industrial Future (1928) op.cit
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The attitude towards public works in depressed areas was not likely 
to encourage the development of works programmes. These areas were 
poor, heavily committed and having problems in merely maintaining services, 
yet they were offered, for the first year of the administration, terms 
less attractive than the more prosperous areas providing the latter 
employed transferred labour. This policy, inherited from the Conser­
vatives, was intended to deal, with structural unemployment associated 
with the declining industries. It was modified when MacDonald attempted 
to get to grips with the unemployment problem in June 1930 but even when 
terms were improved they were not sufficient for the depressed areas to 
put forward plans. Appeals were made for a more sympathetic attitude 
towards these areas. Bevan, for example, in November 1930 was asking 
for the state to finance schemes. Such action he felt could not impinge 
upon local autonomy providing the local authorities were not forced to 
raise money from the rates
In addition, the criteria adopted by the Treasury, which had the ultimate 
power.to sanction schemes appear to have been even more strict than that 
imposed by the policy scrutineers in the I.D.C.U. and later in the Panel 
of Ministers. An example of the stringency of the Treasury was the case 
of the Montague House site which was rejected as unremunerative but had in 
fact been put forward because of the urgent need for accommodation for 
civil servants . There may also be something in the view of Lloyd 12
(1) Hansard, b November 1930* f Co/. ^56^7.
(2) CAB 2b (210) CP 67 (30). This was a proposal to extend the facilities 
of civil servants originally put up as a replacement scheme having 
employment potential but was denied Treasury approval on the basis 
that it was not productive. See Chapter Three above.
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George that Snowden's personality presented a barrier to young ministers 
initiating programmes:
"I would think twice before I approached him 
. to ask for £20m for a project of mine. He would "
probably say nothing, but his very look would be 
enough". (l)
Snowden's policy, he had admitted was to say ''no1 for as long as possible
to colleagues' demands, but it would be unfair to blame Snowden for the
lack of initiative in the programme or its feeble application. In fact,
he was one of the few who mentioned the potential of the electricity
(2)companies' schemes
The Government were relying upon grants to encourage local authorities
and public utility companies to submit schemes. If incentives are used
to encourage works' programmes, then they should be high enough to
facilitate the programme which is required. The Government did not pay
much attention to the level of the grants; "th^were convinced that
uncertainty about terms was the main barrier to the initiation of
schemes and so retained the maximum grant at 75%» Initially, this amount
was paid only when the transfer conditions were fulfilled. There was
plenty to suggest that more schemes would have been put forward had the
grant'been higher: that the demand for funds for public works' programmes
was likely to be elastic with respect to the terms of the grant. The
(3 )
first report from the road engineers to the I.D.C.U. made this point *23
( D  Hansard, 12 February 1931, Vbl. Co/. 721.
(2) CAB 27 413 UPC (30) 1.
(3) CAB 27 389 DU 29 (3).
^39
and Lord St. Davids indicated that increased grants had had a favourable 
effect upon his programme Yet no serious attempt was made to . •
increase the grants. It was suggested many times that 100% Government 
support would be necessary to get the programme going. The idea of 
complete Government finance for schemes initiated by local government 
were, like the suggestions for national .schemes, rejected as likely 
either to impinge upon local autonomy or involve the possibility of 
mal-administration of funds once the onus of paying was removed! This 
commitment to local autonomy and democracy resulted in the Government 
being a passive bystander in the public works programme. Unable to 
initiate schemes and unwilling to provide adequate incentives, they 
relied upon persuasive exhortation. The sensitivity of the Government 
to the problem of local autonomy could have ensured that schemes which 
were devised provided for local involvement and ultimate management of 
the scheme. The Government appeared to be frightened by its own night­
mares. Lloyd George said in February 1931:
. "It is no use blaming the Local Authority 
..... Therefore I am going to ask the Prime 
Minister again to carry out the policy of 
'.Labour and the Dation' where you say that 
there must be a recognition that the main 
roads are national rather than local. You 
will never get the work done until you take 
upon yourselves the same responsibility in 
the Country as France has". (2) 12
(1) CAB 27 389 DU 29 (2).
(2) Hansard. 12 February 1931* Voi. A U 8 Coi, ")ibO
By this time, however, they had not only failed to get a public works 
programme working, but had accepted the view adopted by Thomas at the 
second' meeting of the I.D.C.U.
"large amounts had been expended in the past 
with little results". (l)
The disenchantment was passed on to Hartshorn, who in Summer 1930» a few 
weeks after taking office as Lord Privy Seal, wrote,
"After fully examining the position I am 
satisfied that not much more is possible 
than is actively being done". (2)
and to Johnston, as the next Lord Privy Seal,
1931 (3)
in the debates in April
The administrative organization for sanctioning and initiating the schemes 
was extremely unwieldy^ and successive attempts at reorganization of 
the policy machinery to deal with unemployment did not tackle the central 
problem of lack of executive authority.
By Spring 1931» 226,000 were estimated as being directly or indirectly 
employed in public works. The Labour Party had hoped to create 600,000 
jobs. From then on the programme suffered from Snowden's attempt to 123
(1) CAB 27 389 PH 29 (2), 2nd Meeting.
(2) CAB 2b 213 CP 293 (30).
(3) Hansard. April 1931. V o b  c o ^ ‘
balance his budget, the economies of local authorities, and also from 
the crisis economies. The programme failed to produce the anticipated 
impact largely because of the Government's failure to become involved and 
to take the initiative in formulating the policy.
Public works policies however organized are likely to be rather clumsy 
regulators of the economy. They pose problems of efficiency and dis­
tributional equity which this administration never faced up to*, for not 
being able to decide whether they wished to maximize the potential returns 
from tiie schemes or use them to aid the most severely hit regions. In 
the event they achieved neither objective. In addition, the public 
works schemes are of little use in the 1 fine tuning1 of the economy for 
they have long, and often unpredictable,.lag structures. Even if planning 
is undertaken in advance of the period in which the policy is to be used, 
considerable lags are likely to be involved before the response to the 
original injection has its impact on economic activity. The possibility 
of the policies having an immediate impact upon the problem was not very 
great but had a large works programme been introduced early in the 
administration, it would have had some impact by the Winter of 1931« 
Thomas's estimates suggest a multiplier of l.kk within four years
Reconstruction
Reconstruction was a strategy which relied upon the restoration of 
competitiveness in the economy by reducing the costs of production. This 
policy has a ring of good sense that gave it great importance as a
(l) Thomas (1975) op.cit.
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possible long term remedy. For some periods - from January to May 1930 
and from November 1930 until the Crisis - it was the only policy which - 
retained the confidence of the Labour Administration.
To be effective in reducing the costs of production, the reconstruction 
programme would have involved changing the productive process probably 
by large investments in more efficient plant and machinery. The 
difficulty was ensuring that this investment was in fact forthcoming.
There were two problems associated with establishing such an investment 
programme, the willingness of businessmen to invest andj|the public to 
lend funds. It is doubtful in uncertain economic conditions, whether 
entrepreneurs will be willing to take risks involved in investing in 
improved equipment and possibly capacity when existing equipment was 
already under-employed and the rate of return was low, if not negative 
Profits, which appear to be one of the most important variables deter­
mining investment, fell by about one-fifth between 1929- 1 9 3 1 i and whilst 
profits were falling the 1 confidence1 problem was likely to dominate 
the effect of other policies such as the lower interest rates.
The Government recognised the effects on investment of low profits 
and tried to avoid imposing further burdens on industry in the form of 
taxes or social security payments but was not willing to provide much in 
the way of positive incentives. The Government's attempts to encourage 
businessmen took the form of advocating and trying to ,initiate a cheap 
money policy, in the hope that investment would be responsive to lov/er 
interest rates,and in providing channels for raising the necessary capital.
.Committee on Finance and Trade (1931) op.cit. See Keynes'S comments
on the importance of raising the rate of return on investment.
This was done by organizing banking interests in such a way that 'acceptable'
plans submitted would be able to find the necessary funds
for ' implementation through the B . I . D . C ^ O n l y  one small scheme was 
sanctioned in the first year. Public utility companies were helped by 
the simplification and extension o f  their money raising facilities.
Little was known about the responsiveness of investment to the rate of 
interest; though the appeals of businessmen, managers of the public . 
utility companies and the local authorities to -the Government for help 
in underwriting risks would suggest that they were not so paralysed by 
lack of confidence and dismal expectations as to be completely unres­
ponsive to incentives in the form of reduced rates. Government policy
was based on the assumption that they were likely to respond to lower
(2)interest rates although Norman was highly sceptical . The possibility 
that businessmen were likely to be fairly unresponsive to changes in 
rate of interest was later explored by Keynes as a factor which vPuld 
impede the progress towards a fully employed economy - in the
absence of a real balance effect Keynes did not at this time appear
to consider that this was the case, for he considered that the monetary 
policy of the Government and the Bank of England was .moving in the right 
direction although not going far enough - short term rates had fallen 12
(1) Skidelsky (1969) op.cit. on comparative ineffectiveness of this 
scheme. The Bank of England's involvement with industry preceded the 
setting up of the Bul.D.C. Sayers (1976) op. cit.lbp 31^^-330.
(2) Committee on Finance and Trade (1931) op.cit. See Chapter Three above.
Pigou 'The Classical Stationary State' Economic Journal 19^3;
Gottfried Haberler, Prosperity and Depression, Geneva? League of 
Nations 19^1; Lon Patinkin, 'Price Flexibility and Full Employment', 
American Economic Review 19^8.
but the policy had not made much impression on the long term rates which 
he considered to be more important for investment.
If the problem of stimulating the desire of businessmen to invest could 
have been dealt with the problem of ensuring a flow of funds for invest­
ment remained. In periods of depression other forms of holding assets 
such as money, government securities or foreign investments appear more 
attractive than risky industrial stocks with low rates of return. The 
structure of the asset portfolio changes. The effect of the Government's 
raising money in such circumstances was considered by some to divert 
fluids from industrial investment thus causing no increase in the net amount 
of investment undertaken. In its extreme form this view was linked to 
the concept of Say's Law which denied that any change in employment was. 
possible from government intervention aimed at raising aggregate demand.
In. its weaker form it implied that government intervention would have 
the effect of raising interest rates in order to attract money from 
abroad or from idle balances. Keynes, appeared to believe at the time of 
the publication of the Liberal Policy in 1929, that the mere raising 
of a large government lean would be sufficient to attract funds from 
abroad and out of idle balances and that there would be little inter­
ruption of the flow of funds to industry. He afterwards modified his 
views somewhat and advocated controls on the international flow of 
funds f ^ .  The concept that there were situations when at the going 
rate of interest the demand for money to hold might become infinitely 
elastic was not discussed. This possibility was later built into the
Keynesian model to provide an obstacle to the establishment of full 
employment equilibrium. The possibility that it might be difficult to - ' 
raise funds was mentioned by industrialists many times, for example 
see the discussions with the railway managers and the iron and steel 
companies and local authorities. But banking interests strongly denied 
that any viable project had been held up because of lack of finance. To 
facilitate the H o w  of funds Government established the B.I.D.C.
The reconstruction policy was largely defensive being concerned with the 
orderly contraction of the declining industries: coal, cotton, and iron 
and steel. There were hopes that by reorganization and increased 
efficiency the industries could again compete successfully in inter­
national markets. As we saw in Chapter Two these industries faced vast 
changes in the sipply and demand for the products. Many countries had 
become self-sufficient during the war period in coal and in cotton pro­
duction and in addition, technological changes in the use of fuel and 
the introduction of new forms of energy had reduced the demand for coal. 
Production in Britain was probably less efficient than in competing 
countries but how much less is a matter for debate. Tales of ancient 
equipment in the cotton industry, small units in the iron and steel
industry and the lack of mechanization in coal mining suggest that there
(1)
was much to be done . It has been estimated that an overall adjustment 
of about 10% in prices or exchange rates was necessary but for individual *(l)
■ ii , r - f f i r - i  r r i r r r r r  -~i,   r  ----------------l t - ,-  r  -  r  — t~i - i r  l-i ir r  . ~ ~ i - in n u n . i
(l) Aldcroft (1-970 ) op.cit. Lars Sandberg Lancashire in Decline , 
Columbus Ohio (1974).
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industries much higher figures have been suggested. The iron and steel 
industry was thought to be about one-third to one-fifth less efficient 
than its foreign competitors and output per man shift in the coal 
industry was thought to be about one-third less than in other countries.
If prices had fallen how would exports have been affected? Whether or 
not exports were likely to have responded to lower prices depended upon 
the interaction of income and price effects and the protective strategies 
adopted by other countries. The problem in the coal industry was not 
confined to Britain. Poland was successful in increasing coal exports 
during this period; all other exporting countries suffered losses. The 
iron and steel industry asked for protection in return for reconstruction 
but it had been suggested that recovery in iron and steel came eventually 
from expansion in the domestic market in sectors not much affected by imports 
The ^cotton industry never regained its share of world trade and has 
undergone a period of secular contraction for the past fifty years
Keynes was dubious of the policy and considered it unlikely to have any
great impact on the unemployment problem. His views were endorsed by
(2)the Committee of Economists' Report . The Government's response to this 
advice was such as to make one doubtful of the proposition that it was 
the dissension amongst the economists which was a major stumbling block 
to the- implementation of policies. Here was a case where the advice of 
the economists was unanimous yet ignored largely because the industrial 12
(1) Aldcroft (l970) op.cit.
(2 ) CAB 2h 2 16 CP 363 (3 0 ).
and regional distribution of unemployment made it politically impossible 
for the Government not to associate itself with the reconstruction of 
these 'sectors. Attlee attempted to combine the public works programme 
and the reconstruction programme into a policy for industry in general; 
planned industrial development which Mosley, Boothby, Macmillan and 
others were so keen to develop. Keynes was cool towards such schemes 
seeing the problem in a depression as raising the level of demand 
Yet these programmes would .have generated an increase in capital invest-* 
ment giving rise to an increased income stream, the size of the increase 
depending upon the size of the multiplier. Presumably he felt that the 
rate of return on such projects would not be high enough to sustain the 
development.
The reconstruction policy could have been adapted to speed up the
adjustment process by providing greater incentive to the newer industries
(2)which were being developed . The growing industries were chemicals, 
electrical engineering, vehicles, silk and rayons and electricity.
These industries continued to grow throughout the depression accounting 
for 12.5$ of net industrial output in 19 2 ^, and 19$ in 1935* The motor 
industry, which Amery had been keen to develop in 1929, was an obvious 
possibility. Even without much help the industry did well, output 
falling only slightly during the bad years of 19 3 1 and 19 3 2 , regaining 
its former level by 1933 and passing France and Canada to become the 12
(1) CAB 58 2 10th Meeting, 11th December 1930*
(2 ) Aldcroft (19 70) op.cit.
second largest producer later in the decade. The industry had become 
dependent upon the domestic market and provided 97^ of the cars pur­
chased. There was a movement towards standardization and both the number 
of firms and the number of models was reduced allowing advantages to be 
taken of the economies of scale Britain was rather behind in the
exploitation of the benefits of electricity,largely because the techno­
logy employed in industry generally was out of date and also because the 
vast number of generating establishments led to high prices and ineffi­
cient supply: there were different voltages. Yet the industry grew 
continuously and its prices fell, but as we saw above, the Government 
did not support the applications of the electricity industry. Accompanying 
the rapid adoption of electricity was the growth in the electrical 
applicance industry which almost trebled in the thirties.
Whilst one vast structural change was taking place in the older basic 
industries, another was taking place in the new industries. Yet the 
Government were not very successful in intervening in the process of 
either change in order to speed up or smooth out the process being 
bedevilled by the determination not to bail out industry. Reconstruction 
policy like public works was a policy which could only be effective in 
the long run. It was thus not very suitable for a short term cyclical 
depression but had a part to play in the long term adjustment problem. 1
(1) D. Aldcroft ( 1970) op.cit. G. Maxcy & A. Silbertson The Motor Industry
Allen & Unwin London 1959*1
International Trade
International trading relationships were dominated by the Labour Party's
allegiance to free trade. In spite of the small majority gained by
the Labour Party at the 1929 election, it was interpreted almost
immediately by Snowden as a mandate to maintain free trade,
"you will find that in every constituency in the 
country where a Safeguarding Duty was in operation 
the protectionist candidate was overwhelmingly 
defeated or there was an overwhelming vote cast 
against Safeguarding". (1)
Snowden recalled the 192$ election when the Conservatives, fighting a
protectionist campaign, did not get a mandate and subsequently
modified their trade policy by advocating 'safeguarding' father than
a general tariff and avoiding trading restrictions affecting food. The
allegiance of the Labour Party to free trade was strong and the issue
(2)had great emotive appeal to the electorate. With the continuation 
of high unemployment attitudes changed and disagreements within the 
party emerged in 1930 in connection with the policy for a tariff truce, 
agricultural policy and Imperial trade. The discussions continued 
throughout the period and contributed to the general failure of 
decision making. A delay of three months was allowed to occur because 
Snowden was absent from the Cabinet meetings during the early part of 
1931. The disagreements remained until the final Cabinet meetings of 
the administration when the idea of a revenue tariff was being mooted; 
faced with a choice, of reducing insurance benefits or a tariff,some of 
the free traders were willing to compromise; otherwise tariffs were 
resisted whether for revenue purposes or employment purposes. *2
( D  Hansard 9th July 1929- vol. 229 cols. 7^+7/730. Labour had 27 seats 
more than the Conservatives but no overall majority.
(2) Craig (19 7 5 ) op. cit.
Attitudes, in the Conservative Party hardened in favour of protection and
Chamberlain announced plans for the introduction of protection in November 1930'
after his party had won the Shipley by election, (l) Although the Samuelite
Liberals were still adamant free traders Lloyd George.was thought to be
willing to accept some movement towards protection. Industrialists were\ *"
frequently appealing for protection to ease their situation. Advice from^
the E.A.C., though divided,was moving towards the acceptance of some
trading restrictiqns. The economists did not have the theoretical |
framework available to examine many of:the special cases in which the \• • 1
general advantages of free trade would not apply (2 ) and did little to l 
clarify the posit i.on for the politician. i
} 12
(1) Hansard vol. 2 M t co]_,508.
(2 ) The exception being-the infant industry argument which was already well 
developed in the 19th Century.
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Britain's share in world trade and trade as a portion of GNP had fallen 
considerably since 1913* Trade had suffered because of import sub­
stitution in the traditional markets and the introduction of new products. 
During the early thirties, this problem was accentuated by the erection 
of trade barriers in other countries. The extent of the structural prob­
lem has been discussed above e.g. employment in the coal industry had 
shrunk by about 5G%. It is doubtful whether the market situation could 
accommodate adjustments of this size in anything but the very long run.
The commodities in which Britain's trade was concentrated and the 
countries with whom Britain traded were both affected more than the 
average by the depression but Britain's share in world trade declined 
over a wide range of expanding as well as declining industries and in 
industrialized countries as well as less developed countries. This might 
indicate inefficiency or an over-valued currency.
Would import' controls have achieved any improvement in Britain's economic 
position? Unlike exports, imports remained above the pre-war level. 
Eighty-three per cent of the imports came in duty free. Imports dropped 
fairly sharply after the imposition of the tariff but climbed again as 
the economy began to recover. Thé effect of a tariff on revenue and 
employment depends upon the income and price effects on the goods traded 
and the likely retaliatory actions. No estimates are available but it 
seems likely that by adopting some protection, some industries could have 
Been helped and in addition, a revenue tariff either with or without the 
refinement of export subsidies suggested by Keynes to minimize the 
efficiency problem, could have eased the strain on the budget. These
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policies were discarded because of the adherence to the free trade doctrine 
and also because of the bogy of retaliation Yet given the large market
which Britain was providing for the goods of other countries, it would 
appear that the bargaining power was greater than the Government appeared 
to believe. Something could have been achieved if the Government had not 
allowed itself to believe that it could achieve nothing*
Trading policy instead of being a useful tool with which to ease a 
difficult employment situation was a policy goal. Free trade as a policy 
objective became predominant over the policy to reduce unemployment. Its 
potential as a policy to reduce unemployment is difficult to predict 
during the period but it is likely that the elasticity of demand for 
exports was much less than the Government believed and that given the 
high level of imports which held up in spite of the low economic activity, 
there was scope for either a revenue or a protective tariff.
• Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Snowden was determined to fund some of the war debt on which the Govern-
( 2)ment were paying high interest rates. This together 'with establishing 
budgetary balance was the major task, he set himself as Chancellor. He 
was not unsuccessful in these objectives for although estimates of 
budgetary balance do in fact, show deficits of £ 10  and £32 million in 12
(1) J-F; Richardson ¿1956) Britis'F-ccnomic Foreign Policy.' See for trading 
agreements and negotiations with the Scandinavian .Countries^.
(2) The 5% War Loan, which the Treasury and successive Chancellors were 
anxious to fund, v.as created in 1917- The outstanding balance, £2,100m, 
was 1/4 of the National Debt, and absorbed 2/5 of the income tax payments. 
The first maturity was in 1947 but,as this debt could be repaid at any 
time after 1st July 1929 at three months' notice, it had virtually acquired 
the liquidity of a Treasury Bill. It was thus a budgetary burden,because 
of high interest charges, and a potential drag on monetary policy, see 
Sayers (1976) op.cit. vol.jt* 430-1«
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1930 and 1931j the amounts were extremely small if one considers the 
amount of the debts liquidated out of revenue and the pressures upon 
the budget of the insurance fund which increased by 30?» from 1929 to 1930 
and still further in 1931 when it reached its peak
The troubles in the American market in the Autumn of 1929 reversed for 
a while the flow of funds from London and this reduced the pressure on 
the pound and allowed interest rates to be reduced from 6^% to 3% in six 
months to May 1930. Great hopes were placed on the effect of this move. 
The floating debt had been reduced by £100 million.and the Government 
were able to borrow at 2.\% in April:
"Market conditions left to themselves should 
improve with the lower bank rate and easier 
money conditions which recent Government 
issues were themselves designed to foster". (2)
Conditions began to deteriorate in the Summer of 1930 but the bank rate 
remained low until the April of 1931 when the troublés in the European 
money market began. Whether the effect of this policy, if carried still 
further, could have achieved a great deal in terms of domestic activity, 
is dubious, although there was obviously some response by businessmen to 
low rates - it was a step in the right direction, probably not in itself *2
(.1) The War Loan which the Treasury and subsequent Chancellors were
anxious to fund was created in 1917» The.'-outstanding balance,£2100:.:,was 
■ i/b of the National Debt, and absorbed 2/3ths of the income tax p a y m e n t s .  
The first maturity was in I9V7 but the' Government could give three months 
notice to deal in f.om the 1st Jury x929- ¿ayers(l976)
(2) Feinstein (1972) op.cit.
(3). C;:b 2b 21 1 CF 1 3 ^ (3 ^).
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capable of providing the necessary impetus to the economy. Norman
doubted its effectiveness ^  and later Keynes came to believe that
it was unlikely to be an effective policy instrument in conditions of
acute uncertainty and lack of confidence; although it is thought to
have contributed to the housing boom which was so important for
(2)economic recovery .
Monetary stock rather than the rate of interest may be important in 
stimulating the economy but even the monetarists agree that it did not
provide a very good explanation of output during the period, although
• (3) 'it was more successful in explaining prices
Snowden was pleased that his budget in 1930 shifted the tax burden by 
raising the tax threshold from the poor to the rich. In spite of the 
strong feelings he had about free trade, he did not remove the safe­
guarding duties to the extent that had been expected for he needed the 
revenue.
Snowden did not deny that expansionary policies could affect the level 
of activity in the economy but he felt that such policies would have an 
adverse effect upon the distribution of income and put in jeopardy his 123
(1) Committee on Finance and Industry, (1931) op.cit.■
(2) S. Howson (1973)i 6p»cit.
(3) Valters (1969) 1 op.cit.
f
hopes of rationalizing the National Debt. In not being prepared to use 
the balance of the budget as a regulator in the economy, Snowden still had 
the option of expanding the budget whilst keeping it balanced and inducing 
expansionary effects at the same time. He was pressed to do this by Labour 
back benchers but was bewildered by the request for ’bigger1 23not smaller
It has in fact been asserted that Government policy during the period was 
expansionary, but no adequate statistical estimation has yet been undertaken 
on the. various components of expenditure of the Government, for this 
assertion to be substantiated. Snowden's attempts at modest redistribution 
may have been movements in the right direction and more expansionary than 
he envisaged. .
Although Keynes referred to reduced savings and increased unemployment 
benefits as having expansionary effects, he did not pursue the matter and the 
concept of the balanced budget continued to dominate fiscal policy until the 
forties when concepts and use of compensatory finance became part of economic 
management. This became possible in the managed war-time economy when with 
the statistical background provided by Clarkis work it became possible to apply 
the ideas embodied in the General Theory.
(1) Snowden (193^) op.cit. p. 896.
(2 ) Robbins (19 7 6) op. cit.pp 88/91. Winch (19 6 9) op.cit. pp 3^7/8.
(3) Beveridge op.cit.
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Attempts to balance the budget placed considerable constraints upon the 
implementation of the Labour Party's programme. In spite of the restraint., 
there was constant criticism of the public expenditure of the Government 
and Snowden said that he welcomed the May Committee's report as it would 
provide him with the support needed to implement the necessary cuts
Snowden was against large loanswhich he saw as likely to interfere with his 
funding and on several occasions the* Treasury View' was expressed though 
less dogmatically than in the months before the election in 1929* The 
Treasury View cannot be regarded as a major constraint on policy given 
the rate at which schemes were being suggested, the poor administration 
and implementation of schemes and the unwillingness of the Government to 
intervene in the process of public works directly.
Snowden grossly over-estimated the catastrophe which going off the gold 
standard entailed and by his fire and brim stone speech to the Cabinet 
during the crisis and his doctrinaire view of the revenue tariff he contri­
buted to the break up of the Government and ironically to its replacement 
by an administration keen to introduce the protection which he hated!
There appears not much doubt from the evidence of Norman to the Macmillan 
Committee and from the actions of the Bank that banking policy was concerned 
almost entirely with international rather than national affairs and surely 
there were enough problems on that front to provide some justifications (l)
(l) ibid.
for their actions Had the pre-occupation been indulged in by banking
interests in New York and Paris, the crisis may have been avoided or at 
least cushioned. But for national and political reasons the other financial 
centres were' unable to involve themselves with the international scene 
and contributed to the problem by curtailing lending. London took on the 
job of financing the depression by lending and backing up ailing currencies 
as far as possible (l) 2) 3. This was at a time when holders of sterling were 
liquidating balances and sources of funds available to the Bank, to finance 
its lending activities were drying up The wisdom of the bankers
policy in this respect is questionable.
The management of the gold standard was very much part of the budgetary 
strategy. Even Keynes was against the expansion of Government expenditure 
in the Spring of 1931 Hew, Keynes, Bevin and Citrine being notable
exceptions, questioned the importance of maintaining the exchange rate.
It is interesting to contemplate the effects upon Britain of a devaluation 
of lO^the figure usually mentioned as representing the likely imbalance.
Without constructing some very elaborate tests, it is difficult to estimate 
the effects of the devaluation because of the barrage of policies which i/Jould 
accompanied the change. The’effect would depend upon the elasticity of the
___ ___________ ^ — i W
(l) Norman w? i" already involved with the .problems of reconstruction, of ¿industry 
before the setting up of the B.I.CD. C. Sayers (197^) vol x PP3I^ ~3^®>  ^
vol 11-51+6-7-'
2^) Kindleberger.(1972)* op»cit. p.28
(3) Williams (1963 )> op«cit. p 
CAB 58 2 12th March 1931«
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demand for exports and imports with respect to price and upon the income 
effects and the retaliatory strategies of other countries. Thomas's 
estimates of these elasticities suggest that they are slightly below 
thus\bke: ^ expansionary effect of a devaluation would probably have been 
small The return of the gold standard is seen by some, Robbins
and Johnson, to have been the main problem of the period but these 
estimates would appear to call into question such .. views.
International co-operation was one policy which might have had considerable 
effect upon the problem, but the countries, U.S.A. and France, which could 
have had some impact were not' willing for domestic or political reasons 
to intervene. In spite of his interest and expertise in international 
affairs, MacDonald was not willing to initiate action for fear of worsening 
the confidence problem still further.
When international action did take place in the form of the Hoover Mora­
torium and the London Conference, it was too late to prevent the crisis 
in the international money market.
Labour Supply ^
The Labour Party policy to rationalize the supply of labour by raising 
the school leaving age and lowering the retirement age 
floundered badly. The one failed for technical Parliamentary reasons 1
(1) Thomas (1975), op.cit. •
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involving the difficulties in accommodating the voluntary schools, and 
possibly some lack of commitment by the Government. The other failed 
because of the constraints imposed by budgetary policy.
Migration policy was handicapped as the depression became a nation-wide 
and world-wide phenomenon Various countries accepted fewer and fewer 
migrants as conditions domestically became more serious and the incentives 
to move became less Internally, the transfer policy and the re­
training programme did not have a great impact on the problem and although 
voluntary movements did occur - from Wales in particular - these were not 
large enough to provide a solution. Migration, although generally moving 
in a stabilizing fashion, has seldom been sufficient to remove even modest
regional imbalances and has been shown to aggravate the problem in
(2)certain circumstances .
Alleviation of Distress
Apart from filling in gaps in the coverage of the scheme, little was done 
to improve the support for the unemployed, except the increase in the real 
value of the benefits which occurred as a result of the falling price level. 
The introduction of the new Act (1930) provided an opportunity for persons 
other than those whom the Government had in mind to benefit, and led to 
the great debate about ' abuse* which so embarrassed the Government in its 
last year.
_(l) Drummond (197^), op.cit.
(2) E.J. Mishan and L. Needleman. (1968) op. cit.
I
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Whilst the objective was to balance the budget, it was difficult to 
see what more could have been done, but one feels that more confident 
action would have avoided some of the more acrimonious debates and 
attracted less attention than constant appeals for borrowing powers.
The failure to accept the unemployment situation of 1930 and 1931 as a 
cyclical aberration of dimensions such as to put it beyond the actuarial 
scope of the scheme, caused a crisis of confidence in the management 
of the Unemployment Insurance Fund. The constant appeals for extended 
loan facilities caused Parliamentary difficulties which led to the 
setting up of the May Committee and eventually of the fall of the 
Government.
Summary
"The Labour Party is ready to fight the election
with unemployment as the acid test. It is ready
to put its record against the records of Mr Baldwin
and Mr Lloyd George or to be judged on the comparison
of its plans with those of either of the other policies". (1 )
Unemployment policy during the period 1929-31 failed so far as 
it did not achieve much in terms of either provision of work or 
maintenance of the unemployed. The mere numbers of. unemployed • 
give some evidence of this failure but as little numerical change 
could be expected during the depths of the world depression, one 
might use less severe criteria to judge Government policy such as 
evidence that some action had been taken which would have made an 
impact upon the problem. Although there was endless discussion, 
there is little evidence of any decisive action. Whilst not 
achieving much in a positive way to cure unemployment, Government 
policy did little to aggravate the problem.
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The policy to maintain the standards of the unemployed and the 
modest public works programme accompanied by budgetary policy which 
was probably more expansionary than intended, possibly prevented 
the catastrophic unemployment which might have occured had a de flat» op 
policy been implemented- Kindleberger (1), acknowledges the 
importance of Britain's efforts to stabilize the international 
monetary situation at a time when the U.S.A. and France were unable 
or unwilling to do so.
Investigators into the extent and dimension of depression in the 
thirties have been encouraged, by the stability of GNP, and instances 
of the growth areas, to question the severity of the depression in 
Britain which is compared favourably to that in other industrial 
countries (2). One does not wish to get involved in historical 
riddles about when a depression is not a depression but in spite 
of the existence of growth sectors in the economy and the relative 
stability of GNP, there .is no doubt that during the twenties 
and thirties, Britain's economy was. operating far below its 
full employment growth path. The loss involved in this under 
utilization of capacity was estimated by Keynes to have been in 
the region of £200 million per year (3) approximately 5% of G.N.P. 
Government policy during 19 2 9 -3 1 did not move the economy towards 
its full employment growth path.
(1) Kindleberger (1973)» op»cit. pi S
(2) Richardson and Aldcroft (19^9), op.cit.
çyj C ommittee on Finance and Industry Cl931) opM» c v^,
This failure is often attributed to the inadequacy of economic 
theory and its failure to provide support for radical policies 
which might have eased the situation. This explanation, which 
provides an exciting scenario for competing Keynesian and Classical 
systems, has been over-estimated in the literature, which has 
focused upon the potential of policies advocated by Lloyd George, 
Keynes and Mosley and has neglected the inter-play of factors 
affecting policy formulation. It raises two questions: 
would radical policies would have been effective and did the 
development of economic theory crucially affect policy formulation? 
The answer to the former is debatable but Thomas's estimations 
do not make one optimistic about their potential.  ^ Although 
the weakness of economic theory did contribute to the Government 
inaction during the period, the weakness provides neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient explanation of the failure of Government policy.
The Government's objectives were incompatible and resulted in a 
policy dilemma which the administration was not able to resolve.
As we saw in earlier chapters, academics even at LSE, which is 
usually regarded as the reactionary cell of the period, were 
discussing Robertson's Banking Policy and the Price Level,,and 
had expressed considerable open-mindedness about the relationship 
of the real and monetary sectors of the economy and the workings 
of the economy when it was out of equilibrium. Crude versions 
of the 'Treasury View' were also disclaimed by the most influential 
economists and by the Labour Party. 1
(1) Thomas (1975) op»cit. 5. " lib.
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The * Treasury View 1 is often quoted' as being the central problem
involved in the debate but study of the period suggests that this
was not a dominating issue. The absence at this time of theories
of compensatory budgetary finance placed greater limitations on pqlicy.
Even Keynes, though , mentioning the potential of changes in savings
and unemployment benefits did not develop the policy along these
lines and possibly distracted by problems of confidence continued
( 1 ) • •to argue for a policy to 1 secure the budget 1 . Clarification 
on the issue of price movements and the multiplier concept would 
have added support and realism for the expansionist* s case but 
these issues were not crucial in determining policy;and other aspects 
of economics such as cost-benefit analysis might well have proved 
equally potent in getting the public works programme underway.
Whilst this lack of understanding may have led them to take 
less positive action, it did not preclude them from going ahead 
with a development programme. The programme floundered because 
the Government failed to give high enough incentives to make 
schemes attractive to local authorities and were unwilling to 
assume central control for fear of damaging local authority 
autonomy. The reconstruction policy again provided scope for 
a large government investment programme which they did not 
embark upon being unwilling to aid industry or assume control; 
preferring to provide the channel for credit and leave 
industrialists to initiate action. Economic theory also failed to 
illuminate areas in the debate concerning international trade 
and left the debate largely to polemicists. 1
(1) CAB 58 2.
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Ihese weaknesses in economic theory and policy proposals 
did contribute to policy failure but it would be.technocratic to 
assume that they were crucial. The Government policy portfolio 
contained radical proposals which they failed to implement, not 
because of deficient economic theory or advice but because of the 
acceptance of other policy goals which were incompatible with 
policies to contain unemployment. These goals: the maintenance 
of the gold standard, free trade, balanced budgets, constrained 
unemployment policy throughout the period and finally proved to be 
the dominating objectives of the Government.
In addition to these incompatible policy objectives the administration 
were averse to taking decisions involving any sort of compromise.
They were unaware of or unwilling to accept even modest policy 
trade-offs i.e. ^d on a loaf. They sought support from all quarters 
for decisions which they considered would be unpopular, seeking
p »
to involve experts even c:i issues about which they had adequate 
information and expertise.
The questions asked of experts were badly formulated, they were 
too wide and were not posed in a way in which experts could make 
a useful contribution. Factual and policy implications of problems 
were confused and the experts were left to reconcile conflicting 
issues. Thus the Government abrogated their responsibility for 
formulating economic policy.
t
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Labour Government
(5th June 1929 ~ 24th August 1931)
Cabinet
Prime Minister 
Lord President 
Lord Chancellor 
Lord Privy Seal
: James Karasay ‘MacDonald 
: Lord Parmoar 
: Lord Sankcy 
: James H. Thomas
Vernon Hartshorn from 5th June I93u 
Thomas Johnston from 24th March 1931 
Chancellor of the exchequerj Philip Snowden 
•Foreign Office .* Arthur Henderson
Home Office : J.N* GIynes
Admiralty : A. Alexander
Agriculture and Fisheries: Noel Buxton
C. Addison from 5th duns 1950 
: Lord Thomson
Lord Atnulree from 14th October 1930 
- Lord Passfield 
Lord Passfield
James H. Thomas from 5th June 1930 
Sir C. Trevelyan
H. Lees-Smith from 2nd March 1931 
Antony Greenwood 
W, Wedgewood-Benn 
Margaret Bondfield 
W. Adamson 
W, uraham
H. Morrison in Cabinet from 19th March 1931
T. Shaw
Air
Colonial Office 
Dominion Office
Board of Education
Health
Indian Office 
Labour
Scottish Office 
Board of Trade 
Transport 
War Office
1st Commissioner for Works • George Lansbury
/
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Ministers not in Cabinet.
Chancellor of the Michy of  Lancasters S ir 6» Mosley
Clement Attlee from
23rd May 1930 
Lord Ponsonby from
13th March 1931
Paymaster General { 
Pensions 5 
Postmaster General {
Lord Arnold 
F. Roberts
H. Lees-Smith
Clement Attlee from 2nd March 1931.
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Table la
Percentage of Insured workers unemployed each month 1923-39
Thited Kingdom
Year Jan. Feb. Mar. • Apr. May June July Aug. Sept Oct. Nov. Dec. YearlyMean
1923 13.3 1 2 . a 11.7 11.5 11.2 11.3 11.6 11.8 11.7 11.7 11.5 10.6 ' 11.7192h 11.9 10.6 9.8 9.7 c✓ .a 9.3 9.8 10.$ 10.6 10.9 10.8 10.7 10.3192$ 11.2 11.3 1 1 . 1 10.9 10.9 11.9 11.2 12.1 12.0 ll.U 11.0 10.U 11.31926 11.0 10.U 9.8 9.1 lU.3 H;.6 Hi.l; lii.O 13.7 13.6 13.5 11.9 12.51927 • 12.0 10.9 9.8 9.U 8.7 8.8 9.2 9.3 9.3 9.$ 9.9 9.8 9.71923 10.7 10.U 9.$ 9.$ 9.8 10.7 11.6 11.5 11.3 11.7 12.1 11.1 10.81929 12.2 12.1 10.0 9.8 9.7 9.6 9.7 9.9 9.9 10.3 10.9 11.0 10. h1930 12.1; 12.9 13.7 Hi.2 1$.0 1$.U 16.7 17.0 17.$ 18.$ 18.9 19.9 1 6 . 1
1931 2 1 . 1 21.3 2 1 . 0 2 0 .U 20.3 2 1 .2 21.9 21.9 2 2 .U 21.7 2 1 .2 20.7 2 1 . 3
o^
03
1932 22.2 21.9 2 0 . 8 21.3 2 2 . 0 22.2 2 2 .8 23.0 2 2 .8 21.9 22.2 2 1 . 6 2 2 . 11933 23.0 22.7 21.9 21.3 2 0 .1; 19.U 19.5 19.1 18.1; 18.1 17.9 17.5 19.9193U 18.6 , 1 8 . 1 17.2 16.6 1 6 . 2 16.i; 16.7 1 6 . $ 1 6 . 0 16.3 16.3 16.b 1 6 . 7193$ 1 7 . 6 17.$ 16.u 1 5 . 6 15.5 15.U 1 5 . 2 H;.9 H;.9 1U. $ lli.$ Hi.l 15.51936 16.2 15.3 lli.2 1 3 . 6 1 2 . 8 1 2 .8 1 2 . U 1 2 . 0 1 2 . 1 1 2 . 0 1 2 . 0 1 2 . 0 1 3 . Ï1937 1 2 .U 1 2 . 0 1 1 . 6 1 0 . $ 1C. 7 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 9.9 9.7 1 0 . 1 10.9 1 2 . 1 1 0 . 81933 13.2 13.1 - 12.7 12.7 1 2 . 8 1 3 . 2 12.9 1 2 . 6 1 2 . 8 12.7 1 3 . 0 12.9 12.91939 111.2 13.3 1 2 . 2 11.5 10.$ 9.6 9.0 8.7 9.1 . 9.6 9.5 9.1 1 0 . $
Source : British labour Statistics Historical Abstract. Table 160
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Table 2a
Percentage of insured workers unemployed, by Industry 1923-1939
United Kingdom
Averages of the percentages in January and July each year, excluding workers under 16
Industry
*1931 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
•
1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Fishing 18 .0 12.0 14.1 12.5 16.7 13.8 11.6 11.8 13.3 22.0 22.8 23.2 21.1 22.0 24.2 26.4 24.6Coalmining 28.4 3.0 5.8 11.5 9-5 19.0 23.6 19.0 20.6 34.5 33-5 29.7 27.2 22.8 16.1 16.7 12.5Brick, tile, pipe, etc manufacture l£.0 7.6 7.9 6.8 15.2 6.9 12.4 11.5 13.0 21.5 20.2 13.3 11.9 11.7 8.2 9.1 10 .9Fottery, earthenware, etc 36.3 13.2 13.3 18.1 33.6 16.6 18.6 17.0 23.7 36.2 30.9 23.8 22.3 21.8 17.5 20.7 22.0Chemicals 17.6 11.8 9-9 9.1 10.9 7.2 6.1 6.5 10.0 17.3 15.2 11.3 11.0 9.2 6.8 7.4 6.4Pig iron
Steel melting and iron puddling, and, iron 37.7
10.1 14.1 21.5 43.4 16.4 18.7 14.4 20.3 43.8 41.5 27.7 22.3 16.0 10.7 12.9 17.6
and steel rolling and forging 
General engineering: engineers' iron and
45.5 21.2 22.0 25.0 40.4 19.4 22.4 20.1 28.2 47.9 41.5 27.3 23.5 17.4 11.4 19.5 15.1
steel founding 27.0 20.5 16.9 13.3 15.1 11.8 9.8 9*9 14.2 29.1 27.4 18.4 13.6 9.6 5.8 7.0 6.6
Electrical engineering
Construction and repair of motors, cycles
14.1 7.3 5-5 5.6 7.5 5.9 4.8 4.6 6.6 16.8 16.5 9.6 7.0 4.8 3.1 4.7 4.4
and aircraft 19.3 9.7 8.9 7.1 8.2 8.1 8.1 7.1 12.1 22.4 17.6 10 .8 9.0 6.9 5.0 7.2 4.4Shipbuilding and repairing
Stove, grate, pipe, etc and general iron-
51.9 43.6 30.3 33.5 39.5 29.7 24.5 25.3 27.6 62.0 61.7 51.2 44.4 33-3 24.4 21.4 20.9
founding
Electric cable, apparatus, lamps, etc
24.8 17.7 13.2 11.4 14.7 10.0 12.0 10.9 14.7 28.5 25.O 15.3 14.4 9.8 7.0 12.7 11.9
manufacture 13.9 16.2 7.7 7.2 7.4 7.7 5.6 5.3 7.5 13.3 14.5 10 .0 8.8 7.9 5.0 8.1 6.2Cotton textiles 43.2 21.6 15.9 8.8 18 .3 15.4 12.5 12.9 32.4 30.6 25.1 23.7 22.3 16.7 10.9 23.9 16.9Wool textiles 33.8 9-5 8.4 16 .9 17-4 11.0 12.0 15.5 23.2 22.4 17.0 17.8 15.5 10.3 8.8 21.3 11.0Linen textiles 35.3 19.8 11.8 25.O 28.2 12.2 19.8 15.7 25.2 29.7 23.1 17.7 24.0 21.4 16 .2 40.3 21.5Hosiery manufacture 20.8 7.9 7.4 9.8 10.3 7.6 5.8 7.1 12.5 13.5 12.8 10.9 13.7 9.4 8.1 12.6 7.9Tailoring 17.7 6.7 10.4 11.9 11.2 9.2 9.2 10.0 12.3 17.6 18.2 I6.5 15.4 13.8 12.3 15.5 12.6Dressmaking and millinery 9.7 6.3 8.6 ' 9.0 7.7 6.2 5.9 6.1 6.6 11.5 11.7 8.9 8.3 8.8 7.5 9.2 9.4Boots, shoes, etc, manufacture 22.2 10.6 8.6 11.3 11.5 11.3 13.4 15.5 15.2 18 .O 19.5 21.4 17.1 14.6 12.1 14.3 10.4Bread, biscuits, cakes etc manufacture 12.4 9.9 9.8 9.3 8.4 7.2 6.6 7.2 9.1 12.2 11.8 10.7 10.6 10.3 8.7 8.8 8.3Drink industries 12.9 6.4 6.8 6.9 6.3 6.3 6.2 6.8 8.7 14.4 13.1 10.9 10.6 9.6 7.7 8.0 7.4Sawmilling and machined woodwork 18.4 11.5 10.6 9.8 11.1 8.4 9.2 10.0 11.9 22.0 20.0 16.8 15.8 13.6 10.7 11.9 11.2Furniture manufacture and upholstery 19.0 7.8 8.2 6.9 7.8 6.5 5.9 6.5 10.0 21.7 20.6 15.4 15.9 11.6 9.3 13.4 12.3
Printing, publishing, and bookbinding 9.8 5.6 5.6 5.2 5.4 5.2 4.6 4.6 6.0 11.0 10.3 9.2 8.7 8.1 6.7 6.9 7.1Building 22.7 12.2 12.5 10.5 12.1 11.1 13.9 14.3 16.2 30.2 29.0 21.3 19.7 19 .8 14.6 16 .7 17.6Gas, water and electricity supply 8.9 7.2 6.3 6.2 6.0 5.4 5.8 6.1 7.0 10.9 11.0 10.1 10.4 9.7 8.3 8.3 7.7Bailway service 12.1 6.0 6.4 6.5 12.3 6.1 6.5 . 6.5 6.9 15.7 16.7 12.3 10.0 8.5 6.5 7.3 £•**Tramway and omnibus service 5.0 3.1 3.1 3.6 4.3 3.7 3.1 3.1 3.8 5-9 6.1 5.6 4.8 4.0 3-3 3.2 3 . 1Other road transport 19.3 17.3 15.6 13.9 14.0 11.8 11.7 12.0 14.8 22.2 22.6 20.1 18.7 16 . 1 12 .3 12.5 1 1 .9Docks, harbours, canals etc service 39.8 27.5 25.8 29.0 29.7 24.5 29.1 30.7 33.4 33-3 33.3 31.1 31.0 29.3 27.5 25.O 24.1Distributive trades 11.6 5.9 6.4 6.7 6.7 5.5 5.5 6.2 8.1 12.6 12.4 11.3 11.3 9.8 8.9 9.2 9.0
National government service 10.3 ll-.l 9.8 8.2 7.3 6.2 6.2 6.9 • 8.2 12.4 13.3 14.5 13.8 12.9 11.7 12.1 10.0
Local government service 13.7 6.0 6.9 8.6 9.0 8.2 8.6 9.6 10.7 18 .2 19.6 20.3 20.2 19.7 17.6 17.2 14.6
Hotel, public house, club, etc service 17.6 9.8 11.3 11.4 9.0 7.9 7.6 8.7 11.8 17.5 16.7 15.2 15.5 15.0 13-9 15.5 15.3
Laundry and dry cleaning service 9.8 5.0 5.8 5.8 4.5 4.1 3.8 4.3 6.1 9.4 9.0 7.7 7.6 6.9 6.0 6.8 7.0
Source: British labour Statistics Historical Abstract Table 164,
k?0
Table 3a
Unemployment in industry as a proportion 
of total unemployment
Thousands
Aged iS-Sk in United Kingdom
1927 1928 1929 I93O 1931 1932
Agriculture
Fishing
Mining a'nd quarrying 
Manufacturing
.3 *2 .2 .1 .2
2 2 .k 2k. 2 18.3 lk.l lk. 8 IS.
Non-metalliferous mining products 
Brick, tile, pipe, etc making 
Pottery, earthenware, etc 
Glass
Chemicals, paints, oils, etc 
Metal manufacture 
Engineering, etc
Construction and repair of vehicles 
Shipbuilding and ship repairing 
Other metal industries and trades 
Textiles
Leather and leather goods 
Clothing
Food, drink and tobacco 
Woodworking, etc 
Paper, printing etc 
Other manufacturing industries 
Total manufacturing
.k .k .k A .k .5
.k .7 .6 .5 • .5 .7
.9 .9 .9 1.1 1.1 .9
.5 .k .k .k .k .k
1.3 .9 1.2 1.2 1.2 1 .1
5.3 k.3 k.3 k.k k.9 k .6
6.7 5.k 5.k 5.9 7.8 7.5
1.6 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.5 2.5
k .8 b.J> 3.9 3.3 k.l ¿+.0
k.3 3.7 3.5 ¿*•3 k.7 k.k
10.0 12,¿+ lk .0 22.0 16 .8 12.3
.5 .k .5 .5 .5 .k2.2 3.1 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.9
J>.k 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.5
1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.7
1.7 1.1 1.3 l.k 1.7 1.5
.8 .7 .8 1.0 l.l 1.0
¿+5.8 kk.7 ¿+6.8 33 A 5^.8 ¿+8.9
Building and contracting 
Gas, water and electricity supply 
Transport and communications 
Distributive trades 
Commerce, banking, insurance and 
finance
Miscellaneous service 
Local government service 
National government service
7.3 8.6 8.6 7.8 7.9 11.5.8 .7 .8 .6 .5 .7
8.8 8.¿+ 9.3 7.0 6.6 6.6
6.8 e.k 7.9 ?A 7.5 7.9
.5 .k .¿+ A .5 .5
5.5 k.k k.9 5.2 5.3 5.3
1.5 1.5 1 . 8 1.5 1.5 . 2.0
.7 .7 .6 .5 .k .5
Source: Computed from British. Labour Statistics Historical Abstract
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Numbers of insured employees in employment at each mid year by industry 1923-1933
1923 1921* 1925 1926 1927 19 2 7* 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1936 1935 1936 1937 1933
Agriculture
Fishing 22 A 23.6 2*1.2 22.8 25.3 26.5 25.0 25.6 25.2 26.2 2 6 .2 1 25.6 2 5 .6 27.0 28.6
675.8
28.2
62?.8 
26.1 .
J.ir.ing ar.d quarrying 1.305.9 1,295.3 1 .0 15 .6 1,183.2 1.067.9 1.035-5 9 1 1 , 2 966.*« 907.3 752.5 696.5 715.1 707.6 722.6 711.3 796.3 79 5 .6k^nufacturing •
‘•on retjlliferous sluing product« 38.0 37.7 3 9 .2 36.8 66.0 **2,2 60 .8 66.2
1
*♦1.0 37.6 36.6
f
37.7 61.9 65.7 69.8 56.9 55.?Brick« tile, pipe, etc asking 56.2 7 3 .9 63.3 82.9 7 3 .5 72.8 76.9 76.6 7 3 .8 69.1 7 5 .2 85.6 90.6 96.0 96.9 5 3 .5Tottery, earthenware, etc 66.} 65.9 6 0 .0 30.3 6 2 .5 6 0 .2 59.2 65.7 58.0 50.0 68 .2 5 3 .9 57.7 58.3 59.3 65.0. 6 1 .0
Class 35.5 39.3 3S.3 36.5 3 3 .7 3 7 .7 36.5 6 0 .0 33.1 36.9 35.3 38.3 6 1 .2 60.3 63.0 ’ 66.0 6 6 .0Chemicals, paints, oils etc 192.2 196.1 19*.3 185.0 199.2 192.2 202.9 20 6 .6 195.3 180.8 165.7 192.6 196.2 196.3 201.7 217.0 227.0¡•'ctal car.ufacture 299.6 302.7 270.1 171.5 28.».*« 277.2 266.8 271.9 263.3 178.6 173.3 200.6 236.9 236.2 265.3 30 5 .9 2 5 3 .7S::rir.ecrinj, etc 65*». 6 6 6 9 .3 639.3 628.7 692.0 668.6 675.2 696.7 656.9 563.2 5 10 .6 515.6 ■ 585.6 603.6 £63.2 7 3 3 .2 793.0Construction ar.d repair of vehicles 266.3 261.7 276.6 265.9 292 .6 2S/.6 285.2 297.2 280.5 252.9 . 267.3 263.6 299.1 312.7 356.1 3 9 3 .0 623.3Shicuuilding and ship repairing 151.0 lS.0.6 156.5 123.5 166.7 158.8 I6 7 .1 158.6 1 6 1 .9 86.8 6 7 .5 • 65.9 60.7 89.S 116.5 1 3 3 . 3 160.0Cther octal industries and trades 6 1 5 .6 6 6 5 .2 652.5 6 6 6.0 672.9 A60.** 662.7 687.2 6 76 .2 661.6 650.8 683.6 566.7 579.2 627.8 ■ 7 0 1 .6 £53.6T.xtilea 1,116.9 1,176.3 1.153.1 • 1 .0 1 7 .5 1,221.5 1,191.7 1,156.3 1,152.2 918.0 861.6 919.3 991.7 973.0 971.3 1,000.2 1,065.8 ei6.8
leather and leather goods 
Clothing
62.2 63.5 6 1 . 1 56.9 63.3 62.5 62.*« 6 1 .5 57.5 52.9 55.7 60.8 6 3.9 63.3 67.0 69.8 6?.2-533.1 566.7 566.9 536.1 561.1 552.6 536.8 565.1 531.6 523.9 526.3 569.8 563.8 561.7 556.9 567.7 567.1Food, drink ar.d tobacco • **55.1 *»c3.** 6 7 7 ,7 662.7 6c7.1 *76.6 671.6 677.3 672.6 1.61.2 665.3 669.6 693.1 696.5 5C3.6 530.9 536.2Accd-'Crking etc 172.6 1 7 9 .0 132.3 183.1 19S.9 190.7 i9**.o 199.3 193.9 185.3 181.7 135.8 203.3 202.5 216.7 225.9 220.3r.-.-er, jrintin^, etc 3 2 6 .6 361.3 363.9 3-’*9.0 5 6 1 .2 352.5 3 6 0 .1 371.9 372.5 366.1 376.7 303.9 383.9 389.8 393.6 616.1 6 1 ? .0Other r/.nuiucturing industries 115.9 121.6 1 2 7 .6 .1 1 6 . 8 136.8 132.9 16 0 .8 166.9 139.3 •27.7 125.1 137.7 161.7 162.0 166.3 169.2 ■361.5
Tot: 1 manufacturing *,9^0.* 5.159.1 5.161.7 6.727.5 5.367.7 5.222.5 5 ,16 9 .3 5.291.3 6,839.} ' Ii, 151.7 6,671.2 6,736.9 6,979.0 5,058.1 5<355.a 5,309.0 5,506.7
Building nr.d contracting 729.7 730.9 836-.} 870.3 937.8 893.7 8 6 7 .5 890.6 871.5 9J..7 819.5 866.3 963.1 1,001.8 1,087.8 1,119.1 1,361.2-Css, water and electricity supply 160.0 161.6 167.5 175*0 162.9 155.3 153*6 153.0 15*« «2 159.3 155.3 166.1 177.8 180.1 193.0 2C2.7 205.2Cr-r-sport and communications 676.9 660.5 677.2 6’»5*6 705.1 6S1 . 1 679 .9 693.8 6 8 7 .5 696.L 687.6 675-7 7H.9 727.9 76!;. 9 796.7 772.UDistributive trades l,lC0«5 1,277.0 1,379.3 1,616.8 1.509.3 1,632.1 1 .5 3 2 .6 1*506.9 1,622.1 1,672.3 1,726.6 1,766.9 1,801.1 1,799.6 1,859.7 1,511.2Comrce, blinking, insurance and 
fir..nee 216.8 217.2 213.6 213.9 2 18 .0 216.7 217.0 222.9 226.8 226.8 231.6 236.0 266.2 269.6 251.9 260. U • 6 3.2'I'.incellaneous cervices 569.9 609.2 665.5 659.6 696.5 65x.8 696, S 728.6 729.8 757.6 766.6 809.8 851.5 836.6 925.1» 97u.O 1,105.7Locil government service 227.6 227.7 233.1 233.7 ¿*•0.6 228. S 236.5 253.6 279.1 291.8 282.7 291.8 291».6 291*.? 306.0 315.6 * q♦¡-tional government service 160.0 166.9 l**o.b 160.5 12S.5 123.2 113.6 113.3. 103.1 109.9 107.3 98.7 97. U 106.3 il5.9 130.3 163,’iAll industries and services 10,138.1 10,576.8 10.633.5 10,239.9 1 1 ,0 6 1 .6 10,765.2 . 10,605.1 10,930.3 1 0 ,6 9 6 .0 10,065.1 9,957.0 10,386.9 10,835.6 u;o56.o 11,631.2 13,002.6 12,972.5Ctr.tr insured persons in employment 
Total insured employees in enploysent 10,133.1 10,576.8 1 0 ,6 8 3 .5 10,239.9 1 1 ,0 6 1 .6 10,765.2 1 0 ,6 0 8 .1 10,930.3 1 0 ,696 .0 10,065.1 9,967.0 10,386.9 10,835-6
9 15 .9
U , 969.9
926.8
12,556.0
932.2
13,936.6
82V 0 w  j.y
13,£57-5
*  e s t im a te d
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Table 6a
A c t i v i t y  Rates - G r eat Britain
•under 20 20-24 25-44 45-64 65 + Al l  Ages
Males and
Pernales
1901 76.0 6l,l 55.5 34.1
1911 - 78.7 62.4 56.2 30.9 -1921 (12-19) . 55->8 . 78.3 60.4 5 6 .0 30.9 58.1
1931 (14-20i 77.6 (21) 8o.7 62.5 54.7 25.3 60.7
1951 (15-19) 81.3 79.7 66.7 59.5 15.9 59.6
Males
1901 97.4 98.1 93.5 61.4
1911 97.3 98.1 94.1 56.8
1921 (12-19) 63.2 97.0 98.5 94.9 58.9 87.1
1931 (14-20; 84.7 97.2 97.9 94.3 47.9 90.5
1951 (15-19) 83.8 94.9 98.3 95.2 31.1 87.6
Females
1901 56.7 2 7 .2 2 1 . 1 13.4
1911 61.9 29.3 2 1 . 6 11.5
1921 (12-19) 48.4 62.4 28.4 2 0 . 1 1 0 .0 32.3
1931 (14-20) 70.5 65.1 30.9 19.6 8.2 34.2
1951 (15-19) 78.9 65.4 36.1 28.7 5.3 34.7
Married
Females
1901
1911 (15-19) 12.6 12 .1 9.9 9.3 4.9 9.6
1921 (15-19) 14.6 12.5 9.9 8.0 4.2 8.7
1931 (16-20) 18.7 18.5 11.7 7.7 2.9 10.0
1951 (16-20) 38.1 36.5 25.1 19.0 2.7 21.7
Source: Table 10 9
British Labour Statistics - Historical Abstract 
iM6- i9dó.
Table 7&
Net Migration to the United Kingdom
1924 - 91,000
1925 - 84,000
1926 - 116,000
192? am 98,000
1928 - 78,000
1929 - 87,000
1930 - 26,000
1931 + 37,000
1932 + 49,000
1933 + 33,000
1934 + 21,000
1935 + 16,000
Source: B.R. Mitchell and P. Deane
Abstract of British Historical 
Statistics Cambridge 1962•
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
Table 8a
19 2 0
Manufacturing
3 1 . 6
Mining Construction 
Quarry
113.3 30.2
Electricity
Gas
Water
12.3
Cutout
G.D.P.
59
oer man vear
Industrial
Product
4l
1 9 2 1 24.6 8 1 .2 41.7 11.3 59 4l
19 2 2 28.7 12 0 .8 34.5 1 1 . 6 63 46
1923 30.7 134.6 2 8 .8 1 2 . 5 63 46
1924- 33.7 1 3 1 . 8 45.5 1 3 . 6 66 . 51
1925 34.8 1 2 1 . 6 5 8 .2 14.3 68 53
19 2 6 33.7 67.4 6 7 .6 14.9 67 53
1927 37.0 126.4 74.4 15.9 69 56
19^8 37.2 1 2 0 .2 59.9 1 6 .8 69 55
1929 38.7 1 3 0 .6 64.8 17.8 69 57
1930 37.0 124.2 59.8 1 8 . 1 70 58
1931 34.5 111.9 56.5 1 8 .6 68 57
1932 34.7 IO60 2 53.3 19.1 68 58
1933 37.?- 106.4 61.9 2 0 .2 70 59
1934 4o.7 114.1 69.8 21.7 72 62
1935 ■ 44.6 115.4 71.5 23.7 73 65
1936 48.5 119.3 78.3 26.2 76 67
1937 51.2 1 2 5 .8 8 1 .6 28.3 74 68
1938 49.9 1 1 9 .6 78.3 2 9 .4 74 67
Source:
\
The British Economy - Key Statistics 1900-1970 Table c.
Table 9a
GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAFITAL FORMATION
Fuel
Pov/er
Water
Transport
and
Communication
Public
Services
Dwellings Manufac­
turing
£M at 1963 prices
Distribution
Financing
H<j r it ««.'+ M  ^  t
Total
Public
Sector
# Total
1920 98 337 51 155 315 190 21*+ ' 1,152
1921 127 291 65 313 337 158 393 1,289
1922 152 3*+9 91 280 2*+2 105 373 1,217
1923 17*+ 291 106 255 215 161 299 1,205
192*+ 190 355 117 36*+ 215 167 3*+2 1,*+17
1925 213 39^ 135 *+55 300 155 *+*+3 1,630
1926 190 236 132 573 257 13*+ 505 1,512
1927 215 355 136 625 268 1*+1 5*+8 1,732
1928 1 S6 *+50 136 *+89 289 201 *+8l 1,759
1929 2*+*t 378 165 555 275 202 *+78 1,815
1930 269 316 20*+ 518 259 222' 528 1,785
1931 292 2*+2 ■ 2 3k . 5^3 219 219 56*+ l,7*+3
1932 266 l*+5 168 5*+7 215 158 *+58 l,*+93
1933 2*+8 68 139 71*+ 208 150 396 ' 1,512
193*+ 258 178 150 802 - 31*+ 190 *+31 1,876
1935 276 236 165 76*+ 307 223 *+93 1,959
1936 296 363 20*+ 760 356 20*+ 583 2,172
1937 268 361 253 710 *+37 19*+' 68*+ 2,213
1938 283 *+02 274 701 393 2*+3 735 2,289
Source: The British Economy Key Statistics 1900-1970, Table J
Table 10a
Government Accounts
• IncomeTax
Total
Receipts
National Insurance 
Benefits
Total
Expenditure
£m
Balance 
of Budget
1926 308 812 80 820 - 8
1927 296 8*fl 73 789 + 52
1928 286 857 88 8 0k + 53
1929 295 8 6k 98 838 • + 26 •
1930 303 872 130 882 - 1 0
1931 328 8 7k 15^ 906 ' - 32
1932 352 912 125 ’ 886 + 26
Source: 1'einstein (1972) op. cit.
1920
1921
1922 
192j>
1924
1925 
192b 
1927 
192Ö
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937 
193Ö
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
19271928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
Source :
478
Table 11a
COST OF LIVING INDEX
g>
'l
All items Food Rent Clothing
‘249 256 121 4l6
226 230 148 303
183 176 153 238
174 I69 148 222
175 I70 147 225
176 171 147 229
172 164 149 221
16? 160 151 2l4
166 157 152 219
164 154 153 21b
158 145 154 211
147 131 154 196
144 126 156 189
l4u 120 156 184
l4l 122 157 186
143 125 159 187
147 130 159 189
154 139 160 202
156 l40 162 209
PRICES
Retail Wholesale Capital goods
52
47
38
37
37
37
36
35
35
35
33
31
30
30
30
30
31
32
33
7950
41
41
43
4l
38
36
36
35
30
27
26
26
27
27
29 
33
30
h2
36
32
28
26
26
26
24
24
24
24
23
23
23
22
23
23
26
26,
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Table 12a 
Wages and Profita
A B C D E F
Indices Indices Indices Average Profits Profits'
Weekly Weekly Hourly Weekly U.K. Public
Hours wage Bates Earnings Companies Corporations
Bates £. £M £M
1920 106,9 53.6 53.1 4.69 520 231921 106.9 53.0 41.2 4.64 267 251922 107.3 38.8 33.9 4.22 442 381923 107.3 55.9 33.5 4.23 4?8 4o1924 107.5 37.0 34.4 4.11 .475 381925 lo7.3 37.3 34.6 4.u9 450 391926 108.6 37.1 34.3 4.08 404 381927 108.6 36.8 33.7 4.06 461 471928 108.6 36.3 33.4 4.05 475 511929 lo8.o 56.2 33.4 4.o4 499 511930 108.1 56.o 33.2 4.03 472 531931 1o8.3 35.5 32.4 3.97 420 551932 108.3 34.8 31.9 3.90 373 571933 108.3 34.4 31.8 3.90 428 611934 1u8.2 34.5 32.0 3.93 499 641935 108.2 34.9 32.5 3.97 576 651936 lo8 .1 35.7 33.4 4.01 656 661937 108.0 37.0 34.9 4.o4 738 681930 lo7.7 38.1 35.4 4.o8 690 69
A = All manual workers all industries and services Jan 1956=100
Table 20 B ritish  .Labour S ta tistics  (.Average and June) ot>. c i t .  
B a A ll  manual workers a ll  industries and services Jan 1956=153 
Table 13 June British  Labour Statistics on. c i t .
C »  A ll  manual workers a ll  industries and services Jan 1956=100 
Table 27 Dec. British  Labour Statistics op. c i t .
D a Average weekly earnings male salaried employees» The British  
Economy Key sta tistics  iyoO-1970. Table E op, c i t ,
E a Gross Trading Profits -  Companies -  (U.K. operations) -  The 
B ritis h  Economy Key S tatistics Table G ,op. c i t .
F a Gross Trading Profits -  Public corporations and enterprises -  
The B ritish  economy Key S ta tistics  Table G. op. c i t .
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